Does a supernatural universe have to exist to explain why the natural universe exists?

[William]

I initially thought about posting this in the Science and Religion forum because I think it is most appropriate , but decided that the Christianity and Apologetics forum might garner more interest in the subject.

Q: Does a supernatural universe have to exist to explain why our natural universe exists?


I ask the question because a recent interaction with a Christian who insisted that this was the only plausible conclusion one could reach to explain why we and the universe exist.
Indeed, many Christians argue the necessity for the supernatural to explain the natural.

Some of the key points for discussion/debate.


The influence of Christian beliefs: The cosmological argument has been shaped and influenced by certain Christian perspectives, which can impact its perceived validity.

Alternative explanations: A supernatural explanation may not be necessary to account for the existence of the natural universe, and that simpler explanations without invoking supernatural elements can be considered.

Different interpretations of "supernatural": The definition of "supernatural" and whether it necessarily implies a separate and distinct realm from the natural universe.

Critique of the cosmological argument in natural theology: Re the OP question, counterarguments to this cosmological argument, challenging the assumption that a supernatural cause is required to explain the existence of the natural universe.

(A cosmological argument, in natural theology, is an argument which claims that the existence of God can be inferred from facts concerning causation, explanation, change, motion, contingency, dependency, or finitude with respect to the universe or some totality of objects.)

Context and historical origins: The importance of considering the historical context and origins of the cosmological argument in order to engage in a more comprehensive discussion.

Validity of alternative arguments: Alternative explanations should not be dismissed simply because they reach different conclusions from the OP questioning that cosmological argument, and that critical evaluation of different perspectives is necessary for a robust discussion.

[William]

As part of the debating process, questions are asked for clarification, and I am happy to be asked questions and will attempt to answer all put to me, and expect others to do the same.

Before I answer the questions you posed in Post #70, I would like you to provide answers to the questions I have already put to you.

In relation to the framework of the philosophy you support.
1. How does something non-conscious create consciousness?
2. What prompted the bedrock to begin to organize itself into functional form?
3. Why should the idea of Universe Mind (universe with a mind) be viewed by actual minds within and part of the universe, as any more extravagant than a mindless universe - when we clearly are the apparent exception to that rule?
4. We are minds within form, so why can't the universe (organized matter) be a form for an overall mind and we are intricately related to said mind?
5. So if these QF's are not particles, what are they that we can consider them to being matter? And why should we pluralize them? Are they different from one another and thus have to be distinguished as such and spoken of in that way?
6. Where do/have the alternative philosophies (materialism and supernaturalism) get/gotten us, that these necessarily give us "better" or even "best" explanations?
7. Why should we regard a Universal Mind as being able to be unembodied from the object of the physical, organized universe?
8. "Why did something come from something?" as in "what was the cause?"
9. Did it involve consciousness?
10. Does Thomas Aquinas metaphysics argue that "God" is supernatural?
11. How does your philosophy explain the qualia you experience?
12. Why not bother to organize unorganized matter?
13. Do you believe that the mind is "non-physical"?

Please feel free to ask for clarification on any of these questions asked of you.

[fredonly]

1. How does something non-conscious create consciousness?
“Consciousness” = a series of intentional states. Each intentional state (considered statically) is a product of prior states + new perceptions.

2. What prompted the bedrock to begin to organize itself into functional form?
In the physicalist metaphysics I lean toward, the initial state caused subsequent states; causation is a product of laws of nature.

3. Why should the idea of Universe Mind (universe with a mind) be viewed by actual minds within and part of the universe, as any more extravagant than a mindless universe - when we clearly are the apparent exception to that rule?
Human “minds” (see my answer to question#13) are associated with physical bodies, particularly the central nervous system and our sensory mechanisms. There’s no evidence of “minds” operating without this complexly organized apparatus. The existence of our complex apparatus is consistent with verified physics: complex objects form over time as a consequence of the 2nd law of thermodynamics, as the universe transitions from a low to high entropy state.

4. We are minds within form, so why can't the universe (organized matter) be a form for an overall mind and we are intricately related to said mind?
This seems no more than a logical possibility (i.e. it’s not provably impossible). However, I see no grounds for believing this is actually the case. We evolved mental capacities due to environmental pressure – it permitted offspring to survive. The universe does not exist in an analogous environment, nor does it produce offspring to carry on something analogous to genetic material.

5. So if these QF's are not particles, what are they that we can consider them to being matter? And why should we pluralize them? Are they different from one another and thus have to be distinguished as such and spoken of in that way?
QFs are the building blocks for everything that exists in the material world. We pluralize them because there are multiple fields. A particle (e.g. electron, quark, etc) is an excitation of a field. There is a quantum field associated with every particle in the standard model of particle physics. Are they matter? It depends on how you define “matter”. Ordinarily, we think of matter as the stuff that is composed of atoms. Atoms are composed of electrons, protons, & neutrons. Electrons are fundamental particles (i.e. they are excitations of the electromagnetic field). Protons and neutrons are composed of various types of quarks – each type of quark is fundamental, and consists of an excitation of the associated field.

6. Where do/have the alternative philosophies (materialism and supernaturalism) get/gotten us, that these necessarily give us "better" or even "best" explanations?
What each metaphysical system “gets us” is a paradigm for understanding the world. As to which one gives us the “best” explanation, there’s certainly no consensus on that, but different paradigms can still be compared using the standard means for comparing competing explanatory hypotheses – which is using abductive reasoning – drawing an inference to best explanation. (If one BELIEVES a metaphysical paradigm to be the case, they should have a rational justification for that belief).

7. Why should we regard a Universal Mind as being able to be unembodied from the object of the physical, organized universe?
It’s your paradigm, so you can define it however you like. My understanding is that you said the UM’s existence is not dependent on any organization of matter, so if you wish to say it is EMbodied (i.e. not UNembodied), it raises additional questions.

8. "Why did something come from something?" as in "what was the cause?"
Already answered in #2.

9. Did it involve consciousness? I see no reason to think so.

10. Does Thomas Aquinas metaphysics argue that "God" is supernatural?
Aquinas was a Christian, and they all believe God is supernatural. However, it’s based on Aristotelian metaphysics, which doesn’t include supernaturalism (to the best of my knowledge, but I’m not expert).

11. How does your philosophy explain the qualia you experience?
The specific way something feels is basically an illusion, although it is not epiphenomenal because it establishes an intentional state (e.g. pain causes us to seek means of alleveiating that pain).
*edit* BTW, I don't consider this a completely satisfying answer. So I consider it the primary weakness of physicalism, and it's why I don't fully embrace it. But it's important to recognize that every philosophical paradigm for "mind" has weaknesses.

12. Why not bother to organize unorganized matter?
”Bothering” implies an intentional state, which entails mental processes. You attribute the processes of matter becoming organized to a mind that chose to do so (that’s my impression, but I’ve asked you about this), so it makes me wonder why it would. Under theism, God chose to create a universe so that we would exist and share in his love. That at least provides a motivation.

13. Do you believe that the mind is "non-physical"?
I don’t believe “the mind” is a thing. Rather, we manifest mental activities – transitioning from one intentional state to the next, like the frames in a movie film.

[William]

[Replying to fredonly in post #72]

Thank You for your answers.

It appears we are apart on some things and closer on others.
I will get back to you re your answers after I have posted my reply to your previous post.

Cheers
W

[William]

[Replying to fredonly in post #70]

The “connection” is mind. The Universal Mind is not plural. Human minds are part of the UM, not separate from the UM.

My mind seems linked to my brain, and to be fully distinct from your mind/brain combination. Please explain how these seemingly distinct mind/brain entities are not actually distinct, and merely part of the UM.

Generally, the human experience has it that “mind seems linked to brain”. Please explain why we refer to the mind as if it is not the brain, if indeed these are indistinguishable from the other.
The Natural Philosophy I am developing considers the differing aspects mindfulness can experience. With humans, in general – the experience is unique to the individual personality and in that regard, is responsible for developing the individual personality.
The relationship between the mindfulness of acromyrmex and mycelium on the other hand, appears to be more fluid in terms of observing more of a group-mindedness, and to account for this I hypothesis that it is largely the design of the form that determines whether one is more individual or more hive-minded, but the underlying point therein is that UE is not necessarily at any disadvantage either way and I would not use the expression “merely” re the Universal Mind, as the complexity and variety of organized matter denotes anything but.

We agree that the source of pain is something physical (e.g. a cut finger), but I’m asking you to describe how this physical damage comes to be experienced as pain. Anesthesia can block the pain sensation, even though the physical damage is still present. It appears to me the pain sensation depends on physical brain processes.

Yes. Including the nervous system, as I explained in an earlier post when I wrote “Yes. Without our brains (including the nervous system) we cannot experience being human and develop human personalities.” In answer to your question “Are our minds dependent on the organization of matter in our brains?”

What you appear to be asking is whether the UM "feels pain" when in the timeless state.

No, I’m asking whether the UM experiences pain before matter gets organized into life forms.

Since pain is associated with organized matter - specifically biological forms - I would say the best hypothesis would be that the UM, in its quintessential timeless state, does not feel/experience pain.
Can you explain why you have asked this question Fred?

Physicalism can account for everything that occurs in the universe, including all other mental activities – with the partial exception of qualia. The strength of your model is that it can presumably account for qualia, and (I assume) all other mental activities. But you still need to account for everything else that occurs in the universe. For example: the formation of quarks and electrons, star and galaxy formation, quantum mechanics, etc. Physicalism accounts for these with laws of nature, where a “law” reflects a necessitation: it is NECESSARILY the case that an electron attracts a proton. You apparently reject this, so I’m asking you to explain how this works in your model. Does the UM choose to have electrons attract protons? If so, is this a necessitation, or does each instance entail the UM deciding to have an electron attract a proton? If it’s a necessitation, then it’s a law (by definition).

Can you explain why you think what you wrote [re the bold] is true?

In my model, electrons attracting protons and all other processes to do with the organization of matter, is why matter is organized into functionality. As I have already said in a previous post that things had to be organized to a point where these organized things then played a role in the process of further organizing due to the non-static nature of the unfolding universe.
Since the operative phrasing there is "had to", this denotes necessity.
Therefore, my model is compatible with the concepts of physicalism, laws of nature, and necessity.

You attributed the organization to the UM. Doesn’t that mean it made a choice to organize matter?

Yes. A purposeful mindful choice.

Did it not choose HOW it would organize?

Yes.

If so, doesn’t this mean it could have chosen differently?

Perhaps. Natural Philosophy is focused on what is, not what might have, or could have been.

Could it decide tomorrow to change the manner of organization?

Can you give an example of what you mean by your question?

The laws of physics appear to be static, so that if the UM chose this manner of matter organization, it did so very early in the life of the universe, and it’s stayed that way. But how could this UM know what would occur in the future, unless it’s omniscient (or close to it). Is your UM omniscient?

Possibly, in that the UM may have thought through the whole process of this particular organization in detail from beginning to end before putting the organization of matter into practice.
As we know, the universe is not static and is still unfolding, and it may be that what we identify as “laws of nature” at this point, may change as the organized matter does.

But memories are clearly dependent on the physical brain – memories can be lost through disease (e.g. Alzheimer’s) and trauma (brain injury). Doesn’t this imply the mind needs a functional brain to have memories? What’s the use of a mind that has no memories? My memories define me.

Yes. A growing human personality depends upon mindfulness and memory. Again, NDEs and OOBEs not only have those experiencing these, remembering things they had “forgotten” but ever detail, and there are also reports of personalities experiencing other peoples points of view – such as people they hurt (unintentional or intentionally) and experience these as if they were also the other person.
To add to that, there are also many reports of personalities experiencing being the UM – such as “I was home alone, walking through the living room, not thinking of anything in particular, when suddenly my consciousness erupted. It no longer ended at the surface of my body but expanded outward, filling the surrounding space. I experienced everything around me as inside me and absolutely identical to myself. I was no longer Linda Johnsen; I was everything. The bliss of that single moment was beyond description.

It wasn't as if I was the universe. I really was the universe. It happened spontaneously, and even though it only lasted a few seconds, I emerged from it changed forever. Any confidence I had in the materialistic scientific paradigm collapsed.”
So, while a purely materialistic philosophy would have it that “memories are clearly dependent on the physical brain”, the Natural Philosophy I am developing, takes into consideration these reported experience re the hypothesis of Universal Mind.

Matter is not organized at the initial starting point (see bold part of quote), but you still say it is “conscious/mindful”. Ergo being “conscious/mindful” doesn’t depend on matter being organized.

Okay. Yes, this would mean that there is choice to organize matter rather than compulsion. Re the language being used, only something mindful can experience anything, including being dependent on something or not.

[fredonly]

We agree that the source of pain is something physical (e.g. a cut finger), but I’m asking you to describe how this physical damage comes to be experienced as pain. Anesthesia can block the pain sensation, even though the physical damage is still present. It appears to me the pain sensation depends on physical brain processes.

Yes. Including the nervous system, as I explained in an earlier post when I wrote “Yes. Without our brains (including the nervous system) we cannot experience being human and develop human personalities.” In answer to your question “Are our minds dependent on the organization of matter in our brains?”

I don't see anything to distinguish this from a physicalist account.

What you appear to be asking is whether the UM "feels pain" when in the timeless state.

No, I’m asking whether the UM experiences pain before matter gets organized into life forms.

Since pain is associated with organized matter - specifically biological forms - I would say the best hypothesis would be that the UM, in its quintessential timeless state, does not feel/experience pain.
Can you explain why you have asked this question Fred?

Because your account treats pain as something that emerges from the physical organization of out bodies, rather than something intrinsic to the UM. That's consistent with physicalism. How is the sensation of pain something other than illusion?

Therefore, my model is compatible with the concepts of physicalism, laws of nature, and necessity.

Explain the relationship between UM and laws of nature. For example: is the UM completely subject to these laws? If so, how does it it cause matter to organize?

You attributed the organization to the UM. Doesn’t that mean it made a choice to organize matter?

Yes. A purposeful mindful choice.

Did it not choose HOW it would organize?

Yes.

If so, doesn’t this mean it could have chosen differently?

Perhaps. Natural Philosophy is focused on what is, not what might have, or could have been.

These answers suggest UM is not entirely subject to the laws of nature. Laws of nature reflect necessitation- which leaves no room for the mind to have an impact.

Could it decide tomorrow to change the manner of organization?

Can you give an example of what you mean by your question?

I'm just trying to understand the powers of the UM with respect to laws of nature. For example, if UM chose the laws, then the laws are contingent upon the will of the UM.

The laws of physics appear to be static, so that if the UM chose this manner of matter organization, it did so very early in the life of the universe, and it’s stayed that way. But how could this UM know what would occur in the future, unless it’s omniscient (or close to it). Is your UM omniscient?

Possibly, in that the UM may have thought through the whole process of this particular organization in detail from beginning to end before putting the organization of matter into practice.
As we know, the universe is not static and is still unfolding, and it may be that what we identify as “laws of nature” at this point, may change as the organized matter does.

Planning requires knowledge, which entails encoding of information, which entails organization of matter. You evidently reject this description, so please describe how you account for the UM having such vast knowledge in an unorganized state. (Off-hand, it sounds magical).

So, while a purely materialistic philosophy would have it that “memories are clearly dependent on the physical brain”, the Natural Philosophy I am developing, takes into consideration these reported experience re the hypothesis of Universal Mind.

I don't take OBEs seriously, but you do- but you seem to be contradicting what you said, above: "without our brains (including the nervous system) we cannot experience being human". OBEs are not attached to brains and nervous systems.

Regardless- you seem to have a magical view of memories and knowledge. Recall that you criticized some aspect of physicalism because it was seemingly magical. In fact, the closest to magical (or hand-waving) for physicalism is the nature of qualia. You have significantly more magic in your model.

[William]

[Replying to fredonly in post #75]

Yes. Including the nervous system, as I explained in an earlier post when I wrote “Yes. Without our brains (including the nervous system) we cannot experience being human and develop human personalities.” In answer to your question “Are our minds dependent on the organization of matter in our brains?”

I don't see anything to distinguish this from a physicalist account.

It is unclear to me why it matters that this aspect of Natural Philosophy is indistinguishable from Materialist Philosophy.

Because your account treats pain as something that emerges from the physical organization of out bodies, rather than something intrinsic to the UM. That's consistent with physicalism.

Materialist Philosophy does not include the existence of UM, so not altogether consistent.

How is the sensation of pain something other than illusion?

What makes the pain experienced as real? Identify that and you have the answer to your question.

Explain the relationship between UM and laws of nature. For example: is the UM completely subject to these laws?

From what we understand currently re the LoN, these have to do with the process involved in matter being organized into Functional Objects.
We should be able to agree that the Universe is not only in and of itself a FO, but also consists of innumerable FO, such as Galaxies, Stars, Planets and all other bodies/entities - from the macro to the micro.

In relation to that, it could be argued that yes - while matter is being organized, the UM is subject to all LoN.

If so, how does it it cause matter to organize?

The correct question is " How does the UM cause unorganized matter to organize? "
Given what we already understand about the role of frequency, Natural Philosophy hypothesizes that matter is organized through the UM’s use of frequencies.

These answers suggest UM is not entirely subject to the laws of nature. Laws of nature reflect necessitation- which leaves no room for the mind to have an impact.

You are perhaps forgetting the non-static nature of the universe, which included a beginning – to which our human involvement has it, we are experiencing relatively near said beginning.
So, before objects were organized into the stuff we see now – the galaxies, and that which make up the galaxies (as mentioned) were still in the process of being organized to become those objects, from something which could be said to have been indistinguishable but was to become distinguishable, according to BB hypothesis.
As the formation of distinguishable galaxies occurred, UM could then experience being said galaxies and in doing so become subject to those organized distinguishable objects – being the subjective mind within the experience of the objects, and furthermore, investing/subjecting itself into the objects which altogether make up the consistency of galaxies - namely, stars, planets, plants, animals, microbes et al.
There is always “room for mind to have impact” but that room is subject to the object, yet the UM is experiencing being the whole and the parts which make up the whole, simultaneously and as mentioned, the process is still in its very early stages of development in cosmological terms.

I'm just trying to understand the powers of the UM with respect to laws of nature. For example, if UM chose the laws, then the laws are contingent upon the will of the UM.

This is partially delving into your earlier question as to why the UM would bother organizing matter into functional form. The answer appears to be “for the experience and because it can. “
There is no reason I can think of as to why the UM could not theoretically change its mind and revert back to the state of timeless unorganized matter (matter without functional form – or “undifferentiated sea of energy” as someone else referred to this “bedrock particle”) and do so in an instant, but – as mentioned, Natural Philosophy is focused on what is. Now.

So, while a purely materialistic philosophy would have it that “memories are clearly dependent on the physical brain”, the Natural Philosophy I am developing, takes into consideration these reported experience re the hypothesis of Universal Mind.

I don't take OBEs seriously,

I have yet to meet a materialist who does.

But you do.

Natural Philosophy takes all data of experience reported by humans seriously, in the sense that it does not hand-wave such away as mere "hallucination/illusion of physicality/mirage et al" including the mind itself, which materialist generally consider to be a type of hallucination emergent purely through brain activity.

But you seem to be contradicting what you said, above: "without our brains (including the nervous system) we cannot experience being human". OBEs are not attached to brains and nervous systems.

I have no established opinion on whether this is the case or not. Clearly these are alternate to ordinary experiences involving being human, but they are also human experiences. My unestablished opinion would be that any survival of NDEs, OOBEs et al which are then reported, probably are still attached to brains and nervous systems, but scientific instruments are not fine enough to show evidence for that being the case, as there are cases where the human is even considered brain-dead and yet survives the experience to give us the report.

Regardless- you seem to have a magical view of memories and knowledge. Recall that you criticized some aspect of physicalism because it was seemingly magical. In fact, the closest to magical (or hand-waving) for physicalism is the nature of qualia. You have significantly more magic in your model.

This assumes that OOBEs are “magical” whereas Natural Philosophy sees these as part of Nature and no more “magical” than the existence of Consciousness, and considers Mind to be real, rather than a magical quality such as “an illusion” created by brains.
Thus, while I understand the materialist view on the mind, I reject any implication that it is a magical thing, or even that it is immaterial. Natural Philosophy regards the mind as material, even that current science is unable to detect its physical nature in any other way than where it interacts with more detectable physical objects, notably, brains.
The problem of Qualia is adequately solved by Natural Philosophy re the hard problem of consciousness being solved by the inclusion of hypothesis of the UM.
The hand-waving non-explanation that Natural Philosophy is “magical thinking” is clearly not an adequate critique.

[fredonly]

The problem of Qualia is adequately solved by Natural Philosophy re the hard problem of consciousness being solved by the inclusion of hypothesis of the UM.

I don't understand how this solves anything. Instead of many minds having the quale experience, you say it's one mind having it. Reducing the number of minds isn't a solution.

I still can't understand the relationship of UM with laws of nature (LoN), but let's concentrate on the qualia issue first.

[William]

[Replying to fredonly in post #77]

The problem of Qualia is adequately solved by Natural Philosophy re the hard problem of consciousness being solved by the inclusion of hypothesis of the UM.

I don't understand how this solves anything. Instead of many minds having the quale experience, you say it's one mind having it. Reducing the number of minds isn't a solution.

It has nothing to do with numbers, either one or many.

The solution has to do with the "hard problem of consciousness"

While a supernatural "God" solves that problem (why consciousness exists) it does not solve the problem of infinite regress (who created the supernatural God) whereas this Natural Philosophy solves both philosophical problems by combining rather than separating.

I still can't understand the relationship of UM with laws of nature (LoN), but let's concentrate on the qualia issue first.

Sure. You correctly understand that materialist philosophy doesn't solve the "qualia" issue - as to why we each have subjective experience - thus the problem of consciousness remains a problem.
The natural philosophy I am engaging with solves the problem because it basically takes "God" out of the supernatural proposition and places it within the context of nature and says that - just as the idea there has always existed the fundamental matter that all organized matter derives from, so too - this fundamental matter has always been mindful.

Thus - as we can understand and appreciate that while human minds appear to emerge from human brains, this interpretation of the appearance is done so, because mindfulness as an attribute of the fundamental matter, is not factored in.
When mindfulness is factored in, the (hard) problem of consciousness is solved.

[fredonly]

[Replying to fredonly in post #77]

The problem of Qualia is adequately solved by Natural Philosophy re the hard problem of consciousness being solved by the inclusion of hypothesis of the UM.

I don't understand how this solves anything. Instead of many minds having the quale experience, you say it's one mind having it. Reducing the number of minds isn't a solution.

It has nothing to do with numbers, either one or many.

The solution has to do with the "hard problem of consciousness"

You haven't explained how it solves the hard problem. All you've done is to claim: 1) there's a UM, and we're all part of it. 2) qualia (like pain) are "real"

Here's my account: Pain is real under my materialist account too: it's in the causal chain. It's reducible to physical processes, but its conscious manifestation (why it feels the way it feels) is illusory.

Now give me your account and show how it improves on this. You've said that mindfulness is an attribute of fundamental matter, but you also said the UM didn't experience pain in its unorganized state - so it doesn't seem that pain is an attribute of fundamental matter. So you need to account for it arising from organization while also distinguishing from, and improving upon, the strictly physicalist account I gave.

[William]

[Replying to fredonly in post #79]

You haven't explained how it solves the hard problem.

Yes I have.

All you've done is to claim: 1) there's a UM, and we're all part of it.

No. What I have presented is a philosophical hypothesis.

2) qualia (like pain) are "real"

Again. Hypothesis.

Here's my account: Pain is real under my materialist account too: it's in the causal chain. It's reducible to physical processes, but its conscious manifestation (why it feels the way it feels) is illusory.

That is also philosophical hypothesis.

Now give me your account and show how it improves on this.

I have already provided the hypothesis for this. You have yet to critique it.

I don't have to account for the problem of pain any more than I already have.

The hard problem of consciousness is solved by accounting for its existence. Natural Philosophy has done this through the hypothesis explained in earlier posts. (Consciousness as fundamental)

The problem of "pain" is not why consciousness is regarded as a hard problem.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness
https://consc.net/papers/facing.html

The moral of all this is that you can't explain conscious experience on the cheap. It is a remarkable fact that reductive methods - methods that explain a high-level phenomenon wholly in terms of more basic physical processes - work well in so many domains. In a sense, one can explain most biological and cognitive phenomena on the cheap, in that these phenomena are seen as automatic consequences of more fundamental processes. It would be wonderful if reductive methods could explain experience, too; I hoped for a long time that they might. Unfortunately, there are systematic reasons why these methods must fail. Reductive methods are successful in most domains because what needs explaining in those domains are structures and functions, and these are the kind of thing that a physical account can entail. When it comes to a problem over and above the explanation of structures and functions, these methods are impotent.