Evidence for God's Existence

[WinePusher]

When I first joined this forum I remember McCulloch was creating a series of topics devoted to the various arguments for God's existence. I'd like to explore those issues in this thread and for the purpose of this thread God will be defined as a deistic, supernatural intelligent designer. We will not be using any theistic definition of God.

Teleological arguments prove God's existence based on the design and precise structure of the universe. The universe is structured in an improbable and an unlikely way. The physical laws that govern the universe are fine tuned to an extremely unlikely numerical value, and had these laws been set at any other parameter life could not exist. Statistically speaking, chance/coincidence is not an appropriate explanation, therefore a fine tuner/intelligent designer designed the universe.

Ontological arguments prove God's existence based on the definition of God. God is defined as a maximally great being, meaning that God can have no defects. Nonexistence is a defect, therefore God must exist. First of all, this argument pretty much destroys the ignostic position. Yes, I realize ignostics are willingly ignorant of all the philosophical scholarship surrounding God, but the fact is that the concept of God is pretty well defined. Therefore, the ignostics usergroup should be abolished.

Cosmological arguments prove God's existence based on the fact that the universe began to exist. Meaning, at one point in the distant past, the universe did not exist at all. The universe is itself contingent. Mathematically speaking, it is impossible for the chain of causes to regress backwards infinitely. Therefore, a non contingent first cause must exist. This cause supernatural, in the sense that it must be spaceless and timeless since space and time are bound by the universe.

Moral arguments prove God's existence based on the existence of objective morality. By objective morality I mean a moral statement or declaration. Something like 'killing is an innocent person for fun is wrong.' This is a moral declaration that is objectively true, regardless of any individuals personal opinion. Since an objective moral law exists, there must be a moral law giver. Another version of the moral argument would be the fact that the world would be morally absurd and irrational absent a moral law giver.


Questions:
1) Are these arguments logically valid and sound?

2) In light of these four philosophical arguments, will atheists please stop making the false, disingenuous claim that there is no evidence for God?

3) Are there any arguments against the existence of God?

[keithprosser3]

I do my drinking at the police station these days... it saves time.

I'm not a huge fan of the 'anthropic principle'. But the 'fine-tuning' problem appears to be real, and science hasn't got an answer to it - yet. Unlike some atheists, I don't have any problem admitting that - to the best of my knowledge - there are gaps in what science can explain. We've only been able to blow the planet to pieces for 60 years or so, so there's bound to be things we haven't discovered yet.

Science is on-going and deep puzzles remain. As I have said in the past (and no doubt will say again) I am not an atheist because I know what the answer to 'what is the meaning of life, the universe and everything' is, but because I know(*) what the answer isn't.

(* yeah, know).

[10CC]

I do my drinking at the police station these days... it saves time.

I'm not a huge fan of the 'anthropic principle'. But the 'fine-tuning' problem appears to be real, and science hasn't got an answer to it - yet. Unlike some atheists, I don't have any problem admitting that - to the best of my knowledge - there are gaps in what science can explain. We've only been able to blow the planet to pieces for 60 years or so, so there's bound to be things we haven't discovered yet.

Science is on-going and deep puzzles remain. As I have said in the past (and no doubt will say again) I am not an atheist because I know what the answer to 'what is the meaning of life, the universe and everything' is, but because I know(*) what the answer isn't.

(* yeah, know).

I did a lot of that at one time and how the cops and I ever got home is a miracle

If science didn't have GAPS we would have no need of science. Religion has no gaps and is why we have no need of it.

And I'm sure that you are well aware that the answer is 42.

[keithprosser3]

You mean 42

[Ionian_Tradition]

... only from a naturalistic perspective can the notion of (apparent) "fine tuning" be meaningfully applied and understood. For this reason the argument from "fine tuning" remains ill-equipped to demonstrate the existence of a God. If an omnipotent God did exist, "fine tuning" would not.

I don't think this is a valid objection to the fine-tuning argument. The argument states that fine-tuning cannot be explained without positing a conscious designer. Whether or not God and fine-tuning can coherently exist is irrelevant to the argument. The main point is that allegedly naturalism cannot explain the life enabling values of the universal constants while theism can. To suggest that in theism there's no fine-tuning to explain doesn't counter the argument.

... As such, it is infinitely more improbable that God should arbitrarily choose any particular set of values among this infinite multitude of possible values than the constants should hold the values they do by chance alone. ...

I like this argument, I don't know if it carries much weight in the end though. If I throw a coin in the air, the chance for it landing into any particular spot is one out of an infinite number of possibilities, but it has to land on one of the available spots. Similarly, if God created the universe, he had to choose one set of constants out of the infinite number of possibilities, didn't he? Perhaps he chose the constants randomly and made them life permitting, which would render the above argument irrelevant.

Perhaps God did as you suggest, but if so, how can we say with confidence (as the argument from fine tuning suggests) that it is more probable that the constants and their precise values should be due to design than by chance? If God selected these particular variables at random, out of the infinite number of possible life permitting permutations available to him, then it is difficult to see how God's selection of these values at random is a more probable event than the universe coming to acquire the values it does at random. Yes, any set of values God chooses could be made life permitting subsequent to their selection, but the fact that any particular set of values is selected in the first place (out of the infinite number of possible values) is potentially improbable to an infinite degree. As such, our ignorance regarding any background information which might potentially affect the prior probability that God should choose any particular set of values leaves us ill equipped to state authoritatively that it is more probable that the particular values which correspond to the constants of our particular universe are due to design alone. If we cannot show this notion to be true, or even likely, the argument from fine tuning has ultimately failed to support its conclusion.

If God can make any values life permitting, then it's hardly surprising in the theistic world view that the present set of values are life supporting. The reason why this God came to choose these particular values seems irrelevant to the argument at hand. Thus, theism doesn't face the same problem than naturalism in explaining the values.

Perhaps it is true that any values an omnipotent God chooses could be made life permitting, but an appeal to God's power to affect the causal consequences which result from these values is not an explanation of the values themselves. It would therefore be premature for the theist to assume she has accounted for the whole whilst accounting only for the part.

With that said, your previous response seems to render the entire concept of "fine tuning" a veritable impossibility. If any particular set of values God chooses could potentially be made life permitting, then no overarching constraint can be said to exist which would allow for fine tuning to ever truly occur. If fine tuning cannot exist per the theistic worldview, then the theist cannot appeal to fine tuning as evidence for God's existence. It is only if the theist assumes naturalism (and the constraints which follow from it) that the theist can meaningfully argue that the fundamental constant's are so improbably "fine tuned" for life (as a result of these constraints) that they seemingly require a supernatural explanation. Yet if the theist assumes naturalism in order to argue for God's necessity as a causal explanation for these values, then the theist has tacitly assumed than an omnipotent God does not truly exist. Assuming the natural constraints which allow for fine tuning to actually occur negates the possible existence of an omnipotent God who is constrained by nothing. The theist may therefore wish to salvage both God and fine tuning by appealing to a God who is naturally constrained in the number of values he/she/it can assign to the constants of a life permitting universe. Yet this assumption contradicts the theist's claim that God can make any random set of values "life permitting". As a result, the theist has jettisoned the notion of an omnipotent God, and with it, God's sufficiency as a causal explanation for "finely tuned" values the theist originally claimed only omnipotence could account for.

In short, if the theist rejects (apparent) fine tuning by asserting the existence of an omnipotent God, then the theist cannot appeal to fine tuning as evidence for God's existence (if an omnipotent God exists, fine tuning does not). Instead the theist must beg the question by assuming, a priori, that the universe is the product of an omnipotent designer. If the theist accepts fine tuning as evidence for God's existence, by assuming naturalism, the theist has tacitly conceded that an omnipotent God does not exist, thus comprising theism on theological grounds.

[keithprosser3]

I take it that should have been 'compromising' rather than 'comprising' in the last sentence?

If I understand you, in even shorter terms, theists are in a bind.

If God needed to fine tune the universe, He cannot be omnipotent.

If God did not need fine tune the universe then the fact it is fine tuned is an argument against God's involvement, not for it.

[instantc]

If fine tuning cannot exist per the theistic worldview, then the theist cannot appeal to fine tuning as evidence for God's existence.

I don't see why not.

It is only if the theist assumes naturalism (and the constraints which follow from it) that the theist can meaningfully argue that the fundamental constant's are so improbably "fine tuned" for life (as a result of these constraints) that they seemingly require a supernatural explanation.

Exactly, a theist would say that given naturalism the values remain inexplicable, therefore positing a designer is warranted.

Yet if the theist assumes naturalism in order to argue for God's necessity as a causal explanation for these values, then the theist has tacitly assumed than an omnipotent God does not truly exist.

This reminds me of an objection to the Problem of Evil that I hear sometimes, according to which you cannot argue for the PoE without tacitly assuming God's existence, since in naturalism there obviously is no problem of evil.

You seem to be making the same mistake in your argumentation, while the theist doesn't in fact need to assume anything. The theist does not say that the values of the constants are necessarily fine-tuned, it's more of a figure of speech. He simply says that the values cannot be explained without positing a designer, therefore we are justified in positing a designer.

Just like the PoE says that if God exist, then evil in the world remains inexplicable, the fine-tuning argument says that if naturalism is true, then the life supporting values of the constants in the universe remain inexplicable.

[keithprosser3]

Just like the PoE says that if God exist, then evil in the world remains inexplicable, the fine-tuning argument says that if naturalism is true, then the life supporting values of the constants in the universe remain inexplicable.

An asymmetry I see is the inexplicability of evil under theism is due to a logical paradox which is unsolvable in principle. The lack of a explanation for the fine-tuned values of the universe under naturalism is due to our current state of ignorance which may not be permanent at all.

[Jax Agnesson]

And if we have a finely tuned universe with a lot of evil in it (which does appear to be the case) then neither theism nor atheism can explain anything??

[Ionian_Tradition]

If fine tuning cannot exist per the theistic worldview, then the theist cannot appeal to fine tuning as evidence for God's existence.

I don't see why not.

To take the implication of "fine tuning" seriously is to abandon theism. If theism were true, fine tuning could not possibly exist.

It is only if the theist assumes naturalism (and the constraints which follow from it) that the theist can meaningfully argue that the fundamental constant's are so improbably "fine tuned" for life (as a result of these constraints) that they seemingly require a supernatural explanation.

Exactly, a theist would say that given naturalism the values remain inexplicable, therefore positing a designer is warranted.

To posit an omnipotent designer is to deny the existence of the very phenomenon requiring explanation in the first place. The postulate of a designer, therefore, becomes an assumption made a priori, not an a posterori induction derived from consideration of the constants and their apparently "fine tuned" values.

Yet if the theist assumes naturalism in order to argue for God's necessity as a causal explanation for these values, then the theist has tacitly assumed than an omnipotent God does not truly exist.

This reminds me of an objection to the Problem of Evil that I hear sometimes, according to which you cannot argue for the PoE without tacitly assuming God's existence, since in naturalism there obviously is no problem of evil.

You seem to be making the same mistake in your argumentation, while the theist doesn't in fact need to assume anything. The theist does not say that the values of the constants are necessarily fine-tuned, it's more of a figure of speech. He simply says that the values cannot be explained without positing a designer, therefore we are justified in positing a designer.

The theist has yet to demonstrate that no naturalistic explanation exists for the values which pertain to the fundamental constants and I've yet to witness any apologist brazen enough to claim otherwise. How then do you believe the argument from fine tuning has shown that the values cannot be explained without positing a designer....Especially if you deny the existence of the very phenomenon requiring explanation?

That aside, you seem to be missing the larger implication at work here. Namely, that the argument from fine tuning is really an argument against theism. Only on naturalism could we reasonably expect to find the existence of certain natural constraints which require that the fundamental constants fall into a very narrow range of life permitting values in order for life to exist. Given that an omnipotent God is subject to no such constraints, it would not be reasonable to expect "fine tuning" to exist at all. The existence of the very phenomenon crying out for an explanation you believe can only be found through an appeal to design is itself the foundation of a counter argument, against theism, which can be formalized in the following syllogism:

P1: If Fine tuning exists, an omnipotent God does not.
P2: Fine tuning exists.
Conclusion: Therefore, an omnipotent God does not exist.

Far from demonstrating that design is the only possible explanation for fine tuning, the argument from fine tuning gives us reasonable grounds to question the very existence of an omnipotent God.

Just like the PoE says that if God exist, then evil in the world remains inexplicable, the fine-tuning argument says that if naturalism is true, then the life supporting values of the constants in the universe remain inexplicable.

Perhaps you're understanding of the PoE differs from my own but the argument, as I understand it, does not make the claim that if God exists then evil is inexplicable, rather it claims that if an omnibenevolent God exists then evil logically cannot. Therefore, the non-theists grants the existence of God for the purpose of showing that the existence of God (in a world of evil) is logically untenable via "reductio ad absurdum". If the argument from fine tuning were truly analogous to this, it would need to show that the presumption of naturalism, with regard to the apparent fine tuning of the constants, results in absurdity. It is not apparent to me that the argument has done so. Rather it seems the foundational premise of the argument, the existence of "fine tuning", has given us reasonable grounds to doubt the existence of an omnipotent God.

[instantc]

The existence of the very phenomenon crying out for an explanation you believe can only be found through an appeal to design is itself the foundation of a counter argument, against theism, which can be formalized in the following syllogism:

P1: If Fine tuning exists, an omnipotent God does not.
P2: Fine tuning exists.
Conclusion: Therefore, an omnipotent God does not exist.

Far from demonstrating that design is the only possible explanation for fine tuning, the argument from fine tuning gives us reasonable grounds to question the very existence of an omnipotent God.

There is a major problem in your argumentation. P2 cannot be demonstrated, nor does the fine-tuning argument depend on it. What we observe is that the constants have life supporting values. As you have argued, if God exists, then these values are not 'fine-tuned' for life, but rather they are arbitrarily picked out of infinite possibilities. Therefore we cannot determine whether fine-tuning exists without first determining whether God exists, which is why your argument appears to fail. Furthermore, the life supporting values as such are sufficient for the fine-tuning argument to fail or succeed. Even though it's called the fine-tuning argument, it doesn't depend on P2 above.

Perhaps you're understanding of the PoE differs from my own but the argument, as I understand it, does not make the claim that if God exists then evil is inexplicable, rather it claims that if an omnibenevolent God exists then evil logically cannot. Therefore, the non-theists grants the existence of God for the purpose of showing that the existence of God (in a world of evil) is logically untenable via "reductio ad absurdum". If the argument from fine tuning were truly analogous to this, it would need to show that the presumption of naturalism, with regard to the apparent fine tuning of the constants, results in absurdity. It is not apparent to me that the argument has done so. Rather it seems the foundational premise of the argument, the existence of "fine tuning", has given us reasonable grounds to doubt the existence of an omnipotent God.

You are referring to the logical version of the PoE, while I'm referring to the evidential problem of evil. Obviously there is no logical inconsistency between naturalism and life supporting values of the constants in the universe.