Atheism - The Default Position

[theleftone]

It is often claimed by some atheists that atheism is the default position for human beings to take. With all the reasoning I can muster, I have attempted to solve this riddle over the past five years of my life. I have done so to no avail. So, I am curious if anyone here can help me solve this riddle. For debate...

Is atheism the default position? If so, why? If not, why?

[Cephus]

Maybe it's just my agnostic thinking, but I can't understand how either side can claim to have a credible argument. How can an atheist claim to have insight into an area that he just argued the Jew or Christian COULDN'T have?? Almost seems hypocritical.

Who is claiming to have insight into an area that a Jew or Christian couldn't have? I have no evidence that god(s) do not exist any more than I have evidence that unicorns don't exist. I'm an atheist in the same manner that I'm an a-unicornist, I see no reason to believe either exist, hence I don't.

That's the sum total of atheism, some people just want to make it more difficult than it is, mostly to fuel their absurd philosophies.

[harvey1]

No, In neither case am I claiming knowledge purely because I am claiming that the physical reality is unknowable... how could one justify adding an entity to the world that we cannot know to exist (such as quarks, gluons, black holes etc.)? The reason I can justify this is because empirical evidence...

But, you claim that quarks exist as knowledge, right? We evolved from earlier biological ancestors is knowledge, right? If it's justified in saying something happened, then that makes it knowledge, wouldn't you agree?

This brings me back to my comment that atheism is not proveable. One cannot provide evidence that a non-corporeal entity does not exist.

...how could one justify adding an entity to the world that we cannot know to exist (such as quarks, gluons, black holes etc.)? The reason I can justify this is because empirical evidence, be it either mathematical or experimental, can be used to test the postulation and provide this justification. This is neither true for God nor for the Matrix.

So, from these two quotes I gather that if something isn't justified empirically (either mathematically or experimentally), then one is not justified in saying it exists. However, that still doesn't answer how you justify weak atheism over agnosticism. Agnostics also say that we don't have empirical support for a position, and that's why we should take an agnostic stance on the subject. What causes you to slip into weak atheism on a topic instead of taking the agnostic stance on the topic?

Yes, and that suggests to me that you are justifying agnosticism since whoever makes a statement (either theistic or atheistic) must do so by first showing evidence that shows why an agnostic stance is not the correct one (since you seem here to suggest that it is a default position).

I flatly dispute this reasoning. Again I turn to the analogy of mythology, you could tell me that dragons live in China. Prior to having an understanding of what the nature of a dragon is I am without the ability to confirm or deny this. However after presented with the information as to what a dragon is I may make the statement that I do not believe that you are correct.

Okay. I'm just trying to understand on what basis do you remain an "agnostic" on an issue, and on what basis do you slip into "weak atheism" on the same issue. Do I understand you correctly that you are "agnostic" on Chinese dragons until you know more about them, and then you are a "weak atheist" after hearing more about them? In that case, is it possible you could remain "agnostic" on a theoretical entity even after hearing more about them (e.g., strings from string theory)? What would be the empirical criteria that you would use to decide to remain "agnostic" after hearing more empirical data, and what would cause you to say, "hmm... that just doesn't cut it for me, I think this idea is just wrong altogether"?

I would, however, describe myself as negative (or weak) atheist because I do not believe in a higher power (spiritual entity nor pantheistic unity) not because I have or could ever discover proof of the non-existence of such divinity but because without proof I see no need to believe in it/them.

Although I do hold with the view that a belief in god is unknowable (strong-agnosticism) it is on this basis that I can reject the idea of a creator because I do not feel it necessary to add one to the argument (Occam's Razor again).

So, if I understand you correctly, you are saying that you agree with the strong agnostic that ontology is not falsifiable and not verifiable. However, you disagree with the strong agnostic in that we can justify belief in an ontology (e.g., quarks, gluons, black holes etc.) on an empirical basis alone. Is that correct? If so, then wouldn't this statement need to be corrected:

I would, however, describe myself as negative (or weak) atheist because... without proof I see no need to believe in it/them

Since you agree that ontology cannot be proved, it seems you should say:

I would, however, describe myself as negative (or weak) atheist because... without [empirical justificaton] I see no need to believe in it/them

Is that right?

[OccamsRazor]

So, from these two quotes I gather that if something isn't justified empirically (either mathematically or experimentally), then one is not justified in saying it exists. However, that still doesn't answer how you justify weak atheism over agnosticism. Agnostics also say that we don't have empirical support for a position, and that's why we should take an agnostic stance on the subject

I understand your point. My assertion is rather that the question theism becomes nonsensical because you do not need to add a creator to explain that natural world. I simply cannot suggest that I must sit on the fence. The problem is that as I said before I think that the line between agnosticism and weak-atheism is a very fine one as both suggest that strong-atheism and theism are logically flawed positions. I found a great quote which would apply here:

I don't KNOW that there is no God, but if I had to bet $100 on the answer, I would bet there is no God!

I have seen the comment that "agnosticism is skepticism capitulating to ignorance".

In that case, is it possible you could remain "agnostic" on a theoretical entity even after hearing more about them

Absolutely! I can think of no better example than your own. There is some mathematical evidence pointing toward string-theory but not enough to prove it. In this case I remain agnostic regarding string-theory until it can be either proven or disproven. This is however different from a metaphysical entity which cannot be disproven.

[OccamsRazor]

Since you agree that ontology cannot be proved, it seems you should say:

I would, however, describe myself as negative (or weak) atheist because... without [empirical justificaton] I see no need to believe in it/them

Is that right?[/quote]

That would be correct.

[harvey1]

My assertion is rather that the question theism becomes nonsensical because you do not need to add a creator to explain that natural world. I simply cannot suggest that I must sit on the fence. The problem is that as I said before I think that the line between agnosticism and weak-atheism is a very fine one as both suggest that strong-atheism and theism are logically flawed positions... I have seen the comment that "agnosticism is skepticism capitulating to ignorance".

But, what explanations do you accept of the natural world if you don't accept God explanations? I know you accept only "natural ones" but that only begs the question since a natural explanation is one that explains the natural world naturally. What do you mean by naturally?

In that case, is it possible you could remain "agnostic" on a theoretical entity even after hearing more about them

Absolutely! I can think of no better example than your own. There is some mathematical evidence pointing toward string-theory but not enough to prove it. In this case I remain agnostic regarding string-theory until it can be either proven or disproven. This is however different from a metaphysical entity which cannot be disproven.

But, wait a second. The existence of anything is an ontological (metaphysical) issue, right? That is, there is always a possibility of doubt on the existence of anything due to the fallible nature of theories. So, what is the difference between this form of a metaphysical curtain from that of a God belief? Also, I thought you were a weak atheist which means that you think a God belief could be justified (which is why you are not either a strong atheist or strong agnostic). So, that response seems inconsistent to me since you're saying unobservable strings might have kickable qualities justifying our belief in their existence, but saying that a God belief cannot have such kickable qualities (i.e., "cannot be disproven"). Is your view that, for example, you could become a pantheist like myself if enough evidence came forward? What would kind of evidence would that be? (Note: I'm not asking for supernatural events since I specifically am mentioning a belief in a pantheist God.)

Btw, why is a mathematically consistent theory justification for holding an "agnostic" stance with regard to strings versus a "weak atheist" stance?

[OccamsRazor]

I know you accept only "natural ones" but that only begs the question since a natural explanation is one that explains the natural world naturally. What do you mean by naturally?

Sorry I do not wish to use the term "natural world". When I say "natural world", I really mean "nature of existence". I do not really like the use of the term "natural" because it carries too many connotations.

The existence of anything is an ontological (metaphysical) issue, right? That is, there is always a possibility of doubt on the existence of anything due to the fallible nature of theories. So, what is the difference between this form of a metaphysical curtain from that of a God belief?

There is always the possibility of casting doubt on any theory, absolutely. The issue with a God belief is that such a belief has no positive evidence. String theory in contrast has some positive mathematical evidence.
A good example here is Newtonian mechanics. You could justify a belief that Newtonian mechanics presented an accurate description of all dynamics and statics. However once GR and Quantum Mechanics are presented to disprove this you are then justified in rejecting your previously held belief.

So, that response seems inconsistent to me since you're saying unobservable strings might have kickable qualities justifying our belief in their existence, but saying that a God belief cannot have such kickable qualities (i.e., "cannot be disproven").

Again the implication of this is that because there can be no disproveable qualities inherent in a God belief then this comprises justification for holding this belief. This is equivalent to believing in something because you can't see a reason not to and thus opens the door to any non-disproveable mythology.

Is your view that, for example, you could become a pantheist like myself if enough evidence came forward?

Yes I would but as you state

What would kind of evidence would that be? (Note: I'm not asking for supernatural events since I specifically am mentioning a belief in a pantheist God.)

I cannot think of any evidence or experiment to prove such a thing.

Btw, why is a mathematically consistent theory justification for holding an "agnostic" stance with regard to strings versus a "weak atheist" stance?

The point with strings is that they are mathematically consistent with previously demonstrated experimental results. However this is not enough to justify its validity because many forms of string theory propose phenomena which have yet to be proven (or disproven) experimentally.

The main point is that I can take an agnostic view of something which can be empirically either proven or disproven but may take a weak-atheist view of something for which no evidential proof can ever be given such as a spiritual entity.

btw - What are you attempting to ascertain? Do you think that I am unjustified in making a value judgement as to the existence of God or do you think that my logic is self-defeating?

[harvey1]

Sorry I do not wish to use the term "natural world". When I say "natural world", I really mean "nature of existence". I do not really like the use of the term "natural" because it carries too many connotations.

That's fine, but that then leaves the question open as to what kind of explanation that you seek which satisfies your criteria of "empirical justification." Someone could produce many kinds of explanations (including supernatural ones) that successfully predict observables. If you aren't committed to the term "natural explanation," then what kind of explanations are you committed to that rules out God explanations?

The issue with a God belief is that such a belief has no positive evidence. String theory in contrast has some positive mathematical evidence.

Sure, there's positive evidence. For example, theists predicted way back into antiquity that the world is designed by God, and Paley even made the watchmaker argument which observed (and predicted) the universe is a fine-tuned machine that couldn't be explained by non-intelligent mechanical processes. Cosmologists have found such fine-tuning abundant in the physical constants that make a universe, galaxies, stars, planets, life, etc., even possible. There's positive evidence that was predicted by theists. Why rule out the God explanation given that it made a prediction that those same theists couldn't possibly have known in the 17th and 18th century? What is it about this prediction which rules out agnosticism?

A good example here is Newtonian mechanics. You could justify a belief that Newtonian mechanics presented an accurate description of all dynamics and statics. However once GR and Quantum Mechanics are presented to disprove this you are then justified in rejecting your previously held belief.

That seems to suggest that if a new theory of science shows that there are multiple "dud" universes and those universes are confirmed to exist in the way that the theory predicts, then one is justified in saying that the God explanation for the unique physical constant values is no longer a justified explanation. However, that's not the case right now. There is no such theory, and there may never be such a theory. So, why not hold to an agnostic stance for a God explanation?

Atheism (at least weak atheism) suggests that the burden of proof lies with the theist position. This implies that the atheist is not necessarily asserting that there is no God but is rather suggesting that until logical or empirical evidence can be shown to the contrary then they do not believe in God. I make this point because atheists are merely saying that they actively do not believe until there is a very good reason for the contrary position.

issue with a God belief is that such a belief has no positive evidence... Again the implication of this is that because there can be no disproveable qualities inherent in a God belief then this comprises justification for holding this belief...

These two quotes are hard for me to reconcile with the other things you have said. In the first quote you argue that the burden of proof lies with the theist until they can logical or empirical evidence, which suggests to me that theists could produce such evidence. But I'm assuming from the second quote that in fact theists could never provide logical or empirical evidence (i.e., "[it] has no positive evidence"), and worse, the evidence that is provided cannot be shown not to be invalid logical or empirical evidence. (Btw, I'm assuming here proveable means there is sufficient logical and empirical evidence to justify belief, and therefore "disprovable" means that this logical and empirical evidence cannot ever be shown not to justify a belief. Correct me if I'm wrong.)

However, if this is the case, then it would seem you ought to be agnostic since there's this supposed logical/empirical evidence that theists claim justifies a God belief, but which Iclaim does not meet the sufficient requirements of a positive belief and cannot be falsified.

Is your view that, for example, you could become a pantheist like myself if enough evidence came forward?

Yes I would but as you state

What would kind of evidence would that be? (Note: I'm not asking for supernatural events since I specifically am mentioning a belief in a pantheist God.)

I cannot think of any evidence or experiment to prove such a thing.

Btw, why is a mathematically consistent theory justification for holding an "agnostic" stance with regard to strings versus a "weak atheist" stance?

The point with strings is that they are mathematically consistent with previously demonstrated experimental results. However this is not enough to justify its validity because many forms of string theory propose phenomena which have yet to be proven (or disproven) experimentally.

The main point is that I can take an agnostic view of something which can be empirically either proven or disproven but may take a weak-atheist view of something for which no evidential proof can ever be given such as a spiritual entity.

btw - What are you attempting to ascertain? Do you think that I am unjustified in making a value judgement as to the existence of God or do you think that my logic is self-defeating?[/quote]

[harvey1]

Sorry I do not wish to use the term "natural world". When I say "natural world", I really mean "nature of existence". I do not really like the use of the term "natural" because it carries too many connotations.

That's fine, but that then leaves the question open as to what kind of explanation that you seek which satisfies your criteria of "empirical justification." Someone could produce many kinds of explanations (including supernatural ones) that successfully predict observables. If you aren't committed to the term "natural explanation," then what kind of explanations are you committed to that rules out God explanations?

The issue with a God belief is that such a belief has no positive evidence. String theory in contrast has some positive mathematical evidence.

Sure, there's positive evidence. For example, theists predicted way back into antiquity that the world is designed by God, and Paley even made the watchmaker argument which observed (and predicted) the universe is a fine-tuned machine that couldn't be explained by non-intelligent mechanical processes. Cosmologists have found such fine-tuning abundant in the physical constants that make a universe, galaxies, stars, planets, life, etc., even possible. There's positive evidence that was predicted by theists. Why rule out the God explanation given that it made a prediction that those same theists couldn't possibly have known in the 17th and 18th century? What is it about this prediction which rules out agnosticism?

A good example here is Newtonian mechanics. You could justify a belief that Newtonian mechanics presented an accurate description of all dynamics and statics. However once GR and Quantum Mechanics are presented to disprove this you are then justified in rejecting your previously held belief.

That seems to suggest that if a new theory of science shows that there are multiple "dud" universes and those universes are confirmed to exist in the way that the theory predicts, then one is justified in saying that the God explanation for the unique physical constant values is no longer a justified explanation. However, that's not the case right now. There is no such theory, and there may never be such a theory. So, why not hold to an agnostic stance for a God explanation?

Atheism (at least weak atheism) suggests that the burden of proof lies with the theist position. This implies that the atheist is not necessarily asserting that there is no God but is rather suggesting that until logical or empirical evidence can be shown to the contrary then they do not believe in God. I make this point because atheists are merely saying that they actively do not believe until there is a very good reason for the contrary position.

issue with a God belief is that such a belief has no positive evidence... Again the implication of this is that because there can be no disproveable qualities inherent in a God belief then this comprises justification for holding this belief...

These two quotes are hard for me to reconcile with the other things you have said. In the first quote you argue that the burden of proof lies with the theist until they can provide logical or empirical evidence in support of their belief, which suggests to me that theists could produce such evidence. But I'm assuming from the second quote that in fact theists could never provide logical or empirical evidence (i.e., "[it] has no positive evidence"), and worse, the evidence that is provided cannot be shown not to be invalid logical or empirical evidence. (Btw, I'm assuming here proveable means there is sufficient logical and empirical evidence to justify belief, and therefore "disprovable" means that this logical and empirical evidence cannot ever be shown not to justify a belief. Correct me if I'm wrong.)

However, if this is the case, then it would seem you ought to be agnostic since there's this supposed logical/empirical evidence that theists claim justifies a God belief, but which I understand you to claim does not meet the sufficient requirements of a positive belief and, even worse, the theist claim can never be falsified. (Yet, you hold that one is justified in saying that theism is falsified by not having this logical or empirical evidence... )

Agnosticism is the view that if presented with evidence that shows support for a positive position, and that evidence is not sufficient to cause belief, then one is justified (or even must) in holding an agnostic belief. However, you seem to say that the positive evidence for theism does not exist, despite the claims that it does, and the kind of belief even forbids that there could exist such evidence. Therefore, we are justified in denying the proposition without evidence. But, on what basis are we justified in denying a proposition of existence when you agree that all ontological claims have this problem? You would have to reject the existence of everything!

btw - What are you attempting to ascertain? Do you think that I am unjustified in making a value judgement as to the existence of God or do you think that my logic is self-defeating?

At this stage I'm just trying to understand better why you are not an agnostic given your position that all ontological beliefs (e.g., scientific realism) are without proof. It seems odd that you would deny God's existence because God is an ontological belief, but accept other ontic views of the world (or at least hold an "agnostic" stance on them).

[OccamsRazor]

If you aren't committed to the term "natural explanation," then what kind of explanations are you committed to that rules out God explanations?

You seem to misunderstand I do not feel the need to find an explanation to rule out God. To justify a belief in God my explanations of reality must be unable to do without God.

Paley even made the watchmaker argument which observed (and predicted) the universe is a fine-tuned machine that couldn't be explained by non-intelligent mechanical processes. Cosmologists have found such fine-tuning abundant in the physical constants that make a universe, galaxies, stars, planets, life, etc., even possible. There's positive evidence that was predicted by theists. Why rule out the God explanation given that it made a prediction that those same theists couldn't possibly have known in the 17th and 18th century?

I'm sure that are not seriously suggesting Paley's watchmaker as an argument.
You are talking here in generalities. When I say that a theory must predict as yet unproven phenomena you cannot quote "complexity" as a predicted phenomenon. An example is to prove GR required a very specific bending of light in the 1919 total eclipse of the sun.

That seems to suggest that if a new theory of science shows that there are multiple "dud" universes and those universes are confirmed to exist in the way that the theory predicts, then one is justified in saying that the God explanation for the unique physical constant values is no longer a justified explanation. However, that's not the case right now. There is no such theory, and there may never be such a theory. So, why not hold to an agnostic stance for a God explanation?

I'm sorry harvey but it simply implies nothing of the sort. In my example Newtonian mechanics provided very accurate results on the motion of objects. The notion of God provides no specific explanation of anything. Unlike Newtonian mechanics I cannot devise an experiment to show that God is a viable current position until proven otherwise.

...which suggests to me that theists could produce such evidence... I'm assuming from the second quote that in fact theists could never provide logical or empirical evidence (i.e., "[it] has no positive evidence")

My point is largely rhetorical. I am saying that a theist must provide me with evidence for the existence of God for me to believe in it whereas I believe that no such evidence could be provided (or I have yet to see it).

However, if this is the case, then it would seem you ought to be agnostic since there's this supposed logical/empirical evidence that theists claim justifies a God belief, but which I understand you to claim does not meet the sufficient requirements of a positive belief and, even worse, the theist claim can never be falsified. (Yet, you hold that one is justified in saying that theism is falsified by not having this logical or empirical evidence...)

I'm sorry but I do not understand this. I have never suggested that theists claim justified logical/empirical evidence, on the contrary I suggest that they cannot claim justified logical/empirical evidence.

Therefore, we are justified in denying the proposition without evidence. But, on what basis are we justified in denying a proposition of existence when you agree that all ontological claims have this problem? You would have to reject the existence of everything!...given your position that all ontological beliefs (e.g., scientific realism) are without proof.

This statement really confuses me. When did I put scientific realism into metaphysics (or ontology)?

I must admit that I beginning to feel exasperated by this argument. We are going in circles.

We should proably cut down the argument to the core issue. I feel as if we are both extending the discussion by refuting specific pieces of text from one another's posts.

As I understand it the core issue is this:
You say that my beliefs should be agnostic because while I say I can remain agnostic about, yet to be proven, scientific ontologies you assert that I am making a special case in taking a value judgement about God which is not justified. - Is this your position?

Another point is, where do you draw the line between strong-agnosticism and weak-atheism? or is it rather that you believe weak-atheism to be a terminological impossibility?

[harvey1]

I do not feel the need to find an explanation to rule out God.

This could be taken in two ways. The first way is that ontologically speaking, you are not trying to rule out God as existing. That's fine. I understand that. The second way is epistemically speaking. That is, there's a proposition G, and you either a) accept G, are b) agnostic about G, are c) inclined to rule out G, or d) think G is impossible. It seems to me that you would answer with (c). You are inclined to rule out that proposition as being true. However, if that is so, and (c) is because G does not fit the criteria of a natural explanation, then what kind of criteria does (c) require to show that G does not fit?

For example, does God not fit your criteria of a pragmatic explanation? Perhaps God does not fit psychological criteria for you (e.g., the thought of God makes your feet tingle), etc., etc.. I thought the natural explanation approach was a good approach since that makes you a naturalist and there's certainly no shame in that. But, if (c) (i.e., assuming (c)) is not because of naturalist criteria, then I'm interested to know what that criteria is. Whatever that criteria is, it should be sufficient and necessary to separate you from an agnostic.

When I say that a theory must predict as yet unproven phenomena you cannot quote "complexity" as a predicted phenomenon. An example is to prove GR required a very specific bending of light in the 1919 total eclipse of the sun.

Okay, but why isn't complexity sufficient as positive evidence to posit God if there are no known mechanisms that can account for the fine tuning needed to explain the big bang expansion? What other possible explanation could there be which doesn't have the same problems as a God explanation?

That seems to suggest that if a new theory of science shows that there are multiple "dud" universes and those universes are confirmed to exist in the way that the theory predicts, then one is justified in saying that the God explanation for the unique physical constant values is no longer a justified explanation. However, that's not the case right now. There is no such theory, and there may never be such a theory. So, why not hold to an agnostic stance for a God explanation?

I'm sorry harvey but it simply implies nothing of the sort. In my example Newtonian mechanics provided very accurate results on the motion of objects. The notion of God provides no specific explanation of anything. Unlike Newtonian mechanics I cannot devise an experiment to show that God is a viable current position until proven otherwise.

Sure. It explains why physical constants have their specific values. That should prompt us to look for more aspects of the universe that show the same feature. There are many more experiments that can be conducted.

It seems like that you have settled on what cannot be the cause of the universe before you even know what possibilities exist for the cause of the universe. What if God did cause the universe? What if the physical constants can only be explained by God existing? You sound as if you would rather be ignorant of that cause rather than seek out the answer. However, that's not my main argument. I've given you a reason to believe in the proposition G, and your answer is that you don't know how to devise an experiment right now to test the proposition. But, there are many beliefs to remain agnostic about where we have no way to experiment or even have very good mathematical foundation in believing those things (e.g., string theory which is not mathematically consistent at this point). I'm just surprised that you reject to take an epistemic neutral stance for no other reason than you've already decided an experiment cannot be done when you haven't justified this. In addition, I'm not even sure why you would take that stance since experimental success can never tell you if a theory is right in the first place since as the Newtonian model demonstrates, it might later be proven not to be correct because our equipment and technology is too crude to make those refined measurements between prediction and observation.

Therefore, we are justified in denying the proposition without evidence. But, on what basis are we justified in denying a proposition of existence when you agree that all ontological claims have this problem? You would have to reject the existence of everything!...given your position that all ontological beliefs (e.g., scientific realism) are without proof.

This statement really confuses me. When did I put scientific realism into metaphysics (or ontology)?

I'm sorry, I suppose I assumed that we would both agree that realism is metaphysics (which is how philosophers treat the matter). It's sort of important to show this, so let's make this a sidebar. I'll start a thread on this issue so that we can get back to this issue. (Without an agreement on that issue, I'm skeptical we'd make much progress here since your argument boils down to putting ontological issues aside and even treating them false. Which, in my view, would include realism.)

I am saying that a theist must provide me with evidence for the existence of God for me to believe in it whereas I believe that no such evidence could be provided (or I have yet to see it).

What I'll try to show if you'll be kind enough to discuss whether realism is an ontology is that you can never have enough evidence to establish the truth of any metaphysical claim (e.g., what is really true, what really exists, and, most importantly... what is justified to believe, and what is justified to not believe).

I must admit that I beginning to feel exasperated by this argument. We are going in circles.

It takes months and months to have a discussion of this sort. Unfortunately it's not for the faint of heart. We both come into these kind of debates with years of looking at things a totally different way, and our lines of communication is completely out of sync. We have to go to the root of our disagreement, which is probably not theism/atheism, but some other more abstract area of discussion. If you don't want to pursue it, that's okay. But, unfortunately we will then be going in circles in all future discussions (i.e., until we get at the roots of our disagreement).

As I understand it the core issue is this:
You say that my beliefs should be agnostic because while I say I can remain agnostic about, yet to be proven, scientific ontologies you assert that I am making a special case in taking a value judgement about God which is not justified. - Is this your position?

Close. What I've seen so far in these discussions is that your atheism hinges on justification based on certain criteria that only a scientific theory could meet, however you use philosophical theories (e.g., realism, empiricism, etc.) to establish what is justified to believe as an ontology. If you use philosophical theories to justify an ontology, then you can't very well use a scientific theory to justify the philosophical theory since the philosophical theory justifies the use of a scientific theory to establish an ontology. That would be circular reasoning. However, if you use philosophical argument to establish an ontology, then you should be consistent and use philosophical argument to consider the existence of God. Now, that by itself doesn't necessarily make you an agnostic (or theist, or atheist), but at least it focuses the issue of why you are an atheist (versus agnostic) on what is justified because it is better able to address certain philosophical arguments (or, conversely, what is not justified because it is less able to address certain philosophical arguments). What I find about your argument here as dissatisfying is that you start off with science, and then when pressed on science you jump to epistemology, and you jump to ontology when pressed on epistemology, and then back to science when pressed on ontology.

Another point is, where do you draw the line between strong-agnosticism and weak-atheism? or is it rather that you believe weak-atheism to be a terminological impossibility?

I'm a strong theist, I think any position other than strong theism is not epistemologically justified.