I'm curious: how do we know that truth exists? Are we to prove it exists to know that it exists? If so, wouldn't that mean we have to frame an argument in which we'd need to concede some premises as true? Wouldn't this be cirular logic - relying on that which we are trying to prove to prove it? In such a case, is it just up to accepting the existance and possibility truth as a fundamental axiom to our human thinking?
Also, what do you think the ramifications of evolution on truth are? Does the nature of change through evolution change truth or is truth what is beyond our immediate mental capacity and our attempts to find it necessarily shortfalling because of our limited capacities as humans (perhaps hence why we're so focused on a scientific approach of weeding out the untruths to make truth hide in smaller and smaller spaces)?
How do we know there is such a thing as truth?
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truth
Post #2I think the primary method for arriving at truth is logic. But we have to start somewhere. Descartes assumes that he thinks, and proceeds from there. Can we prove that we think, if by prove we mean logically deduce it as truth from other truths? I suppose not, but it certainly makes sense to start there, and I think there are other similar assumptions/premises/axioms that you can’t deduce logically, but it is fair to start with them.
But this whole framework of using logic assumes truth exists, and whatever is contradictory is false, which is what you are saying. I suppose it would be circular if you ended up coming back to the starting point using logic, but the problem with most circular arguments is not the fact that they are circular per se (this just means they are internally consistent) but that the assumed truths are not very reasonable. All that to say, I think we can find truth, only because I think that some axioms, like “I think” are, well, reasonable to start with.
You bring up an interesting point with evolution. In all this we are relying on our evolved brains to make these logical conclusions. Let us say, hypothetically, we evolve into beings where our brains tell us that we do not exist and do not think, somehow. Do we then not exist? I say we do exist, and there I am trusting my brain as it is now. I think we can rely on our brains to reason logically despite their physical, changing nature. However, I think we can only rely on our brains to an extent. It is fair to say “I think” like Descartes, but we cannot assume that all truth will be comprehensible to our brains. It is, I suppose, a fine line in deciding when to consider something that seems reasonable to us to be an axiom, and I think this is where faith comes in, partly. Either you start somewhere or you don’t go anywhere.
But this whole framework of using logic assumes truth exists, and whatever is contradictory is false, which is what you are saying. I suppose it would be circular if you ended up coming back to the starting point using logic, but the problem with most circular arguments is not the fact that they are circular per se (this just means they are internally consistent) but that the assumed truths are not very reasonable. All that to say, I think we can find truth, only because I think that some axioms, like “I think” are, well, reasonable to start with.
You bring up an interesting point with evolution. In all this we are relying on our evolved brains to make these logical conclusions. Let us say, hypothetically, we evolve into beings where our brains tell us that we do not exist and do not think, somehow. Do we then not exist? I say we do exist, and there I am trusting my brain as it is now. I think we can rely on our brains to reason logically despite their physical, changing nature. However, I think we can only rely on our brains to an extent. It is fair to say “I think” like Descartes, but we cannot assume that all truth will be comprehensible to our brains. It is, I suppose, a fine line in deciding when to consider something that seems reasonable to us to be an axiom, and I think this is where faith comes in, partly. Either you start somewhere or you don’t go anywhere.
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Furrowed Brow
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Post #3
Depends what you mean by truth? If you mean something metaphysical truth - maybe have some Platonic presumptions - then I’d say no. That kind of truth is bogus.Undertow wrote:I'm curious: how do we know that truth exists?
Our language does indeed seem to be a vehicle for representation. Ignoring Descartes sceptical doubt and on the assumption that there is a world out there beyond are words being represented by our words then I think we can introduce some notion of truth. Though things get a bit murky when one starts looking at this kind of problem. Personally I’m happy to say that the desk I’m sitting at is there, that this proposition makes sense, and can be falsified. There for the proposition can be a true or false proposition. In fact Descartes whole method relies on this presumption.
When talking about truth I don’t think it can mean much more than the correspondece between our words and what they represent. To be true that kind of definition of truth is positivistic. Coursely put - if our propostions cannot be true or false then they are meaningless.
Truth does not change. Only opinion. I’m sitting at my desk or I’m not. That regularly pattern in rock is a fossil or it is not. The world is billions of years old or it is not. I'm not one to over inflate quantum effects. If I don't know the position and momentum of a particle below a certain degree of accuracy then I don't know. But such problems have no affect on my ability to say whether that lumpy rock is a fossil or not a fossil.Undetow wrote:Also, what do you think the ramifications of evolution on truth are? Does the nature of change through evolution change truth or is truth what is beyond our immediate mental capacity and our attempts to find it necessarily shortfalling because of our limited capacities as humans (perhaps hence why we're so focused on a scientific approach of weeding out the untruths to make truth hide in smaller and smaller spaces)?
I might say the age of the earth is less than 10^400 years old. And I’ve said something true. Just not very accurate or enlightening. Consequently I think the focus on truth is not that helpful. I prefer to think of things in terms of rigour, precision, falsification. How much intellectual effort and evidence has gone in to reaching a conclusion and how can it be falsified or improved is what counts. If I was to sum all that up I would reduce everything to one word - rigour.
Post #4
Those are some good responses. On the whole I'd agree with simple truths such as 'I'm typing on a computer or I'm not.' These notions also make sense to me and yes I'd also agree that truth wouldn't change, only our perceptions of what that truth may exactly be. This is where I completely agree with Furrowed Brow's veiw on looking at things in terms of precision, verification or falsification rather than lunging straight for truth. Truth seems to be illusive if we try to guess it off the bat, hence why a rigourous approach like science seems to work much better.
Post #5
Mind if I get in on this?
In response to Undertow's initial questions (ie. 'Does the nature of change through evolution change truth or is truth what is beyond our immediate mental capacity and our attempts to find it necessarily shortfalling...' and 'how do we know that truth exists?') I answer that there seems to be two types of truths: (1) Those gained (a) by immediate observation in the physical world and through (b) measurements in the physical world-all which are all learnt via induction, and (2) those arrived at via deduction (either from basic logic or accepted first principles).
The truths about the physical world in group (1a) encompass statements like 'Most human beings have five fingers (ah, including the thumb). Now, let's say we evolve and lose that meddlesome pinky finger. The statement would then no longer be true. So these truths change.
The truths about the physical world in group (1b) encompass statements like that uttered by Furrowed Brow: 'the age of the earth is less than 10^400 years old' and 'all objects fall towards earth at 9.81 m/s^2'. These 'truths' could, as F.B. points out, be regarded better as opinions, since as our measuring technology becomes more precise, we get more accurate results. In becoming more precise though, we are aiming at a goal-the elusive truth of what earth's gravity actually is, or was, at the moment of time we conducted the measurement. So I have to disagree with F.B. when he says 'Consequently I think the focus on truth is not that helpful.' It is the very focus on truth that gives meaning to words like 'precise' and 'rigourous', for we would never be precise or rigorous if we were aiming at nothing-we are precise and rigorous in regard to our focus on a 'truth'. As precision increases, yes, or when we are given better results, our opinion on this will change.
Again, though- these 'truths' must change though-the world is getting older every second, land masses change so that the acceleration of gravity at a certain point on earth alters...
The truths in group (2) encompass statements like '2+2=4' and 'If all A are B, and some C are B, some C are A' and all statements arrived at via deduction. These do not change, but are always necessarily true, and are important since they help us realize a basis for belief. Say someone says 'the only truths that are really truths are those which are empirically derived'. We realize that via basic reasoning that if we apply this statement to itself, it refutes itself.
In forming metaphysical beliefs, as elliott137 points out, we all need to start somewhere. We begin with first principles. By extending those first principles, looking at their implications and seeing if they are consistent, we realize whether the first principles are 'true' or 'false'.
But I guess this still doesn't answer your question, Undertow, as to how we know that truth exists.
When do we say that something is 'true'? A statement is true if it holds necessarily-ie. it always must be true? This would suggest though that 'truths' about the physical world can never be real truths-even if there does exist an exact value of '9.81 m/s^2' at this moment in time, we can never know it exactly-and at the next moment, it changes'. But we always must presuppose there is a truth, or else we have no basis for our lives. We suppose it is true that I am writing this, that you are, things are. ?Perhaps it might be said that to suppose truth is to suppose that things are? Rather sketchy on this.
Oh, by the by... Furrowed Brow said 'Depends what you mean by truth? If you mean something metaphysical truth - maybe have some Platonic presumptions - then I’d say no. That kind of truth is bogus.' Would you care to elaborate on this? By 'metaphysical truth', do you mean truths separate and apart from the physical world? Because if yes-if your statement that this type of truth is always bogus-it's self-refuting, as we've seen physical truths always change, whereas you gave an absolute statement. Please explain! This sounds very interesting.
In response to Undertow's initial questions (ie. 'Does the nature of change through evolution change truth or is truth what is beyond our immediate mental capacity and our attempts to find it necessarily shortfalling...' and 'how do we know that truth exists?') I answer that there seems to be two types of truths: (1) Those gained (a) by immediate observation in the physical world and through (b) measurements in the physical world-all which are all learnt via induction, and (2) those arrived at via deduction (either from basic logic or accepted first principles).
The truths about the physical world in group (1a) encompass statements like 'Most human beings have five fingers (ah, including the thumb). Now, let's say we evolve and lose that meddlesome pinky finger. The statement would then no longer be true. So these truths change.
The truths about the physical world in group (1b) encompass statements like that uttered by Furrowed Brow: 'the age of the earth is less than 10^400 years old' and 'all objects fall towards earth at 9.81 m/s^2'. These 'truths' could, as F.B. points out, be regarded better as opinions, since as our measuring technology becomes more precise, we get more accurate results. In becoming more precise though, we are aiming at a goal-the elusive truth of what earth's gravity actually is, or was, at the moment of time we conducted the measurement. So I have to disagree with F.B. when he says 'Consequently I think the focus on truth is not that helpful.' It is the very focus on truth that gives meaning to words like 'precise' and 'rigourous', for we would never be precise or rigorous if we were aiming at nothing-we are precise and rigorous in regard to our focus on a 'truth'. As precision increases, yes, or when we are given better results, our opinion on this will change.
Again, though- these 'truths' must change though-the world is getting older every second, land masses change so that the acceleration of gravity at a certain point on earth alters...
The truths in group (2) encompass statements like '2+2=4' and 'If all A are B, and some C are B, some C are A' and all statements arrived at via deduction. These do not change, but are always necessarily true, and are important since they help us realize a basis for belief. Say someone says 'the only truths that are really truths are those which are empirically derived'. We realize that via basic reasoning that if we apply this statement to itself, it refutes itself.
In forming metaphysical beliefs, as elliott137 points out, we all need to start somewhere. We begin with first principles. By extending those first principles, looking at their implications and seeing if they are consistent, we realize whether the first principles are 'true' or 'false'.
But I guess this still doesn't answer your question, Undertow, as to how we know that truth exists.
When do we say that something is 'true'? A statement is true if it holds necessarily-ie. it always must be true? This would suggest though that 'truths' about the physical world can never be real truths-even if there does exist an exact value of '9.81 m/s^2' at this moment in time, we can never know it exactly-and at the next moment, it changes'. But we always must presuppose there is a truth, or else we have no basis for our lives. We suppose it is true that I am writing this, that you are, things are. ?Perhaps it might be said that to suppose truth is to suppose that things are? Rather sketchy on this.
Oh, by the by... Furrowed Brow said 'Depends what you mean by truth? If you mean something metaphysical truth - maybe have some Platonic presumptions - then I’d say no. That kind of truth is bogus.' Would you care to elaborate on this? By 'metaphysical truth', do you mean truths separate and apart from the physical world? Because if yes-if your statement that this type of truth is always bogus-it's self-refuting, as we've seen physical truths always change, whereas you gave an absolute statement. Please explain! This sounds very interesting.
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Furrowed Brow
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Post #6
I think this is probably a matter of emphasis. Stay rigorous, be methodical, explore every anverue, don’t fall into fallacy, or Semantic confusions, and the answer you come to will be about the best you can manage.Marta wrote:So I have to disagree with F.B. when he saysIt is the very focus on truth that gives meaning to words like 'precise' and 'rigorous', for we would never be precise or rigorous if we were aiming at nothing-we are precise and rigorous in regard to our focus on a 'truth'. As precision increases, yes, or when we are given better results, our opinion on this will change.furrowed Brow wrote:Consequently I think the focus on truth is not that helpful.
Well I dismiss metaphysics and I’m sniffy about the whole concept of truth as something in itself. I’m pretty much a positivist. Our words form propositions that can - at times - picture reality. If there is a correspondence to the degree we can say the proposition P is true, then that is as much as we can hope for.Marta wrote:Oh, by the by... Furrowed Brow saidWould you care to elaborate on this? By 'metaphysical truth', do you mean truths separate and apart from the physical world? Because if yes-if your statement that this type of truth is always bogus-it's self-refuting, as we've seen physical truths always change, whereas you gave an absolute statement. Please explain! This sounds very interesting.Depends what you mean by truth?If you mean something metaphysical truth - maybe have some Platonic presumptions - then I’d say no. That kind of truth is bogus.
Either the world is less than 10^400 years old or it is not. Though not an accurate proposition it is still a true of false proposition. Collections of words that follow good grammar, that seem to say something, but which do not form true or false propositions are meaningless. If I said that “there is the platonic form that can be called Good“, then I’d say this is one of those kinds of pseudo propositions. I speak in English., the words seems to be in a correct order, but I’m still talking nonsense because the proposition can never be verified or falsified. If we dig a little deeper it cannot be analysed out into any other proposition or set of propositions that can be verified or falsified.
But positivism when put in the right hands is not as clumsy as that. If I say “the word is 4 billion years old” there is evidence that verifies it, and it is a statement that can in principle be falsified. Therefore it is a meaningful statement. Lets say the world is really only 10,000 years old. Then the 4 billion years claim will be false. The real issue is are you saying something meaningful, how rigorous was the methodology that brought you to make that claim.Marta wrote:Say someone says 'the only truths that are really truths are those which are empirically derived'. We realize that via basic reasoning that if we apply this statement to itself, it refutes itself.
There are two question getting mingle up here I feel.
A/ How do we know anything we say is true?
B/ Is what we say meaningful?
Empirical propositions of the form you have identified as 1b always have a question mark hanging over them as to their truth. Though for highly verified statements the question mark is very small. This is why I don’t think we should get too hung up of the ultimate truth of our propositions, whilst be more focused on methodology and rigour.
I’d say B, backed up my rigour, evidence, etc is what counts - or at leat should be the first concern. A/ comes later.
Re: How do we know there is such a thing as truth?
Post #7We start out hypothesizing what we observe to be true. Then through methodological inquiry, we test what we observe to be true. Our inquiry will either yield a null hypothesis or support it. The only premises we can start with as being "true" are what we can observe as a cause or effect. Now, truth can either be "facts" or "beliefs". A belief is generally considered to be an assumption that need not be based on anything but instinct (not saying all beliefs are merely subjective instincts). Proving the truth of that instinct would either follow the same inquiry as if the truth being sought was indeed based on facts or it would be exempt from such inquiry and would render the truth of belief being based on faith, not fact.Undertow wrote:I'm curious: how do we know that truth exists? Are we to prove it exists to know that it exists? If so, wouldn't that mean we have to frame an argument in which we'd need to concede some premises as true? Wouldn't this be cirular logic - relying on that which we are trying to prove to prove it? In such a case, is it just up to accepting the existance and possibility truth as a fundamental axiom to our human thinking?
Also, what do you think the ramifications of evolution on truth are? Does the nature of change through evolution change truth or is truth what is beyond our immediate mental capacity and our attempts to find it necessarily shortfalling because of our limited capacities as humans (perhaps hence why we're so focused on a scientific approach of weeding out the untruths to make truth hide in smaller and smaller spaces)?
The only things we can know to be true are those that can be subjected to a standardized methodology and that can withstand retesting with reliability and validity. It isn't really circular when you are starting out with both a hypothesis and a null hypothesis. It is either or. The truth cannot be both.
I don't understand what you are trying to compare in regards to evolution. The truth of evolution in regards to the "facts of evolution" or the truths in evolution in regards to the "mechanism of evolution"? Our inquiry into the facts of evolution don't yield smaller places for the truth to reside. On comparison, one could make the argument that our inquiry into the mechanism might yield even smaller places for truth to hide.
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McCulloch
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Re: How do we know there is such a thing as truth?
Post #8Maybe there is no such thing as truth, at least as something we can aspire to know fully. Perhaps we must be satisfied with identifying and rejecting falsehood.Undertow wrote:How do we know there is such a thing as truth?
Examine everything carefully; hold fast to that which is good.
First Epistle to the Church of the Thessalonians
The truth will make you free.
Gospel of John
First Epistle to the Church of the Thessalonians
The truth will make you free.
Gospel of John
Post #9
You must forgive me, F.B., if I'm rather confused about the philosophical concepts you use here. I'm kinda inexperienced with philosophy.
You say that (*)'Collections of words that follow good grammar, that seem to say something, but which do not form true or false propositions are meaningless.' I do beg your pardon, but could you show me how this statement is falsifiable?
I might attempt to demonstrate this myself according to your directive of making it ' analysed out into any other proposition or set of propositions that can be verified or falsified, '. Never having tried to do this according to the positivistic method before, I am likely to err and I should hope you would correct me.
We must show how under what conditions the statement you gave can be proven false, yes? So we would have to find its negation and under what conditions it is true, yes?-a collection of words that follows good grammar, that seems to say something and which does not form true or false propositions which is 'meaningful'. (Mind, 'meaningful' seems like a rather sketchy word. What do we mean when we say something has 'meaning'? What on earth do you mean?) But (*) is an absolute, unqualified statement, and as soon as I find a single statement as would falsify it, isn't the entire concept undone? I mean, the existence of a statement that would falsify it under any conditions does in fact falsify it.
(Granted, though, I have gone from finding the possibility of a statement that would falsify it to the actuality of a statement that would falsify it-but when we're discussing mental concepts, the possibility of the statement is in fact nothing, isn't it? So we must conceive of an actual statement that would falsify it... which you may point out, I haven't done here, but I'm not sure what would falsify it)
So we're left with it refuting itself either way? Help me, I'm lost. And how do I apply 'methodology and rigour' to (*)? Or am I to restrict 'methodology and rigour' to physical truths?
'Empirical propositions of the form you have identified as 1b always have a question mark hanging over them as to their truth. Though for highly verified statements the question mark is very small. This is why I don’t think we should get too hung up of the ultimate truth of our propositions, whilst be more focused on methodology and rigour.'
-Granted, empirical values usually have a very small error, but my point was-unless there was something we were aiming at, we couldn't be said to be rigourous in physical truths. If I'm trying to find a friction coefficient for ice and my values are all over the board, well, I immediately say I screwed up and its imprecise. Why? Because I expect there to be a single thing I'm aiming for, yes? Petty point, I suppose.
You said 'I’m sniffy about the whole concept of truth as something in itself,'-please explain, if it isn't something in itself, pardon my ignorance, please, but what is it? What is meaning, if (*) doesn't seem to hold, and how does it relate to truth?
You say that (*)'Collections of words that follow good grammar, that seem to say something, but which do not form true or false propositions are meaningless.' I do beg your pardon, but could you show me how this statement is falsifiable?
I might attempt to demonstrate this myself according to your directive of making it ' analysed out into any other proposition or set of propositions that can be verified or falsified, '. Never having tried to do this according to the positivistic method before, I am likely to err and I should hope you would correct me.
We must show how under what conditions the statement you gave can be proven false, yes? So we would have to find its negation and under what conditions it is true, yes?-a collection of words that follows good grammar, that seems to say something and which does not form true or false propositions which is 'meaningful'. (Mind, 'meaningful' seems like a rather sketchy word. What do we mean when we say something has 'meaning'? What on earth do you mean?) But (*) is an absolute, unqualified statement, and as soon as I find a single statement as would falsify it, isn't the entire concept undone? I mean, the existence of a statement that would falsify it under any conditions does in fact falsify it.
(Granted, though, I have gone from finding the possibility of a statement that would falsify it to the actuality of a statement that would falsify it-but when we're discussing mental concepts, the possibility of the statement is in fact nothing, isn't it? So we must conceive of an actual statement that would falsify it... which you may point out, I haven't done here, but I'm not sure what would falsify it)
So we're left with it refuting itself either way? Help me, I'm lost. And how do I apply 'methodology and rigour' to (*)? Or am I to restrict 'methodology and rigour' to physical truths?
'Empirical propositions of the form you have identified as 1b always have a question mark hanging over them as to their truth. Though for highly verified statements the question mark is very small. This is why I don’t think we should get too hung up of the ultimate truth of our propositions, whilst be more focused on methodology and rigour.'
-Granted, empirical values usually have a very small error, but my point was-unless there was something we were aiming at, we couldn't be said to be rigourous in physical truths. If I'm trying to find a friction coefficient for ice and my values are all over the board, well, I immediately say I screwed up and its imprecise. Why? Because I expect there to be a single thing I'm aiming for, yes? Petty point, I suppose.
You said 'I’m sniffy about the whole concept of truth as something in itself,'-please explain, if it isn't something in itself, pardon my ignorance, please, but what is it? What is meaning, if (*) doesn't seem to hold, and how does it relate to truth?
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Furrowed Brow
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Post #10
Lets consider the form of a proposition. We have words, and they can be stood next to each other in grammatically correct statements that may or may not convey a meaning. Here I’m defining meaning as information that can be true or false, or your group 1 statements. When they are well formed and convey meaning lets call them a proposition. Our sentences might add up toMarta wrote:You say that (*) 'Collections of words that follow good grammar, that seem to say something, but which do not form true or false propositions are meaningless.' I do beg your pardon, but could you show me how this statement is falsifiable?
1/ Tautology
2/ Contradiction
3/ A true/false proposition
4/ A collections of words that is neither none of the above three.
From the philosophical line I’m following - of the above four options only statements in the form of 3 say something meaningful. Tautologies and contradiction reveal the form of our language. Rather than saying something meaningful they are themselves truth-conditions that are the limits of what can be said sensibly. Which also entails they mark the limits of what can be said meaningfully. However they themselves convey no meaning.
However, according to Wittgenstein, and I’m very much with him on this, tautologies and contradictions are not nonsensical -they are the limits of what can make sense. So the (*) statement is according to this theory of language a tautology. It should be noted I said “meaningless” and not "nonsensical" or "nonsense".Wittgenstein wrote:4.461Propsotions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show they say nothing.
A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true; and a contradiction is true on no condition.....
(for example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.)
The rejection of Platonic metaphysics is then motivated by the idea that metaphysics provides neither tautologies, contradictions or true/false propositions. What we are left with is 4, and statements that fall in the category are meaningless I.e. they say nothing about the world, and they are nonsensical, because they are fail to be tautology or contradiction.
Well I’m hoping you’ll now see that it is a tautology.Marta wrote:But (*) is an absolute, unqualified statement, and as soon as I find a single statement as would falsify it, isn't the entire concept undone? I mean, the existence of a statement that would falsify it under any conditions does in fact falsify it.
Well I depends how useful your results are. Can they be used for anything. If they can’t then back to the drawing board. However science is pretty much a pragmatic enterprise. There is quirky statistical stuff in quantum physics that is useful, but put limits on precision. So I say yes, science should endeavour to be as precise as possible, until it reaches the theoretical limits that say that is it - this is as precise as you can get.Marta wrote:-Granted, empirical values usually have a very small error, but my point was-unless there was something we were aiming at, we couldn't be said to be rigorous in physical truths. If I'm trying to find a friction coefficient for ice and my values are all over the board, well, I immediately say I screwed up and its imprecise. Why? Because I expect there to be a single thing I'm aiming for, yes? Petty point, I suppose.
For me truth is the T that can appear in truth tables alongside F for false.Marta wrote:You said 'I’m sniffy about the whole concept of truth as something in itself,'-please explain, if it isn't something in itself, pardon my ignorance, please, but what is it? What is meaning, if (*) doesn't seem to hold, and how does it relate to truth?
Statements of the form “God is truth” by these lights is plain nonsense.
