Limits of Scientific Inquiry

[McCulloch]

Science does not have all the answers. It never did, and it never will.

Question for debate: What are the limits to scientific inquiry? Specifically, what answers would be impossible to address scientifically? What, if any, valid means of inquiry are there to find these answers?

Please note, we are not talking about the current limits of our scientific knowledge, but on the theoretical limits of scientific inquiry.

[Grumpy]

McCulloch

Question for debate: What are the limits to scientific inquiry? Specifically, what answers would be impossible to address scientifically? What, if any, valid means of inquiry are there to find these answers?

There are certain questions that man thinks need an answer that simply have no answer(I would say they are not important to the Universe, but the Universe is incapable of value judgements). Example...

Why? Man's view is tainted by his experience of man and his intelligence, where intent, motives and goals do exist. These are not evident in the Universe(in Cosmology or in Evolution)so, to the degree we ask the question, we are projecting our traits on the Universe. The only real answer to the question is that there is no why, it just is. There is no reason(intent, motive)that something exists, but there are causes that science can find(in theory, anyway). How is a question that can be answered, as is when and where. But when you start positing intent where intent simply does not exist, you are projecting your expectations on the inanimate, "humanizing" that which is not human. It is a very human thing to do, but it is not the reality.

Grumpy

[McCulloch]

I propose that the only avenues of inquiry that are out of bounds to science in principle would be those for which there can be no answers. The limits of scientific inquiry are identical to the limits of inquiry generally.

To be more specific and perhaps provoking, I believe that questions of ethics, morality, aesthetics, jurisprudence and cuisine are not, in principle, beyond scientific inquiry. In short, I disagree with Steven Jay Gould's concept of non-overlapping magisteria. To me, questions of moral value could be and possibly should be addressed, not by religious traditions and alleged revelations from various deities, but scientifically, just as matters of health, physics and biology are. There should not be Christian ethics or Muslim morals anymore than there is Christian algebra or Hindu geometry.

This would be a difficult field of study, but morals (what ought to be done) is essentially the science of maximizing well-being. This is too important to be left to fields of inquiry where answers cannot be validated.

[Miles]

Trouble is, in science conclusions work regardless of what we think. And when it comes to morals, things like "what ought to be done, are dependent on what we think is right. Ought is a "should be" concept, and what you may thing "should be" may not be what I think "should be." So I don't know how you would determine once and for all whose "well being" is the only acceptable "well being." Exactly what would such a science consist of? What would be the mortar and bricks of your hypothesis? And what kind of final, works-all-the-time-should-be, conclusion would you expect to find?

[Druijf]

This would be a difficult field of study, but morals (what ought to be done) is essentially the science of maximizing well-being. This is too important to be left to fields of inquiry where answers cannot be validated.

The problem is that people aspire different goals in life and there is no and probably never will be agreement on what "well-being" is.

[cnorman18]

Seems to me that any field of study which depends on axioms that are human constructs -- right and wrong, for instance, or metaphysical thought in general -- is outside the purview of science, which is objective or nothing. If subjective human judgment is called for and there is no objective measure available, science doesn't apply.

The perception of beauty, for instance, might be scientifically measured with surveys and experiments and whatnot, but the nature of beauty itself -- what is in and of itself beautiful, and what is not -- depends on human thought and perception as it changes from place to place and at different periods of history.

Obviously, religious concepts are ALL human constructs; speculation, imagination, ideals. That doesn't make them "false," any more than any other speculation or imaginative construct of the mind is "false" on account of that only. "Not objectively real" is arguable, but that's not the same thing.

[McCulloch]

Trouble is, in science conclusions work regardless of what we think. And when it comes to morals, things like "what ought to be done, are dependent on what we think is right. Ought is a "should be" concept, and what you may thing "should be" may not be what I think "should be."

Thus, according to you, there is no objective way to determine whether gratuitous sadistic torture should be or should not be. I beg to differ.

So I don't know how you would determine once and for all whose "well being" is the only acceptable "well being."

I believe that an exact measure of well-being is currently beyond our capabilities, just as the exact measure of pain is. However, that does not put it outside the purview of science, in principle. It just means that we need to do some work to find reliable measures of well-being.

Exactly what would such a science consist of? What would be the mortar and bricks of your hypothesis? And what kind of final, works-all-the-time-should-be, conclusion would you expect to find?

I really don't know. That's the wonder of science.

The problem is that people aspire different goals in life and there is no and probably never will be agreement on what "well-being" is.

We have, for example, difficulty defining just what health is. Does that stop us from having health sciences? We would expect that disputes as to what well-being entails will be a productive part of the science of ethics.

[McCulloch]

Seems to me that any field of study which depends on axioms that are human constructs -- right and wrong, for instance, or metaphysical thought in general -- is outside the purview of science, which is objective or nothing. If subjective human judgment is called for and there is no objective measure available, science doesn't apply.

There's the question in a nutshell. Why would you think that questions of right and wrong be subjective and forever beyond objective measurement? If the goal of ethics is to maximize human well-being, then could that not be, in principle, measured? We currently have no objective measure for pain or for health, yet science contributes much to pain relief and to health. We don't say that because health is difficult to define or to measure that health sciences are not science.

The perception of beauty, for instance, might be scientifically measured with surveys and experiments and whatnot, but the nature of beauty itself -- what is in and of itself beautiful, and what is not -- depends on human thought and perception as it changes from place to place and at different periods of history.

But, the experience of beauty is fundamentally a neurological event. We certainly are not far along in our understanding of neurology to deconstruct what it means to be perceived as beautiful, but in principle, this could be scientifically determined.

[cnorman18]

Seems to me that any field of study which depends on axioms that are human constructs -- right and wrong, for instance, or metaphysical thought in general -- is outside the purview of science, which is objective or nothing. If subjective human judgment is called for and there is no objective measure available, science doesn't apply.

There's the question in a nutshell. Why would you think that questions of right and wrong be subjective and forever beyond objective measurement? If the goal of ethics is to maximize human well-being, then could that not be, in principle, measured? We currently have no objective measure for pain or for health, yet science contributes much to pain relief and to health. We don't say that because health is difficult to define or to measure that health sciences are not science.

Of course. The basics or extremes are clear enough; life is generally better than death, pain is generally better than no pain. The objectives are as scientific as the science of making paint or carving stone. But the desirability and "good" or "bad" of the final result, particularly in non-extreme or complex cases, are inalterably fuzzy, in my opinion.

Even if we could measure pain, that doesn't solve the problem of ethics. Medical treatment sometimes involves pain. How much is permissible? Any amount? Doesn't that answer vary from person to person, and doesn't that render it subjective? Take the case of my own client from last year, for instance. Alzheimer's and cancer. How does one quantify and objectivize whether chemotherapy is beneficial enough to warrant extension of life, when one must simultaneously judge, in advance, the potential quality of that life?

The perception of beauty, for instance, might be scientifically measured with surveys and experiments and whatnot, but the nature of beauty itself -- what is in and of itself beautiful, and what is not -- depends on human thought and perception as it changes from place to place and at different periods of history.

But, the experience of beauty is fundamentally a neurological event. We certainly are not far along in our understanding of neurology to deconstruct what it means to be perceived as beautiful, but in principle, this could be scientifically determined

That's what I'm saying. The experience of beauty, may, in the future, be quantified, yes; but that isn't what I'm talking about. The quality of beauty itself, as an attribute of an object or a person, is as different from the experience of it as the taste of food is from the recipe we use to make it. Those are related, but not identical. I love bananas; my Lynell hates them. She loves tomatoes; I find them nauseating. Same banana, same tomato.

In the case of beauty, the quality itself would vary by culture and time. Today, for instance, a woman who wears a size 2 or 3 dress is considered ideal: in the 50s, it was more like a 10 or 12. Marilyn Monroe wore a 12 and at one time wore a 16, and nobody was calling her a gross tub of lard -- as has happened today (there have been lawsuits over cheerleaders and airline attendants going over a size 5 or so). Attractiveness also varies by race and culture, obviously. Tattoos and piercings are fetching or ugly or essential, depending on one's culture and background and the period of history we're talking about.

One might measure a given person's reactions to a painting or a face or even music, but that's as subjective as the taste of food. How does one measure beauty itself, as opposed to reactions to it? If the reaction is all there is, why do we draw a distinction between "I don't care for this painting" and "that's a bad painting"? And don't tell me we don't; any art historian or critic knows better. Taste isn't the same as talent or artistry.

Do you really think that EVERYTHING is quantifiable and measurable? Human reactions, in the future, may be; but are human reactions the same as the intrinsic qualities of that to which we react?

[McCulloch]

The basics or extremes are clear enough; life is generally better than death, pain is generally better than no pain. The objectives are as scientific as the science of making paint or carving stone. But the desirability and "good" or "bad" of the final result, particularly in non-extreme or complex cases, are inalterably fuzzy, in my opinion.

The sciences of anthropology, economics and biology necessarily have areas of a certain amount of fuzziness. Yet, no one claims that these fields cannot be studied scientifically. What is good and what is bad can be both easy and difficult to define. Good is that which increases well-being. Bad the opposite. The difficulty lies in measuring, estimating or otherwise determining well-being.

Even if we could measure pain, that doesn't solve the problem of ethics.

I never said that it would. My point about the current lack of an objective measure of pain is that this lack does not prohibit scientists from studying methods of pain management.

Medical treatment sometimes involves pain. How much is permissible? Any amount? Doesn't that answer vary from person to person, and doesn't that render it subjective?

Of course. Good science recognizes individual differences. Take the science of nutrition. Depending on various conditions, allergies, development stage and even personal preferences, the scientific advise of a nutritionist will vary.

Take the case of my own client from last year, for instance. Alzheimer's and cancer. How does one quantify and objectivize whether chemotherapy is beneficial enough to warrant extension of life, when one must simultaneously judge, in advance, the potential quality of that life?

I don't know. Do you? I just don't share your pessimism that such decisions will forever be a shot in the dark.

The experience of beauty, may, in the future, be quantified, yes; but that isn't what I'm talking about. The quality of beauty itself, as an attribute of an object or a person, is as different from the experience of it as the taste of food is from the recipe we use to make it. Those are related, but not identical. I love bananas; my Lynell hates them. She loves tomatoes; I find them nauseating. Same banana, same tomato.

You've confused me. On one hand you make reference to the quality of beauty as if it is an intrinsic characteristic of the thing perceived to be beautiful. But on the other hand, you argue that beauty is relative and subjective, equating it with the experience of beauty. What I claim is that what is experienced to be beautiful could in principle be scientifically explained. And yes, that explanation would have to take into account the effects of culture, and personal history of the subject.

How does one measure beauty itself, as opposed to reactions to it? If the reaction is all there is, why do we draw a distinction between "I don't care for this painting" and "that's a bad painting"? And don't tell me we don't; any art historian or critic knows better. Taste isn't the same as talent or artistry.

The difference is in how general the statement is. "I don't care for this painting" implies that there may be others who could in the understanding of the speaker, who would care for that painting. "That's a bad painting" on the other hand implies that the speaker cannot comprehend others appreciating the work, that he expects that his dislike for the painting to be almost universal. Obviously the science of art appreciation, if it is to be developed, would have to be able to find both the elements that have somewhat universal appeal as well as what makes certain individuals like this or that while others do not. While the first task, in itself, would be an incredibly daunting and complex task, the second would be hugely moreso.

Do you really think that EVERYTHING is quantifiable and measurable?

In principle, yes. There may be practical barriers, but yes.