The Coherence of Naturalism (Atheism)

[Haven]

One of the major criticisms of metaphysical naturalism (and by extension, atheism) is that it is logically inconsistent, with some even going as far as to say that it is self-undermining. This criticism, which comes primarily from Reformed Christian thinkers such as Cornelius Van Til, Alvin Plantinga, John Frame, and our own theopoesis, is due to the fact that (according to Reformed thinkers) naturalism cannot account for several features of human existence, such as (objective) morality, existential meaning, consciousness, free will, and aesthetic taste.

Plantinga goes further, saying that a combinstion of evolution and naturalism would lead us to develop cognitive faculties geared for survival rather than truth, meaning that, on naturalism, we would be unable to know whether or not any of our beliefs -- including naturalism itself -- are true, meaning naturalism defeats itself.

As an alternative to naturalism, Reformed thinkers believe Christian theism can account for true cognitive faculties, teleology, morality, beauty, etc., and that it should therefore be preferred over atheistic naturalism. They use a presuppositional approach to illustrate this, arguing that Christian presuppositions are required for a coherent worldview.

Atheists, in my experience, rarely respond to these criticisms. When they (we) do, they tend to defend a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability while writing off morality, aesthetics, knowledge, etc. as subjective or illusory. Naturalistic thinkers also tend to point toward philosophical problems with theism, such as Michael Tooley's (2008) update of the problem of natural evil. Additionally, one major naturalistic response to this comes from philosopher Feng Ye, who attempts to give a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability. The book "Naturalism Defeated?" (2001) was written in response to Plantinga's argument.

Debate question: Are the Reformed thinkers right? Is naturalism coherent? Can atheists account for morality, purpose, etc. on naturalism? Are Christian presuppositions necessary for a coherent worldview? Does Plantinga's argument succeed? Is theism coherent?

[Haven]

Hi Sayak. I think you've misunderstood my argument (I don't think I made it clear enough, I apologize).

Also, for the sake of clarity, I'll point out that I'm an atheist and a naturalist-leaning metaphysical skeptic. I don't believe the universe has a designer. My intent was to appeal to Plantinga's argument to point out some possible flaws with naturalistic accounts of truth.

Reasoning follows logic and algorithm is logic (with all AND, NOT, TRUE, FALSE, OR, NAND etc.) digitized. If you have a better idea of what reasoning is if not logic, expand.

When I mentioned "reason," I was referring to a conscious reasoning process performed by a sentient, sapient individual. Algorithms use logic, but they are not sapient (as far as we can tell, at least ).

Lets get some clarity here:-
1) Q1:- No physical system can have truth finding properties. This I have disproved by referring to algorithms.

I wasn't asserting that no physical system can have truth-finding properties, I was simply raising the question of whether a purely physical system could have truth-finding properties. Plantinga, however, does make such an argument (specifically, that no undesigned physical system can have such properties), which I personally feel is dubious at best.

1) Q2:- All such physical systems need to be designed by the designer.

I never made such an assertion; I merely pointed out that all computer algorithms have some level of design.

[sayak83]

Therefore Google's search algorithm simply cannot output the most relevant search results for the words you type because that deterministic algorithm simply cannot aim at finding the true solutions of your search query. Yet it does.
Refuted.
Your argument is therefore refuted.

Google's algorithm, though determinate, is designed to produced effective outcomes. Google's algorithm cannot aim itself, and yet it is aimed by its designer.

Argument unrefuted.

In the natural world there are many more ways to die than to survive long enough to reproduce...creating a fitness function from the basic vulnerability of life systems to destruction. Evolutionary processes will be guided by this natural fitness function.

Haven, I was aiming my reply rather generally to several different kinds of arguments. Some were yours, some were others.

[sayak83]

Evolutionary Search algorithms are naturally occuring and has now been mimic-ed by us and shown to be successful in searching for truth (or fitness however defined).

I rest my case.

You're still assuming that the search algorithm, however it was put together, is a kind of reasoning.

I was a bit puzzled why you said this. But in another thread I saw you argument,

I would like to present an argument showing that free will is essential to reason and that, because we reason, it must be the case that we have free will.

Suppose I were to make a spinner and label the two halves "Yes" and "No." When I ask the spinner a question, I will spin the spinner and its "Yes" or "No" will constitute an answer. Thus, were I to ask it "Does 2 + 2 = 4?" and then spin it, however it lands could be taken as its "answer." In this case it answers "Yes." Could the spinner be said to reason?

No. In order that something be said to reason, that reason must operate of a thing's own volition. That is, reasoning is an internal operation intrinsic to particular kinds of things. The kinds of things we understand to reason are persons. However, not everything a person does can be considered reasoning.

For example, suppose I were to be blindfolded and then asked to pick one half of a circle. The halves of the circle are alternately labeled "Yes" and "No." When someone asks me "Does 2 + 2 = 4?" and I happen to pick the "Yes" half, can that be called reasoning? No. It was purely accidental that I happened to pick the "Yes" half. The answer I happened to pick can be explained entirely externally to myself.

We understand, then, that were something to be engaging in reasoning, we must attribute the act of reasoning to something which arises of the person, and that what the person does in this instance cannot have its operation explained by causes external to itself, because then it would be the case that the "person" only happens to be completing a series of events which began outside himself and which could not be called "reasoning." Allow me to restate this in a more plain form.

You are confusing the process of reasoning with the conscious experience of reasoning. In the spinner case "Reasoning" does not occur because the process for finding the correct answer (spinning the spinner) does not give a reliable way at getting at the answer. If a "correctly constructed" process exists for decision making (choosing the correct result of addition for all additions, or choosing the next move in a chess game) that is "REASONING" whether or not the "Reasoning apparatus" is aware that a reasoning process is going on inside it.
There are things like conscious reasoning and unconscious reasoning in persons too. You are not aware of most of the reasonings behind the decisions you make or the perceptions you experience, yet they exist below the level of consciousness. In the same way it is perfectly legitimate to say "an apparatus" reasons but has no awareness that it does.

[theopoesis]

evolutionary search algorithms are undesigned or mimic naturally occuring evolutionary systems (mutation+selection)
http://www.geatbx.com/docu/algindex.html

refutation invalid.

And I used original google search algorithms as refuting the argument that deterministic systems simply cannot aim at truth, not if that particular deterministic system was itself designed or not.

Evolutionary Search algorithms are naturally occuring and has now been mimic-ed by us and shown to be successful in searching for truth (or fitness however defined).

I rest my case.

It would seem that you need to establish some link between truth/fitness. The website you sent us seems to explain how evolutionary algorithms result in more fit populations through a multivariable selection process yielding Pareto optimization, while accounting for mutation and recombination. But we are not searching for an algorithm that yields fitness, but one that yields truth. The very question at hand is whether a naturalist worldview which considers biological evolution the basis of everything biological can account for higher level reasoning such as metaphysics, epistemology, and the like.

Your counter example seems to indicate that naturally occurring algorithms do not aim at truth, but at fitness. Unless you can establish that fitness is truth, then your counterexample is hardly relevant.

I contest that if a determinate system aims at fitness, we have no guarantee that the outcome of that determinate system will come anywhere near truth.

[theopoesis]

Therefore Google's search algorithm simply cannot output the most relevant search results for the words you type because that deterministic algorithm simply cannot aim at finding the true solutions of your search query. Yet it does.
Refuted.
Your argument is therefore refuted.

Google's algorithm, though determinate, is designed to produced effective outcomes. Google's algorithm cannot aim itself, and yet it is aimed by its designer.

Argument unrefuted.

In the natural world there are many more ways to die than to survive long enough to reproduce...creating a fitness function from the basic vulnerability of life systems to destruction. Evolutionary processes will be guided by this natural fitness function.

But do we have any reason to believe that this natural fitness function will cause us to have legitimate answers to questions like:

(1) Is there an objective morality?
(2) Does God exist?
(3) What is truth?
(4) What is the nature of being?
(5) How do I know what I know?

I do not challenge whether evolutionary theory can explain the existence of a fitness function. I do challenge to what extent evolutionary theory can explain the existence of a truth function.

[Haven]

But do we have any reason to believe that this natural fitness function will cause us to have legitimate answers to questions like:

(1) Is there an objective morality?
(2) Does God exist?
(3) What is truth?
(4) What is the nature of being?
(5) How do I know what I know?

Evolutionary theory (assuming naturalism, of course) could provide legitimate answers to such things only if such things provide a survival advantage to the human species. If true answers to such questions are harmful, or incidental to survival, then there is no reason to believe our cognitive faculties are accurate concerning such things. This is why I'm inclined to take seriously Plantinga's remark that the probability of human cognitive reliability on naturalism as inscrutable, or unknowable. However, I'd advance a weaker form of Plantinga's EAAN, where, on naturalism, the probability that human minds discover non-survival-oriented truths is inscrutable, as I feel that true beliefs directly relevant to survival are likely attainable from an evolutionary fitness standpoint.

I think there may be some successful way at defeating this criticism -- Feng Ye's treatment of teleosemantics looks promising -- but his treatment largely ignores the question of abstract truths.

[Haven]

So far, this discussion has been devoted to protecting naturalism from theistic philosophical attacks. I'd like to raise another question: is it possible to advance a theistic worldview that is coherent and meaningful; and that -- without contradiction or circularity -- accounts for both scientific truths and the so-called "soft truths" like morality, aesthetics, life purposes, etc.? My OP mentioned the 21st-century Reformed thinkers, who all feel that they possess a worldview more coherent than naturalism. What do you think on that?

Theopoesis, I'm especially interested in hearing your account of a coherent, non-naturalistic worldview.

[theopoesis]

Evolutionary theory (assuming naturalism, of course) could provide legitimate answers to such things only if such things provide a survival advantage to the human species. If true answers to such questions are harmful, or incidental to survival, then there is no reason to believe our cognitive faculties are accurate concerning such things. This is why I'm inclined to take seriously Plantinga's remark that the probability of human cognitive reliability on naturalism as inscrutable, or unknowable. However, I'd advance a weaker form of Plantinga's EAAN, where, on naturalism, the probability that human minds discover non-survival-oriented truths is inscrutable, as I feel that true beliefs directly relevant to survival are likely attainable from an evolutionary fitness standpoint.

I think there may be some successful way at defeating this criticism -- Feng Ye's treatment of teleosemantics looks promising -- but his treatment largely ignores the question of abstract truths.

I am unfamiliar with Feng Ye, and should go look him (her?) up. And I grant that we need to make a distinction between "survival-oriented" and "non-survival-oriented" truths. I was not precise enough in the terminology I used, but that is what I was getting at.

However, I think specificity would require us to be even more complex in our argumentation. Taking sayak's evolutionary algorithm seriously, we must recognize that the outcome is pareto optimality. Pareto optimality (at least if it is being used in the scientific world in an equivalent fashion as it is used in the economic world, where I learned most of my math) implies optimization of several factors.

So let's suppose a very simplistic biological humanoid, with only four genetic factors:
(1) cardio-vascular health
(2) accurate sensory perception
(3) mobility and dexterity
(4) cognitive truth-seeking

A pareto optimal outcome of the "evolutionary algorithm" must optimize all of these four variables. Which humanoids have superior cardio-vascular health, and which die of heart attacks or are susceptible to frequent over-exertion? Which have keen hearing and sight, and can identify poisons through taste? Which are quick enough to hunt game, or nimble enough to use tools? Which can uncover the truth of epistemology?

A recombination with a very high score on variables 1-3 and a low score on 4 may have a much higher pareto optimality with respect to survival than a recombination with a lower score on variables 1-3 and a very high score on 4. As such, the combination with the lower ability of cognitive truth seeking may still be selected by the algorithm as more fit.

What this means is that we need to account for marginal benefit and multivariable selection. We must not only classify some cognitive abilities as "non-survivial-oriented", but also as "insufficiently-survival oriented." In other words, some cognitive traits, though beneficial to survival, might be beneficial in such an insignificant way as to have little to no effect on the outputs of evolutionary natural selection.

To further complicate things, I would think we would need to wonder how long survival-oriented cognitive abilities would take to emerge from such a system. Is it possible that even given the benefit of some cognitive aptitudes, that these aptitudes would not be selected or even developed until a sufficient timespan had passed? And has this timespan passed for us?

Finally, we must consider the phenomenon of adaptive radiation. Humans live in a variety of environments, which implies a wide variety of possible advantageous genetic combinations. The question becomes, are there some cognitive adaptations that are more advantageous in some environment and not others? And if so, which environments (and which human populations) result in these traits? (now that's a potentially non-PC question if I've ever written one).

Ultimately, I think most of these questions are unanswerable. Especially from the naturalist perspective, where to offer an answer to answer these questions assumes one's ability to do so. I agree with Plantinga that humanity's cognitive ability assuming naturalism is inscrutable.

[theopoesis]

Theopoesis, I'm especially interested in hearing your account of a coherent, non-naturalistic worldview.

That's a tall order. Give me a few days and I'll see what I can come up with. I had intended to rest these first few days this week, yet here I am. And I have a house guest arriving tomorrow until friday. Yet, I somehow suspect I'll still be back here soon to post a response.

[Goat]

Therefore Google's search algorithm simply cannot output the most relevant search results for the words you type because that deterministic algorithm simply cannot aim at finding the true solutions of your search query. Yet it does.
Refuted.
Your argument is therefore refuted.

Google's algorithm, though determinate, is designed to produced effective outcomes. Google's algorithm cannot aim itself, and yet it is aimed by its designer.

Argument unrefuted.

In the natural world there are many more ways to die than to survive long enough to reproduce...creating a fitness function from the basic vulnerability of life systems to destruction. Evolutionary processes will be guided by this natural fitness function.

But do we have any reason to believe that this natural fitness function will cause us to have legitimate answers to questions like:

(1) Is there an objective morality?

Can you provide a methodology to show there is? How do you know? I can show that different societies have different sets of morals. That argues against the 'objective morality' viewpoint.

(2) Does God exist?

Can you properly define God without going into a spasm of complex words that have multiple meanings and suffer from vagueness. The ignostic point of view has merit when it comes to this plain question.

First , you must define God in a plan an testable way.

(3) What is truth?

Does this question even have meaning? "Truth" can either be defined as 'the simple facts of existence', or it could have a deeper metaphysical meaning that changes depending on who is talking. What do you mean by 'truth'?

(4) What is the nature of being?

What is meant by 'nature of being'?? The word being has very many definitions... and often, I noticed , people who deal with metaphysics will switch the meaning around so you don't know what they are actually talking about.. Does this question actually have meaning in and of itself?? Until it gets precisely defined, .. no.

(5) How do I know what I know?

That's a good question.. and the naturalist will say 'You don't ever know for certain, but you can assign probabilities based on testing'. I know , with pretty much certainity, that if I pick up a rock, and then let it go, it will accelerate towards the ground at approximately 32 feet per second per second. I know that, because it has been tested, repeatedly, and measured.

I do not challenge whether evolutionary theory can explain the existence of a fitness function. I do challenge to what extent evolutionary theory can explain the existence of a truth function.

Why should evolutionary thoery explain that? That sounds like asking to what extent a plumber can explain the existence of electricity.