Can subjective experience be explained by science?

[Furrowed Brow]

In the debate Robot v Humans I got myself into a tricky area. That debate became largley about Free Will. However I find myself also wanting to talk about subjective experience. Philosophers sometimes use the word qualia.

Qualia = The intrinsic phenomenal features of subjective consciousness, or sense data. Thus, qualia include what it is like to see green grass, to taste salt, to hear birds sing, to have a headache, to feel pain, etc.

To be clear about the problem I am trying to address. I am not asking about how you know the pain you feel is like the pain someone elses feels, or that when you see a red billboard everyone else sees the red as you. And I am also not asking about how we become self conscious.

My question is I think both simple and yet probably the most difficult philosophical question of all.

Q1:How does that bunch of jangling molecules or forces become not just that particular experience, but an experience at all?

I believe it is a matter of logic that a material/scientific explanation will always systematically fail to explain why and how there is subjective experience. Bugmaster on the other hand is more hopeful.

I can grant you that we currently do not know the mechanism by which subjective experiences operate (especially, subjective experiences other than yourself), but that doesn't mean that we can't know that mechanism, in principle.

Q2: So can we in principle know how jangling atoms/physical forces turn into subjective experience?

[QED]

Q1:How does that bunch of jangling molecules or forces become not just that particular experience, but an experience at all?
First you would have to convince me that this is a valid question. People seem very certain about what things can have qualia and what can't, but we're lost for ways of confirming this beyond our own subjectuve experiences. Someone (George?) said he was absolutely sure that he had it while a logic gate didn't. Why should this be so to any finite degree? Two cross-connected Nand gates have a one-bit memory -- who knows what feelings a few trillion might have. If someone says this view is obviously dopey I would want to know why given that we find it so difficult capturing the experience with an adequate definition.


I believe it is a matter of logic that a material/scientific explanation will always systematically fail to explain why and how there is subjective experience. Bugmaster on the other hand is more hopeful.

I can grant you that we currently do not know the mechanism by which subjective experiences operate (especially, subjective experiences other than yourself), but that doesn't mean that we can't know that mechanism, in principle.

Q2: So can we in principle know how jangling atoms/physical forces turn into subjective experience?

[Bugmaster]

Q2: So can we in principle know how jangling atoms/physical forces turn into subjective experience?

I would say that this depends on what the nature of subjective experience is.

If you believe that subjective experience is an independently existing supernatural entity (or, a result of some activity of such an entity), then you will never be able to explain it in natural terms. Here, I use the term "supernatural" to mean, "any entity for which empirical evidence cannot, in principle, be found". I do not use it to mean any specific supernatural critter, such as gods, demons, goblins, etc.

If, on the other hand, you believe that subjective experience is entirely natural, then it stands to reason that it could be explained in natural terms. If we assume that what science does is explain things in natural terms, then yes, science will eventually explain subjective experience.

I should also point out that it's not enough to explain your own subjective experience. Whatever explanation you end up with -- a scientific one, a religious one, a philosophical one, etc. -- must adequately explain the subjective experiences of other people, as well. Otherwise, you end up with a kind of solipsism, which is philosophically neat, but pragmatically not very useful.

[palmera]

Q1:How does that bunch of jangling molecules or forces become not just that particular experience, but an experience at all?

Great topic. Starting out on the molecular level one must first note that molecules do not "jangle." I realize this question is not meant to provide insight into the nature of molecules but rather to speak about the improbability of explaining subjective experience through science. The journey from molecules to subjective experience is structured and incremental. Setting aside the journey from molecule to primate, let's begin here: Subjective experience is a by product of self-awareness. The human brain has developed into an intelligent computer with the ability not only to conceptually distinguish itself from the rest of the world, but along with the larynx (et. al) is able to talk about said experience. Subjective experience is a by product of our evolution. Of course it's not this simple but it can definitely be explained by science.

I'm just not seeing how this is a conundrum for science. Natural selection has given us the self aware brain and linguistic ability necessary to think about and articulate such an experience. Experience is simply part of interaction with the world. All creatures have experiences but do not think of them in the same way we do because they do not have the same mental or linguistic faculties.

[Furrowed Brow]

Starting out on the molecular level one must first note that molecules do not "jangle."

Um. Yeah. Well. It’s was just a folksy way of talking, However I it was an attempt to get the reader thinking about physical interactions.

I realize this question is not meant to provide insight into the nature of molecules but rather to speak about the improbability of explaining subjective experience through science.

Well I don’ think this is a matter of probability but, but I guess We can tease out the difference.

The journey from molecules to subjective experience is structured and incremental.

Hmm. I don’t think we talking about the same thing yet.

Subjective experience is a by product of self-awareness.

Ok I’m going to disagree with that. Putting aside the problem of how do we know - I would say squirrels have an experience of the taste of nuts, lions have an experience of the taste of meat, but I would not say either have self awareness.

I think my use of the word “subjective” has not helped. By subjective I mean personal feelings and tastes, but I do not mean to imply a self aware person in the personal. So I guess I am trying to limit the conversation to the feelings, experiences of a subject viz., a thing or individual that expereinces.

The human brain has developed into an intelligent computer with the ability not only to conceptually distinguish itself from the rest of the world, but along with the larynx (et. al) is able to talk about said experience.

Agreed. Though the route is highly complex and language fluid, and social based. However if I said the words "tooth ache" and you have experienced tooth ache, then we are talking about the same.

Subjective experience is a by product of our evolution.

Well it depends on what you have in mind when you are talking about “subjective experience”. I’d say any cognitive function is a product of evolution. And I’d say that the pain response to noxious stimuli could also be argued as such. But the feel of the pain. The ouch. The ache. The colour - any colour, the smell of fresh coffee as it is experienced. Any smell. And again some of these things we recognisee because we have learnt to recognize. So there will be some higher brain functions involved; the presence of which I am happy to put down to evolution. But those higher functions are still physical processes. Don’t get hooked into thinking about how the brain organises these things; rather this is a question about how any physical organization (regardless of complexity)can be experiential.

All creatures have experiences but do not think of them in the same way we do because they do not have the same mental or linguistic faculties.

Ok. Agreed. I’m then talking about not what separates us, but that basic sensual experience. Big brain and small brain creatures will make sense of that experience in the way the size and complexity of their brains limit them. So I am not talking about the organization of experience. And I know self awareness can feed back into how we experience pain, but pain seems to be an easy brute experience that is the best example I can think of.

You burn yourself. There will be various physical process, electrochemical interactions etc that are the physical actuality of the pain. But the feel of the pain is an aspect of those interactions that I think logically cannot be explained by science.

Put it this way. You have experiences. Your brain is complex and makes sense of those experiences in the unique way that it does. But what turns the lights on inside you? What turns the feel of pain on? What makes the difference between a highly functional android, one that can mimic your behavior, sound like you, express itself like you; yet it has never had an experience of fresh coffee, or seen blue; though it has behaviors protocols that allow it to react to these physical/chemical phenomena perfectly well.

I think the answer to those “what?” questions cannot be answered by physical/causal explanations because there is a shift in perspective/aspect.

One more pain example: we have very good physical theories for describing radiation, and the physical interactions when our skin is exposed to the radiation of the sun. And we have perfectly good evolutionary theories as to why our skin is the way it is. And we can understand how we get sunburn. The pain mechanisms of the body are less well understood. But even if we understood them fully - I’m saying we still have not explained the Oohh!!! Arrhh!! Awohhh!!! Of the feel of sunburn.

[QED]

You burn yourself. There will be various physical process, electrochemical interactions etc that are the physical actuality of the pain. But the feel of the pain is an aspect of those interactions that I think logically cannot be explained by science.

Put it this way. You have experiences. Your brain is complex and makes sense of those experiences in the unique way that it does. But what turns the lights on inside you? What turns the feel of pain on? What makes the difference between a highly functional android, one that can mimic your behavior, sound like you, express itself like you; yet it has never had an experience of fresh coffee, or seen blue; though it has behaviors protocols that allow it to react to these physical/chemical phenomena perfectly well.

This certainly has the appearance of being a major mystery, but I don't see how we can say that it could not logically be explained by science just because of that.

I agree that pain is a good thing to contemplate. I view it like this: pain has evolved to moderate the behaviour of organisms. It would have been present in some form as a behavioural modifier for the simplest of mobile organisms e.g. don't keep swimming in that direction -- it's too hot/cold/acid/alkaline/light/dark/etc.

I think the key issue is that pain must be effective. Ineffective pain results in an ineffective survival strategy, so whatever pain is, it isn't just another observation that can be ignored (e.g. ah, what a pretty flower). But that's not entirely accurate! Pain is only hard to ignore -- it has the potential to distract us to lesser or greater degrees. Harvey (you may or may not recall him on here) once said that pain couldn't just be a "flag-bit" that got set for the CPU to inspect. But although I can understand the sentiment in that, it strikes me that if the CPU's job is to check an ocean of "flag-bits" that keeps it from doing other things then this may get us closer to the issue.

I'm putting pain in a similar class to auditory experience at the moment. Certain sounds seem painful to me -- not just because of excessive sound pressure. The sound of chalk scraping on a blackboard seems to generate a similar sensation to pain in the teeth for example. Given that pain can be ignored to a degree, I think we can consider it in terms of being "just another brain state". Let's see if we can knock this down now

[Furrowed Brow]

Hi QED

It would have been present in some form as a behavioural modifier for the simplest of mobile organisms e.g. don't keep swimming in that direction -- it's too hot/cold/acid/alkaline/light/dark/etc.

Say you build an automata. You build this machine in an attempt to replicate fish behaviour. You build into it various sensing devices that react to how warm the water is. And you programme it to quickly avoid temperature ranges that will damage it, and you give it a preference for a particular temperature range. Say 5-15 degrees C.

Ok your fishy automata is very good at avoiding certain temperatures. And in less rigorous moments you might say things like my fish does not like hot water. And it would be true to say, as it has sensing equipment, that it is sensing the temperature of the water. But at no point - unless you have had a bit too much Dorset scrumpy - would you seriously say (and literally mean) that your fish “feels” the heat. Or maybe you would?

I view it like this: pain has evolved to moderate the behaviour of organisms.

Well I’d certainly say evolution is reasonable for pain moderating behaviours. That is to say organisms make use of the ability to feel pain to moderate their behaviour. And how that is organised is certainly a tale that belongs to science.

But evolutionary processes do not produce the pain itself. So what does? Well one might point to certain neurons firing, or any physical interaction that is the physical token of the pain, but again we come to the same mysterious conceptual wall. How and why does, say, a bunch of neurons firing, have a feel to it at all. The evolutionary answer provides one kind of why answer. But explaining the survival advantage of pain is not the kind of why I’m try to get at.

So I guess I’m saying there are two different questions.

1/ The hows and whys of evolution engendering a species to take evolutionary advantage of the ability to feel pain, with moderating behaviours that utilise pain.

2/ The how and why of a physical interaction engendering a feel.

The second question is the one that keeps me up nights.

[palmera]

But evolutionary processes do not produce the pain itself. So what does? Well one might point to certain neurons firing, or any physical interaction that is the physical token of the pain, but again we come to the same mysterious conceptual wall. How and why does, say, a bunch of neurons firing, have a feel to it at all. The evolutionary answer provides one kind of why answer. But explaining the survival advantage of pain is not the kind of why I’m try to get at.

So I guess I’m saying there are two different questions.

1/ The hows and whys of evolution engendering a species to take evolutionary advantage of the ability to feel pain, with moderating behaviours that utilise pain.

2/ The how and why of a physical interaction engendering a feel.

The second question is the one that keeps me up nights.

I still don't see how this problem can't be solved by beginning with self awareness. In the computer example, it doesn't "feel" the pain in the same way humans do because it is not sentient. We evolved into conscious beings with the capacity to think abstractly. I think this also has something to do with how we conceptualize and talk about experiences in terms of feelings.

"Feelings" do not exist outside of our minds. They are mental constructs we use, probably as a by-product of our predilection to think dualistically (mind/body.) Experiences, physical interactions, engenders feelings inside of us because that's the way we've been "programed" over millions of years of evolution.

[QED]

Say you build an automata. You build this machine in an attempt to replicate fish behaviour. You build into it various sensing devices that react to how warm the water is. And you programme it to quickly avoid temperature ranges that will damage it, and you give it a preference for a particular temperature range. Say 5-15 degrees C.

Ok your fishy automata is very good at avoiding certain temperatures. And in less rigorous moments you might say things like my fish does not like hot water. And it would be true to say, as it has sensing equipment, that it is sensing the temperature of the water. But at no point - unless you have had a bit too much Dorset scrumpy - would you seriously say (and literally mean) that your fish “feels” the heat. Or maybe you would?

A nice little micro-controller-based project like the one you describe would never be far from responding directly to its inputs. Sure it might have some other conditionals to take into consideration (e.g. my batteries are running low and to get to the underwater recharger I ought to risk getting too hot otherwise I'll come to a certain end!). If we see an accumulation of many such conditionals (perhaps in their billions) then what gives us the rights to say "ah well, when it was only one or two it was obviously mind dead SO just adding a few more (even if its billions) won't make it any less mind dead". I don't actually accept that as a valid argument as it rules out emergent phenomena.

This is probably where you and I lose most sleep at night though because we ought to worry about platform independence i.e. if it still all reduces to an algorithm that could, in principle, be run on a UTM then we would have to accept that a suitably laid-out train set could also run the algorithm and be self-aware as a consequence. Now this makes some people set down their spectacles and say "OK, that rules out any computational solution to AI" but this conclusion is not at all obvious to me.

How do we know that that which we experience isn't experienced by degree in other things? We have to take it on trust that other humans experience what we do, because even though we can communicate we still have the problem of the Turing Test. But it's a pretty safe bet when face-to face. But who's to say that a cruise-missile isn't experiencing some microscopic quantity of this feeling we jealously guard as our own? I bet my pet cat does, and by the way the live mice he brings in behave, I'm very much inclined to think that they have a fair degree of feeling.

Well I’d certainly say evolution is reasonable for pain moderating behaviours. That is to say organisms make use of the ability to feel pain to moderate their behaviour. And how that is organised is certainly a tale that belongs to science.

But evolutionary processes do not produce the pain itself. So what does? Well one might point to certain neurons firing, or any physical interaction that is the physical token of the pain, but again we come to the same mysterious conceptual wall. How and why does, say, a bunch of neurons firing, have a feel to it at all. The evolutionary answer provides one kind of why answer. But explaining the survival advantage of pain is not the kind of why I’m try to get at.

But aren't you falling into some sort of trap here? We might be tempted to say that a machine obviously can't feel and we do -- so what's the essential difference? I'm neither certain that machines can't feel nor am I certain that we can!

So I guess I’m saying there are two different questions.

1/ The hows and whys of evolution engendering a species to take evolutionary advantage of the ability to feel pain, with moderating behaviours that utilise pain.

2/ The how and why of a physical interaction engendering a feel.

The second question is the one that keeps me up nights.

I think our observational standpoint clouds the second issue for us. We know that pain starts out as a physical signal in our nervous system and ends up as a sensation of some sort. The sensation seems to be something real that's "felt" by someone inside us. But this is the best we can do to imagine the situation. If you pinch yourself and savour the sensation what exactly is it? It seems to me that it elicits a range of thoughts along the lines of "hey! this sort of thing could spoil all your other plans -- stop it at once!". It seems to me to be the tipping of a balance relating to some notion of how well we're meeting up with our expectations of how we should be feeling. I think this makes it ratio-metric rather than some sort of absolute. The feeling itself can be masked to a greater or lesser degree.

[Goat]

But evolutionary processes do not produce the pain itself. So what does? Well one might point to certain neurons firing, or any physical interaction that is the physical token of the pain, but again we come to the same mysterious conceptual wall. How and why does, say, a bunch of neurons firing, have a feel to it at all. The evolutionary answer provides one kind of why answer. But explaining the survival advantage of pain is not the kind of why I’m try to get at.

So I guess I’m saying there are two different questions.

1/ The hows and whys of evolution engendering a species to take evolutionary advantage of the ability to feel pain, with moderating behaviours that utilise pain.

2/ The how and why of a physical interaction engendering a feel.

The second question is the one that keeps me up nights.

I still don't see how this problem can't be solved by beginning with self awareness. In the computer example, it doesn't "feel" the pain in the same way humans do because it is not sentient. We evolved into conscious beings with the capacity to think abstractly. I think this also has something to do with how we conceptualize and talk about experiences in terms of feelings.

"Feelings" do not exist outside of our minds. They are mental constructs we use, probably as a by-product of our predilection to think dualistically (mind/body.) Experiences, physical interactions, engenders feelings inside of us because that's the way we've been "programed" over millions of years of evolution.

And when they start making computers that are sentient? And just how much intelligence is needed to have a 'mind'? do cuttle fish have 'minds'? How about other mammals?