The Coherence of Naturalism (Atheism)

[Haven]

One of the major criticisms of metaphysical naturalism (and by extension, atheism) is that it is logically inconsistent, with some even going as far as to say that it is self-undermining. This criticism, which comes primarily from Reformed Christian thinkers such as Cornelius Van Til, Alvin Plantinga, John Frame, and our own theopoesis, is due to the fact that (according to Reformed thinkers) naturalism cannot account for several features of human existence, such as (objective) morality, existential meaning, consciousness, free will, and aesthetic taste.

Plantinga goes further, saying that a combinstion of evolution and naturalism would lead us to develop cognitive faculties geared for survival rather than truth, meaning that, on naturalism, we would be unable to know whether or not any of our beliefs -- including naturalism itself -- are true, meaning naturalism defeats itself.

As an alternative to naturalism, Reformed thinkers believe Christian theism can account for true cognitive faculties, teleology, morality, beauty, etc., and that it should therefore be preferred over atheistic naturalism. They use a presuppositional approach to illustrate this, arguing that Christian presuppositions are required for a coherent worldview.

Atheists, in my experience, rarely respond to these criticisms. When they (we) do, they tend to defend a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability while writing off morality, aesthetics, knowledge, etc. as subjective or illusory. Naturalistic thinkers also tend to point toward philosophical problems with theism, such as Michael Tooley's (2008) update of the problem of natural evil. Additionally, one major naturalistic response to this comes from philosopher Feng Ye, who attempts to give a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability. The book "Naturalism Defeated?" (2001) was written in response to Plantinga's argument.

Debate question: Are the Reformed thinkers right? Is naturalism coherent? Can atheists account for morality, purpose, etc. on naturalism? Are Christian presuppositions necessary for a coherent worldview? Does Plantinga's argument succeed? Is theism coherent?

[Haven]

I don't see how that's not a legitimate response to criticism. How does naturalism explain objective morality? It doesn't, because it hasn't found any objective morality to explain. You might as well ask how naturalism explains god. With naturalism, we tend to try to figure out if things are real before we worry about explaining them - theism seems to either want to go about this backwards, or skip the figuring-out-if-it's-real stage altogether.

Obviously, appealing to nihilism is one way for the naturalist to get around the problem of morality. However, the Reformist (?) would say that moral nihilism is unacceptable by either appealing to intuition (can one really say that pedophilia isn't objectively wrong?) or inconsistency (even moral nihilists have moral feelings). Personally, I think an appeal to the illusion of morality, coupled with social convention, can explain our moral feelings on naturalistic ethical nihilism.

[Haven]

It seems to me -- and also to other naturalists on this thread (judging by their posts) -- that naturalism necessarily entails moral nihilism and teleological nihilism. It also seems likely that, if Plantinga's argument is successful, naturalism also entails epistemological nihilism, for if we can't trust our cognitive faculties to produce true beliefs, then we can't say that we know anything, leaving Humean skepticism as our only option.

I'm skeptical of Plantinga's argument because I feel that naturalism (via some theory of mind, such as teleosemantics) can account for cognitive reliability.

[Haven]

This is great stuff. I love it. But it's not about Christianity. Shouldn't this, and Aki's 'A Few questions of Interest' be in the philosophy forum?

This post also concerns (Reformed) Christian theism, so it fits in the Christianity and Apologetics forum. Besides, I didn't really want this topic to languish in the Philosophy forum .

I'll have a go at Haven's actual question later. I just did a response to Aki's this afternoon, and I need to think about the differences, but I'm in the Seafarer's Mission at the mo, recharging my laptop, and Jean Genie's on the jukebox, and I'd rather dance than think!

Have fun!

[Haven]

As soon as free will is shown to make sense within the scope of our physical and biological understandings, I cannot take it seriously as a concept. My stance on this is much more adamant than most, as I view it as a common 'cop-out' on behalf of many Theists from explaining contradictions in their views.
I've yet to even have a Theist try to reconcile free will and physics, which is a little disheartening.

Determinism is self-refuting:

1) If one's thoughts are determined by prior blind causal chains beyond one's control, then one's reasoning process is also determined by such causal chains.

2) Any beliefs one forms on the basis of reason will be the result of such deterministic forces, as reason entails thought.

3) Deterministic physical forces have no end or goal, but are simply combinations of chance and necessity.

4) Chance and necessity are purposeless, while reaching truth is a purpose.

5) Therefore, there is no reason for one to believe that any of her beliefs -- including her belief in determinism -- is true.

Even if determinism were true, it would be irrational for one to accept it.

[Fuzzy Dunlop]

Obviously, appealing to nihilism is one way for the naturalist to get around the problem of morality. However, the Reformist (?) would say that moral nihilism is unacceptable by either appealing to intuition (can one really say that pedophilia isn't objectively wrong?) or inconsistency (even moral nihilists have moral feelings). Personally, I think an appeal to the illusion of morality, coupled with social convention, can explain our moral feelings on naturalistic ethical nihilism.

I believe I was appealing to moral relativism more than moral nihilism, but both seem to eliminate the "problem of morality" quite easily. Morality clearly exists, it's just a social construct and is explainable as such. You certainly don't need objective morality to explain moral feelings, and again one would have to somehow prove that something was objectively wrong before there is even anything for the naturalist to explain.

[Haven]

I have serious problems with the presuppositionalism inherent to the Reformed's critiques, but it seems possible to use the arguments in a different epistemological context and save the essence.

If theism is false, then presuppositionalism is problematic, but if theism is true, then presuppositionalism (specifically, Reformed epistemology) seems to me the most rational form of assessing human knowledge. In fact, an evidentialist (or Thomist) approach to religious belief -- assuming theism is true -- seems backwards, and worse (for the Christian ), inevitably ends in atheism, agnosticism, ignosticism, or some form of non-theism.

While I know that they are right to point out the nihilist proclivities (and that this contradicts the frequent supposition of naturalists that Christian morality is "repressive"), I think the criticism of naturalism should aim at its roots, rather than its fruits, since it assumes one will find the fruits odious.

I agree to some extent, however, nihilism (especially epistemological nihilism) seems an almost fatal blow to the credibility of a worldview, and as I and others have rightly pointed out, naturalism entails (at least) existential, moral, and teleological nihilism.

No. Plantinga is right to point out the contradiction of naturalized epistemology, since it tries to ground reason in the reasonless.

See my above comments.

But that's only one example. I believe a greater problem is that naturalism does not include any positive account of what there is; it is devoid of any positive ontological commitments. Instead, it is primarily negative, beginning and ending with the proposition that God does not exist. In principle, nothing couldn't be included in naturalism provided one is willing to to make some positive ontological commitments, but then naturalism just becomes whatever that positive ontological commitment is, i.e. materialism.

Naturalism is defined by most naturalists (including myself) as an ontological commitment to the existence of only objects and forces describable by science and mathematics and abstract objects (although not all naturalists accept abstracta).

[Haven]

I believe I was appealing to moral relativism more than moral nihilism, but both seem to eliminate the "problem of morality" quite easily. Morality clearly exists, it's just a social construct and is explainable as such. You certainly don't need objective morality to explain moral feelings, and again one would have to somehow prove that something was objectively wrong before there is even anything for the naturalist to explain.

I don't see a qualitative difference between moral relativism and non-error-theory forms of moral nihilism; relativism is quite compatible with expressivism, for example. Both reduce moral statements to expressions of personal and societal preference, the only difference is that relativists see moral statements as propositional and expressivists do not.

[Goat]

I don't see how that's not a legitimate response to criticism. How does naturalism explain objective morality? It doesn't, because it hasn't found any objective morality to explain. You might as well ask how naturalism explains god. With naturalism, we tend to try to figure out if things are real before we worry about explaining them - theism seems to either want to go about this backwards, or skip the figuring-out-if-it's-real stage altogether.

Obviously, appealing to nihilism is one way for the naturalist to get around the problem of morality. However, the Reformist (?) would say that moral nihilism is unacceptable by either appealing to intuition (can one really say that pedophilia isn't objectively wrong?) or inconsistency (even moral nihilists have moral feelings). Personally, I think an appeal to the illusion of morality, coupled with social convention, can explain our moral feelings on naturalistic ethical nihilism.

Another way to put it , MORALITY is a socially driven response. If you take the emotion of empathy, which seems to have evolved in all social animals, and you couple that with reciprocal altruism, you can explain our moral feelings.

[AquinasD]

If theism is false, then presuppositionalism is problematic, but if theism is true, then presuppositionalism (specifically, Reformed epistemology) seems to me the most rational form of assessing human knowledge. In fact, an evidentialist (or Thomist) approach to religious belief -- assuming theism is true -- seems backwards, and worse (for the Christian ), inevitably ends in atheism, agnosticism, ignosticism, or some form of non-theism.

Well it seems we are both evidentialists of sorts, and our difference on how the evidence works gives us our difference of opinion on the use of evidence to our pursuits.

I agree to some extent, however, nihilism (especially epistemological nihilism) seems an almost fatal blow to the credibility of a worldview, and as I and others have rightly pointed out, naturalism entails (at least) existential, moral, and teleological nihilism.

Sure, and I'm willing to stake a claim on it, that any ontological commitment which leads to reason being grounded in the reasonless is an epistemic non-starter. I could make a positive argument from reason.

That said, I'd like to strike at the root in this case.

Naturalism is defined by most naturalists (including myself) as an ontological commitment to the existence of only objects and forces describable by science and mathematics and abstract objects (although not all naturalists accept abstracta).

But that isn't to make any positive ontological claims. Those are epistemological claims which are meant to ground what kind of things might possibly exist.* To be able to describe is to be able to know; if something isn't knowable, it isn't possible. But they are not ontological claims, merely an epistemic definition for the set of that which is possible.

*Which is a problem in its own right. The content of modal statements are beyond knowing and not verifiable by science and mathematics, nor can they be included in the realm of abstract objects. The way you'd formulate naturalism is self-contradictory. Either you must introduce some other way of knowing which isn't amenable to your original definition (without thereby committing yourself to, say, the existence of God as well), or abandon the naturalist project.

[Bust Nak]

Sure, and I'm willing to stake a claim on it, that any ontological commitment which leads to reason being grounded in the reasonless is an epistemic non-starter.

It's probably too simplistic but isn't reason being grounded in reason circular?

But that isn't to make any positive ontological claims. Those are epistemological claims which are meant to ground what kind of things might possibly exist.* To be able to describe is to be able to know; if something isn't knowable, it isn't possible. But they are not ontological claims, merely an epistemic definition for the set of that which is possible.

I don't understand, how is "nature is all there is" not a positive ontological claim?

The content of modal statements are beyond knowing and not verifiable by science and mathematics, nor can they be included in the realm of abstract objects.

I don't understand this either, all statements modal or otherwise are abstract. It's the mind that gives it meaning, right?