The Coherence of Naturalism (Atheism)

[Haven]

One of the major criticisms of metaphysical naturalism (and by extension, atheism) is that it is logically inconsistent, with some even going as far as to say that it is self-undermining. This criticism, which comes primarily from Reformed Christian thinkers such as Cornelius Van Til, Alvin Plantinga, John Frame, and our own theopoesis, is due to the fact that (according to Reformed thinkers) naturalism cannot account for several features of human existence, such as (objective) morality, existential meaning, consciousness, free will, and aesthetic taste.

Plantinga goes further, saying that a combinstion of evolution and naturalism would lead us to develop cognitive faculties geared for survival rather than truth, meaning that, on naturalism, we would be unable to know whether or not any of our beliefs -- including naturalism itself -- are true, meaning naturalism defeats itself.

As an alternative to naturalism, Reformed thinkers believe Christian theism can account for true cognitive faculties, teleology, morality, beauty, etc., and that it should therefore be preferred over atheistic naturalism. They use a presuppositional approach to illustrate this, arguing that Christian presuppositions are required for a coherent worldview.

Atheists, in my experience, rarely respond to these criticisms. When they (we) do, they tend to defend a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability while writing off morality, aesthetics, knowledge, etc. as subjective or illusory. Naturalistic thinkers also tend to point toward philosophical problems with theism, such as Michael Tooley's (2008) update of the problem of natural evil. Additionally, one major naturalistic response to this comes from philosopher Feng Ye, who attempts to give a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability. The book "Naturalism Defeated?" (2001) was written in response to Plantinga's argument.

Debate question: Are the Reformed thinkers right? Is naturalism coherent? Can atheists account for morality, purpose, etc. on naturalism? Are Christian presuppositions necessary for a coherent worldview? Does Plantinga's argument succeed? Is theism coherent?

[Haven]

Also, one last thing:

One of your major criticisms of secularism is that it offers no basis for objective morality. You have also stated that your knowledge of trinitarian Christianity and the Bible -- in fact, anyone's knowledge of trinitarian Christianity and the Bible -- is inherently and inescapably subjective; you have also claimed that objective morality is derived from God / the Bible. However, these two principles taken together are problematic for any system of objective morality that you wish to advance.

Given your axioms, any system of Christian morality would not be objective, but subjective, because it would flow from subjective knowledge (i.e., knowledge of God) and subjective interpretation / meaning of (what Christian theists take to be) God's word.

If you attempt to circumvent this problem by saying that God objectively exists and that morality is based in his nature, you'd still have the epistemological problem of human beings' inability to gain objective knowledge of such God-grounded moral truth, leaving moral skepticism in place. Also, the problem of subjectivity would still apply to (what Christian theists allege are) God's commands in the Bible, as those would also be rendered subjective due to the non-objectivity of reading and meaning in literature.

In either case, you are left with moral subjectivism, not moral objectivism, and are in no better a position than the atheist who holds to a subjective system of morality.

[sayak83]

You are confusing the process of reasoning with the conscious experience of reasoning.

How am I doing so?

If a "correctly constructed" process exists for decision making (choosing the correct result of addition for all additions, or choosing the next move in a chess game) that is "REASONING" whether or not the "Reasoning apparatus" is aware that a reasoning process is going on inside it.

So, reasoning is just following rules?

Yes. Logically proper ones.

[sayak83]

And I reject Wittgenstien, Serle Austin due to them playing irrelevant word games that , well, really don't answer the question. See Paul Kurtz, .

Your Kurtz reference is missing.

Yes, some do that.. some (mostly postmodernists) Strive to get an incomprehensible and highly stylized way of saying things to hide the fact they are saying nothing. Derrida is one of those. It sounds fantastic, but means NOTHING.

I certainly wouldn't say that Derrida said "nothing," but that's a discussion for another topic.

Why do you feel words have objective meanings? You can't assume this without argument.

If it works, and provides answers, then yes. if it is a byproduct of another feature (intelligence) that did help us along the way, then no. Ask again if we survive the next 500 years as a species with our vaunted 'intellect' and our amazing technology. If it destroys us as a species, then obviously, no. If we survive, then it might be a neutral or an advantageous.. It could very well be the side effect of something that IS advantageous (the ability to see patterns).

This is an appeal to strong pragmatism, and strong pragmatism entails contradiction:

P1: "truth = what works"
P2: "what works = what produces satisfactory results"
P3: It is possible for false information to produce satisfactory results
P4: It is possible for false information to produce "what works"
P5: It is possible for false information to produce truth
C: (P5) contradicts (P1)

Umm no..if satisfactory results are produced by P1 that information would "be" truth. No contradiction...though I don't know how what works is being defined here.

[sayak83]

P1: "truth = what works"
P2: "what works = what produces satisfactory results"
P3: It is possible for false information to produce satisfactory results
P4: It is possible for false information to produce "what works"
P5: It is possible for false information to produce truth
C: (P5) contradicts (P1)

How about:

• P1: "truth = what works"
  P2: "what works = not unsatisfactory"
  P3: It is possible for false information to produce unsatisfactory results
  Conclusion 1: with false information it is not possible to safely conclude the result is not unsatisfactory
  Conclusion 2: it is not possible for false information to imply truth

I think that works better.

P3 still contradicts P1. Since we are defining what truth and falsity is, we cannot smuggle in another definition of truth/falsity in P3 in order to contradict P1.

Though generally best defn. of truth would either the correspondence theory or the Tarskian semantic theory.

[Furrowed Brow]

How about:
P1: "truth = what works"
P2: "what works = not unsatisfactory"
P3: It is possible for false information to produce unsatisfactory results
Conclusion 1: with false information it is not possible to safely conclude the result is not unsatisfactory
Conclusion 2: it is not possible for false information to imply truth

I think that works better

P3 still contradicts P1.

Lets see if you are right? Between P1 and P2 we have truth = what works = not unsatisfactory. The third premise - if it was itself false - means it would be not possible for false information to produce an unsatisfactory result. Do we really wish to admit false information is never unsatisfactory? Given P1 and P2 the negation of P3 would leave False equal to True. This looks like a highly undesirable result. A point which gives considerable merit to including P3 as a premise. Given "truth = what works = not unsatisfactory", and P3, we are then are unable to say True = False, or True implies False. This is seems a minimum requirement for a consistent logic.

Since we are defining what truth and falsity is, we cannot smuggle in another definition of truth/falsity in P3 in order to contradict P1.

It is not smuggling and yes we can. The premises stand or fall on their own. The argument stands and falls on how we reach a conclusion based on the premises.

P1 and P 2 define True, P3 defines false, only by comparison to P1 and P2 does P3 define True. It all looks consistent to me, and one way of defining a pragmatic theory of truth that at least does not lead to the kind of contradiction Haven reached.

Though generally best defn. of truth would either the correspondence theory or the Tarskian semantic theory.

Well I might not disagree there are better theories. I was simply trying to show Haven they had built a straw man argument, and trying to use terminology as close as I could get to their original show there was stronger formulation just in reach.

I stand by the argument as valid, though its premises are moot depending on what theory of truth one prefers. to be honest "what works" is a tad vague.

[theopoesis]

Thanks for responding. First of all, I'd like to apologize for the offensive personal comment I made about your search in a previous post. After reading it again, I realize the offensive, condescending tone it possesses, and I'm embarrassed and ashamed for having posted it. Thank you for dealing with my stolidity with grace.

I'll address the arguments you raised in a following post. For now, I want to focus on your personal story because we share so many commonalities .

Hi Haven:

Thanks for the response(s). I actually tried to post a brief response this morning, but the internet ate it. So I'll try again.

You apology is accepted but certainly unneeded. I've seen enough of you around here to be certain that you wouldn't intentionally do anything to offend. My response is largely a result of the fact that threads like these are read by many people, and so I couldn't let such a question, even if unintended, go unanswered. My awkward preface and postscript to the response was an attempt to show that I hold you in the highest regard. I'll reiterate that here.

Thank you for sharing your story. I appreciate your openness, and wish that you did not have to go through such difficult situations. Given my own experience, I suspect everything has still contributed to your character. And I do see a mirror image of my story in your own. (Even in more details... I studied political science in undergrad, for example, and have some interesting stories about demons myself from my time as a prison chaplain; no oil though).

I plan to respond to your longer post in due time. Bust Nak is next in line for a response. In the mean time, I didn't want to leave this without an answer. So thank you, and be well.

[theopoesis]

Hi Bust Nak. Sorry for the delayed response. It's been a busy week.

Squirrels could be said to plan for winter by hiding food, and they do not have philosophy (not the kind we have anyway.) But the planning I had in mind was our kind of planning.

I still suppose there is a categorical type of different between the type of thinking involved. However, the more I think about it, the more I think that I need to undertake a study of the physiology of the brain. I've been suggesting that differences between instinct & conscious reasoning, between abstract & conscious reasoning, between functions performable at low IQs & at high IQs, etc. were self evidently different. It seems to me there is a clear difference between the two. But what has only recently occurred to me is that it isn't just the type of thinking itself, but also the biological development necessary for the type of thinking that must be discovered.

Do the same parts of the brain cause philosophical thinking, and planning for winter? Do the same genetic codes result in the development of the brain required for each? If the codes are linked with other genetic code, are they linked with code that is evolutionarily advantageous? These are the sorts of questions that would really answer this question, and I admit I do not have the expertise to answer them. Usually I try not to enter an argument too heavily based on science, as my expertise lies elsewhere. I guess I violated that norm here.

Do you know anything about this?

So would you accept that our far more involved kind of planning, as a simple advance from squirrel planning, is something that one would expect from evolution? If so, it would not be unfair to compare the thinking in our complex planning with the thinking involved with philosophy.

That would depend on the answers to my above questions.

(1) Being able to plan for the winter largely requires one to think in concrete terms of time, quantity, and space. Philosophy requires one to think in abstract and universal terms, developing complex systems of logic, and analyzing other's arguments. The type of thinking is different.

I think being able to form meaningful statements about concrete things, and then distinguish between statements which are accurate and which aren't, necessitate abstract concept such as truth and falsity, as well as the required analytical skills (if not at the beginning then surely after the first time someone lies to you.)

When I make a distinction between abstract and concrete, I am making a distinction between being able to think in terms of ideas which correspond to concrete things in space and time, and ideas that are metaphorical, symbolic, analogical, etc. I do know developmentally that children are able to understand metaphorical language at an older age than they are able to understand concrete thinking. This suggests to me that there is indeed a biological basis for distinguishing between the two, but I could be wrong.

(2) Being able to plan for winter requires a lower level of mental development (as is evidenced by non-humans that plan for winter). Philosophy seems to be, as far as we can tell, an exclusively human phenomenon.

As commented on above. I propose that advances in mental prowess is easily explained. As such we should compare the human phenomenon of planing with human phenomenon of philosophy.

I understand the assertion, but don't know that we have established one way or the other whether it is true, based on my observations above.

(3) Being able to plan for winter may be in some respects a result of instinct. However, I know of no reason why philosophy is instinctual.

This is simular to the original argument that philosophy is not evolutionarily advantageous; I don't think this matters if philosophy turns out to be a side effect of good brain. Thinking itself is instinctual.

I was not intending to re-state the original argument. Rather, I was intending to suggest that the brain is doing something different when it works by instinct than when it works by conscious philosophical thought. It is plausible, though undemonstrated, that this difference is traceable to different parts of the brain or different genetic code.

I would be redundant to continue through the last three points, and would reiterate what I've already said.

[theopoesis]

Hi Haven:

Sorry for the slow response. It's been a busy week.

(1) I experience the world as if morality is real, as if persons are different from non-persons, as if epistemology is possible.

So do I, in fact, I would argue that all humans experience the world in this fashion. However, as I'm sure you know, experience is susceptible to illusion. I feel that our senses of morality and personhood are illusions produced by our evolutionary biology (brain structure, social orientation, etc.) and social history. This explanation accounts for our moral and personhood experiences while relying on a much more elegant and parsimonious ontology (naturalism) than trinitarian Christian theism. Additionally, the evidence we possess from science (evolutionary biology, cosmology, neurobiology, psychiatry, etc.) seems to suggest that naturalism is more plausible than Christian theism.

I do not find this response compelling. First, to claim that naturalism is more elegant is simply to state an aesthetic preference, and one which I do not necessarily share.

Second, I do not find it obvious that naturalism is more parsimonious than Trinitarian theism. There are some instances where there is an obviously more parsimonious answer, but it seems as if both perspectives in question make one rather enormous assumption: either nature is the ultimate reality and explanation of everything that was, is, or will be, or else the Trinitarian God is the ultimate reality and explanation of everything that was, is, or will be. Each of these claims in themselves involve a number of assumptions underlying the ideas of nature and of God. Neither seems to be particularly parsimonious.

Third, I recognize quite well that our human experiences can be illusory. Why I find Christianity superior is that Christianity affirms the broad categories of human experience as legitimate, though admittedly skewed by sin. Naturalism undermines and denies two quite large categories of human expereince: morality and personhood. Indeed, it would seem that personhood is the fundamental human experience. If naturalism does not explain these experiences so much as explain them away, and thereby invalidate much of human experience altogether, it leaves me with very little confidence in my other experiences, which are, after all, what I would build a naturalistic worldview from.

Fourth, I do recognize that there are profound answers offered from "evolutionary biology, cosmology, neurology, and psychiatry." However, I wonder how many of these answers are directly germane to the question at hand. In my opinion, the vast majority of scientific knowledge, which explains how the universe operates, does almost nothing to explain why the universe operates in the way it describes. So to say that science as a whole is in favor of naturalism and against Trinitarian theism is to fail to distinguish between the various types of data offered by science.

Fifth, as is no surprise to me as a presuppositionalist, I should note the circularity of those scientific fields which do offer answers as to why the data observed happens in the way it does. These fields all begin with the assumption of naturalism, so is it any surprise that they conclude that things have a natural cause an effect when they are all said and done?

Sixth, I'll speak specifically about psychology, which I have studied the most of the fields listed, and which is the only field in which I have been a practitioner (crisis counseling as a chaplain, as well as systems counseling as a chaplain). I have witnessed the efficacy of spiritual counseling where secular counseling failed. While psychoanalytic psychology can posit natural, subconscious causes of many mental disorders, these subconscious phenomena are no more demonstrable than many of the spiritual claims of their religious counterparts. However, they are given validity because they work and because of the assumption of naturalism. When spiritual counseling works, it is still considered invalid because of the assumption of naturalism.

As a whole then, you have marshaled emotional rhetoric and circular evidence to buttress the superiority of naturalism, but in doing so you have had to sacrifice the ultimate validity of what may be the majority of human experience. As such, I stand by my original point that Christian Trinitarianism is a superior explanation for the human experience.

I agree with your conclusion that secular nihilism is coherent, however I don't see why it must be an "extreme" form thereof. I think a modest form of nihilism is both self-coherent and adequate to explain reality. I also agree that there are formidable forms of trinitarian theism (which I'll abbreviate as TT from here on), however, I feel they suffer from a few fatal flaws, which I'll discuss later in this post.

I simply post extreme in order to make the point that nihilism must be consistent to be coherent. All too often, the nihilist tries to smuggle in meaning, truth, or beauty through the back door, and in doing so ceases to be a nihilist or coherent.

I find that [nihilism] is logical at the cost of having to invalidate my experience of the world, while [TT] is logical while validating my experience of the world. As such, I choose the worldview that is logical, and that explains the phenomenal "facts" of my experience.

See my above comments on how naturalistic nihilism can account for phenomenal experience.

I still contend that nihilism doesn't so much account for phenomenal experience as explain it away. I experience the world as a person, yet nihilism says there is no such thing. Therefore, I fundamentally experience the world in an illusory way. My experience then is not validated, but rather the entire thing collapses as a house of cards.

I also continue to wonder whether nihilism can justify the idea of "logic" in itself.

I see no problem, on nihilistic naturalism, with the statement "logic is simply a system describing the behavior of objects, forces, and beings within the universe."

This would not be a classical definition of logic. It would seem to equate logic with science. Logic is more traditionally a system which determines what criteria a thing must meet in order to be valid reasoning. However, nihilism has already undermined "valid" reasoning by denying a real truth. Therefore, to affirm logic is to be an inconsistent nihilist.

I grant that seems a bit simplistic, and that there may be very complex ways to validate logic, but I have not yet read any nihilist who has explained how to do so.

(3) I have considered in significant depth the historical data regarding Christianity. I have analyzed historical Jesus studies (D. Strauss, A. Schweitzer, G. Theissen, J.D. Crossan, M. Borg, M. Powell, N. Perrin, B. Ehrman, G. Bornkamm, B. Witherington, W.L. Craig). I have examined the NT through redaction criticism, form criticism, tradition-historical criticism, source criticism, and canonical criticism. I have taken classes on the archaeology of second temple Judaism, and read arguments for and against a historical Exodus, a historical Davidic monarchy, and a historical Moses. I've considered multiple variations of the Q hypothesis, the Documentary Hypothesis, and the Newer Documentary Hypothesis. I've considered the history of religions school and the relationship between Christianity and various mystery religions. I learned Greek and examined the textual tradition of the New Testament, examining the dating of various NT manuscripts and contested manuscripts. In short, I've completed graduate level work at non-evangelical schools, and I've still come out an evangelical. Why? Because I believe the historical data, though never able to prove the miraculous life of Jesus happened as recorded in the gospels, has not raised any sufficiently plausible theory to discount the possibility of the truth of these stories.

I find the bolded statement highly dubious, especially as it relates to an evangelical interpretation of the Biblical stories. Geology and evolutionary biology falsify literal interpretations of the Creation myth, the Flood myth, and the long ages of the Genesis figures. Linguistics falsifies the Babel myth. Historical studies demonstrate that the Exodus, wars of Joshua, reign of David, and the existence of the first temple are unlikely. The gospels possess numerous inconsistencies and discrepancies exist, which seem to invalidate the evangelical assertion that they are the product of eyewitness testimony.

A brief response:
(1) My claims were specifically regarding the life of Jesus, and yours are mostly OT objections.

(2) I do not see where we must exegetically hold to a literal six day creation account. Augustine, for example, did not, long before there was any scientific evidence to cause him to interpret it metaphorically.

(3) Though Finkelstein and some archaeologists have argued that the Exodus, the wars of Joshua, and the reign of david are unlikely, I find these arguments unsatisfactory. I could go into some depth historically and archaeologically, but I'll just briefly mention the tel dan stele as historical evidence of a "house of David." This phrase was a way to describe a kingdom by linking it to its most significant leader. The "house of Omri" is listed on the same stele, as testimony to the split between Israel and Judah, with Omri the most noted king of Israel. To me, if we have historical accounts of a David, and if we have archaeological evidence that seems to validate these accounts, the person who claims the existence of David is "unlikely" is as implausible as the person who claims the evidence demonstrates that the Biblical account of David's life is historically proven. Thus, just looking at the David example, my more moderate appraisal of the evidence still satisfies me more.

(4) When you point to inconsistencies, you really offer nothing to a discussion of whether the NT was a result of eye witness testimony. Dating of the NT is much more relevant. Even modern eye witness testimony is fraught with inconsistency. Read any two books about any historical event, and you'll wind up with inconsistencies and alternate interpretations. History is necessarily fraught with inconsistency. But we do not discount all of history.

As for the unfalsifiable supernatural claims (e.g., the talking donkey, Jonah's fish, Job's sufferings, the Jericho walls, Jesus' miracles and exorcisms, Jesus' resurrection, Paul's vision, etc.), I find it unreasonable to assent to such things for two reasons:

(1) Writings and stories of supernatural claims similar to those in the Bible exist in other religions (Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, etc.) and cults (Heaven's Gate, Branch Davidians, etc.), and all evidence strongly points to such claims being false. To give the claims of evangelical Christianity -- without physical evidence -- special status is to commit the fallacy of special pleading.

(2) In the case of supernatural stories (or any extraordinary claim, such as alien abduction), the burden of proof is on the one making the claim, not the one who is skeptical of the claim. It is reasonable to lack belief in supernatural stories unless and until sufficient positive evidence corroborating such stories surfaces.

Your objections presuppose your conclusions. In demanding empirical evidence, "physical" evidence, one assumes a world in which physical and empirical evidence are the standard of truth. Why is skepticism the default stance toward miraculous claims unless one begins with either a skepticist epistemology, or unless one begins with a naturalism empiricism? I recognize there is no way to adjudicate miracle claims except within an existing worldview, and so I step back and ask which worldview best allows me to adjudicate the claims. Since I find Christian Trinitarianism to be the best worldview, I arrive at different conclusions than you regarding miracles. But I know that my conclusion is derived from my axioms, and that there is no such thing as a way to demonstrate the miracles via neutrality. Which is why I did not cite miracles as support of my worldview. But I do not find your objections here compelling. In bringing this up, you are doing nothing other than demonstrating the fruit of the worldview I already knew that you had.

Ultimately, any theory that succeeds in dismantling Jesus, does so by presupposing that Jesus is not, nay, cannot be, what Christians claim that he was. But that obviously begs the question. Christians defending Jesus do so through beginning with the momentous leap of faith that claims Jesus was what he says he was, and they are able to explain the evidence in such a way that it plausibly makes sense. But there is no neutral historiography, and so I must ask which set of presuppositions leads me to a workable worldview, which returns me to #1 and #2.

The above statement is self-stultifying. This is because you seem to be advancing a double standard: you have repeatedly stated that you non-fallaciously presuppose the truth of TT, yet you accuse the atheist who presupposes the truth of naturalism of begging the question. If presupposing naturalism is question-begging, then so is presupposing TT. If presupposing TT is not fallacious, then presupposing naturalism is also not fallacious. To state otherwise is to commit the fallacy of special pleading.

I would think a charitable reading of my saying that "Christians defending Jesus do so through beginning with the momentous leap of faith that claims Jesus was what he says he was" would indicate that I also thought Christians would beg the question. Apparently, you missed that. So let me say it here: Christians beg the question.

I have repeatedly argued that circularity is necessary in a worldview. My presupposition of TT is not fallacious because it is not subject to a reductio ad absurdam, not because it neutrally approaches the evidence. My objections to naturalism are that it is subject to a reductio ad absurdam and that it has limited explanatory scope. But I will not grant that it has a neutral assessment of the evidence because it does not have one. So I assert again, there is no neutral historiography, which quite obviously entails that Christian historiography is not neutral either.

My point here is merely to explain why I turn to a presuppositional analysis to adjudicate the debate between worldviews: because there is no neutral way to assess evidence. We must therefore first consider which worldview to assess the evidence within.

. . . I consider the Bible to be a narrative account of history, specifically redemption history. And it is this redemption history, the real incarnation of the transcendent God in immanence, that provides much philosophical benefit in my presuppositional framework . . . [/color]

If by "[the Bible is a] narrative account of history" you mean "[the Bible is] historically factual," then your brand of TT is demonstrably false for reasons I stated above (evolution, the age of the Earth, the historical errors of the Bible, the falsity of substance dualism, etc.).

I do not see where you have demonstrated the falsity of substance dualism. Furthermore, there is an ongoing academic debate over whether the Bible teaches bipartite substance dualism, tripartite substance dualism, or substance monism where "spirit" and "soul" mean merely matter that has the breath of life in it. Monism is the minority position, but leaves open the possibility that a literal reading would not be susceptible to the criticism you might raise against it.

I see where you made blanket statements about the historicity of the Bible which seem simplistic. Given my own academic analysis of the data, I do not agree that the historical errors of the Bible are such as to discredit it entirely.

I have indicated that Genesis creation accounts need not be taken literally. There is a long theological tradition of reading Genesis this way.

On what I mean: history is not merely stating facts, it is interpreting them. By a "narrative account of history" and by "redemption history" I mean that the Bible interprets history in and through the activity of a Trinitarian God. This is much in the same way that a secular account of history. When we speak of the American Revolution, it is rarely to convey facts. More often, it is to explain who we are by idealizing our origins. When we speak of the Civil War, World War II, or many other wars, it is usually a stylized account to justify our involvement in war. And so forth. My claim is that the narrative account of history in the Bible is an account that intersects with much historical data, but it is an account that interprets the data theologically, as opposed to anthropologically, sociologically, or mythologically. Each of the latter is an equally ideological stance.

(1) Whenever we read (say a book as we try to develop a true worldview), we find that the meaning is not exhaustive. Our minds have to fill in the gaps, so to speak, and in doing so we always skew and shape the meaning. I don't take this so far as Derrida to say there is no meaning, nor as far as Fish and say that all meaning is just the projection of the community's beliefs, but I do agree with Iser that as we read, we effect the meaning. All reading is subjective, and subjectively interpreted.

If all reading is subjective and subjectively interpreted, then so is the Bible, since it is a reading. Given this, the atheist could just as easily subjectively read the Bible as a meaningless, incoherent collection of ancient writings as the TTist can read it as the inerrant word of God. This makes your view self-defeating, as you are left with no basis to claim that your reading of the Bible (i.e., as the "word of God") is superior to that of the atheist.

On the contrary, Trinitarian theology offers a way to bridge the subjectivity problem by ontologically connecting the reader with the author. God the Father reveals his will through Scripture and through Christ. God the Son is the revelation which the Scriptures points to: the Embodied Christ. God the Spirit is at work in the people of God to recognize the Christ, and to understand the Scriptures.

You see, I can accept subjectivity without having to reject that there is an objective meaning out there to be found. God's teleological purpose for all events in history, and therefore for all facts, means that everything is meaningful. God's omniscience and omnipotence means that the meaningfulness of the facts of creation can be known exhaustively God, and God's presence within the Church can lead finite, subjective humanity toward an approximate knowledge of the truth.

The nihilist must deny that there is any real meaning in the facts of the world: they are chance, not purposeful events. He must deny that, even if there were any meaning in the facts of the world, that this meaning could be known exhaustively. Therefore, to the nihilist, any speech or writing about the facts of the world are constructivist or constructionist meanings, created by the author. However, since there is no real connection between the author and the reader (except perhaps, at best, a similar community or situation in life), there is really no way for the reader to transcend his subjectivity with any certainty to apprehend the meaning of the author, and there is really no way for the author to speak authoritatively about the meaning of the event that he describes. And so we are left with the vacuum of meaning known as postmodern literary criticism.

You see, the reality of subjectivity is unavoidable. Naive empiricism has failed. Thus, evidentialist apologetics has failed. But the Christian has theological resources to overcome what the nihilist cannot (or at least has not). The atheist, within his world view, cannot say that his reading can even possibly be "correct." The Christian at least has the possibility of correct reading.

What does this mean? I do not believe that subjectivity leads us to solipsism.

I definitely feel that subjectivity logically ends in solipsism, and that it is only pragmatic concerns and social norms that keep us from that epistemic black hole.

And yet you continue to debate and speak here as if you know what you are saying. You verbally assent to solipsism, but you do not pragmatically assent. And so there is discord between your theory and your praxis. "Orthopraxy", which is right practice, and "orthodoxy", which is right thinking, can never (it seems to me) be the same for the nihilist. But for the Christian it cannot be "orthodoxy" unless it yields "orthopraxy." For faith without works is dead.

Again, I find Trinitarian Christianity to validate my experience and my practice, where I do not see that nihilism can do so, and so I remain a Trinitarian Christian.

We can know things

Define "know."

To perceive and understand as truth.

Granted, this knowledge is not exhaustive. Granted, it is arrived at through subjectivity. Granted, some of what we consider knowledge is, in fact, not. But the Christian can argue that there is something to be known, and can explain how subjectivity can be overcome to obtain knowledge. The nihilist, it seems to me from my reading of nihilists, claims there is nothing actually there to be known, and that meaning is created from within one's own subjectivity, and so in this way subjectivity can never be overcome.

So what do I do? I do not abandon correspondance theories of truth. What is true is that which corresponds to reality.

But your view (and mine, to some extent) does not allow us to have knowledge of objective reality, if such a thing even exists. Given this, it seems irrational and inconsistent to define truth as "that which corresponds to reality."

My view does not allow us to have objective knowledge of objective reality (though it maintains that such a thing exists). However, it attempts to begin with subjectivity, and to ask "what sort of subjectivity best allows us to say something about objective reality?" I have already suggested that nihilism leads to a dissonance between experience and knowledge, and between practice and thinking. Trinitarian Christianity allows for unity of knowledge, experience, practice, and thinking. And since subjectivity always is effected by and even constituted by experience and practice, the Christian is not forced to accept a necessary distinction between knowledge obtained through subjectivity and the actual subjectivity itself.

What I do question is what set of axioms produce a subjective experience of reality that most approximately corresponds to reality, and therefore is most true.

I don't see how, on your view, we can have any knowledge of objective reality, but only subjective reality representations that may or may not apply to an objective world.

The Christian view allows for the possibility of knowledge despite subjectivity for several reasons:

(1) Christians posit that we were created with the ability to know, whereas we have suggested in this thread that naturalism leaves our higher epistemological function to be an inscrutible mystery.

(2) Christians posit that there is real meaning in the facts of the world (i.e. in history) as a result of divine Providence, and therefore that speech or writing about the world at least has something it can more or less correspond to. Nihilism would deny any real meaning in the world, and so the constructed meanings of our speech and language have nothing to correspond to with which we can asses truthfulness.

(3) Christianity accepts much of its fundamental ideas as given by authority. There is One who, perfect in subjectivity, can interpersonally speak to us in an attempt to help us overcome our imperfect, finite subjectivity. Yes, doctrine is still filtered through our own subjectivity, but it originates in One whose subjectivity is not a hindrance to knowledge. Nihilism (or atheism) lacks any comparable authority on whom we can rely. The most intelligent human being in history is still finite, historically conditioned, and fallible.

(4) The Trinity, as noted above, allows Christians to posit an ontological unity between the Speaker (the Father), the Word Spoken (the Son), and the one who Listens (the Spirit active in the life of the believer). In this way, there is still a connection which makes some degree of communication possible. Nihilism seems to perpetuate an insurmountable gap between the speaker, the word, and the listener.

This is just a rudimentary philosophy of meaning in Christianity. Theories become much more complex. But the point is that subjectivity need not entail solipsism, given certain Trinitarian presuppositions. And therefore, to avoid solipsism, I turn to Trinitarianism. To quote C.S. Lewis, "I believe in God like I believe the sun has risen: not necessarily because I see the sun, but because by the sun I see everything else."

And within a set of axioms the best way to determine which are superior is through an analysis of internal coherence, hoping to uncover a reductio ad absurdam.

For what it's worth, I also adhere to a coherentist epistemology, without completely abandoning foundational truths. My epistemic view is similar in many respects to Susan Haack's "foundherentism."

You'd mentioned that earlier. I hope to read Haack's work sometime.

Of course, I'll never live to be old enough to consider every possible epistemological framework, every possible worldview. But I do what I can. And within my worldview, through the doctrines of election and providence, I have to believe that I'll have the chance to get as close of an approximation as I need. Those who pretend that their subjective analysis of the data is not subjective, who never consider the validity of their axioms, who never wonder what interpretive heuristic grants the best results, who never contemplate the possibility of a paradigm shift, in short who blindly follow a naive view of objectivity, these are the ones we should worry about. True, I will never consider all possible worldviews and axioms, but they will only consider 1: that which they have adopted from birth. And without comparing their system to the other possibilities, it seems that they literally have no reason to prefer their own system. At least I believe mine is superior to the other options I have considered, so I can turn to the data with some faith that I have done the best I can to develop a worldview which will allow me to sift data in a way that yeilds results that correspond to reality. When my mind fills in the gaps of my reading, when my paradigm shapes the conclusions I derive from data, I can then at least trust that what my mind is doing isn't counterproductive.

This seems like an inference to the best explanation and a pragmatic consideration. While I won't claim that such a view is incorrect, I don't see how adopting such an approach puts you in any better position than the atheist who adopts nihilistic naturalism for the same reasons.

If it is indeed only a pragmatic solution, then we must ask what we can do pragmatically with each worldview. I think the above discussions suggest that nihilist leaves me able to consistently do much less.

I think you like to use "counter-examples" in a very broad way. Yes, we have dozens of counter examples of individuals who seriously and honestly adopt a worldview and try to interpret reality through it. So what? This counter-example doesn't undermine my claim any more than the "counter-examples" of different conclusions from the same empirical data in the same scientific test undermines the validity of science. One interpretation of the scientific test, one set of axioms and their resulting worldviews, can better explain reality and the truth.

It seems that trinitarian Hindus can take belief in their god as properly basic and can also use the same trinitarian arguments as the Christian in order to defend morality, personhood, etc. I don't see how this does not serve as a valid counterexample to your brand of TT.

I have heard numerous times that Hinduism can be Trinitarian, but no one has ever shown me a metaphysical explanation of Hinduism that in any significant way resembles Christian Trinitarianism. Besides, even if it did, I noted that the Incarnation is significant philosophically as well, so "Trinitarian" Hinduism would require a comprable doctrine to the incarnation to satisfy me.

Can you point me to what you consider Trinitarian Hinduism?

If your brand of postmodern-ish Reformed fideism is based upon subjective principles and presuppositions, then it by definition can only arrive at subjective conclusions.

Can you demonstrate that reaching a conclusion subjectively thereby guarantees it is false? If so, can you demonstrate how you transcended your subjectivity in demonstrating this proof? (otherwise it will be self-defeating)

I never claimed that reaching a conclusion subjectively guarantees it is false. My argument was that there is no reason to prefer one subjectively reached conclusion over another subjectively reached conclusion. Without appealing to some objective truth, subjective opinions boil down to preference and convention.

I see. Well, as outlined more thoroughly above, objective truth would belong to God alone. Therefore, our subjective knowledge is validated based on the degree which it corresponds to the objective knowledge of God.

The theist can actually use [the limitations of human knowledge] to his advantage. Humans cannot know a thing exhaustively, and therefore cannot really know a thing in itself. Our knowledge will always be incomplete and skewed. But an infinite God can know all things exhaustively, and as such obtain perfect, exhaustive knowledge, knowing all things in themselves. Then God can communicate this knowledge through discourse, as a communicative way to ensure an appropriate degree of understanding.

This assumes a god exists, and that she/he/it is willing to accurately communicate with human beings. As a skeptic, I see no reason to accept this without supporting argument.

Of course it assumes God exists. I am a presuppositionalist who begins with the assumption that a Triune God exists and has communicated to us in the life of Jesus Christ.

I have offered numerous supporting arguments at this point why presupposing Trinitarian Christian theism allows us to escape nihilism, which you seem to grant undermines epistemology, morality, linguistics, and ultimately places us in pure solipsism. Given that you speak and act as if you know and as if your speaking and acting is doing something, it seems that there is reason to accept Christian Trinitarianism: it can rationally validate the life you are already living as evidenced here on this board.

Additionally, if humans are precluded from obtaining objective knowledge, then it follows that global skepticism (of the Humean variety), rather than theism, is the most rational worldview for individuals to adopt.

I do not see that this is the case.

If we are skeptical, you have arrived at the position of skepticism through your subjective reasoning. If you can accept skepticism as a sufficient approximation of truth, why then couldn't you accept an alternative?

From this line of reasoning, it follows that one could very well accept any alternative that is logically coherent (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, atheistic nihilism, Pastafarianism, etc.), it simply boils down to personal preference. This is the key problem with your brand of strong subjectivism: it leaves us in an epistemic black hole. Assuming such a framework is correct, I find skepticism the best option as it makes the fewest positive claims.

I suppose what you are missing is that I only think there is one worldview (which I am aware of) that is logically coherent. Nihilism speaks as if its speech is meaningful and its knowledge is real, but it ultimately denies speech and knowledge, and so suffers a reductio ad absurdam. Other secular worldviews seem to be tending toward nihilism. Monotheistic or polytheistic religions lack the Trinitarian ontology which allows us to escape many of the problems we've discussed above.

Skepticism makes the fewest positive claims, but it still speaks and thinks and acts as if the positive claims it has made have validated its speech and knowledge. But having made no claims, its knowledge and its speech is not validated.

[McCulloch]

Second, I do not find it obvious that naturalism is more parsimonious than Trinitarian theism. There are some instances where there is an obviously more parsimonious answer, but it seems as if both perspectives in question make one rather enormous assumption: either nature is the ultimate reality and explanation of everything that was, is, or will be, or else the Trinitarian God is the ultimate reality and explanation of everything that was, is, or will be. Each of these claims in themselves involve a number of assumptions underlying the ideas of nature and of God. Neither seems to be particularly parsimonious.

I believe that you are wrong. Naturalism is more parsimonious. It posits that all that exists is only that which, in principle, can be shown to exist. The God hypothesis, on the other hand, posits that there exists one or more entities in the spiritual realm, which are not evidenced at all. A whole level of existence that is unnecessary in the naturalistic model.

Naturalism undermines and denies two quite large categories of human expereince: morality and personhood. Indeed, it would seem that personhood is the fundamental human experience. If naturalism does not explain these experiences so much as explain them away, and thereby invalidate much of human experience altogether, it leaves me with very little confidence in my other experiences, which are, after all, what I would build a naturalistic worldview from.

Maybe I missed something. I don't see how naturalism denies or undermines either morality or personhood.

(1) My claims were specifically regarding the life of Jesus, and yours are mostly OT objections.

You mean the Jesus who is said to have turned water into wine, walked on water, cured disease with spit, raised the dead, multiplied foodstuffs, ascended bodily into heaven and spoke to people after doing that? These types of claims, if made by the believers in some other religion would be dismissed as myth, right?

[theopoesis]

Naturalism undermines and denies two quite large categories of human expereince: morality and personhood. Indeed, it would seem that personhood is the fundamental human experience. If naturalism does not explain these experiences so much as explain them away, and thereby invalidate much of human experience altogether, it leaves me with very little confidence in my other experiences, which are, after all, what I would build a naturalistic worldview from.

Maybe I missed something. I don't see how naturalism denies or undermines either morality or personhood.

It seems you missed the bulk of the conversation between Haven and I here and on a few other threads. At this point, if I read him correctly, he has essentially admitted what I here attribute to naturalism.

(1) My claims were specifically regarding the life of Jesus, and yours are mostly OT objections.

You mean the Jesus who is said to have turned water into wine, walked on water, cured disease with spit, raised the dead, multiplied foodstuffs, ascended bodily into heaven and spoke to people after doing that?

That's the guy. The point is that I pointed to the life of Jesus, and Haven responded with criticism about the literal reading of Genesis, about the historical existence of David, the Exodus, and the second temple. I merely point out that, in some ways, Haven's objections were not germane.

Your raising questions about the miracles of Jesus is more germane in a sense. However, the question of miracles is far different from the question of the historical existence of David, or the correct way to interpret Genesis.

These types of claims, if made by the believers in some other religion would be dismissed as myth, right?

As myth, as manifestations of a false god or a demon, as miracles of the Christian God working in another culture, as distortions of vaguely remembered Christian miracles. I suppose a wide array of responses have been made to miracles in other religions.

As a whole, your questioning here is on peripheral matters to the main outline of my argument. I don't see that I'll have time to do any substantial debating on the possibility of miracles, or in reconstructing what I have argued earlier.