What is person?

[McCulloch]

For the idea of a person to have any meaning, it must be differentiated from "being" and "nature." Otherwise it is a redundant and vacuous term. Christianity differentiates person and being so that each are separate. One being may be three persons, and two natures one person. This was the origin of the idea of personhood in the first place.

Can one being be three persons? Can one person have two mutually exclusive natures?

[McCulloch]

A person is most broadly defined as any individual self-aware or rational being, or any entity having rights and duties.

One's nature is the particular combination of qualities belonging to a person, animal, thing, or class by birth, origin, or constitution; native or inherent character.

In abstract usage, "the being" or "one's being" is the mind's concept of the self as a whole entity.

Perhaps I am stupid or missing something, but I just cannot see how in the ordinary use of these terms, a being can be three persons or how one person can have two contradictory natures.

[Furrowed Brow]

For the idea of a person to have any meaning, it must be differentiated from "being" and "nature." Otherwise it is a redundant and vacuous term. Christianity differentiates person and being so that each are separate. One being may be three persons, and two natures one person. This was the origin of the idea of personhood in the first place.

Can one being be three persons? Can one person have two mutually exclusive natures?

The word "persons" means just as much as all the uses the word can be put to. Its meaning is located in its social usage. To try and abstract a theory of personhood or invoke metaphysical distinction is exactly wrong. It is also wrong to think the word has no meaning because it can not be abstracted out of the contexts of its usage. It is when seeking the "essence" of our nature that the true meanings are thrown away.

We have no single nature. You might as well ask if we have a single facial expression. We do have regular habits of behaviour and a repetitive biology and nervous system. I suspect it is because brain and nervous sytem are usually located in the same order each day and can move around their enviroment as a generally cohesive and unified whole and if you pinch us we tend to give the same reaction that we then tend to think we are one thing, and that we amount to more than the some of our behaviours.

[McCulloch]

Furrowed Brow rightly points out that we have no single nature. However, the attributes of what we call human nature as far as I can see are incompatible with divine nature.

[earl]

My two cents here is ,returning to the best biblical description,"there are three that bare witness in heaven and the three are one"."Are one","as one " either way read equal to me.
In actuality there are three actuals (three what ) with each having a characteristic unique to each one.One is uniquely characterized as as God ,one is Son, one is Spirit.These three,nonindipendent actuals are mostly refered to as,yes with all the baggage of confusion, the trinity.(did not say gods,did not say spirits)
Spiritually the three are inseperately one.(one God,one spirit)-The harmony blend of all three actuals to produce a spiritual God consisting of Spirit.Jesus ,while in human form said "God is Spirit".
It is easier to comprehend in thought the spiritual than that of the actual.Human thought is only able see a fleeting glimpse of the actual and also in thought a mere sampling of the spiritual.After all it is spirit that is discovered in thought and nowhere else.I can comprehend something of the concept.I am down to one cent.

[theopoesis]

Can one being be three persons? Can one person have two mutually exclusive natures?

Sorry for the delayed response, McCulloch, but I've been quite busy at work recently. It also has taken me a while to uncover the patristic theology I needed to respond to this thread and to Murad's thread on the hypostatic union. Let's see if I can explain my position more carefully and clearly.

A person is most broadly defined as any individual self-aware or rational being, or any entity having rights and duties.

I'm going to set aside the second half of your definition for the moment, as I'm not sure I think it is the best starting point for defining a person. Self-awareness, on the other hand, is an excellent place to start.

To be self-aware, I think two things are required. First, is a mechanism of awareness, and second is an object of that awareness. In other words, to be self-aware, you must both have a self-as-subject which is aware of the self, and a self-as-object which the self-as-subject apprehends.

One's nature is the particular combination of qualities belonging to a person, animal, thing, or class by birth, origin, or constitution; native or inherent character.

This seems accurate enough, except that if we want to posit a continuity of self, we should posit a continuity of nature. In other words, as I grow and mature, each growth or maturation to my nature does not make me a new person. The attributes native to a person might change over time, but the original attributes influence the trajectory of change.

The nature of change needs to also be considered. I suppose what I mean is that if human nature changes through growth and maturity, we must wonder whether the specific changes are intrinsic to the nature of the specific human (which is true to an extent, to be sure), or are the result of an outside force acting on the nature (this could be will, or intellect, or some other such entity).

This leads to the question of whether self-awareness has any effect on nature itself. For self-awareness to exist, we must at least posit some mechanism of self-awareness by which this awareness is differentiated from the self-as-object. Christian conceptions of the self have also posited the existence of a will (whether this will is free or bound - i.e. whether the will can choose the direction in which the nature heads - is a disputed matter). In modern times, the will is challenged as a non-existent entity. To this I typically apply the philosophical ideas of Jean Baudrillard and Slavoj Zizek: dissimulation, according to these thinkers, is pretending not to have what one knows one has. Each day, we choose what cereal we want to eat; we decide how hard to work, what sort of work to do, and which tasks we will perform first at work; we decide what TV shows to watch at home, when to sleep, when to take a shower, which friends to visit, and what to say when we are with them. Yet, because we cannot explain it through science, we pretend that we do not have a "will" directing these choices or their overall consequences on our nature. I consider this dissimulation a basic obfuscation of what we know to be true. That being said, the full explanation of such doctrines as the Trinity and the hypostatic union are only possible with the will, but even a partial explanation can be made if we grant the differentiation of the self-as-subject and the self-as-object. The very act of thinking about one's self through self-awareness (and forming an identity through this thought) shapes one's actions, development, and growth. This has even been demonstrated through secular psychology. The placebo effect is another example of this.

In abstract usage, "the being" or "one's being" is the mind's concept of the self as a whole entity.

I reject this definition because it reduces being or ontology to the level of phenomenology. In other words, if being is nothing more than a concept, then the substance of my "person" is eliminated and we wind up with the thinking mind and the being as a projection of that thinking mind, but no ontological ground for the mind itself. Where do thoughts originate from, if not (at least in part) from some "substance" or "entity" or some other equivalent?

Even if we posit the priority of mind over being (something which some variations of Christianity defend), we still must posit a link of some sort between the mind and the being beyond a simple cognitive link. If a person is that which is "self-aware" then there must be something (i.e. some substance, entity, etc.) external to the mind which the mind apprehends and of which it is aware. There must be a self, or else the mind is not a person by definition (in that it is not-self-aware). If being/the self is nothing but a thought contained in the mind, the mind cannot stand apart from the being because the being is nothing but part of the mind.

Taking this definition, we wind up with a mind that conceives of the self, but we forget the critical discussion of person and nature above. If a person is self-aware, then there is a mechanism by which it is aware, and a self-as-other of which it is aware. If there is a nature, then this nature in some ways effects the mechanism of awareness, but is in some way effected by this mechanism of awareness. If, however, "being" is nothing but the mind (the mechanism of awareness) and it's thoughts (the means of effecting the awareness) then we wind up with no role for nature. I can be whoever or whatever I wish to be, so long as I can conceive of myself in that way.

The idea of a "person" on the other hand, is of a "being" which is in a dialectical relationship between nature and a "will" or some equivalent mechanism of self-awareness and direction. If a being is a personal being, than the full definition of "being" should include both the thesis and antithesis, or the mind and nature. Being, I propose, is therefore a particular instantiation of the relationship between nature and will. To use the words of Greek theology (more recently re-introduced into the discussion by John Zizioulas): "Being is communion."

Perhaps I am stupid or missing something, but I just cannot see how in the ordinary use of these terms, a being can be three persons or how one person can have two contradictory natures.

Certainly, you are not stupid. I generally find you a cogent, intelligent, polite, and wise discussion partner. I'll try to explain things to you given the above discussion, but I'm not sure I fully have it down myself. Here goes...

In terms of the Trinity, if "being is communion" between nature and the mechanism of self-awareness (will, thoughts, or otherwise), then we already posit at least two forces in relation to one another in the concept of "being." I see no definitive reason why "being" by definition must exclude more than one relationship. For example, if a Person is one who is self aware (i.e. one who views its nature as an object and effects that nature), then Three Persons might be one Being if three mechanisms of self-awareness reflect mutually on the same identical, shared nature. Three wills, then, might be posited among God, whereby the Son could submit his will to the Father's will, but still retain an identical nature to the Father. I'm at the point philosophically where I can make sense of the possibility of the Trinity, but I admit I am not at the point where I can understand the actuality of the Trinity and how it works. If there is a triune God, I suspect this is something that cannot be understood.

As for the hypostatic union, it might be possible if a single mechanism of self-awareness became aware of and capable of changing two distinct natures. For Christ, these natures are the human and the divine. Christ's Person was said to be aware of the divine nature and able to limit his personal use of the divine attributes through kenosis, but also aware of the human nature, and able to elevate human nature through theosis and the communication of attributes. In short, a single self-as-other had two self-as-objects.

These are very cursory and initial considerations. The point, however, is that by definition I see no need to eliminate the possibility of the Trinity or the Hypostatic union. To do so by definition, one either develops an incomplete ontology (as I think you did), or an incomplete understanding of a person (as one lacking self-awareness or a mechanism of self-awareness). This in no ways proves that the Trinity or the hypostatic union is an actual thing, but merely suggests that it is possible.