“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?”
~Epicurus
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Re: ~Epicurus
Post #2Substance wrote:“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?”
Illogical.
The argument presumes that the existence of evil is other than a subset of good.
The only thing that Epicurus 'proved' is that his conception of God does not exist.
(Other possibility) Evil is in the service of 'good' because evil is designed to send you away from itself and towards the good (pleasure/pain principle).
Re: ~Epicurus
Post #3Pi wrote:Substance wrote:“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?”
Illogical.
The argument presumes that the existence of evil is other than a subset of good.
The only thing that Epicurus 'proved' is that his conception of God does not exist.
(Other possibility) Evil is in the service of 'good' because evil is designed to send you away from itself and towards the good (pleasure/pain principle).
If we are to assume that "evil" is merely a subset of "good", by what right are evildoers punished and not rewarded by "God"?
The problem with the idea that somehow God is the presence of good and evil is the absence of God fails upon examination. It appears to be a kludge designed to work around the otherwise insurmountable Problem of Evil in Christian Apologetics. However the underlying Christian morality based on Hebrew scripture treats evil as an entity unto itself. In no sense is evil rewarded for showing the way toward good or evildoers praised for their completion of God's plan.
In light of the later Christian tradition, Epicurus was correct in that the problem of Evil creates an unanswerable problem in that specific area of apologetics. Let's remember that Epicurus was not speaking to the Hebrew Yahweh but the Greek pantheon. If one does not accept the premise of a good good then the reductio of Epicurus fails.
However, one can not postulate a good god and then dismiss evil from the context unless one is literally willing to dismiss evil. I have yet to meet anyone of the Abrahamic faiths willing to make that step.
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Catharsis
Post #4
Who were the Epicureans? Epicureanism was founded at roughly the same time as Stoicism by Epicurus (341–270 bc).
Epicureanism can be described as follows: It is a materialistic philosophy based on Democritus’ atomic theory. While ‘gods’ exist, they are composed of atoms—the finest atoms—just as is the rest of every possible world, and they live in a condition of supreme bliss completely detached from and indifferent to the present world and the affairs of men. All things are composed of atoms; there are a finite number of elements whose compounds go to make up all existent things. The natural movement of the atoms is downward (hence in parallel) and at uniform speed, but these atoms have a certain limited ‘swerve’ which is indeterminate (the ‘swerve’ introduces a non-deterministic element) and causes the interaction of the atoms: this ‘swerve’ by its existence preserves the non-determined nature of human experience, but its rather limited scope preserves the uniformity or regularity of experience. The world is wholly due to mechanical causes.
There is an unlimited number of universes of similar types; the ‘gods’ live in the mid-regions between the various universes.
The human is a compound of body and soul, neither of which can exist without the other. Body and soul are each composed of atoms. The elements of the soul comprise just air, wind, fire and a fourth element peculiar to the soul and nameless. After death, body and soul disintegrate. Death is mere extinction, the complete absence of all consciousness and feeling. No judgement and no punishment await men in the afterlife. ‘Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved is devoid of sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is nothing to us.’[1]
Epicurus’ epistemology was empiricist: Man knows only on the basis of the data of sense-perception, which results, in the case of sight, from images of the object seen, which images are emanations of atoms from the object. Very fine emanations, for example those from the ‘gods’, can impress the mind directly without the mediation of the sense organs. Emanations that have become scrambled in transit give rise to dreams and fantasies. Repeated experiences of sense data received by the senses and preserved in the memory give rise to ‘anticipations (prolepseis)’ that are equivalent to concepts. This seems to be a notion of the formation of a concept through the habituation of sense-perception. From concepts can be formed opinions or judgements, which are tested either against the objects in the world or, when the opinion is by nature untestable, by consistency with observable things and by a criterion of the incompatibility with observable things of the negation of the opinion.
The passion of pleasure is the highest good; and the passion of pain, the greatest evil. All statements about good and evil have meaning only with reference to the passions of pleasure and pain. ‘The criteria of truth are the senses, the preconceptions [prolepseis] and the passions.’[2]
The part of the soul that deals with sense-perception is spread throughout the body; the part that thinks and feels is centred in the heart. There is no part of the self that is not strictly dependent on sense-perception. However, man has free will.
Read more here: http://timiosprodromos.blogspot.com/200 ... r-i-7.html
Epicureanism can be described as follows: It is a materialistic philosophy based on Democritus’ atomic theory. While ‘gods’ exist, they are composed of atoms—the finest atoms—just as is the rest of every possible world, and they live in a condition of supreme bliss completely detached from and indifferent to the present world and the affairs of men. All things are composed of atoms; there are a finite number of elements whose compounds go to make up all existent things. The natural movement of the atoms is downward (hence in parallel) and at uniform speed, but these atoms have a certain limited ‘swerve’ which is indeterminate (the ‘swerve’ introduces a non-deterministic element) and causes the interaction of the atoms: this ‘swerve’ by its existence preserves the non-determined nature of human experience, but its rather limited scope preserves the uniformity or regularity of experience. The world is wholly due to mechanical causes.
There is an unlimited number of universes of similar types; the ‘gods’ live in the mid-regions between the various universes.
The human is a compound of body and soul, neither of which can exist without the other. Body and soul are each composed of atoms. The elements of the soul comprise just air, wind, fire and a fourth element peculiar to the soul and nameless. After death, body and soul disintegrate. Death is mere extinction, the complete absence of all consciousness and feeling. No judgement and no punishment await men in the afterlife. ‘Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved is devoid of sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is nothing to us.’[1]
Epicurus’ epistemology was empiricist: Man knows only on the basis of the data of sense-perception, which results, in the case of sight, from images of the object seen, which images are emanations of atoms from the object. Very fine emanations, for example those from the ‘gods’, can impress the mind directly without the mediation of the sense organs. Emanations that have become scrambled in transit give rise to dreams and fantasies. Repeated experiences of sense data received by the senses and preserved in the memory give rise to ‘anticipations (prolepseis)’ that are equivalent to concepts. This seems to be a notion of the formation of a concept through the habituation of sense-perception. From concepts can be formed opinions or judgements, which are tested either against the objects in the world or, when the opinion is by nature untestable, by consistency with observable things and by a criterion of the incompatibility with observable things of the negation of the opinion.
The passion of pleasure is the highest good; and the passion of pain, the greatest evil. All statements about good and evil have meaning only with reference to the passions of pleasure and pain. ‘The criteria of truth are the senses, the preconceptions [prolepseis] and the passions.’[2]
The part of the soul that deals with sense-perception is spread throughout the body; the part that thinks and feels is centred in the heart. There is no part of the self that is not strictly dependent on sense-perception. However, man has free will.
Read more here: http://timiosprodromos.blogspot.com/200 ... r-i-7.html
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achilles12604
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Re: ~Epicurus
Post #5Or perhaps, God's involvement with evil is much like a parent who's child refused to listen or obey. And thus ended up in prison. Is it really God's job to eliminate all evil in the world when it is created by men? Is God our own personal maid?Substance wrote:“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?”
It is a first class human tragedy that people of the earth who claim to believe in the message of Jesus, whom they describe as the Prince of Peace, show little of that belief in actual practice.
