Volitional Non-contingent Reality?

[EduChris]

Who and what are we as human beings? Specifically, do we possess any measure of genuine volition—some causal mechanism which is not strictly reducible to the causal mechanisms of chance and necessity—whereby we can, in certain cases and in some degree, take ownership and responsibility for our thoughts and behaviors by intentionally using our volition to alter some causal chain?

If we do have some measure of genuine volition, as rational beings we will attempt to find some epistemologically justified explanation for it. What is the best epistemically justified explanation for volition? I believe theism is the best and only epistemically justified explanation.

For this debate, I will define theism as the claim that the explanation for all contingencies (including our universe and our selves) ultimately derive from some non-contingent reality which involves at least some volition. Since we cannot subject this non-contingent reality to empirical testing, and since we cannot know precisely what it is, we will wrap this non-contingent reality up inside a tool of logic known as a black box. There could be anything inside this black box, but for simplicity’s sake we will start with the following minimal definition of the contents of the black box:

1) It undergirds all contingent existence
2) It is not arbitrarily limited by any physical or spatio-temporal dimensions
3) It is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle or process information
4) It is not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy

I believe the above definition is both simple and capable of producing any possible world. If I am correct, then there is no need (and no epistemological warrant) to postulate additional entities inside the black box.

Question for debate: if some genuine volition exists within our universe, does theism—volitional non-contingent reality as defined above—provide the best epistemically justified explanation?

[Jax Agnesson]

I would be interested in how someone might try to define volition so as to avoid the force of the argument (which, in its present form, leads directly and obviously to theism)

OK. I could make an attempt at that.
I note that you put volition alongside chance and necessity as equal 'causal mechanisms', and that you do not propose there could be any others. This raises three questions
1. Are there any 'causal mechanisms' at all, independent of human consciousness, and if so how are they defined?
2. Is volition worthy to stand alongside chance and necessity as a causal mechanism?
3. Could there be 'causal mechanisms' other than the three proposed?
The answer to question one is entirely dependent on whether one starts from an idealist or a materialist viewpoint. I will set that aside for the moment, and proceed pro tem on the assumption that there are at least some such mechanisms in the Universe.
The answer to question two, (assuming there is at least a possible Universe existing independent of human consciousness,) is 'I don't know, but probably not, unless one starts with the presumption of a Universal will'.
The answer to question three is 'Not that I can think of off-hand, but I'm a bear of very little brain, so there might well be. Or indeed there might not be any causal mechanisms at all, outside our heads.'

Admittedly this doesn't get us very far, apart from agreeing that neither the materialist nor the idealist starting point is an automatic bar to rational thought.

To meet head on your challenge to 'define volition so as to avoid the force of (your) argument,' I will observe that, to all but the extreme solipsist, necessity and chance appear capable of operating even in universes that contain no conscious minds at all. This immediately makes volition less than equal to the other two, as possible causal mechanisms.
And this difference is not a small one, as can be seen by considering what the other two entail.
A purely random universe, (one in which any sequence of events, if they could be observed by a human-like intelligence, would show no predictable patterns whatsoever) still cannot be described as being independent of the 'causal mechanism' of chance.
A universe in which the sequences of events, if they could be observed by a human-like intelligence, show very predictable, albeit subtle and complex, patterns like 'whenever X at time t, then Y at time t+1', could be described by that observer as exhibiting behaviour consistent with a necessary causal mechanism.
Either of the above universes could exist independent of even this 'outside observer', ie with no 'volition' at all. Which, if true, implies that necessity and chance, either separately or together, are capable of acting as causal mechanisms without volition,, and chance is what must necessarily rule in the absence of both volition and necessity.
Either of the above universes could be influenced by a volition unknown to the observer, but that would be multiplying entities unnecessarily.
We do not know of any volition existing outside our own heads, and even that interior experience of volition is open to serious questioning as neuroscience develops.
Excluding (for now) the possibility of causal mechanisms other than the three you propose, and allowing (for now) the status of 'causal mechanism' to the concepts of chance and necessity, we are left with the question of whether volition actually deserves to be ranked as an equal alongside these.
Now I have shown that (unless one starts with a presumption of idealism) it is possible for universes to exist without volition as a causal mechanism; and we agree that we, as humans, experience something that we are calling volition; so we need to ask whether this experienced phenomenon is a third causal mechanism, or a product of some other processes.
If it is a causal mechanism, what does it cause?
In the absence of proof, we can dismiss telekinesis, ie the action of the will on objects outside the human body. Which leaves volition as a 'something' that causes the human body to act in a way other than it would have done in the absence of volition.
So, what changes in the physical world are directly attributable to human volition?
Well, I can decide to lift a finger. There. It moved in exactly the way I wanted. (You'll have to take my word for it, though
1. .)
OK. Longitudinal muscle fibres shifted in response to electrical changes between them. These electrical changes are due to the presence of acetylcholine, which is released when a nerve-ending..... etc etc, need I go on? The question is, we can trace these perfectly comprehensible electrochemical processes back to a particular site in the brain,. ... and then what?
Either there is a 'ghost in the machine' or there isn't.
If there isn't a 'ghost in the machine' then volition has no right to stand alongside other, more observable, causal mechanisms, because it depends on these other mechanisms for its existence..
But if there is a ghost in the machine, there must be a stage at which it translates its non-physical thought into a physical force capable of obliging at least some electrons in the brain to move in ways other than they otherwise would; ie against the laws of physics.
So; we see two causal mechanisms which we find adequate to explain all the phenomena outside the human brain. We see the processes that drive human physical movement as no different from the processes that drive analogous movement in animals. We see behaviours similar to human behaviours in animals with similar brain-structures, and we note that where an animal lacks certain brain structures, it appears incapable of exhibiting some corresponding set of behaviours.
But inside our own heads we feel experiences that we cannot yet explain in terms of the same causes that we assign to objects outside our heads.
Either we must assume that the laws (chemical, electrical, etc) that apply inside our heads are exactly the same as those that apply outside, but operating on so complex and subtle a physical structure that we are not yet able to fully understand it,( and indeed it may be so complex that understanding might not be within the capacity of brains structured like ours)
or we can introduce a third causal mechanism which has, in the observable universe outside our heads, no apparent effect, but which is capable of operating inside our heads in a way that completely over-rides the other two.
Which is the most parsimonious?.

[EduChris]

...to all but the extreme solipsist, necessity and chance appear capable of operating even in universes that contain no conscious minds at all. This immediately makes volition less than equal to the other two, as possible causal mechanisms...

I can envision a possible universe operating strictly according to necessity. I can imagine a possible universe operating strictly according to volition. And I can almost envision a possible universe operating strictly according to chance--although such universe would be impenetrable to the scientific method, which relies on patterns of cause and effect absent in such a completely randomized universe. And of course I can envision a universe operating according to some admixture of two or more of these three causal mechanisms (which constitute the complete set of causal mechanisms known to us or even imaginable by us). In other words, your claim (highlighted above) appears rather ad hoc.

...Either of the above universes could be influenced by a volition unknown to the observer, but that would be multiplying entities unnecessarily...

If there is a possible world that operates strictly according to chance, without recourse to any necessity, do we therefore throw out necessity? And if there is a possible world that operates strictly according to necessity, without recourse to chance, do we therefore throw out chance? It seems you are subjecting volition to special demands which you do not apply equally to chance and necessity.

...We do not know of any volition existing outside our own heads, and even that interior experience of volition is open to serious questioning as neuroscience develops...

We do not know of chance & necessity existing outside our own heads. Every question or thought we have had, or do have, or will have, traverses or resides (apparently) inside our mind. Only volition and consciousness comes to us in a direct, unmediated fashion; everything else is mediated through causal chains which can be quite tentative and long, relying as they do on multiple testimonies and multiple observations and multipe blips on a computer screen and multiple conflicting interpretations and complex mathematical formulas inaccessible to all but a few people with specialized training. If I have to start throwing out causal mechanisms, volition is the last one I would throw out--because without it, I have no means of taking ownership of any thoughts or questions or interpretations regarding anything (including chance and necessity).

...we are left with the question of whether volition actually deserves to be ranked as an equal alongside these...I have shown that (unless one starts with a presumption of idealism) it is possible for universes to exist without volition as a causal mechanism...

I appreciate your reasoning here, but I think you need to take it all the way and consider the possibility that volitional universes might exist without recourse to necessity and chance.

...we agree that we, as humans, experience something that we are calling volition; so we need to ask whether this experienced phenomenon is a third causal mechanism, or a product of some other processes...

If we are to ask such questions, we will certainly want to end up with an epistemically justified explanation for volition. If the causal chain which leads to our experience of volition contains even a single element of chance, then we either have an incorrect explanation (i.e., there really is some cause, but this cause is unknown to us and thereby incorrectly labeled as "chance") or else we have the "Poof! It just happened!" scenario, which circumvents the normal cause-and-effect requirements of scientific method. Either way, whenever we try to explain volition in terms of some admixture of chance & necessity, we always end up without any epistemically justified explanation for volition.

...If it is a causal mechanism, what does it cause? ...what changes in the physical world are directly attributable to human volition? ...Longitudinal muscle fibres shifted in response to electrical changes between them. These electrical changes are due to the presence of acetylcholine, which is released when a nerve-ending..... etc etc, need I go on?...

Not being a scientist myself, such discussions always end up looking like the proverbial scientist who spends so much time examining the bits and bytes of a CD that she never gets around to listening to the music.

...The question is, we can trace these perfectly comprehensible electrochemical processes back to a particular site in the brain...and then what?...

Which begs the question: What is a brain? Apparently it is mostly empty space which ultimately fizzles out into the cloudy fitfullness of quantum particles(?) or processes(?) or entanglements(?) or whatever, which our brains may never be able to fully fathom.

...Either there is a 'ghost in the machine' or there isn't...If there isn't a 'ghost in the machine' then volition has no right to stand alongside other, more observable, causal mechanisms, because it depends on these other mechanisms for its existence...

Or perhaps the volition itself is the machine? Perhaps we don't know what we're talking about when we speak of a "machine"?

...But if there is a ghost in the machine, there must be a stage at which it translates its non-physical thought into a physical force capable of obliging at least some electrons in the brain to move in ways other than they otherwise would; ie against the laws of physics...

The laws of physics are nothing more than observed regularities--which can be measured and quantified and reduced to mathematical equations--the knowledge of which may lead to pragmatically useful results. "Volition" appears difficult or impossible to reduce to mathematic equations, which in turn leads science to attempt to explain it away in terms of something else which is more amenable to its tools. As the saying goes, "When all you have is a hammer, everything ends up looking like a nail."

...So; we see two causal mechanisms which we find adequate to explain all the phenomena outside the human brain. We see the processes that drive human physical movement as no different from the processes that drive analogous movement in animals. We see behaviours similar to human behaviours in animals with similar brain-structures, and we note that where an animal lacks certain brain structures, it appears incapable of exhibiting some corresponding set of behaviours...

I don't think our science has really reached this point yet; I don't think we can explain all the phenomena outside the human brain. I doubt we've even discovered the nth portion of all the phenomena outside the human brain. How would we ever know when we've finally arrived? How would we ever know whether our tiny brains are even capable of such knowledge? At best, we've come up with some useful formulas that lead to pragmatically useful results.

...But inside our own heads we feel experiences that we cannot yet explain in terms of the same causes that we assign to objects outside our heads...

It seems to me that there cannot, even in principle, ever be any epistemically justified explanation for volition (per the reasons given in paragraph #5, above). It appears to me that only volition can provide an epistemically justified explanation for itself--which means that it is fundamental, irreducible, and independent of chance & necessity.

...Either we must assume that the laws (chemical, electrical, etc) that apply inside our heads are exactly the same as those that apply outside, but operating on so complex and subtle a physical structure that we are not yet able to fully understand it,( and indeed it may be so complex that understanding might not be within the capacity of brains structured like ours) or we can introduce a third causal mechanism which has, in the observable universe outside our heads, no apparent effect, but which is capable of operating inside our heads in a way that completely over-rides the other two...Which is the most parsimonious?.

Parsimony is only part of the criteria. We also need explanatory scope. To me, explanatory scope fails whenever we attempt to reduce volition down to the mechanisms of chance & necessity.

Scientific knowledge ultimately boils down to pragmatic results. Pragmatically, we cannot live our daily lives without resorting to personal ownership and responsibility and accountability and individual autonomy which the "conceit" (if it be a "conceit" at all) of volition uniquely provides. Thus, even from the standpoint of science--with all its hazy quantum fitfullness and uncertainty--it seems that volition must take its rightful place, perhaps the prominent place, among the only causal mechanisms we believe we can see operating within our universe and our selves.

[Jax Agnesson]

...to all but the extreme solipsist, necessity and chance appear capable of operating even in universes that contain no conscious minds at all. This immediately makes volition less than equal to the other two, as possible causal mechanisms...

I can envision a possible universe operating strictly according to necessity. I can imagine a possible universe operating strictly according to volition. And I can almost envision a possible universe operating strictly according to chance--although such universe would be impenetrable to the scientific method, which relies on patterns of cause and effect absent in such a completely randomized universe. And of course I can envision a universe operating according to some admixture of two or more of these three causal mechanisms (which constitute the complete set of causal mechanisms known to us or even imaginable by us). In other words, your claim (highlighted above) appears rather ad hoc.
This is a really strong point, Chris. I must admit to a materialist presupposition here.. I must rethink this one.

...Either of the above universes could be influenced by a volition unknown to the observer, but that would be multiplying entities unnecessarily...

If there is a possible world that operates strictly according to chance, without recourse to any necessity, do we therefore throw out necessity? And if there is a possible world that operates strictly according to necessity, without recourse to chance, do we therefore throw out chance? It seems you are subjecting volition to special demands which you do not apply equally to chance and necessity.

...We do not know of any volition existing outside our own heads, and even that interior experience of volition is open to serious questioning as neuroscience develops...

We do not know of chance & necessity existing outside our own heads. Every question or thought we have had, or do have, or will have, traverses or resides (apparently) inside our mind. Only volition and consciousness comes to us in a direct, unmediated fashion; everything else is mediated through causal chains which can be quite tentative and long, relying as they do on multiple testimonies and multiple observations and multipe blips on a computer screen and multiple conflicting interpretations and complex mathematical formulas inaccessible to all but a few people with specialized training. If I have to start throwing out causal mechanisms, volition is the last one I would throw out--because without it, I have no means of taking ownership of any thoughts or questions or interpretations regarding anything (including chance and necessity).

...we are left with the question of whether volition actually deserves to be ranked as an equal alongside these...I have shown that (unless one starts with a presumption of idealism) it is possible for universes to exist without volition as a causal mechanism...

I appreciate your reasoning here, but I think you need to take it all the way and consider the possibility that volitional universes might exist without recourse to necessity and chance.

...we agree that we, as humans, experience something that we are calling volition; so we need to ask whether this experienced phenomenon is a third causal mechanism, or a product of some other processes...

If we are to ask such questions, we will certainly want to end up with an epistemically justified explanation for volition. If the causal chain which leads to our experience of volition contains even a single element of chance, then we either have an incorrect explanation (i.e., there really is some cause, but this cause is unknown to us and thereby incorrectly labeled as "chance") or else we have the "Poof! It just happened!" scenario, which circumvents the normal cause-and-effect requirements of scientific method. Either way, whenever we try to explain volition in terms of some admixture of chance & necessity, we always end up without any epistemically justified explanation for volition.

...If it is a causal mechanism, what does it cause? ...what changes in the physical world are directly attributable to human volition? ...Longitudinal muscle fibres shifted in response to electrical changes between them. These electrical changes are due to the presence of acetylcholine, which is released when a nerve-ending..... etc etc, need I go on?...

Not being a scientist myself, such discussions always end up looking like the proverbial scientist who spends so much time examining the bits and bytes of a CD that she never gets around to listening to the music.

...The question is, we can trace these perfectly comprehensible electrochemical processes back to a particular site in the brain...and then what?...

Which begs the question: What is a brain? Apparently it is mostly empty space which ultimately fizzles out into the cloudy fitfullness of quantum particles(?) or processes(?) or entanglements(?) or whatever, which our brains may never be able to fully fathom.

...Either there is a 'ghost in the machine' or there isn't...If there isn't a 'ghost in the machine' then volition has no right to stand alongside other, more observable, causal mechanisms, because it depends on these other mechanisms for its existence...

Or perhaps the volition itself is the machine? Perhaps we don't know what we're talking about when we speak of a "machine"?

...But if there is a ghost in the machine, there must be a stage at which it translates its non-physical thought into a physical force capable of obliging at least some electrons in the brain to move in ways other than they otherwise would; ie against the laws of physics...

The laws of physics are nothing more than observed regularities--which can be measured and quantified and reduced to mathematical equations--the knowledge of which may lead to pragmatically useful results. "Volition" appears difficult or impossible to reduce to mathematic equations, which in turn leads science to attempt to explain it away in terms of something else which is more amenable to its tools. As the saying goes, "When all you have is a hammer, everything ends up looking like a nail."

...So; we see two causal mechanisms which we find adequate to explain all the phenomena outside the human brain. We see the processes that drive human physical movement as no different from the processes that drive analogous movement in animals. We see behaviours similar to human behaviours in animals with similar brain-structures, and we note that where an animal lacks certain brain structures, it appears incapable of exhibiting some corresponding set of behaviours...

I don't think our science has really reached this point yet; I don't think we can explain all the phenomena outside the human brain. I doubt we've even discovered the nth portion of all the phenomena outside the human brain. How would we ever know when we've finally arrived? How would we ever know whether our tiny brains are even capable of such knowledge? At best, we've come up with some useful formulas that lead to pragmatically useful results.

...But inside our own heads we feel experiences that we cannot yet explain in terms of the same causes that we assign to objects outside our heads...

It seems to me that there cannot, even in principle, ever be any epistemically justified explanation for volition (per the reasons given in paragraph #5, above). It appears to me that only volition can provide an epistemically justified explanation for itself--which means that it is fundamental, irreducible, and independent of chance & necessity.

...Either we must assume that the laws (chemical, electrical, etc) that apply inside our heads are exactly the same as those that apply outside, but operating on so complex and subtle a physical structure that we are not yet able to fully understand it,( and indeed it may be so complex that understanding might not be within the capacity of brains structured like ours) or we can introduce a third causal mechanism which has, in the observable universe outside our heads, no apparent effect, but which is capable of operating inside our heads in a way that completely over-rides the other two...Which is the most parsimonious?.

Parsimony is only part of the criteria. We also need explanatory scope. To me, explanatory scope fails whenever we attempt to reduce volition down to the mechanisms of chance & necessity.

Scientific knowledge ultimately boils down to pragmatic results. Pragmatically, we cannot live our daily lives without resorting to personal ownership and responsibility and accountability and individual autonomy which the "conceit" (if it be a "conceit" at all) of volition uniquely provides. Thus, even from the standpoint of science--with all its hazy quantum fitfullness and uncertainty--it seems that volition must take its rightful place, perhaps the prominent place, among the only causal mechanisms we believe we can see operating within our universe and our selves.

[Jax Agnesson]

...to all but the extreme solipsist, necessity and chance appear capable of operating even in universes that contain no conscious minds at all. This immediately makes volition less than equal to the other two, as possible causal mechanisms...

I can envision a possible universe operating strictly according to necessity. I can imagine a possible universe operating strictly according to volition. And I can almost envision a possible universe operating strictly according to chance--although such universe would be impenetrable to the scientific method, which relies on patterns of cause and effect absent in such a completely randomized universe. And of course I can envision a universe operating according to some admixture of two or more of these three causal mechanisms (which constitute the complete set of causal mechanisms known to us or even imaginable by us). In other words, your claim (highlighted above) appears rather ad hoc.

Then let me put the same case from a different angle.
What is a 'causal mechanism'?
Consider any situation in which some state, X is followed by some state Y.
Either state X is such that nothing but state Y could possibly follow from it; (necessity)
Or state X is such that any of states A,B,C, .. Y, Z could follow, either with equal probability or different probabilities, (chance)
or, what else? Volition?
Can volition exist without somebody's Will? I think you will agree with me that the idea is inconceivable.
So.
Supposing state X is 'somebody wills state Y'.
Now. Is state Y the only possible state that can follow state X: (necessity)?
Or is state Y one of several things that could follow state X?; (chance, or a mixture of chance and necessity).
In this way, I think I have shown that, even without addressing the question of whether 'volition' is capable of existing independent of chance and necessity, the operation of volition on the material world cannot be described without them.

And I can almost envision a possible universe operating strictly according to chance--although such universe would be impenetrable to the scientific method, which relies on patterns of cause and effect absent in such a completely randomized universe.

Actually, if we replace the word 'chance' with the word 'probability' this gives modern science a very good working basis for understanding the fundamental operations of our universe. The model I suggested earlier, of a universe with no recognisable patterns at all, is itself so improbable that it could exist only in abstract thought.

...We do not know of any volition existing outside our own heads, and even that interior experience of volition is open to serious questioning as neuroscience develops...

We do not know of chance & necessity existing outside our own heads. Every question or thought we have had, or do have, or will have, traverses or resides (apparently) inside our mind. Only volition and consciousness comes to us in a direct, unmediated fashion; everything else is mediated through causal chains which can be quite tentative and long, relying as they do on multiple testimonies and multiple observations and multipe blips on a computer screen and multiple conflicting interpretations and complex mathematical formulas inaccessible to all but a few people with specialized training. If I have to start throwing out causal mechanisms, volition is the last one I would throw out--because without it, I have no means of taking ownership of any thoughts or questions or interpretations regarding anything (including chance and necessity).

To all but the extreme solipsist, our grasp of the events outside our heads can sometimes qualify as knowledge.

...we are left with the question of whether volition actually deserves to be ranked as an equal alongside these...I have shown that (unless one starts with a presumption of idealism) it is possible for universes to exist without volition as a causal mechanism...

I appreciate your reasoning here, but I think you need to take it all the way and consider the possibility that volitional universes might exist without recourse to necessity and chance.

Either A, such a universe has no material substance existing outside the consciousness that wills it,
or else B, the substance of such a universe exists outside of, but is (entirely or partially) controlled by, such a consciousness.
In case A, yes there could be, and probably are, lots of such universes inside lots of people's minds;
in case B, the operation of volition on the substance of the universe is either by necessity or by a mixture of necessity and chance.

...we agree that we, as humans, experience something that we are calling volition; so we need to ask whether this experienced phenomenon is a third causal mechanism, or a product of some other processes...

If we are to ask such questions, we will certainly want to end up with an epistemically justified explanation for volition. If the causal chain which leads to our experience of volition contains even a single element of chance, then we either have an incorrect explanation (i.e., there really is some cause, but this cause is unknown to us and thereby incorrectly labeled as "chance") or else we have the "Poof! It just happened!" scenario, which circumvents the normal cause-and-effect requirements of scientific method. Either way, whenever we try to explain volition in terms of some admixture of chance & necessity, we always end up without any epistemically justified explanation for volition.

We need to understand the difference between calculable probability and completely chaotic situations.
The machines through which we are presently communicating pass huge amounts of data across thousands of miles every second of every day, with stunning levels of reliability. And yet at the heart of every semiconductor junction processes are taking place which are entirely probabilistic.

...The question is, we can trace these perfectly comprehensible electrochemical processes back to a particular site in the brain...and then what?...

Which begs the question: What is a brain? Apparently it is mostly empty space which ultimately fizzles out into the cloudy fitfullness of quantum particles(?) or processes(?) or entanglements(?) or whatever, which our brains may never be able to fully fathom.

So you do know something about the dialectical relationship between ordered patterns and random events in a probabilistic universe.

...But if there is a ghost in the machine, there must be a stage at which it translates its non-physical thought into a physical force capable of obliging at least some electrons in the brain to move in ways other than they otherwise would; ie against the laws of physics...

The laws of physics are nothing more than observed regularities--which can be measured and quantified and reduced to mathematical equations--the knowledge of which may lead to pragmatically useful results.

Agreed

"Volition" appears difficult or impossible to reduce to mathematic equations,

You seem throughout this discussion to be presenting 'volition' necessity' and 'chance' as real things, rather than descriptions of relations between sequences of events. This is the heart of the difficulty I have with your 'black box'.
For these 'causal mechanisms' to exist in the box, without some sequentially distinct events expressing them, seems to require that the black box is itself a consciousness of some sort. But that is ultimately what is to be debated; whether ideas (and I argue that these causal mechanisms, in the absence of spatially and temporally separated events, can be only ideas) can exist outside, and prior to, all possible universes.

...So; we see two causal mechanisms which we find adequate to explain all the phenomena outside the human brain. We see the processes that drive human physical movement as no different from the processes that drive analogous movement in animals. We see behaviours similar to human behaviours in animals with similar brain-structures, and we note that where an animal lacks certain brain structures, it appears incapable of exhibiting some corresponding set of behaviours...

I don't think our science has really reached this point yet; I don't think we can explain all the phenomena outside the human brain. I doubt we've even discovered the nth portion of all the phenomena outside the human brain. How would we ever know when we've finally arrived? How would we ever know whether our tiny brains are even capable of such knowledge? At best, we've come up with some useful formulas that lead to pragmatically useful results.

Agreed in principle. I was being a bit hyperbolic. And in return you are entitled (just this once ) to be somewhat dismissive of the achievements of science.

...But inside our own heads we feel experiences that we cannot yet explain in terms of the same causes that we assign to objects outside our heads...

It seems to me that there cannot, even in principle, ever be any epistemically justified explanation for volition (per the reasons given in paragraph #5, above). It appears to me that only volition can provide an epistemically justified explanation for itself--which means that it is fundamental, irreducible, and independent of chance & necessity.

If, instead of seeing volition, and the other causal mechanisms, as 'things' we see them as descriptions of (different kinds of) relations between prior and later events, the problem of epistemic justification for our use of these descriptions is the same as for other relational/descriptive terms like 'speed' or 'colour'.

...Either we must assume that the laws (chemical, electrical, etc) that apply inside our heads are exactly the same as those that apply outside, but operating on so complex and subtle a physical structure that we are not yet able to fully understand it,( and indeed it may be so complex that understanding might not be within the capacity of brains structured like ours) or we can introduce a third causal mechanism which has, in the observable universe outside our heads, no apparent effect, but which is capable of operating inside our heads in a way that completely over-rides the other two...Which is the most parsimonious?.

Parsimony is only part of the criteria. We also need explanatory scope. To me, explanatory scope fails whenever we attempt to reduce volition down to the mechanisms of chance & necessity.

Scientific knowledge ultimately boils down to pragmatic results. Pragmatically, we cannot live our daily lives without resorting to personal ownership and responsibility and accountability and individual autonomy which the "conceit" (if it be a "conceit" at all) of volition uniquely provides. Thus, even from the standpoint of science--with all its hazy quantum fitfullness and uncertainty--it seems that volition must take its rightful place, perhaps the prominent place, among the only causal mechanisms we believe we can see operating within our universe and our selves.

But, as I have argued above, when we think about the relation between the act of volition and the result of that act, that relation must be either necessary, probabilistic, or a mixture of the two.
Can you describe a process in which an act of volition has a physical effect which is neither a necessary nor a probabilistic consequence of that act?
To put it more clearly still:
Suppose you consciously will event Y, (and let us call your act of volition 'event X'); and further suppose that event Y promptly follows event X. Did event X cause event Y to happen, or did it not?
And if event X did cause event Y, was the 'causal mechanism' necessity, or chance?

[Bust Nak]

The point of this thread is that non-theism, to be coherent and rational, must either demonstrate that volition does not exist, or else provide some epistemically justified explanation as to how volition can be outside of the black box if it is not also inside the box. And of course if volition is inside the box, then theism is true.

Sure, and we do that by reducing volition to necessities and chance, by reducing the mind to the brain.

It is impossible, even in principle, to demonstrate that volition does not exist, given that we cannot prove that chance & necessity do exist. We certainly have prima facie reason to suppose that all three exist--but this fact is compatible with theism, and incompatible with non-theism (at least this is my claim on this thread).

But do we need to demonstrate that volition does not exist if we can demonstrate volition as we know it is reducable? Is this the same argument as you cannot disprove God even if we can explain how life on Earth arises via abiogenesis.

There are problems with evolutionary theory, but that doesn't stop scientists from appealing to it due to the simple fact that there is at present no widely acknowledged competing scientific theory. But even if evolutionary theory were known to be correct, we would still need to explain why this universe was set up with the particular sort of physical properties and regularities ("laws") so as to allow for evolution to proceed. The specificity of this universe requires some epistemically justified explanation--and if volition is in fact part of this universe, then the explanation can only be theism (or so I claim, and obviously I'm expecting some challenges here).

The problems of evolution aside, I agree that non-reducable volition is incompatible with non-theism.

We assume it to be true, but I don't believe any scientist would argue that she knows this for an absolute fact. Any claim that genuine chance actually exists would involve the logical fallacy of "appeal to ignorance." We have prima facie reason to suppose that chance exists, but it can't serve as an epistemically justified explanation--any more than "Poof! It just happened!" can serve as an epistemically justified explanation.

I am reading Hawking's latest book. It seems there is an epistemically justified explanation for chance. It's not due to our incompetence that we can pin point an electron, but it is the nature of the electron to exist as probabilities.

If we are the product of chance and necessity, then we have no good reason to suppose that the convictions of our own minds are any more valid or true than the convictions of a monkey's mind, or an ant's mind. On the other hand, if volition is involved, then the convictions of our minds might possibly mean something. Either way, we will carry on with our life as we see fit. But getting back to the main point of this thread, this "carrying on with our life as we see fit" seems to inevitably involve a measure of volition on our part. That being the case, theism seems to provide the best and only epistemically justified explanation for our universe and our selves.

I use the phase "volition as we know it" above, I don't think I would be all that bothered when we unlock how the brain works and find out for a fact that my convictions are no more valid than a an ants. (Or rather, by necessity, my brain is wired to not be bothered when...)

[EduChris]

...Consider any situation in which some state, X is followed by some state Y...Either state X is such that nothing but state Y could possibly follow from it; (necessity) ... Or state X is such that any of states A,B,C, .. Y, Z could follow, either with equal probability or different probabilities, (chance) ... or, what else? Volition? ...

...Supposing state X is 'somebody wills state Y'... Now. Is state Y the only possible state that can follow state X: ... necessity)? ... Or is state Y one of several things that could follow state X?; (chance, or a mixture of chance and necessity)...

...In this way, I think I have shown that, even without addressing the question of whether 'volition' is capable of existing independent of chance and necessity, the operation of volition on the material world cannot be described without them...

By way of preface, I will argue that volition and chance are similar in some ways, but different in other ways. Neither volition nor chance is the same as "necessity." And "chance," if it exists at all, is the objective lack of explanation, whereas "volition" is explained by value-based selectivity.

...a universe with no recognisable patterns at all, is itself so improbable that it could exist only in abstract thought...

Yes, such a world might be conceivable, but not necessarily possible.

...our grasp of the events outside our heads can sometimes qualify as knowledge...

Yes, but not to the extent that it necessarily nullifies the unmediated perceptions inside our minds.

...Either A, such a universe has no material substance existing outside the consciousness that wills it, or else B, the substance of such a universe exists outside of, but is (entirely or partially) controlled by, such a consciousness...In case A, yes there could be, and probably are, lots of such universes inside lots of people's minds...

True.

...So you do know something about the dialectical relationship between ordered patterns and random events in a probabilistic universe...

No, but I'm willing to hear your explanation.

...You seem throughout this discussion to be presenting 'volition' necessity' and 'chance' as real things, rather than descriptions of relations between sequences of events. This is the heart of the difficulty I have with your 'black box'. For these 'causal mechanisms' to exist in the box, without some sequentially distinct events expressing them, seems to require that the black box is itself a consciousness of some sort. But that is ultimately what is to be debated; whether ideas (and I argue that these causal mechanisms, in the absence of spatially and temporally separated events, can be only ideas) can exist outside, and prior to, all possible universes...If, instead of seeing volition, and the other causal mechanisms, as 'things' we see them as descriptions of (different kinds of) relations between prior and later events, the problem of epistemic justification for our use of these descriptions is the same as for other relational/descriptive terms like 'speed' or 'colour'...

...when we think about the relation between the act of volition and the result of that act, that relation must be either necessary, probabilistic, or a mixture of the two...Can you describe a process in which an act of volition has a physical effect which is neither a necessary nor a probabilistic consequence of that act? ... Suppose you consciously will event Y, (and let us call your act of volition 'event X'); and further suppose that event Y promptly follows event X. Did event X cause event Y to happen, or did it not? ... And if event X did cause event Y, was the 'causal mechanism' necessity, or chance?

Ontologically, I don't know whether causal mechanisms are "things" or "ideas" or "descriptions" or "relations." Whatever they are, they evidently cause particular states of affairs (and note that if causal mechanisms are non-physical ideas, then we have an example of the "non-physical" exerting causal influence on the "physical").

Epistemology seems to require the principle of cause-and-effect, and as long as cause-and-effect pertain, there must be some relationship(s) between causes and effects. By convention we refer to these relationships as "causal mechanisms."

At any rate, whatever causal mechanisms may be, we can refer to them as follows:

1) necessity (unable to have been otherwise)
2) chance (the objective lack of any explanation whatsoever)
3) volition (selectivity based on value)

We agree that chance and volition differ from necessity, which does not allow for options or selectivity. We differ in that you, in essence, seek to equate chance with volition. To reject such claim, all I have to do is show how volition and chance are different--and this is easy to do.

Let's suppose that "chance" operating on X results in state-of-affairs Y1. Let's also suppose that "volition" operating on the same X results in state-of-affairs Y2. It is impossible for Y1 to be completely equivalent to Y2, since a state of affairs with an explanation is not identical to a state of affairs without any explanation.

Therefore, volition cannot be reducible to some admixture of chance & necessity, and this holds true whether volition is a "thing" or a "relationship" or a "description" or an "idea."

Thus, all three of our causal mechanisms are conceptually independent. We have no way of knowing whether necessity or chance actually exist, or whether they actually describe any relationships at all. But we cannot deny our daily experience of value-based selectivity. And if volition is a genuine, independent causal mechanism within our universe, then we may justifiably conclude that volition also inheres within the black box of non-contingent reality.

[EduChris]

...reducing volition to necessities and chance, by reducing the mind to the brain...

I don't think these sort of reductions have been demonstrated. They are often claimed, but never truly demonstrated.

...But do we need to demonstrate that volition does not exist if we can demonstrate volition as we know it is reducable?...

If volition were fully reducible, then probably not. But as long as we're on the subject of contrary-to-fact conditions, If I were a rich man...

...I agree that non-reducable volition is incompatible with non-theism...

Good. We all three agree on that point, at least.

...I am reading Hawking's latest book. It seems there is an epistemically justified explanation for chance. It's not due to our incompetence that we can pin point an electron, but it is the nature of the electron to exist as probabilities...

I'm not familiar with his argument here, but I'm not sure it matters. Referring to my previous post, if C(x) = Y1, and if V(x) = Y2, then Y1 and Y2 would still be different, even if there were some epistemically justified explanation for "chance." This is the case because the random fluctuations of electrons is a quite different explanation than value-based selectivity.

[Jax Agnesson]

By way of preface, I will argue that volition and chance are similar in some ways, but different in other ways. Neither volition nor chance is the same as "necessity." And "chance," if it exists at all, is the objective lack of explanation, whereas "volition" is explained by value-based selectivity.

I agree that 'chance' is a lack of explanation, but I don't accept that 'volition' is an explanation.
Chance is the word we use when Y follows X and we can not see any causal link between them. Later we might discover that there is one, in which case we might stop describing the sequence 'X followed by Y' as 'chance', and start describing the relationship as necessary, ie we might feel sure enough of the relationship to say that 'X causes Y'.

Volition may reasonably be defined as 'value-based selectivity'. But a definition is not an explanation.

But 'necessity' is not an explanation either.
"Y always follows X because Y always follows X" is hardly an explanation. On its own, it tells us nothing. As part of a web of inter-related patterns, "Y always follows X" , if true, is useful information.
Well, what about "Y always follows X because it is necessary that Y always follows X"? Is that any more of an explanation? I don't see how it explains anything.

"Why did that lottery number come up straight after I willed it to?"
"Because I willed it to" is not an explanation.
An explanation would be a description of the links between event X and event Y.
If we can see a strong, very consistent causal linkage from X to Y, we might say 'X caused Y' If we can't see a linkage, we might say 'I don't know what the connection is, or whether there is any connection at all', and we might assign the sequence of events to chance.

Uri Geller was (and hopefully still is) a famous Israeli mentalist. One of his tricks was to stare at the camera and tell the viewer 'I'm going to stop your clock. Right now'. And quite often apparently, someone's clock would stopped ticking at that very moment.
In those days most clocks were actual clockwork, and if someone didn't wind them up every twentyfour hours or so, they just stopped. There might be twenty million people watching the entertaining Mr Geller. Uri Geller knows these facts, and he knows something about probabilities.
So there is indeed link between Uri Geller's mind and the astonishingly stopped clock, but it operates in a direction opposite to the way the credulous viewer might suppose.

"Why did that woman buy a Lexus?"
"Because they put an advert in Scientific American magazine." although possibly quite true in outline, is not really an explanation, is it? Millions of people will have seen the ad. Not many will have been persuaded by that one prompt, on its own, to pick up the phone and order a car.

But 'explanation' is an elastic term.

.
"Why did my finger move?"
"Because I willed it to" is a good enough 'explanation' until the day I will my finger to move and it doesn't. Then it's time to look closer at the linkages between the muscles, the nerves, the brain, and the 'mind'. Now there's a can o' worms!

...our grasp of the events outside our heads can sometimes qualify as knowledge...

Yes, but not to the extent that it necessarily nullifies the unmediated perceptions inside our minds.

Not necessarily. Agreed.

...Either A, such a universe has no material substance existing outside the consciousness that wills it, or else B, the substance of such a universe exists outside of, but is (entirely or partially) controlled by, such a consciousness...In case A, yes there could be, and probably are, lots of such universes inside lots of people's minds...

True.

And in case B?
(I'll copy my original post here in full, to save readers having to search back. . .)

QUOTE
'Either A, such a universe has no material substance existing outside the consciousness that wills it,
or else B, the substance of such a universe exists outside of, but is (entirely or partially) controlled by, such a consciousness.
In case A, yes there could be, and probably are, lots of such universes inside lots of people's minds;
in case B, the operation of volition on the substance of the universe is either by necessity or by a mixture of necessity and chance.'
'/QUOTE'

Is above also true, or could you refute it?

...So you do know something about the dialectical relationship between ordered patterns and random events in a probabilistic universe...

No, but I'm willing to hear your explanation.

I could describe the basic principles of probability, but I suspect your maths is a lot better than mine, so you will already be familiar with it. Likewise quantum physics and neuroscience. You almost certainly know as much as I do. But even if you knew nothing whatsoever about these subjects, and wanted to learn the basics, you would pick up as much as I know in a few days on Wikipedia, the Khan academy, Youtube. . .

Ontologically, I don't know whether causal mechanisms are "things" or "ideas" or "descriptions" or "relations." Whatever they are, they evidently cause particular states of affairs (and note that if causal mechanisms are non-physical ideas, then we have an example of the "non-physical" exerting causal influence on the "physical").

I don't see how 'chance' causes anything. Explain please?
I don't see how 'necessity' causes anything. Explain please?
'Chance' and 'necessity' are descriptions of our understanding of the connections between temporally separated events.
'We don't see causal linkages' = chance.
'We do see causal linkages'= necessity.
And here we return to the fundamental difference between the materialist and idealist world-views. For the materialist, the causal linkages, if they exist, exist before we come to understand them, and may continue to exist even if we never manage to understand them.

Epistemology seems to require the principle of cause-and-effect, and as long as cause-and-effect pertain, there must be some relationship(s) between causes and effects. By convention we refer to these relationships as "causal mechanisms."

By philosophical convention, yes. But philosophy deals mostly with the business of the human mind. Inside the human head, the operations do not have to include the fact that the world we contemplate actually exists; we can refer to ideas and real-world events without discriminating between them. In terms of 'causality', either we see a causal linkage or we don't. If we do see a causal linkage, we describe the sequence X-then-Y as 'necessary'. If we don't, we ascribe the sequence to 'chance'. And then, if we are thinking like true idealists, we can forget that we are using 'chance' and 'necessity' as descriptors of our state of knowledge, and assign them the status of actual causal mechanisms.
For the materialist, matters are otherwise. Where we know of some consistent pattern X-then-Y, we may say X causes Y. Where we don't see any causal link between X and Y, we say that there is some probability that Y will follow X.
In either case, the descriptions 'necessity' and 'chance' are nothing more or less than descriptions of our state of understanding.

We agree that chance and volition differ from necessity, which does not allow for options or selectivity. We differ in that you, in essence, seek to equate chance with volition.

But I don't equate chance and volition at all.
I say that 'chance' is the word we use when we see no causal linkage by means of which Y follows X. It is a word that expresses the lack of knowledge of, or even the suspected absence of, any causal connection from X to Y.
I say that 'volition' is our experience of a real process that occurs in the human nervous system, resulting sometimes in real actions of the human muscular system, and further I very strongly believe that some other animals, to varying extents, experience volition, or something very like it.

Thus, all three of our causal mechanisms are conceptually independent. We have no way of knowing whether necessity or chance actually exist, or whether they actually describe any relationships at all. But we cannot deny our daily experience of value-based selectivity. And if volition is a genuine, independent causal mechanism within our universe, then we may justifiably conclude that volition also inheres within the black box of non-contingent reality.

I would say that all three of your 'causal mechanisms' are equally expressions of mental states:
1. "I can see a perfectly consistent pattern of Y-follows-X"; (I believe that Y follows X necessarily)
2. "I can't see why Y should always follow X"; (I believe that Y follows X by chance)
3, "I want Y to happen". This mental state differs from the other two in that it is one of the events in the sequence X-then-Y. If Y subsequently happens, either there is, or there is not, a causal link between my willing Y and Y happening. I might assign necessity or chance to this sequence, and I might assign them correctly or incorrectly. Further investigation might lead to further understanding.

There is one more question outstanding from an earlier post, which I would be interesting in seeing your answer to. . .
QUOTE
'.Can you describe a process in which an act of volition has a physical effect which is neither a necessary nor a probabilistic consequence of that act? ... '
/QUOTE

[Bust Nak]

I don't think these sort of reductions have been demonstrated. They are often claimed, but never truly demonstrated.

Surely prima facie reason for accepting the mind is the result of the brain is that inaimate object don't think, if not that then orgainism without brain don't think, and if not that then, altering the brain alters the mind.

At least the above is enough for me.

I'm not familiar with his argument here, but I'm not sure it matters. Referring to my previous post, if C(x) = Y1, and if V(x) = Y2, then Y1 and Y2 would still be different, even if there were some epistemically justified explanation for "chance." This is the case because the random fluctuations of electrons is a quite different explanation than value-based selectivity.

Sure, Y1 can't be the same as Y2, I agree they are conceptually different, I don't see why V can't just an illusion and is reducable to the others.

[EduChris]

...Either A, such a universe has no material substance existing outside the consciousness that wills it...or else B, the substance of such a universe exists outside of, but is (entirely or partially) controlled by, such a consciousness...In case A, yes there could be, and probably are, lots of such universes inside lots of people's minds ... in case B, the operation of volition on the substance of the universe is either by necessity or by a mixture of necessity and chance.' ... Is above also true, or could you refute it?

...There is one more question outstanding from an earlier post, which I would be interesting in seeing your answer to...Can you describe a process in which an act of volition has a physical effect which is neither a necessary nor a probabilistic consequence of that act? ...

As I see it there are some things that are impervious to known volitional activity--we can't will ourselves to be unmarried bachelors; we can't will that a random event will play itself out in some specified non-random fashion; we cannot will that A ≠ A. If some state of affairs X always entails some other state of affairs Y, and if this relation is impervious to all known forms of volitional activity, then we speak of "necessity."

Similarly, if some state of affairs X sometimes leads to Y1, and sometimes to Y2, ..., and sometimes to Yn, and if there is no established correlation between the outcome and any known volitional activity, then we speak of "chance" or "probability."

But there are also some states of affairs X where a relationship exists between volitional activity and the result. This correlation might be strong or weak--a continuum rather than a simple binary function. A strong volitional relation tends toward necessity; a weak volitional relation tends toward chance. In such cases, we see that volition entails a physical effect which is neither necessary nor random. Here we have something entirely new: here we have an agent marshalling resources in pursuit of value; here we can speak of volition.

In terms of our contingent physical world, perhaps science will one day "figure it all out," so to speak; perhaps then we will finally rise above all limitations of physical-temporal-spatial "necessity" and "chance," so that only logical necessities will remain (and who knows? perhaps even logical necessities might be more malleable than we presently imagine). Without arbitrary limitations, our volition would cause any states of affairs we wished. None of these states would be necessary, and none would be random. We would always be free to consider any possibilities and select for value. All arbitrary limitations of necessity and chance will have passed away; only volition would remain.