Scientific faith?

[Ragna]

Some days ago I claimed that critical thinking is usually foregone by religion among other things when discussing what atheism is and what atheism is not, and by these claims I got said that me, like many non-theists in the forum, usually engage in hate-speech against Christianity (most likely any religion).

I came across several striking claims about atheism, and not the most impressive of them was:

...the absence of evidence, usually called faith...

This is just another example of ignorant slander. You know nothing of which you speak, nor do you wish to know, since actual knowledge would jeopardize your own faith in scientism.

1. Is it ignorant to claim that faith is belief in the absence of evidence? What is faith then?

2. Does science involve some sort of religious-like faith that actual knowledge can jeopardize? What kind of actual knowledge, and obtained through which methods?

[Ragna]

Also, as a clarification for evidence, I think Otseng did a good job here:

http://debatingchristianity.com/forum/v ... 102#373102

[nygreenguy]

I'm still confused. Does the word "faith" in the OP refer to a set of religious convictions, or the cognitive act of credulous belief? If the latter, then nothing of significance has been said: the word has merely been defined. If the former, than it is false so long as a person has evidence for their religious beliefs.

You later posted a definition showing that "evidence" is something which determines the truth. However, as I showed, evidence can be used to come to a false conclusion. So while it may appear to be evidence for a particular belief, it could be incorrect. This means it requires further examination.

I would speculate that "faith" would be used to fill in the missing evidence. I dont really think faith is the absence of all evidence. In fact, if people believe in the absence of ALL evidence, I think THAT would be (sort of) evidence for god, and not religion being a social construct. We are influenced by our family, friends and community from birth. All this add to "evidence" for our beliefs. Im not saying its credible or valid, but it does count as something. I think the "leap" is accomplished through faith.

[Ragna]

I'm still confused. Does the word "faith" in the OP refer to a set of religious convictions, or the cognitive act of credulous belief? If the latter, then nothing of significance has been said: the word has merely been defined. If the former, than it is false so long as a person has evidence for their religious beliefs.

You later posted a definition showing that "evidence" is something which determines the truth. However, as I showed, evidence can be used to come to a false conclusion. So while it may appear to be evidence for a particular belief, it could be incorrect. This means it requires further examination.

I would speculate that "faith" would be used to fill in the missing evidence. I dont really think faith is the absence of all evidence. In fact, if people believe in the absence of ALL evidence, I think THAT would be (sort of) evidence for god, and not religion being a social construct. We are influenced by our family, friends and community from birth. All this add to "evidence" for our beliefs. Im not saying its credible or valid, but it does count as something. I think the "leap" is accomplished through faith.

That's correct, but I don't think calling religion's bases "evidence" is correct. Maybe a special category should be made for "evidence for God", but it wouldn't be accepted by a critical mind as true evidence. There's no evidence for God in the same way there is no evidence against God.

However, none has denied that religion has a basis (because it does), just the nature of the basis is being argued.

[nygreenguy]

That's correct, but I don't think calling religion's bases "evidence" is correct. Maybe a special category should be made for "evidence for God", but it wouldn't be accepted by a critical mind as true evidence. There's no evidence for God in the same way there is no evidence against God.

I was going by the definition his source used to define "evidence". The definition said that evidence is only evidence if it is used for a statement that is true.

Well, the "evidences" are most often explained quite well by human behavior and how our mind work, invalidating it as evidence for "god"

[Adamoriens]

I'm still confused. Does the word "faith" in the OP refer to a set of religious convictions, or the cognitive act of credulous belief? If the latter, then nothing of significance has been said: the word has merely been defined. If the former, than it is false so long as a person has evidence for their religious beliefs.

The word faith in the OP refers to the definition which was given. It applies for many religious convictions, but it doesn't normally apply to the cognitive act.

Though I might have faith that the world is real (in a certain sense we all do), this is not significant because the words evidence and even knowledge already rest upon these necessary metaphysical assumptions, we don't need to go further. As I pointed out, theistic claims are not to be equated with claims of the sort: "Senses reflect the real world", "I can trust what I hear is real", "Time exists", "My memory is real"...

Fair enough. I`m not convinced by the sort of move Reformed Epistemology makes in this way either.

It's, as well, different to trust somebody for something in a given moment (e.g.: I "know" my sister has my keys because she told me) than to claim deep knowledge of existence on this basis as a norm (e.g.: I know that in the afterlife we'll all be judged). It depends as well on the kind of authority.

I think you`re referring to epistemic stakes here, so I would agree. However, as I`ve been saying, this is only a difference of degree, not of category, so it still seems cogent to imagine even religious faith as induction.

And induction is an extrapolation of the evidence, but there is a limit for induction. We can discuss this as well. It depends on the quantity, quality and range of the extrapolation. But many extrapolations are not claims of knowledge. The thing is that many religions claim knowledge through bases even weaker than the biggest-extrapolating induction.

Agreed on all counts. This is a theist`s fight, not mine.

Also, as a clarification for evidence, I think Otseng did a good job here:

http://debatingchristianity.com/forum/v ... 102#373102

Thanks, I haven`t seen this post. The definition I`ve been using is at the very top of his list.

I would speculate that "faith" would be used to fill in the missing evidence. I dont really think faith is the absence of all evidence. In fact, if people believe in the absence of ALL evidence, I think THAT would be (sort of) evidence for god, and not religion being a social construct. We are influenced by our family, friends and community from birth. All this add to "evidence" for our beliefs. Im not saying its credible or valid, but it does count as something. I think the "leap" is accomplished through faith.

It would be a bit odd, then, to say that there is some evidence for God, and nonetheless that religious faith is belief in the absence of evidence, as per the OP. Not that this is what you`re saying necessarily. Your usage of the word faith here differs from the OP, since Ragna has stated he is not referring to the cognitive act. Just wanted to point that out to avoid confusion.

That's correct, but I don't think calling religion's bases "evidence" is correct. Maybe a special category should be made for "evidence for God", but it wouldn't be accepted by a critical mind as true evidence. There's no evidence for God in the same way there is no evidence against God.

However, none has denied that religion has a basis (because it does), just the nature of the basis is being argued.

This is one reason I have difficulty accepting your definition in the OP. It`s not because I`m a theist (I`m not) or because I think there are religions more or as plausible than non-theism, but because such a definition rests on a huge body of controversy. I don`t doubt your ability to cogently argue that all religious beliefs are unwarranted by the evidence, but you certainly do not have the ability to persuade even a majority of theists that this is the case. It seems to me that, if a definition is authoritative only in that it maintains an agreed meaning, the one given in the OP is not authoritative. More later.

[Ragna]

I think you`re referring to epistemic stakes here, so I would agree. However, as I`ve been saying, this is only a difference of degree, not of category, so it still seems cogent to imagine even religious faith as induction.

This is a point of disagreement. I think there are two categories: valid induction and invalid induction. For rationalization of religious claims, I've only seen the second: watchmaker argument, the CA and its Kalam variety, designer argument, fine-tunning, etc. None of these claims meet the quantitative, qualitative or contextual criteria needed for a valid inductive reasoning.

Please provide an example of faith in a purely religious claim (the Resurrection of Jesus, the Assumption of Mary, the existence of God, an afterlife... etc) which meets the criteria for a valid induction like my belief that the Sun will rise tomorrow.

This is one reason I have difficulty accepting your definition in the OP. It`s not because I`m a theist (I`m not) or because I think there are religions more or as plausible than non-theism, but because such a definition rests on a huge body of controversy. I don`t doubt your ability to cogently argue that all religious beliefs are unwarranted by the evidence, but you certainly do not have the ability to persuade even a majority of theists that this is the case. It seems to me that, if a definition is authoritative only in that it maintains an agreed meaning, the one given in the OP is not authoritative. More later.

I don't directly need to persuade (since how persuasive is something is subjective and might not have to do with its validity - e.g. theory of relativity is not intuitively persuasive yet true), nor need I to be authoritative (I don't think just an author makes something valid, much less me). What I want is my definition to be intrinsically valid, and this enough should "persuade" critical minds.

If faith is not belief in the absence of evidence, with all the definitions provided, then faith must be something else. Provide an alternative definition or a counter-example denying mine. When something which normally requires "religious faith" (something only a certain group of "believers" believe) is supported by evidence, then religious faith stops being needed. Also, as I've pointed out, many things that apparently are "belief in the absence of evidence" are not actually so (induction, trust, metaphysical assumptions, ...) - but this is not the case for religious faith, which fits.

Also, as I've previously stated, people who believe in a claim have a basis. However, this basis can exist in the absence of evidence - for example, faith in the Assumption of Mary, one doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church.

[Adamoriens]

Hello Ragna.

I think you`re referring to epistemic stakes here, so I would agree. However, as I`ve been saying, this is only a difference of degree, not of category, so it still seems cogent to imagine even religious faith as induction.

This is a point of disagreement. I think there are two categories: valid induction and invalid induction. For rationalization of religious claims, I've only seen the second: watchmaker argument, the CA and its Kalam variety, designer argument, fine-tunning, etc. None of these claims meet the quantitative, qualitative or contextual criteria needed for a valid inductive reasoning.

Please provide an example of faith in a purely religious claim (the Resurrection of Jesus, the Assumption of Mary, the existence of God, an afterlife... etc) which meets the criteria for a valid induction like my belief that the Sun will rise tomorrow.

I'm a little confused, mainly because I didn't know that validity could even be a property of inductive arguments. As you are probably aware, logical validity refers to the entailment of a conclusion from the premises, such as in deduction. Unless I'm very much mistaken, there is no such property in inductive arguments, only the degree to which the premises support (rather than entail) the conclusion.

This is one reason I have difficulty accepting your definition in the OP. It`s not because I`m a theist (I`m not) or because I think there are religions more or as plausible than non-theism, but because such a definition rests on a huge body of controversy. I don`t doubt your ability to cogently argue that all religious beliefs are unwarranted by the evidence, but you certainly do not have the ability to persuade even a majority of theists that this is the case. It seems to me that, if a definition is authoritative only in that it maintains an agreed meaning, the one given in the OP is not authoritative. More later.

I don't directly need to persuade (since how persuasive is something is subjective and might not have to do with its validity - e.g. theory of relativity is not intuitively persuasive yet true), nor need I to be authoritative (I don't think just an author makes something valid, much less me). What I want is my definition to be intrinsically valid, and this enough should "persuade" critical minds.

Okay, I think I'm beginning to understand your purposes in offering your definition. I thought you were attempting to present a common-sense definition which would, on examination, be self-evident. If what you really intended was to argue that there are no sufficient inductive grounds to justify any religious beliefs, then I have no complaints. In fact, I would agree, with the caveat that I believe all religious beliefs are false as a matter of induction, since I haven't encountered all of them.

If faith is not belief in the absence of evidence, with all the definitions provided, then faith must be something else. Provide an alternative definition or a counter-example denying mine. When something which normally requires "religious faith" (something only a certain group of "believers" believe) is supported by evidence, then religious faith stops being needed. Also, as I've pointed out, many things that apparently are "belief in the absence of evidence" are not actually so (induction, trust, metaphysical assumptions, ...) - but this is not the case for religious faith, which fits.

At this point, I tentatively stand by my definition of faith as induction. I understand that religious beliefs are rife (or perhaps constituted entirely by) with informal fallacies and cognitive biases, as is all human thought. But I do not understand where the property of logical validity as understood from deduction is found, and how inductive arguments can be distinct from one another apart from the degree to which they support their conclusions.

[Ragna]

I'm a little confused, mainly because I didn't know that validity could even be a property of inductive arguments. As you are probably aware, logical validity refers to the entailment of a conclusion from the premises, such as in deduction. Unless I'm very much mistaken, there is no such property in inductive arguments, only the degree to which the premises support (rather than entail) the conclusion.

Of course there are invalid inductions, which already entails that they are not valid inductions, they are plain fallacious reasonings. Some kind of pseudo-logical argument with the form of an induction but with fallacious logic (a non sequitur). This is something any kind of logical reasoning is subject to, not specially or exclusively induction. I'll offer an example of what I consider a valid and an invalid induction:

1. Since all swans I've seen in my cities' ponds are white, all swans in my region are white.

2. Since all swans I've seen in my cities' ponds are white, all swans in the planet are white.

3. Since every molecule of H₂O isn't blue, water isn't blue.

The differences in quality and quantity make an induction (according to Wikipedia) "strong" and "weak" (1 vs 2). I admit this can't make it invalid. But an error in category (3) can hide a non sequitur as an induction - and this is where I put things like the watchmaker argument.

I have yet to see any "religious faith through induction", as you call it, which qualifies as a valid induction (or as a genuine induction, if you wish). I get the impression you have seen them, which are these? Faith in the Resurrection of Jesus follows a "weak" induction, a "strong" one maybe?

At this point, I tentatively stand by my definition of faith as induction. I understand that religious beliefs are rife (or perhaps constituted entirely by) with informal fallacies and cognitive biases, as is all human thought. But I do not understand where the property of logical validity as understood from deduction is found, and how inductive arguments can be distinct from one another apart from the degree to which they support their conclusions.

A child claims:

"Since all I know to have four vertices is a square, a tetrahedron is a square too."

Not even errors in category, or non sequuntur, (formal fallacies, not only informal) make an induction invalid in your view?

Please present some example of religious faith which you consider to be derived from induction, so we can analyze it.

[Adamoriens]

Of course there are invalid inductions, which already entails that they are not valid inductions, they are plain fallacious reasonings. Some kind of pseudo-logical argument with the form of an induction but with fallacious logic (a non sequitur). This is something any kind of logical reasoning is subject to, not specially or exclusively induction. I'll offer an example of what I consider a valid and an invalid induction:

1. Since all swans I've seen in my cities' ponds are white, all swans in my region are white.

2. Since all swans I've seen in my cities' ponds are white, all swans in the planet are white.

3. Since every molecule of H₂O isn't blue, water isn't blue.

The differences in quality and quantity make an induction (according to Wikipedia) "strong" and "weak" (1 vs 2). I admit this can't make it invalid. But an error in category (3) can hide a non sequitur as an induction - and this is where I put things like the watchmaker argument.

I have yet to see any "religious faith through induction", as you call it, which qualifies as a valid induction (or as a genuine induction, if you wish). I get the impression you have seen them, which are these? Faith in the Resurrection of Jesus follows a "weak" induction, a "strong" one maybe?

Hello Ragna. I've done a little reading, and have found one instance of the term "validity" being used to describe the strength of inductive process. But as you can see, it means something significantly different from deductive validity:

In inductively valid arguments, the (joint) truth of the premises is very likely (but not necessarily) sufficient for the truth of the conclusion. An inductively valid argument is such that, as it is often put, its premises make its conclusion more likely or more reasonable (even though the conclusion may well be untrue given the joint truth of the premises).

In all of the other definitions of logical validity I've seen, logical validity cannot be an evaluative criteria for all types of logical argument, since by common definition no inductive argument can be logically valid. So you can understand my confusion with your usage.

At this point, I tentatively stand by my definition of faith as induction. I understand that religious beliefs are rife (or perhaps constituted entirely by) with informal fallacies and cognitive biases, as is all human thought. But I do not understand where the property of logical validity as understood from deduction is found, and how inductive arguments can be distinct from one another apart from the degree to which they support their conclusions.

A child claims:

"Since all I know to have four vertices is a square, a tetrahedron is a square too."

Not even errors in category, or non sequuntur, (formal fallacies, not only informal) make an induction invalid in your view?

1. All squares have four vortices.
2. All tetrahedrons have four vortices.
3. All tetrahedrons are squares.

Properly construed, the argument you give as an example is deductive rather than inductive, so the presence of a formal fallacy is not troublesome. However, I concede that formal fallacies may occur in an inductive argument, but only as flaws in a deductive step. My understanding is that a formal fallacy can only be detected by examining an argument's relations rather than its content, and if the relations between the premises and the conclusion are not logically necessary, this is said to be invalid. Of course, only deductive arguments demand this sort of relation, so formal fallacies are most often found there. In short, you could call an inductive argument invalid if there were a flawed deductive step somewhere in it and be somewhat correct, but it would be imprecise.

Any simple inductive argument (ie. empty of deductive steps) by definition cannot have formal fallacies, since no one demands that that it follow with logical consequence. Otherwise it would be deductive.

Please present some example of religious faith which you consider to be derived from induction, so we can analyze it.

That will not be necessary, I think, since your purpose would be to show that such an example is inductively weak. But nowhere have I claimed that religious beliefs are formed on the basis of strong induction, merely that all religious beliefs can be construed as inductions of some sort. And, if my understanding is correct, an inductive argument (such as that underpinning a religious belief) remains an inductive argument, no matter how perforated with fallacies etc.

[Ragna]

An induction can't be valid? Generalization is a type of induction, and I can imagine some valid generalizations:

1. I have DNA.
2. You have DNA.
3. Therefore, any person has DNA.

Though wikipedia says this:

The term validity in logic (also logical validity) is largely synonymous with logical truth. However, the term is used in different contexts. Validity is a property of formulae, statements and arguments. A logically valid argument is one where the conclusion follows from the premises.

I can understand where you're coming from because the conclusion doesn't directly "follow", but even if logical validity doesn't apply, there must be a distinction between the condition of the argument applying an induction and it applying a fallacy.

Also, that an induction is valid doesn't necessarily make it sound; but this doesn't need to mean it's always valid. If it's not valid, it can't in any case be sound.

1. All squares have four vortices.
2. All tetrahedrons have four vortices.
3. All tetrahedrons are squares.

Properly construed, the argument you give as an example is deductive rather than inductive, so the presence of a formal fallacy is not troublesome. However, I concede that formal fallacies may occur in an inductive argument, but only as flaws in a deductive step. My understanding is that a formal fallacy can only be detected by examining an argument's relations rather than its content, and if the relations between the premises and the conclusion are not logically necessary, this is said to be invalid. Of course, only deductive arguments demand this sort of relation, so formal fallacies are most often found there. In short, you could call an inductive argument invalid if there were a flawed deductive step somewhere in it and be somewhat correct, but it would be imprecise.

You have changed my example, since the child didn't even know what a tetrahedron is, so he/she can much less have a definition for it. The induction (from particular to general) was devised with the underlying logic that:

1) The child knows that squares have four vertices.

2) The child only knows squares to have this characteristic.

Therefore, in the sight of an unknown shape (a tetrahedron), he mistakenly generalized (generalization is a type of induction) a (deficient) definition of square to cover the tetrahedron, and herein lies the categorical fallacy which renders his logic invalid and therefore his conclusion false.

Induction and deduction, as far as I know, are kinds of reasonings for arguments, not kinds of structures for arguments, so I don't know how correct is it to apply a valid/sound difference here. I'm not any expert in logic, though, and might very well be wrong.

But as far as I understand "validity" deals with how logically the conclusion of an argument is derived from its premises, while "soundness" deals with the truth value of the conclusion. If an argument which attempts to apply an inductive reasoning fails to do so making a formal or informal fallacy, then the inductive reasoning is not so and the conclusion is derived invalidly (for applying an invalid reasoning), making the argument, as well, unsound.

Any simple inductive argument (ie. empty of deductive steps) by definition cannot have formal fallacies, since no one demands that that it follow with logical consequence. Otherwise it would be deductive.

I don't follow you here. An inductive reasoning has to derive something general from something particular; if it fails to do this appropriately, isn't it invalid logic? What we demand from an induction is it to derive something general from something particular, but these both "something"s have to be meaningful and equally true. E.g.:

1. I have two parents.
2. You have two parents.
3. Therefore, a rock has two parents.

Is this a valid induction through generalization? Since both premises are true, and the conclusion is false, it must be invalid. We have attempted to infer the status of a rock through the statuses of two people, but rocks are not people, and herein lies the categorical fallacy which makes the reasoning invalid.

That will not be necessary, I think, since your purpose would be to show that such an example is inductively weak. But nowhere have I claimed that religious beliefs are formed on the basis of strong induction, merely that all religious beliefs can be construed as inductions of some sort.

You're missing my point. I'm arguing altogether that I haven't seen any argument for faith through induction which properly resembled any weak or strong induction I can accept, that's why I ask you to provide one. I've only seen errors in category like the one I put above, and there's a huge gap between these three types. If you present an argument that resembles a weak induction, I'll have to change my statement that "faith is not based in a valid induction" (weak induction is, for example: "my hair is black therefore the hair of all people is black"). Do something close to this, for example, for any doctrine.

And, if my understanding is correct, an inductive argument (such as that underpinning a religious belief) remains an inductive argument, no matter how perforated with fallacies etc.

Please name one of these which underpines a religious belief.

Of course it will remain being an induction, but an invalid (fallacious? fake?) one. That is, something that attempts to apply an inductive reasoning but fails to do so appropriately, like my example in the half of the post.