"All possibilities are necessarily actualized"

[EduChris]

Consider the following hypothesis:

"Any and all possibilities are necessarily actualized in some or another universe(s) within an infinite omniverse"

Does this represent a parsimonious hypothesis, or a profligate one?

[AquinasD]

If you are the only person in sight, the epistemically preferred option is to suppose that there are NOT invisible targets at which all of the guns are necessarily aimed. To do otherwise would be to multiply entities unnecessarily.

...and this is where the analogy breaks down, obviously. If there were a multiverse, you couldn't observe the other worlds.

Remember that the point here is not to "prove" the existence of VUR beyond all doubt (as if that could be done).

Then we have a differing method.

Science needs to postulate a near infinite number of universes in order to overcome the otherwise compelling "apparent design" of our universe. Thus the notion of only 21 guns is obviously a simplification. Suppose 21^21 guns, or X number of guns. At some point you have to start believing that something more than chance & necessity was responsible for your surviving the firing squad.

It's like you're just missing the point when it's convenient. Remember, the difference is that of multiplying principles. If a nigh-infinite amount of individual entities would be the result of a single explanatory principle, this doesn't speak against the principle, especially if it is simpler than a multiplicity of explanatory principles.

It is like saying "Material objects are constituted by atoms." If this principle of physics is true, there are a nigh-infinite amount of entities (individual atoms in this case). Does this speak against the principle? I am disinclined to think so.

[EduChris]

...and this is where the analogy breaks down, obviously. If there were a multiverse, you couldn't observe the other worlds...

Yes, and if there were invisible targets, we couldn't observe those either.

...we have a differing method...

Nothing wrong with that. I hope you succeed with your "proofs." For me, epistemically justified beliefs are adequate.

...the difference is that of multiplying principles. If a nigh-infinite amount of individual entities would be the result of a single explanatory principle, this doesn't speak against the principle, especially if it is simpler than a multiplicity of explanatory principles...

I'm remebering the point very well, but you have to remember that I'm not the one multiplying universes in order to get around the "apparent design" of the only universe we can ever know anything about--scientists are doing this, and they don't yet seem to have discovered the subversive "hit" this strikes against epistemology.

...It is like saying "Material objects are constituted by atoms." If this principle of physics is true, there are a nigh-infinite amount of entities (individual atoms in this case). Does this speak against the principle? I am disinclined to think so.

I don't think your example "speaks against the principle either," but again you have two "principles" here: 1) the constitution of matter and 2) the quantity of matter. It would be more helpful to your case if you could find an example that doesn't require this sort of 2-in-1 equivocation.

[AquinasD]

Yes, and if there were invisible targets, we couldn't observe those either.

God is invisible. Why is legitimate for you to posit an invisible being, but not others?

I'm remebering the point very well, but you have to remember that I'm not the one multiplying universes in order to get around the "apparent design" of the only universe we can ever know anything about--scientists are doing this, and they don't yet seem to have discovered the subversive "hit" this strikes against epistemology.

Look, perhaps it is the case that this is not a multiverse, and if there are other worlds, they might be not physically connected to our own (which would not be in support of the multiverse hypothesis in-itself, note). But I believe that your abduction in this mode of reasoning stands on the same ground as the multiverse hypothesis. You ask why q? and come up with a different fill for p.

If p, then q

Yes, if it was the case that God existed, then apparent design would be explained by the fact of His being the creator. (Or maybe not; He could create a multiverse, and perhaps He very well did that.) But to argue as you do is to affirm the consequent. The fact of q could very well have a different explanation, i.e. a multiverse. From within the mode of reasoning, these are both legitimate hypotheses, and they introduce the same amount of principles.

I don't think your example "speaks against the principle either," but again you have two "principles" here: 1) the constitution of matter and 2) the quantity of matter. It would be more helpful to your case if you could find an example that doesn't require this sort of 2-in-1 equivocation.

Like something that could actually has a small quantity but could be a large quantity? Very well.

"There is a kind of animal known as the tiger." I would that the total population of tigers is only in the thousands, which is vanishingly small compared to the number of atoms or photons that exist.

[EduChris]

...God is invisible. Why is legitimate for you to posit an invisible being, but not others?...

My argument does not claim that God is invisible; instead, it notes the obvious fact that whatever Ultimate Reality is, it lies beyond the reach of empiricism, yet to some degree it's amenable to logical analysis.

...your abduction in this mode of reasoning stands on the same ground as the multiverse hypothesis...to argue as you do is to affirm the consequent...

I give the multiverse a fair chance at providing an epistemically justified explanation. It fails. Then I try VUR and it succeeds where NVUR failed. Whatever I'm doing, it isn't "affirming the consequent." If I had to label my approach it would be, "Determine what the available options are, weed out the one(s) that don't work, and keep the one(s) that do work."

...Like something that could actually has a small quantity but could be a large quantity? Very well...

It seems we're operating on different wavelenths, as I have no idea what you are trying to say here. Still, I've benefitted from some of your comments, so that's better than usual on these Internet forums. Thank you.

[AquinasD]

My argument does not claim that God is invisible; instead, it notes the obvious fact that whatever Ultimate Reality is, it lies beyond the reach of empiricism, yet to some degree it's amenable to logical analysis.

So why is your objection to the multiverse theory valid, again?

I give the multiverse a fair chance at providing an epistemically justified explanation. It fails. Then I try VUR and it succeeds where NVUR failed. Whatever I'm doing, it isn't "affirming the consequent." If I had to label my approach it would be, "Determine what the available options are, weed out the one(s) that don't work, and keep the one(s) that do work."

I still do not see why your principle is more likely than the competing principle. They both seem equally explanatory.

Still, I've benefitted from some of your comments, so that's better than usual on these Internet forums. Thank you.

My words are always very valuable. It is to be expected.

[EduChris]

...So why is your objection to the multiverse theory valid, again?...

The multiverse theory stipulates a near-infinitude of universes, but only a vanishingly small fraction of those universes will preserve epistemology. In such case, no one would be able to justify the notion that their universe just happened to be one of the vanishingly improbable universes wherein true beliefs predominate.

...I still do not see why your principle is more likely than the competing principle. They both seem equally explanatory...

The multiverse theory is the only scientifically viable NVUR option; but since it is epistemically self-defeating, it cannot provide an epistemically justified explanation. VUR, on the other hand provides a real explanation without creating contradictions and without subverting epistemology.

...My words are always very valuable. It is to be expected.

[ThatGirlAgain]

...So why is your objection to the multiverse theory valid, again?...

The multiverse theory stipulates a near-infinitude of universes, but only a vanishingly small fraction of those universes will preserve epistemology. In such case, no one would be able to justify the notion that their universe just happened to be one of the vanishingly improbable universes wherein true beliefs predominate.

I already answered this. I do not recall a proper reply. But if you are talking about "ontologically true" beliefs held by intelligent beings as opposed to "true enough" survival oriented beliefs, then they are indeed very rare in any universe. In fact, how does one demonstrate that there is such a thing as an ontologically true belief involving volition without profligate assumptions? My proposal assumes only logic, something we would be hard pressed to deny without eliminating all possible solutions to the problem.

Anyway got to run. Probably will not be available until Monday.

[EduChris]

...if you are talking about "ontologically true" beliefs held by intelligent beings as opposed to "true enough" survival oriented beliefs, then they are indeed very rare in any universe...

Depends on whether we have the sort of VUR that cares enough about us to make such beliefs a goal toward which we might reasonably attain.

...how does one demonstrate that there is such a thing as an ontologically true belief involving volition without profligate assumptions? My proposal assumes only logic, something we would be hard pressed to deny without eliminating all possible solutions to the problem...

Is it possible to have "logic" without any conscious minds? Many people believe that "logic" only truly exists in the noosphere. Are you saying there is some ontologic reality of logic outside of or beyond the conscious mind? Is logic capable of actually doing things on its own, rather than merely describing relationships of pre-existing concrete or abstract things? Is logic capable of creating matter and energy, or do we have to start with some amorphous and infinite supply of it in order to fund the profligacy of your omniverse?

It seems as though you do believe that immaterial things such as logic can have their own independent ontologic reality--capable of doing things and creating things and describing things. How is it that your "logic" can be capable of doing all these things to an infinite degree, but yet remain forever incapable of selectivity?

[AquinasD]

The multiverse theory stipulates a near-infinitude of universes, but only a vanishingly small fraction of those universes will preserve epistemology. In such case, no one would be able to justify the notion that their universe just happened to be one of the vanishingly improbable universes wherein true beliefs predominate.

Why should I believe that it's possible for there to be a universe in which there are minds that are incapable of gaining knowledge about the world around them? Such a situation seems impossible; a flat contradiction. If there are minds-proper, than they can know, for that is just what a mind is.

[EduChris]

...Why should I believe that it's possible for there to be a universe in which there are minds that are incapable of gaining knowledge about the world around them?...

Monkeys can gain "good-enough" knowledge about the world around them; but this hardly implies that such "knowledge" is actually "true." Naturalistic, materialistic evolution selects for behaviors, not for beliefs. If there are an infinite number of false beliefs which can produce "fit enough" behaviors for any given question, why should we assume it likely that any mind will somehow find the needle of "truth" in the infinite haystack of "true-enough = actually false" beliefs? It seems much more likely that a given species will--if they develop "beliefs" at all--gravitate into some truth-deficient cul-de-sac, and perhaps occasionally move up into a higher level of truth-deficient cul-de-sac. There is no reason to assume that any more than a vanishingly small fraction of species will ever make their way into the one and only cul-de-sac of actual truth--and especially with regard to questions that have no immediate survival value.