Evidence for God's Existence

[WinePusher]

When I first joined this forum I remember McCulloch was creating a series of topics devoted to the various arguments for God's existence. I'd like to explore those issues in this thread and for the purpose of this thread God will be defined as a deistic, supernatural intelligent designer. We will not be using any theistic definition of God.

Teleological arguments prove God's existence based on the design and precise structure of the universe. The universe is structured in an improbable and an unlikely way. The physical laws that govern the universe are fine tuned to an extremely unlikely numerical value, and had these laws been set at any other parameter life could not exist. Statistically speaking, chance/coincidence is not an appropriate explanation, therefore a fine tuner/intelligent designer designed the universe.

Ontological arguments prove God's existence based on the definition of God. God is defined as a maximally great being, meaning that God can have no defects. Nonexistence is a defect, therefore God must exist. First of all, this argument pretty much destroys the ignostic position. Yes, I realize ignostics are willingly ignorant of all the philosophical scholarship surrounding God, but the fact is that the concept of God is pretty well defined. Therefore, the ignostics usergroup should be abolished.

Cosmological arguments prove God's existence based on the fact that the universe began to exist. Meaning, at one point in the distant past, the universe did not exist at all. The universe is itself contingent. Mathematically speaking, it is impossible for the chain of causes to regress backwards infinitely. Therefore, a non contingent first cause must exist. This cause supernatural, in the sense that it must be spaceless and timeless since space and time are bound by the universe.

Moral arguments prove God's existence based on the existence of objective morality. By objective morality I mean a moral statement or declaration. Something like 'killing is an innocent person for fun is wrong.' This is a moral declaration that is objectively true, regardless of any individuals personal opinion. Since an objective moral law exists, there must be a moral law giver. Another version of the moral argument would be the fact that the world would be morally absurd and irrational absent a moral law giver.


Questions:
1) Are these arguments logically valid and sound?

2) In light of these four philosophical arguments, will atheists please stop making the false, disingenuous claim that there is no evidence for God?

3) Are there any arguments against the existence of God?

[instantc]

... only from a naturalistic perspective can the notion of (apparent) "fine tuning" be meaningfully applied and understood. For this reason the argument from "fine tuning" remains ill-equipped to demonstrate the existence of a God. If an omnipotent God did exist, "fine tuning" would not.

I don't think this is a valid objection to the fine-tuning argument. The argument states that fine-tuning cannot be explained without positing a conscious designer. Whether or not God and fine-tuning can coherently exist is irrelevant to the argument. The main point is that allegedly naturalism cannot explain the life enabling values of the universal constants while theism can. To suggest that in theism there's no fine-tuning to explain doesn't counter the argument.

... As such, it is infinitely more improbable that God should arbitrarily choose any particular set of values among this infinite multitude of possible values than the constants should hold the values they do by chance alone. ...

I like this argument, I don't know if it carries much weight in the end though. If I throw a coin in the air, the chance for it landing into any particular spot is one out of an infinite number of possibilities, but it has to land on one of the available spots. Similarly, if God created the universe, he had to choose one set of constants out of the infinite number of possibilities, didn't he? Perhaps he chose the constants randomly and made them life permitting, which would render the above argument irrelevant.

[JohnA]

... only from a naturalistic perspective can the notion of (apparent) "fine tuning" be meaningfully applied and understood. For this reason the argument from "fine tuning" remains ill-equipped to demonstrate the existence of a God. If an omnipotent God did exist, "fine tuning" would not.

I don't think this is a valid objection to the fine-tuning argument. The argument states that fine-tuning cannot be explained without positing a conscious designer. Whether or not God and fine-tuning can coherently exist is irrelevant to the argument. The main point is that allegedly naturalism cannot explain the life enabling values of the universal constants while theism can. To suggest that in theism there's no fine-tuning to explain doesn't counter the argument.

... As such, it is infinitely more improbable that God should arbitrarily choose any particular set of values among this infinite multitude of possible values than the constants should hold the values they do by chance alone. ...

I like this argument, I don't know if it carries much weight in the end though. If I throw a coin in the air, the chance for it landing into any particular spot is one out of an infinite number of possibilities, but it has to land on one of the available spots. Similarly, if God created the universe, he had to choose one set of constants out of the infinite number of possibilities, didn't he? Perhaps he chose the constants randomly and made them life permitting, which would render the above argument irrelevant.

But your belief is that infinity does not exist.
That renders your above argument irrelevant.

How can the god chose anything if he has not created anything yet, and the fact that he is timeless (thus can not action anything as we know it)?

That renders your above argument irrelevant.

So, the god chose the constants randomly and then made them life permitting? So, he first tuned it, then fine tuned it for life, or went back in his timeless capsule and fine tuned it - maybe that is why life started so long after the being that is not a being created everything...

That renders your above argument irrelevant.

[FarWanderer]

By FarWanderer,

At most, all science says is that the universe's existence cannot be scientifically explained. It doesn't go out of it's way to leave room for God; it doesn't make God a better explanation.

To "confirm" the existence of the Universe is as easy as it is to confirm the existence of the Earth as these go together, in Earth, Solar System, (The Milky Way) Galaxy, Galaxy Cluster and all the way to the biggest, the Universe. There's great confidence, plausibility to believe this too, yes, the greatest, scientifically. There is no use in trying, even, to appeal to a kind of Zeno's Paradoxes where one claims that "from inside a larger set you can't prove the larger set that you're inside".

So this has to go down. I merely inform you here. "Please, don't go there!"

If the universe (small "u"- meaning space-time as we know it) is all there is, then there is no explanation for its existence. If it's not all there is, maybe we'll find one.

I don't even really agree with the idea that science "tells us" that the universe didn't come from anything. That's a common interpretation which I kind of let slide earlier. But to be precise: science simply doesn't have answers for us regarding how the universe is here. That's different from "telling us" that there is no answer.

[Ionian_Tradition]

... only from a naturalistic perspective can the notion of (apparent) "fine tuning" be meaningfully applied and understood. For this reason the argument from "fine tuning" remains ill-equipped to demonstrate the existence of a God. If an omnipotent God did exist, "fine tuning" would not.

I don't think this is a valid objection to the fine-tuning argument. The argument states that fine-tuning cannot be explained without positing a conscious designer. Whether or not God and fine-tuning can coherently exist is irrelevant to the argument. The main point is that allegedly naturalism cannot explain the life enabling values of the universal constants while theism can. To suggest that in theism there's no fine-tuning to explain doesn't counter the argument.

... As such, it is infinitely more improbable that God should arbitrarily choose any particular set of values among this infinite multitude of possible values than the constants should hold the values they do by chance alone. ...

I like this argument, I don't know if it carries much weight in the end though. If I throw a coin in the air, the chance for it landing into any particular spot is one out of an infinite number of possibilities, but it has to land on one of the available spots. Similarly, if God created the universe, he had to choose one set of constants out of the infinite number of possibilities, didn't he? Perhaps he chose the constants randomly and made them life permitting, which would render the above argument irrelevant.

Perhaps God did as you suggest, but if so, how can we say with confidence (as the argument from fine tuning suggests) that it is more probable that the constants and their precise values should be due to design than by chance? If God selected these particular variables at random, out of the infinite number of possible life permitting permutations available to him, then it is difficult to see how God's selection of these values at random is a more probable event than the universe coming to acquire the values it does at random. Yes, any set of values God chooses could be made life permitting subsequent to their selection, but the fact that any particular set of values is selected in the first place (out of the infinite number of possible values) is potentially improbable to an infinite degree. As such, our ignorance regarding any background information which might potentially affect the prior probability that God should choose any particular set of values leaves us ill equipped to state authoritatively that it is more probable that the particular values which correspond to the constants of our particular universe are due to design alone. If we cannot show this notion to be true, or even likely, the argument from fine tuning has ultimately failed to support its conclusion.

[Ionian_Tradition]

Greetings WinePusher,

I appreciate your thoughtful response to my previous post. Though the conclusions you've drawn may differ from my own, I believe you've given them honest consideration. For that, I commend you.

If the natural constraints which appear to limit the number of possible universes in which life can evolve and persist are truly the product of God's will, then these constraints cannot have constrained God prior to their creation. How then can it be said that God was ever truly constrained in the number of possible life permitting universes he/she/it could have created prior to the implementation of the constraints which make fine tuning possible in the first place? Moreover, if God is the author of these constraints, then God is certainly sovereign over them. How then, can these contingent constraints prove binding to their omnipotent author in any meaningful fashion? If no a priori (non-logical) constraint restricted the number of possible (life permitting) universes God could have created prior to the creation of natural law, then it seems quite apparent that God was never truly constrained in the number of possible (life permitting) universes he/she/it could have created. Thus God never truly "fine tuned" the universe according to constraints that were, for him/her/it, never truly constraining.

I hate to dismiss what you’re arguing since you clearly know a lot about this matter. However, your use of the term ‘constraint’ is totally incorrect. God would by no means be constrained or bound by the way the universe is ordered. Yes, the natural constraints on life are contingent upon God. If God is indeed the fine tuner, he chose to design the universe in a way where the existence of life would be constrained by an improbable and precise combination of natural laws. But, at the same time God could have easily created a universe where life was not constrained by improbable physical laws. He could have taken more liberty with his creation and allowed life to develop freely, without any constraints whatsoever.

I don’t want to gloss over your argument so let me restate it and you tell me if I understand it correctly. To use your safe analogy, you suggested that one individual opens the safe by entering the correct combination. Also, another individual places a restriction on the safe so that only one precise combination can open it. Are you saying that it is impossible for God to manufacture the safe and, at the same time, set a restriction upon opening it by designing it to where only one code is correct? I would say that God created the universe, set forth the precise restrictions on life, and chose to abide by these restrictions. God is not bound to abide by his own restrictions, he voluntarily chooses to abide by them. Like I said he could have easily created another universe where life is completely unrestricted.

Both you and I agree that God is not constrained by the constraints he/she/it imposes upon the universe, but is God constrained by constraints he/she/it imposes upon himself? This is a very interesting question. Let us return to the safe analogy in an attempt to address it.

The question you've put forward is, "Is it impossible for God to manufacture the safe and, at the same time, set a restriction upon opening it by designing it to where only one particular combination is correct?". The answer is certainly not. God could easily design a safe for which only one particular combination is correct. Can we then say that God is constrained by this constraint? Not entirely. Yes, God may choose to only open the safe by imputing the correct combination, however, this does not negate the fact that God could, if he/she/it so desired, open the safe without imputing the correct combination. Nor does it negate the fact that God could reset the combination all together. It is God's will to adhere to the initial blueprint (conceptual design) of the safe which constrains his/her/its own conduct, not the safe itself.

This creates a problem for the fine tuning argument. If the only constraint imposed upon God which allows for fine tuning to occur is that which follows from his/her/its conceptual design of the universe, then the notion of "fined tuning" has been reduced to a mere truism:

"Every life permitting universe God chooses to create is "fine tuned" according to the conceptual "blueprint" which preceded it".

Apart from divorcing the term "fine tuning" from its initial meaning, this new understanding of "fine tuning" restructures the argument from fine tuning such that it assumes God's existence in order to demonstrate that the universe is truly "fine tuned" in the first place:

P1. Every universe God creates is "fine tuned" according to some preceding conceptualization of said universe.
P2. God created our universe.
Conclusion: Therefore, our universe is "fine tuned" according to its preceding conceptualization.

This necessary restructuring of the "fine tuning" argument (which follows from an understanding of "fine tuning" as "that which accords with design") results in a fallacy of begging the question.

This of course leaves open the question concerning why the universal constants hold the values they do. Cosmologists are working to find an answer to this deeply profound question. At present, the most prevalent hypothesis seems to be that of the "multi-verse" (a consequence of both inflationary theory and certain models derived from string theory). Regardless of whether or not this theory proves valid, it appears, none the less, that only from a naturalistic perspective can the notion of (apparent) "fine tuning" be meaningfully applied and understood. For this reason the argument from "fine tuning" remains ill-equipped to demonstrate the existence of a God. If an omnipotent God did exist, "fine tuning" would not.

This is the heart of the issue in my opinion, and I would say that physicists are ill equipped to explain this anomaly. First of all, would you agree that it is an anomaly as to why the universal constants are structured the way they are?

It is possible that the universal constants which correspond to this universe are the consequence of a multiverse (accounted for by eternal inflation, or perhaps the multiple dimensions which follow from the mathematics of string theory). If such is the case, our universe, and its constants, may be an "anomaly" in the literal sense of the term, but the probability of their existence would be exceedingly greater than if no multiverse existed at all.

Second of all, I think that it is important to note that improbable, unlikely and out of place events do not occur spontaneously by chance. I realize that the watchmaker analogy has been presented ad nauseum, but I still find it to be convincing. I think that it is intellectually dishonest to suggest that an infinite number of beaches exists, and a watch happened to spontaneously generate on one of these beaches. Yet, that is precisely what the multiverse theory states. An infinite number of universes exists, and life happened to come about in one of these universes.

Nestled within the watch maker analogy is hidden the tacit presumption of design. The only reason a watch is distinguishable from a beach is because we recognize that unlike the watch, the beach is not a product of design. If we assumed that both the beach and the watch were equally products of design, (as most theists would contend) Paley's watchmaker analogy would become fundamentally incoherent. To say that the universe, or life, is analogous to a watch is certainly to assume design by begging the question. Yet if we wish to be honest seekers of truth, we cannot assume design a priori. As mentioned, to do so would be quite fallacious. Recognizing this, thoughtful apologist have sought to work from the bottom up by presenting cogent arguments which attempt to support the design inference. The argument from fine tuning is one such argument. It is our job as truth seekers to test its merits objectively without assuming, a priori, the veracity of its conclusion.

This argument is a non sequitor. The fact is that humans are able to make value judgments regarding various degrees of greatness and perfection. In order for us to make any judgments there must exist a perfect, maximally great standard by which everything else is compared too and the theist will claim that this maximally great standard is God. In other words, it is impossible to see a line as crooked unless there is a perfectly straight line to compare it to. The fact that we are able to judge things in this world as being 'less great' or 'more great' requires an objectively great standard to exist, otherwise we have be completely oblivious.

If you assume that this standard is God, then you've presupposed the existence of God in order to argue that a "maximally great being" (God) possibly exists, and therefore necessarily exists in all possible worlds. In other words, you committed the fallacy of begging the question by assuming the conclusion of the ontological argument and positing it as one of the argument's key premises. Thus by positing God as the standard of objective greatness (a postulate you've in no way defended), you've rendered the Ontological argument logically invalid.

Your first objection to this argument dealt with the greatness of God, did it not? You seemed to be asking how God can be defined as maximally great. Well, my point was that God is considered to be the maximal standard. This is the definition of God (according to Philosophers) and I also explained further how we can know that God is maximally great and perfect by showing that various degrees of greatness and perfection exist. Since various degrees of greatness and perfection exist there must be a maximally great and perfect standard, is this something you agree with?

Human beings certainly possess subjective notions of what constitutes "greatness", typically instructed by their own subjective values, but this hardly seems compelling evidence that objective "greatness" exists irrespective of our own subjective values. Yes we perceive what appears to be degrees of greatness, and perfection, but these subjective value judgements cannot themselves transcend all subjective opinion, preference, or disposition, such that they might truly be considered "objective" in any literal sense of the term. Hence, we arrive at the problem of accounting for God's objective greatness. We know our own subjective understanding of greatness is ill equipped to account for truly objective greatness, so what standard of objective greatness do we refer to when assessing the greatness of a possible God's nature? Is a possible God's nature the objective standard of greatness by which its own greatness is measured? Or is the standard of objective greatness external to God? If the former (which I believe you subscribe to), then we've assumed the existence of God in order to account for his/her/its maximal greatness. This is problematic because the Ontological argument seeks to demonstrate God's existence as a consequence of his/her/its maximal greatness. Yet if in order for God to be objectively "great", God must first exist, the existence of God is assumed as a key premise in the ontological argument, thus rendering it fallacious by begging the question. In other words, we cannot argue for the possible existence of a maximally great God by assuming its existence in order to demonstrate that it possibly exists. If we assume the latter, that the objective standard of greatness exists external to God, then we are assuming the existence of a standard upon which God's own greatness is contingent. This standard is therefore, by definition, greater that God. If the standard of objective greatness is greater than God, God is not maximally great (nothing is greater than a maximally great being).

In other words, if God is not defined as maximally great in your opinion then what is God exactly? But, if God is maximally great then the premises and the conclusion of the ontological argument are true. Unless you do not consider existence to be one of the properties of maximal greatness.

God can be defined in any number of ways. The question is not "how do we define God" but rather can our definition of God be shown to be logically tenable. In the absence of an objective standard of greatness, the concept of a "maximally great being" becomes fundamentally incoherent.

Subjective consensus does not an objective truth make. At best you've shown that there are certain moral maxims which most (certainly not all) human beings possess a subjective affinity toward (perhaps due to certain biological or pragmatic factors). In order to demonstrate that objective moral values exist, you must demonstrate that such values transcend all subjective opinion, preference, or disposition. Citing subjective consensus as a means of demonstrating this seems to me a rather counter productive method of doing so.

The moral compass of the world seems to perfectly coincide with Christian doctrine, and the moral argument. The claim made by Christians is that humans have within them a shared conscience, and this conscience expresses sentiments that are essentially uniform across the world. This is a view that is shared by thinkers across disciplines, most notably Adam Smith who referred to this ‘conscience’ as an impartial spectator. What this shows is that there is a universal moral law which would therefore require a universal moral law giver. Also, it seems to be verifiably impossible to prove the existence of objective moral values beyond any reasonable doubt. I am only offering reasons as to why objective moral values are likely to exist. Subjective moral consensus is one good reason in my opinion.

This is a sentiment echoed by C.S. Lewis. While seemingly intuitive, a deeper inspection of the claim reveals certain inadequacies. Though the moral sentiments common to mankind enjoy a wide range of consensus, they are far from uniform. Yet even if we could demonstrate perfect uniformity with regard to these sentiments, uniformity in no way relieves these sentiments of their sentimentality. In the end sentiments are ultimately mental/emotional constructs which find their origins in the minds of subjects/persons. Subjective constructs cannot transcend the subjective opinions, preferences, or dispositions of the mind. As such, they cannot exist as an objectively binding set of transcendent moral maxims.

You claim that these values must transcend all subjective opinion, preference and disposition. Well, if you present a human with a certain ‘moral’ situation they will react a certain way, regardless of their subjective preferences and opinion and dispositions. If you have an adult and a baby in a room and you give the adult a knife, how likely is it that the adult will run over and begin stabbing the baby to death for no reason? This shows that an objective moral truth (do not kill innocent babies for fun) does exist.

I'm not sure this is true. While it is certainly unlikely that for sentimental, rational, or pragmatic reasons an adult will stab a baby to death, it is not certain that such a thing will never occur. Yet even if we could show that such a thing would never occur, we are still bereft of an explanation as to how a subjective aversion toward infanticide constitutes an objective moral obligation not to commit such acts. As I've argued previously, obligations, duties, and values all possess the property of intentionality (they possess the mental property of meaning or "aboutness"). Intentionality is a product of the subjective mind alone. It cannot exist in the absence of a mind. In the same way, obligations, duties, and values cannot exist in the absence of a subjective obligation, value, and duty assigning mind. For this reason objective moral duties, values and obligations cannot logically exist.

Second, actions are judged by their intentions and consequences. Any action that has a good intention behind it and a good consequence can be considered 'objectively good.'

You're assuming the existence of objective goodness in order to argue that "good" intentions and "good" consequences demonstrate the existence of objective moral values...Unfortunately this would be another example of circular reasoning.

Positive for who exactly? No doubt the killer would not deem his own demise a "positive" outcome. You seem to be positing a Utilitarian view of morality which is anything but objective. Yes, certain actions may objectively produce certain outcomes, but concepts such as "positive" or "negative", which we assign to these outcomes (which also instruct Utilitarianism), are, at their core, subjective judgements informed by our own subjective values. In the absence of subjective valuers, subjective value judgements such as "good", "bad", "positive" and "negative" cannot logically exist. If such values cannot exist in the absence of a subjective mind, they cannot transcend all subjective opinion, preference or disposition. How then can they be thought of as "objective" in any literal sense of the term?

Positive for the greatest number of people. And yes, you are quite correct to assume that I am applying utilitarianist principles here. I think your point about subjective valuers and subjective judgements is very compelling and it is making me rethink my argument here, but I am hesitant to completely give into what you’re saying. To use William Lane Craig’s example, if the nazi’s had taken over the world and brainwashed everybody, including future generations, into believing and supporting things like mass extermination and genocide, would that make it a right action? I would say no, because even though the subjective consensus is that it was right, the objective outcome of the nazi’s actions is wrong. Would you instead say that it is impossible to make objective judgements concerning morality and that all morality is essentially relative?

I can certainly empathize with the sentiment which would reject the notion that the attempted extermination of the Jews could ever be "right", but the very fact that this aversion to the notion Dr. Craig has put forward is fundamentally subjective in nature seems to severely undercut the force of Craig's argument. Now a recognition that all moral values are fundamentally seated in the subjective mind does not require that we capitulate to moral relativism. Moral relativism states that the moral quality of a given sentiment is contingent upon the person or society who identifies with it. From a moral subjectivist's perspective, this is absurd. On moral subjectivism (moral skepticism, or even moral nihilism), no subjective moral sentiment is objectively moral, regardless of who happens to hold the sentiment. On the subjectivist's view, all human beings stand on an equal playing field with regard to matters of morality. We all possess personal or corporate subjective affinities/aversions both of which are ours to preserve and defend. There is no "live and let live" mentality nestled within the subjectivist's moral paradigm, if our subjective moral sensibilities are challenged or molested, we fight to protect them. If the subjective moral sensibilities of another person or collective offend our own, we rise in opposition to them. This is the moral landscape we actually traverse. History is replete with anecdotes which confirm the veracity of this moral paradigm. When coupled with a knowledge of the logical untenability of moral absolutism, we find that there exists a strong case to be made for the truth of moral subjectivism.

Anyways, thank you for the post. You're definitely the best debater on here in my opinion. I wish more people would follow your lead.

Once again your kind words do me too much credit. The pleasure has been mine WinePusher.

[instantc]

... only from a naturalistic perspective can the notion of (apparent) "fine tuning" be meaningfully applied and understood. For this reason the argument from "fine tuning" remains ill-equipped to demonstrate the existence of a God. If an omnipotent God did exist, "fine tuning" would not.

I don't think this is a valid objection to the fine-tuning argument. The argument states that fine-tuning cannot be explained without positing a conscious designer. Whether or not God and fine-tuning can coherently exist is irrelevant to the argument. The main point is that allegedly naturalism cannot explain the life enabling values of the universal constants while theism can. To suggest that in theism there's no fine-tuning to explain doesn't counter the argument.

... As such, it is infinitely more improbable that God should arbitrarily choose any particular set of values among this infinite multitude of possible values than the constants should hold the values they do by chance alone. ...

I like this argument, I don't know if it carries much weight in the end though. If I throw a coin in the air, the chance for it landing into any particular spot is one out of an infinite number of possibilities, but it has to land on one of the available spots. Similarly, if God created the universe, he had to choose one set of constants out of the infinite number of possibilities, didn't he? Perhaps he chose the constants randomly and made them life permitting, which would render the above argument irrelevant.

Perhaps God did as you suggest, but if so, how can we say with confidence (as the argument from fine tuning suggests) that it is more probable that the constants and their precise values should be due to design than by chance? If God selected these particular variables at random, out of the infinite number of possible life permitting permutations available to him, then it is difficult to see how God's selection of these values at random is a more probable event than the universe coming to acquire the values it does at random. Yes, any set of values God chooses could be made life permitting subsequent to their selection, but the fact that any particular set of values is selected in the first place (out of the infinite number of possible values) is potentially improbable to an infinite degree. As such, our ignorance regarding any background information which might potentially affect the prior probability that God should choose any particular set of values leaves us ill equipped to state authoritatively that it is more probable that the particular values which correspond to the constants of our particular universe are due to design alone. If we cannot show this notion to be true, or even likely, the argument from fine tuning has ultimately failed to support its conclusion.

If God can make any values life permitting, then it's hardly surprising in the theistic world view that the present set of values are life supporting. The reason why this God came to choose these particular values seems irrelevant to the argument at hand. Thus, theism doesn't face the same problem than naturalism in explaining the values.

[10CC]

Isn't this whole argument very "me centric"?

"I" exist and therefore all of the "things" that make my existence possible must have of necessity been created for "me"?

What makes anybody so sure that other lifeforms do not exist who have absolutely opposing "things" that make their existence possible?

What makes anybody think that if other "things" were the reason for existence that other things wouldn't exist?

I contend that the reason these beliefs "exist" is precisely because we "exist".

"I exist ergo I should exist and all of the "things" that allow my existence are absolutely necessary."

End of story!

[JohnA]

... only from a naturalistic perspective can the notion of (apparent) "fine tuning" be meaningfully applied and understood. For this reason the argument from "fine tuning" remains ill-equipped to demonstrate the existence of a God. If an omnipotent God did exist, "fine tuning" would not.

I don't think this is a valid objection to the fine-tuning argument. The argument states that fine-tuning cannot be explained without positing a conscious designer. Whether or not God and fine-tuning can coherently exist is irrelevant to the argument. The main point is that allegedly naturalism cannot explain the life enabling values of the universal constants while theism can. To suggest that in theism there's no fine-tuning to explain doesn't counter the argument.

... As such, it is infinitely more improbable that God should arbitrarily choose any particular set of values among this infinite multitude of possible values than the constants should hold the values they do by chance alone. ...

I like this argument, I don't know if it carries much weight in the end though. If I throw a coin in the air, the chance for it landing into any particular spot is one out of an infinite number of possibilities, but it has to land on one of the available spots. Similarly, if God created the universe, he had to choose one set of constants out of the infinite number of possibilities, didn't he? Perhaps he chose the constants randomly and made them life permitting, which would render the above argument irrelevant.

Perhaps God did as you suggest, but if so, how can we say with confidence (as the argument from fine tuning suggests) that it is more probable that the constants and their precise values should be due to design than by chance? If God selected these particular variables at random, out of the infinite number of possible life permitting permutations available to him, then it is difficult to see how God's selection of these values at random is a more probable event than the universe coming to acquire the values it does at random. Yes, any set of values God chooses could be made life permitting subsequent to their selection, but the fact that any particular set of values is selected in the first place (out of the infinite number of possible values) is potentially improbable to an infinite degree. As such, our ignorance regarding any background information which might potentially affect the prior probability that God should choose any particular set of values leaves us ill equipped to state authoritatively that it is more probable that the particular values which correspond to the constants of our particular universe are due to design alone. If we cannot show this notion to be true, or even likely, the argument from fine tuning has ultimately failed to support its conclusion.

If God can make any values life permitting, then it's hardly surprising in the theistic world view that the present set of values are life supporting. The reason why this God came to choose these particular values seems irrelevant to the argument at hand. Thus, theism doesn't face the same problem than naturalism in explaining the values.

No. Philosophy (naturalism) faces the same problem as theism. It can not prove anything. It declares truth based on faith. Both are flawed. Science rejects this rubbish called religion and philosorcerery. Why don't you?

[keithprosser3]

"I exist ergo I should exist and all of the "things" that allow my existence are absolutely necessary."

One aspect of fine-tuning is that a small adjustment to a parameter would not have a small effect but a very big effect - that is why the tuning has to be 'fine'. If the parameters of our universe were but slightly different, atoms would not be stable, or there would be no atom more complex than helium, or stars would not form or burn, or they would burn too fast.

While one can imagine life of some sort existing in a slightly changed universe, it is not so easy to imagine how complex life could arise if, say, there was nothing but highly diffuse clouds of H and He around or if there were no stars to provide sources of energy.

The universe has to be 'just right', not only for 'life as we know it', but for any thing that can reasonably said to be 'life'. And - surprise, surprise (or no surprise at all depending on your point of view) it is just right for life.

Now you can say, well we are here. Isn't that explanation enough? Not really.

Imagine you wake up in a police cell. You can't remember anything. But you realise that whatever happened, it ended up with you locked in a cell. That is right as far as it goes, but wouldn't it be nice to know what it was exactly what got you locked up?

(Your cell mate tells you you were locked up because it was gods will you were locked up, but that 'explanation' might not make you content either).

[10CC]

"I exist ergo I should exist and all of the "things" that allow my existence are absolutely necessary."

One aspect of fine-tuning is that a small adjustment to a parameter would not have a small effect but a very big effect - that is why the tuning has to be 'fine'. If the parameters of our universe were but slightly different, atoms would not be stable, or there would be no atom more complex than helium, or stars would not form or burn, or they would burn too fast.

While one can imagine life of some sort existing in a slightly changed universe, it is not so easy to imagine how complex life could arise if, say, there was nothing but highly diffuse clouds of H and He around or if there were no stars to provide sources of energy.

The universe has to be 'just right', not only for 'life as we know it', but for any thing that can reasonably said to be 'life'. And - surprise, surprise (or no surprise at all depending on your point of view) it is just right for life.

Now you can say, well we are here. Isn't that explanation enough? Not really.

Imagine you wake up in a police cell. You can't remember anything. But you realise that whatever happened, it ended up with you locked in a cell. That is right as far as it goes, but wouldn't it be nice to know what it was exactly what got you locked up?

(Your cell mate tells you you were locked up because it was gods will you were locked up, but that 'explanation' might not make you content either).

Nah, wouldn't stop me from doin' it next Friday.

But of course we are only capable of asking these questions because we are here.

Do methane breathing sentient quadrupeds somewhere in the universe ask the same questions? Just because they are there?