The Coherence of Naturalism (Atheism)

[Haven]

One of the major criticisms of metaphysical naturalism (and by extension, atheism) is that it is logically inconsistent, with some even going as far as to say that it is self-undermining. This criticism, which comes primarily from Reformed Christian thinkers such as Cornelius Van Til, Alvin Plantinga, John Frame, and our own theopoesis, is due to the fact that (according to Reformed thinkers) naturalism cannot account for several features of human existence, such as (objective) morality, existential meaning, consciousness, free will, and aesthetic taste.

Plantinga goes further, saying that a combinstion of evolution and naturalism would lead us to develop cognitive faculties geared for survival rather than truth, meaning that, on naturalism, we would be unable to know whether or not any of our beliefs -- including naturalism itself -- are true, meaning naturalism defeats itself.

As an alternative to naturalism, Reformed thinkers believe Christian theism can account for true cognitive faculties, teleology, morality, beauty, etc., and that it should therefore be preferred over atheistic naturalism. They use a presuppositional approach to illustrate this, arguing that Christian presuppositions are required for a coherent worldview.

Atheists, in my experience, rarely respond to these criticisms. When they (we) do, they tend to defend a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability while writing off morality, aesthetics, knowledge, etc. as subjective or illusory. Naturalistic thinkers also tend to point toward philosophical problems with theism, such as Michael Tooley's (2008) update of the problem of natural evil. Additionally, one major naturalistic response to this comes from philosopher Feng Ye, who attempts to give a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability. The book "Naturalism Defeated?" (2001) was written in response to Plantinga's argument.

Debate question: Are the Reformed thinkers right? Is naturalism coherent? Can atheists account for morality, purpose, etc. on naturalism? Are Christian presuppositions necessary for a coherent worldview? Does Plantinga's argument succeed? Is theism coherent?

[theopoesis]

I reject ignosticism as grounded in an outdated theory of semiotics. I refer you to Wittgenstein, Searle, Austin, etc.

And I reject Wittgenstien, Serle Austin due to them playing irrelevant word games that , well, really don't answer the question. See Paul Kurtz, .

Playing that kind of metaphysical word games does not answer the question. Reject it all you want.. but.. one thing I noticed you DIDN'T do is provide a coherent and testable definition of God.

Do that.. and I might accept it. Don't do that, well, there is no way to distinguish your belief from the sheerest fantasy. It might be right.. but there is no way you can show it.

Whenever we debate, you inevitably claim my arguments are nothing but "word games" or "word soup" or some such nonsense. I fail to see how this is any sort of legitimate response. Failure to understand a thing, and labeling is "word games" as a result, does nothing to further a claim of falsehood about that thing.

Furthermore, I find the requirement of a "testable" definition of God simply ridiculous. Not only because I reject strong empiricism, but also because I reject any theory of semiotics that requires testing. Language is a prerequisite to testing, not built upon it. After all, how could you test the definition of "test" unless that definition of testing were already valid prior to testing? If the definition was already valid and understood, why bother testing it at all?

Further, it would seem that language itself consists of words with multiple meanings and vagueness. Some (postmodernists) take this to suggest that all words are meaningless, and that meaning is a creation of the reader. To be consistent, it would seem the ignostic would need to apply the critique across the board and run the course of Derrida into deconstruction.

Yes, some do that.. some (mostly postmodernists) Strive to get an incomprehensible and highly stylized way of saying things to hide the fact they are saying nothing. Derrida is one of those. It sounds fantastic, but means NOTHING.

Again, your failure to understand Derrida does not reduce the persuasive force of his argument. Nor do you explain why it is legitimate to follow him with respect to the word "God", but not with respect to other words. Why is a method so similar to Derrida valid in one instance and one instance only - the word God? But "incomprehensible" toward all other words?

[theopoesis]

You might want to note the discussion between Haven and I on distinguishing between evolutionarily advantageous and evolutionarily non advantageous traits. As I said in that discussion in this very thread, "We must... classify some cognitive abilities as "non-survivial-oriented", (and) also as "insufficiently-survival oriented." In other words, some cognitive traits, though beneficial to survival, might be beneficial in such an insignificant way as to have little to no effect on the outputs of evolutionary natural selection." The question at hand is not whether evolution can explain a degree of "simulation" (to use your term) that frees us from solipsism. Clearly it does.

Which is easier to build, a general computer or a computer that can do everything a general computer can except calculate the value of pi to 10 decimal points? Alternatively, if you want to build this "almost general" computer, would you build a general computer then put a artifical limit on calculating pi, or build a computer with specific solver for each maths problem explicitly and leave out a solver for pi?

I would think building a general computer that can calculate everything except the value of pi to ten decimal points would be easier. It would save you from having to code or program in order to make that calculation possible.

I expect a brain evolved to do general problem solving be able to deal with philosophical questions. The "non-survivial/insufficiently-survival oriented" are simple side effect of a brain capable of running a mind.

Could we not equally posit a brain evolved to do general problem solving which, as a side effect, applies these same general problem solving tools to categories which cannot be solved with the same intellectual apparatus as general problems?

The question is whether it can validate the sort of reasoning we frequently use in a debate forum like this in asking questions about ultimate truth, meaning, and morality. In that respect, I do not think that such a clear link between fitness and truth has been established.

What makes the reasoning in answering these question different to the reasoning required in answering what is the best plan to keep your family feed over winter?

The difference is that those who arrive at poor decisions about how to survive during the winter do not survive. Those who arrive at poor decisions about ultimate truth are quite capable of flourishing (at least in this life).

[Bust Nak]

I would think building a general computer that can calculate everything except the value of pi to ten decimal points would be easier. It would save you from having to code or program in order to make that calculation possible.

Really? Then I'll simply say you are wrong, it's far easier to write a program to calculate pi than to write a program to regonise code that calculate pi and prevent it from running.

Could we not equally posit a brain evolved to do general problem solving which, as a side effect, applies these same general problem solving tools to categories which cannot be solved with the same intellectual apparatus as general problems?

Then those problem is unsolvable and becomes a matter of pragmatism.

The difference is that those who arrive at poor decisions about how to survive during the winter do not survive. Those who arrive at poor decisions about ultimate truth are quite capable of flourishing (at least in this life).

That is a difference in the consequence of getting things wrong. Not a difference in the reasoning required.

[Goat]

I reject ignosticism as grounded in an outdated theory of semiotics. I refer you to Wittgenstein, Searle, Austin, etc.

And I reject Wittgenstien, Serle Austin due to them playing irrelevant word games that , well, really don't answer the question. See Paul Kurtz, .

Playing that kind of metaphysical word games does not answer the question. Reject it all you want.. but.. one thing I noticed you DIDN'T do is provide a coherent and testable definition of God.

Do that.. and I might accept it. Don't do that, well, there is no way to distinguish your belief from the sheerest fantasy. It might be right.. but there is no way you can show it.

Whenever we debate, you inevitably claim my arguments are nothing but "word games" or "word soup" or some such nonsense. I fail to see how this is any sort of legitimate response. Failure to understand a thing, and labeling is "word games" as a result, does nothing to further a claim of falsehood about that thing.

Furthermore, I find the requirement of a "testable" definition of God simply ridiculous. Not only because I reject strong empiricism, but also because I reject any theory of semiotics that requires testing. Language is a prerequisite to testing, not built upon it. After all, how could you test the definition of "test" unless that definition of testing were already valid prior to testing? If the definition was already valid and understood, why bother testing it at all?

Further, it would seem that language itself consists of words with multiple meanings and vagueness. Some (postmodernists) take this to suggest that all words are meaningless, and that meaning is a creation of the reader. To be consistent, it would seem the ignostic would need to apply the critique across the board and run the course of Derrida into deconstruction.

Yes, some do that.. some (mostly postmodernists) Strive to get an incomprehensible and highly stylized way of saying things to hide the fact they are saying nothing. Derrida is one of those. It sounds fantastic, but means NOTHING.

Again, your failure to understand Derrida does not reduce the persuasive force of his argument. Nor do you explain why it is legitimate to follow him with respect to the word "God", but not with respect to other words. Why is a method so similar to Derrida valid in one instance and one instance only - the word God? But "incomprehensible" toward all other words?

So, some people are impressed with gobbledygook. You know.. if you took some of Derrida's statements, changed a few things to have the opposite implication , the post modernists wouldn't know the difference.

As far as I am concerned, post modernism HAS no persuasive force... period.

And, some people say Post modernism is dead


Other people agree with me

Some are philosophers

As quoted in the one essay, Richard Dawkins said No doubt there exist thoughts so profound that most of us will not understand the language in which they are expressed. And no doubt there is also language designed to be unintelligible in order to conceal an absence of honest thought. But how are we to tell the difference?

I personally am of the opinion that post modernism is of the language designed to be unintelligible in order to conceal an absence of honest thought.

[theopoesis]

So, some people are impressed with gobbledygook. You know.. if you took some of Derrida's statements, changed a few things to have the opposite implication , the post modernists wouldn't know the difference.

Or perhaps some people, such as myself, understand the claims being made by individuals such as Derrida.

As far as I am concerned, post modernism HAS no persuasive force... period.

And, some people say Post modernism is dead


Other people agree with me

Some are philosophers

I will admit there is reason to consider postmodernism "dead", though that is debatable. What I will not grant is that scientist Richard Dawkins' agreement with you in not understanding postmodernism means anything at all. It is merely an appeal to authority, and not even to an authority in the correct field.

Furthermore, citing an article from Julia Galef as a philosopher who agrees with you that postmodernism is meaningless is just silly. Her post recounts her inability to understand postmodernism as a freshman in college. Her bio on the same blog indicates that she got a B.A. in statistics in 2005. She now gives public talks on skepticism and information theory. How this makes her a philosopher, I am unsure. source. That being said, there are certainly philosophers who would argue against post-modernism, as I ultimately will. However, the question is whether postmodernism follows naturally from a secular perspective, as my arguments are theistic.

I personally am of the opinion that post modernism is of the language designed to be unintelligible in order to conceal an absence of honest thought.

You are entitled to your opinion when it comes to Derrida. But just make sure your opinion of Derrida does not express itself as an opinion towards me, as it so often seems to. I do not intend to be unintelligible, nor to i intend to offer dishonest thought.

[theopoesis]

I would think building a general computer that can calculate everything except the value of pi to ten decimal points would be easier. It would save you from having to code or program in order to make that calculation possible.

Really? Then I'll simply say you are wrong, it's far easier to write a program to calculate pi than to write a program to regonise code that calculate pi and prevent it from running.

I guess I did not understand your analogy. I did not intend to say it was easier to write a program to calculate pi and then negate that program. Rather, I intended to suggest it was easier to write a program that can divide, multiply, add, and subtract but not calculate pi to ten digits than it is to write a program that can divide, multiply, add, and subtract and also calculate pi. The latter would seem to require some formula to understand what pi is, through a ratio between the radius and circumference of a circle, for example. This program would need the other mathematical functions listed above plus an additional formula for calculating pi.

I think your analogy in this case might not apply to our discussion at hand. It assumes that we have sufficient computational ability to discern higher level truths such as metaphysical ones that are debated on this site. A better analogy would be to point to a computer program that can multiply, but wonder whether it can perform calculus. The degrees of difference between recognizing what is edible and what isn't and developing comprehensive philosophical systems would seem to me to be self-evident. I grant that evolution can explain the former quite easily, but your analogy seems to imply that granting the former entails the latter. This I cannot concede.

Could we not equally posit a brain evolved to do general problem solving which, as a side effect, applies these same general problem solving tools to categories which cannot be solved with the same intellectual apparatus as general problems?

Then those problem is unsolvable and becomes a matter of pragmatism.

Fair enough.

The difference is that those who arrive at poor decisions about how to survive during the winter do not survive. Those who arrive at poor decisions about ultimate truth are quite capable of flourishing (at least in this life).

That is a difference in the consequence of getting things wrong. Not a difference in the reasoning required.

But if the consequence, survival, is the mechanism by which a computational ability is perpetuated evolutionarily, then this difference is the key one. Do we have any reason to believe that cognitive function of a higher philosophic level is evolutionarily advantageous?

[Goat]

So, some people are impressed with gobbledygook. You know.. if you took some of Derrida's statements, changed a few things to have the opposite implication , the post modernists wouldn't know the difference.

Or perhaps some people, such as myself, understand the claims being made by individuals such as Derrida.

Or, at least think you do. Can you be fooling yourself? Does your understanding have semantic content?? Can you translate it into distinct and clear language, or is it forever to be convoluted? To me, it sounds like overly pompous rhetoric that means nothing. Can you demonstrate it has any correspondence to reality?

As far as I am concerned, post modernism HAS no persuasive force... period.

And, some people say Post modernism is dead


Other people agree with me

Some are philosophers

I will admit there is reason to consider postmodernism "dead", though that is debatable. What I will not grant is that scientist Richard Dawkins' agreement with you in not understanding postmodernism means anything at all. It is merely an appeal to authority, and not even to an authority in the correct field.

Furthermore, citing an article from Julia Galef as a philosopher who agrees with you that postmodernism is meaningless is just silly. Her post recounts her inability to understand postmodernism as a freshman in college. Her bio on the same blog indicates that she got a B.A. in statistics in 2005. She now gives public talks on skepticism and information theory. How this makes her a philosopher, I am unsure. source. That being said, there are certainly philosophers who would argue against post-modernism, as I ultimately will. However, the question is whether postmodernism follows naturally from a secular perspective, as my arguments are theistic.

Yep.. she admits it.. However, can you show that those statements of her are false? Can you translate it into plain language, or is it nonsense?

I personally am of the opinion that post modernism is of the language designed to be unintelligible in order to conceal an absence of honest thought.

You are entitled to your opinion when it comes to Derrida. But just make sure your opinion of Derrida does not express itself as an opinion towards me, as it so often seems to. I do not intend to be unintelligible, nor to i intend to offer dishonest thought.

Well, the opinion is based on that language.. and that is the language of avoidance of the issues. Avoid that language, and you will be just fine.

[theopoesis]

Or perhaps some people, such as myself, understand the claims being made by individuals such as Derrida.

Or, at least think you do. Can you be fooling yourself? Does your understanding have semantic content?? Can you translate it into distinct and clear language, or is it forever to be convoluted? To me, it sounds like overly pompous rhetoric that means nothing. Can you demonstrate it has any correspondence to reality?

Our debate began with you calling on ignosticism's claims that God was meaningless because of multiple meanings and vagueness. I then referred to Derrida's claim that all language has multiple meanings and vagueness. Next thing I know you're saying that Derrida was intentionally being deceptive and was meaningless word games. But all I did is cite where Derrida used the exact claim as ignosticism, which you brought up in the first place.

If I understand your argument at all, if you understand your argument at all, then we can both understand this aspect of Derrida's argument.

If it sounds like "overly pompous rhetoric that means nothing" then I have to ask why you brought it up in the first place.

[Haven]

Do we have any reason to believe that cognitive function of a higher philosophic level is evolutionarily advantageous?

No, I don't believe we do. In fact, the capacity for philosophical reasoning may be disadvantageous, as it may lead people to have fewer children (or opt to remain childfree).

My best guess, from a naturalistic perspective, is that the capacity for abstract reasoning is an evolutionary spandrel which emerged as a side effect of humanity's evolution of increased brain capacity. As for whether these abstract reasoning capacities are reliable, I admit that Plantinga may be right in stating the probability of their reliability is inscrutable. However, if this is the case, I see no reason to stop using them, if only from a position of (non-philosophical) pragmatism. Instead, I'd say keeping an attitude of Humean skepticism, while continuing to live as normal, may be the best option in such a state of affairs.

[Bust Nak]

I guess I did not understand your analogy. I did not intend to say it was easier to write a program to calculate pi and then negate that program. Rather, I intended to suggest it was easier to write a program that can divide, multiply, add, and subtract but not calculate pi to ten digits than it is to write a program that can divide, multiply, add, and subtract and also calculate pi.

The idea I was trying to get accorss was, it is easier to write a generalise program that solve generic maths problems (lets call the set of problems that this program can solve X) than an "almost generalise" program that can solve most problems in X, with particlar exceptions (such as calculating pi, which would involve "negate that program" as you called it.)

I think your analogy in this case might not apply to our discussion at hand. It assumes that we have sufficient computational ability to discern higher level truths such as metaphysical ones that are debated on this site. A better analogy would be to point to a computer program that can multiply, but wonder whether it can perform calculus. The degrees of difference between recognizing what is edible and what isn't and developing comprehensive philosophical systems would seem to me to be self-evident. I grant that evolution can explain the former quite easily, but your analogy seems to imply that granting the former entails the latter. This I cannot concede.

Well performing calculus would certainly involve mora than just multiplying, and developing comprehensive philosophical systems would involve more than recognizing what is edible, but would it involve more than planning for winter?

I don't think it is more involving. If true, with respect to the above, I think it's more improbable to evolve a brain that can do that level of planning (do general maths) with the exception of philosophy (negate calculate pi program.)

But if the consequence, survival, is the mechanism by which a computational ability is perpetuated evolutionarily, then this difference is the key one. Do we have any reason to believe that cognitive function of a higher philosophic level is evolutionarily advantageous?

Let me put it another way, it's of vital importance to outrun pray/preditors for survival, where as leaping over sand pits in sport competition have no notable effect on survival. It is of no consequence that leaping sand pits have no evolutionarily advantageous, it's a side effort from having strong leg muscles. Simularly it doesn't matter if thinking philosophically have no evolutionarily advantageous, it's a side effort from having good brains. Maybe the link between good brains and philosophical thinking isn't as obvious, so I am asking you why the reasoning involved in coming up with a plan to feed your family over winter is different to the reasoning involved in philosophy; Or why leaping sand pits doesn't use the same muscles as running, as it were.