Do You Apply Your Epistemology Consistently?

[bluegreenearth]

Whenever I evaluate apologetic arguments, I'm compelled to wonder if these apologists consistently apply their epistemology to other claims. Usually, the apologists I encounter dodge the challenge of applying their epistemology consistently. Instead, I'm offered appeals to special pleading for why they are justified in accepting a positive result of a particular epistemology when it has been applied to a desirable theistic claim but also justified in rejecting an equally positive result from that same epistemology when it has been applied to an unfavorable or competing claim.

For example, some Christians commonly refer to an epistemology which justifies the application of faith in Holy Scriptures and sensory experiences they interpret to be divine revelation from the Holy Spirit as a reliable mechanism for obtaining knowledge of Gods existence and his requirements for humanity. At the same time, the identical or nearly identical epistemology underlies theological claims from other competing religious traditions which are not only incompatible with Christianity but each other as well. This inconsistency is not necessarily a problem for theism in general, but most religious traditions are inherently dogmatic and unwilling to embrace external theological claims.

When confronted with this dilemma, many theists modify or transfer their epistemology grounded on faith to an epistemology grounded on something like emotional appeal or personal experience which may help distinguish their preferred theology from other less desirable theologies, but these epistemological approaches are equally unreliable. For instance, Christians will often say things like, I know Jesus Christ exists as my one true Lord and Savior because I have a personal relationship with him. or I know Christianity is true because Ive experienced positive changes since surrendering my life to the will of God. Meanwhile, nothing prohibits loyal followers of competing religious traditions from using the identical epistemology to distinguish and justify their own theological beliefs.

In more intellectual circles, many theists will modify their epistemology to resemble a scientific or historiographic methodology as a strategy for maintaining confidence in a religious belief. Nevertheless, those intellectually motivated epistemological modifications usually fail at permanently resolving the initial problem of producing positive results that also serve in supporting the interests of unfavorable or competing claims. At the same time none of those strategies successfully mitigate for confirmation bias and may actually depend upon it to achieve the theist's desired goal unlike an epistemology that is actually grounded in a scientific or historiographic methodology.

In all fairness, theists are not prohibited from utilizing a fluid epistemology in that way to justify their beliefs among themselves. If the goal is to reinforce a preferred belief, then adopting the most favorable epistemology or swapping back and forth between multiple epistemologies will serve to achieve that goal regardless of whether or not it corresponds with reality. Furthermore, when changing the epistemic rules at any convenient moment is acceptable or unnoticeable, it becomes relatively easy for apologists to justify theological claims to themselves and other people who already harbor a strong emotional attachment to their shared beliefs. However, it should be noted that every religious tradition retains the same ability to modify their epistemology at will in order to justify and reinforce a preferred theology. More importantly, there is no reason to expect a non-believer to operate under such an unstable and unreliable epistemological model which fails to mitigate for confirmation bias and produces a knowledge base that is inconsistent with or contradictory to the reality they experience.

Questions for consideration and debate:

What is the justification for failing to consistently apply an established epistemology?

How reliable is an epistemology that serves to support multiple competing or contradictory beliefs?

[William]

If not, then how do you decide - using your current epistemology - on the best way to look at your existence, being that you do not have access to alternate experience and that one day your body will die?

I'm not sure I completely understand what you are asking but will try my best to supply an answer. I don't have to decide on the best way to look at my existence because there appears to be only one option.

Primarily, there is firsthand experience of the self. I can know that I am a sentient being who experiences a continuous flow of information from what appears to be an external world. I cant be absolutely certain that the world my mind perceives as an external reality is or is not a Reality Simulation. However, I can know it is true that Im experiencing sensory input regardless of its source. This type of knowledge is called personal knowledge.

William: I want to focus on this part of your answer because it appears to me to be inconsistent with what you say about the apple in your member notes.
I need to know exactly what it is you are referring to as your 'Self'. It appears you are referring to being a human. Would that be the case?

[bluegreenearth]

William: If you don't claim to know if we do or do not live within a creation and accept the logical possibility of either position, then does your epistemology system allow for evidence which can be taken either way as being therefore "unknowable" equally?

I'll need you to explain this phrase, "evidence which can be taken either way as being therefore 'unknowable' equally."

[bluegreenearth]

William: Be aware I am still trying to understand whether your particular Epistemology is consistent. My question and your answer help.

Did you mean to indicate that you are trying to understand if the way I apply my epistemology is consistent? I'm not sure how an epistemology itself can be consistent or inconsistent because it is just a method for evaluating knowledge claims.

[bluegreenearth]

William: I want to focus on this part of your answer because it appears to me to be inconsistent with what you say about the apple in your member notes.
I need to know exactly what it is you are referring to as your 'Self'. It appears you are referring to being a human. Would that be the case?

No. The concept of "self" refers to my experience of conscious thought. What is labeled "human" may or may not be consistent with "self" depending on whether I exist in a Reality Simulation or not.

[William]

William: If you don't claim to know if we do or do not live within a creation and accept the logical possibility of either position, then does your epistemology system allow for evidence which can be taken either way as being therefore "unknowable" equally?

I'll need you to explain this phrase, "evidence which can be taken either way as being therefore 'unknowable' equally."

William: Okay - I will place this to one side for now and perhaps revisit it at some other time, if it comes up.

[William]

William: I want to focus on this part of your answer because it appears to me to be inconsistent with what you say about the apple in your member notes.
I need to know exactly what it is you are referring to as your 'Self'. It appears you are referring to being a human. Would that be the case?

No. The concept of "self" refers to my experience of conscious thought. What is labeled "human" may or may not be consistent with "self" depending on whether I exist in a Reality Simulation or not.

William:
1: Do you therefore see the 'self' as separate from your experience of conscious thought?
2: Why do you think your idea of self depends upon whether you exist in a Reality Simulation or not?

[William]

William: Be aware I am still trying to understand whether your particular Epistemology is consistent. My question and your answer help.

Did you mean to indicate that you are trying to understand if the way I apply my epistemology is consistent?

William: Yes.

[bluegreenearth]

William:
1: Do you therefore see the 'self' as separate from your experience of conscious thought?
2: Why do you think your idea of self depends upon whether you exist in a Reality Simulation or not?

The "self" is my experience of conscious thought; not separate from it.

It is my idea of "human" that depends on whether I exist in a Reality Simulation or not. If the body I am currently experiencing that we label as "human" is a component of a Reality Simulation, then the existence of the "self" doing the conscious thinking need not be consistent with the idea of "human." Conversely, if the "human" body I am currently experiencing is not a component of a Reality Simulation, then the existence of the "self" doing the conscious thinking must be consistent with the idea of "human."

[William]

William:
1: Do you therefore see the 'self' as separate from your experience of conscious thought?
2: Why do you think your idea of self depends upon whether you exist in a Reality Simulation or not?

The "self" is my experience of conscious thought; not separate from it.

It is my idea of "human" that depends on whether I exist in a Reality Simulation or not. If the body I am currently experiencing that we label as "human" is a component of a Reality Simulation, then the existence of the "self" doing the conscious thinking need not be consistent with the idea of "human." Conversely, if the "human" body I am currently experiencing is not a component of a Reality Simulation, then the existence of the "self" doing the conscious thinking must be consistent with the idea of "human."

William: Which one do you lean toward more? That you are a human being and that is your 'self' or the other?

[bluegreenearth]

William: Which one do you lean toward more? That you are a human being and that is your 'self' or the other?

Intellectual honesty requires me to concede that agnosticism about whether the "self" is contingent upon the existence of the human body or not is the only justifiable position to hold from a perspective that is limited to the only reality I am able experience. However, confirmation bias would have me believe that the "self" could not exist without the human brain. In scientific terms, if the proposed hypothesis is that my human body is just a component of a Reality Simulation I'm experiencing where my concept of "self" exists independently from my brain, then the null hypothesis would be that my concept of "self" is consistent with my common experience of identifying as a human being.