Arguments against first cause/uncaused cause?

[BearCavalry]

I've always believed that the argument of first cause/uncaused cause is an unbeatable argument for proving the concept of God.

It doesn't prove whether Christians, Muslims, Jews, or Jainists have the right idea about God. It doesn't prove whether God is good or evil. It doesn't prove whether God is a personal, loving entity or something as impersonal as some self-causing physics concept that propogates the galaxy.

But I think it does prove the existence of God if God is defined as an entity so infinitely powerful that it becomes self-causing by permeating all time and space. I just don't logically see how something could come out of nothing. In my opinion, that's an absolute, self-evident truth the way Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" is. However, I was curious if any of the cynics had anything to say.

[Ionian_Tradition]

Premise C
Any entity that can make a choice has a mind

Here is the crux of the issue. Choice is predicated upon knowledge. A mind cannot choose what a mind does not first know. Knowledge itself is predicated upon experience (either internal or external). This is because, true knowledge is rooted in existent things (that which does not exist cannot be known). To recognize something which exists in reality is to experience it in some form. Therefore if the first cause possessed knowledge concerning what a universe is and how to create it, (from which to make the choice to actually create it) the first cause must first have experienced the properties of which the universe is comprised prior to their own existence. It follows from what I've stated above that this is logically impossible. Therefore, the actions of the first cause cannot meaningfully be construed as conscious "choice".

I don't agree that the concept of knowledge requires that it must be gained through experience. For example: say some mind thinks of a completely new concept, and then knows what that concept would taste like on a Ritz cracker. Whether or not a human mind can think of a completely new concept is not important, since humans minds are not the only potential minds.

If the concept correlates with taste and can be applied to a consumable product (such as a Ritz cracker) then the concept is obviously predicated upon prior experiential knowledge concerning what taste and consumption is like. The concept wasn't born in the absence of this knowledge, rather it was formed from it. If prior experiential knowledge concerning taste and consumption was not present within the mind which composed this new concept, the concept would be bereft of context. Uncontextualized thoughts cannot produce truly coherent concepts. I would go further to argue that uncontextualized thoughts do not even exist. I believe they are quite literally "non-thought". For this reason, I believe your analogy demonstrates nicely why all novel concepts require a prior base of experiential knowledge in order to form.

In this situation, the thing itself is completely new, and has some aspects that are common to things we see, and some aspects which are completely foreign. Even then, there could very well be some mind that thinks of something completely new with nothing that we would understand whatsoever.

Perhaps, but in order to do this, this mind must still possess a prior base of experiential knowledge from which to form the concept in question. Simply inserting a concept predicated upon knowledge foreign to the human mind does not address the issue of how concepts form, or more importantly, what they are. To form a novel concept from nothing, is to form a concept bereft of context. Uncontextualized thoughts do not exist as coherent concepts, (context is that which lend coherency to any thought) thus no mind can form a coherent concept in the absence of a prior knowledge base from which to provide the meaningful context it, by nature, requires.

For a human mind to think of something completely without context, that would seem to me to be non-thought, too.

No human mind has ever, or will ever, do this. I charge you to provide evidence that such a thing has occurred.

But then again, I could be wrong. Just because I can't fathom it doesn't mean it can't exist.

True, but would you also affirm the same for square circles? Does your inability to fathom such a thing render it reasonable to assume such an entity is capable of existing? The hidden premise at play here is that uncontextualized concepts are logically possible, and as such, our inability to fathom such concepts does not form an impediment to their existence. But what you've yet to recognize is that uncontextualized concepts are not merely abstruse, they are logically paradoxical. Much in the same way that square circles cannot logically be thought to exist, so too is it logically impossible to consider coherent thoughts, lacking supportive context, a viable construct. This is because context is that which lends a coherent concept its coherency. Remove context from a coherent concept and it effectively ceases to be what it is...coherent. From this it seems clear that the contrivance of a coherent uncontextualized concept is no more logically tenable a notion than the notion of painting a blue sky without the use of color.

If I tell a mentally handicapped person that the moon exists, and he can't fathom that, it doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. If some super-genius tells me that he thought of something completely new, so new that he couldn't even describe it to me, then if I used that argument, it would be completely ineffective. A supreme, ideal mind would have even less potential limit than even the best human mind, so to argue from the human mind without a logical link to all potential minds is pointless.

Regardless how "supreme" (an attribute you've added to the equation without warrant) this mind is, its novel concepts must at least be coherent to itself. It matters not if the human mind is capable of comprehending the context driving the concept in question. We might expect that a supreme mind possesses a knowledge base far more advanced than that of a human mind. None the less, it remains true that in order for the novel concept in question to remain intelligible to the supreme mind which formed it, it must first be derived from a base of prior experiential knowledge from which to acquire context, and thus coherency.

What is a real choice? Doing something because you were (completely or partially) caused may or may not be a real choice; but certainly doing something completely free of any outside cause would be a real choice.

Premise B
Any entity that performs an action (such as a cause) which was not caused by anything else is choosing the action

This isn't necessarily true. Imagine a stack of books which have existed for an eternity. The bottom book is performing the action of holding the books above it in their specific location. In other words, the bottom book is "causing" the books above it to occupy the space that they are. Nothing caused the bottom book to cause the others to occupy their current location. This fact however does not imply that the bottom book "chose" to act in the manner it is. Similarly, this illustration may in fact be analogous to what is implied by a tenseless model, or "B-theory", of time (more commonly understood as the block time/universe suggested by Einsteinian relativity).

The force of gravity and the nuclear forces are in a tug-of-war, with gravity trying to pull the book into the center of the earth (and the books into each other), and the nuclear forces away from the surface of the earth (and each other) because the book is in a location where both forces will act accordingly. (I'll eliminate the stack for simplicity's sake since I don't see how it adds to the conversation considering the earth has to be there). What caused the book and the earth to be in their current locations? There are 4 possible conditions.

1) They have always been in their locations for an infinite past.
This results in no cause at all since no states have changed. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)


2) They have always been in their locations for a finite past.
Nothing has happened since the moment that they came into existence. This would require some sort of entity that can bring things into existence. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

3) They have moved into that position some time during an infinite past.
It's unknown what dislodged the book from its previous location. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

4) They have moved into that position some time during an infinite past.
It's unknown what dislodged the book from its previous location. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

A B-theory of time posits that all points along the continuum of time are equally real. As such, no moment in time is causally contingent upon any moment preceding it. This creates the conditions in which a universe, like ours, might exist without ever having been caused at all.

More importantly, even if such a thing was evidence for an non-choosing uncaused causing entity, it seems to me to be an a priori definition of choice that it is any uncaused action by an entity. In that case, the truth of the statement is my starting point, and I would have to see evidence supporting that such a thing existed, not merely conjecture.

Yet you gladly do without evidence in support of the existence of a supreme mind capable of producing coherent concepts from absolutely nothing. Mere conjecture seems to suite your conclusions just fine in this regard.

For example, I find it to be an a priori statement that I'm not a cyborg. If you make an argument based on me being a cyborg, I'm going to tell you that it's possible, but my position remains unchanged until you show conjure some keyword that makes me stand on my head, or show me an x-ray of my head full of metal.

Duly noted, However, I suggest you apply this same reasoning to the dubious notion that unobserved supreme minds are capable of performing logically impossible feats.... If only for the preservation of consistency on your part.

[StephanM]

In this situation, the thing itself is completely new, and has some aspects that are common to things we see, and some aspects which are completely foreign. Even then, there could very well be some mind that thinks of something completely new with nothing that we would understand whatsoever.

Perhaps, but in order to do this, this mind must still possess a prior base of experiential knowledge from which to form the concept in question. Simply inserting a concept predicated upon knowledge foreign to the human mind does not address the issue of how concepts form, or more importantly, what they are. To form a novel concept from nothing, is to form a concept bereft of context. Uncontextualized thoughts do not exist as coherent concepts, (context is that which lend coherency to any thought) thus no mind can form a coherent concept in the absence of a prior knowledge base from which to provide the meaningful context it, by nature, requires.

I don't agree that every possible mind must have prior experience to gain knowledge in order to make choices. The way we think, you're making perfect sense, but you haven't explained why every possible mind must think the way we do.

For a human mind to think of something completely without context, that would seem to me to be non-thought, too.

No human mind has ever, or will ever, do this. I charge you to provide evidence that such a thing has occurred.

I meant that I agree with you here; that it's impossible for a human to do such a thing.

But then again, I could be wrong. Just because I can't fathom it doesn't mean it can't exist.

True, but would you also affirm the same for square circles? Does your inability to fathom such a thing render it reasonable to assume such an entity is capable of existing? The hidden premise at play here is that uncontextualized concepts are logically possible, and as such, our inability to fathom such concepts does not form an impediment to their existence. But what you've yet to recognize is that uncontextualized concepts are not merely abstruse, they are logically paradoxical. Much in the same way that square circles cannot logically be thought to exist, so too is it logically impossible to consider coherent thoughts, lacking supportive context, a viable construct. This is because context is that which lends a coherent concept its coherency. Remove context from a coherent concept and it effectively ceases to be what it is...coherent. From this it seems clear that the contrivance of a coherent uncontextualized concept is no more logically tenable a notion than the notion of painting a blue sky without the use of color.

If I tell a mentally handicapped person that the moon exists, and he can't fathom that, it doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. If some super-genius tells me that he thought of something completely new, so new that he couldn't even describe it to me, then if I used that argument, it would be completely ineffective. A supreme, ideal mind would have even less potential limit than even the best human mind, so to argue from the human mind without a logical link to all potential minds is pointless.

Regardless how "supreme" (an attribute you've added to the equation without warrant) this mind is, its novel concepts must at least be coherent to itself. It matters not if the human mind is capable of comprehending the context driving the concept in question. We might expect that a supreme mind possesses a knowledge base far more advanced than that of a human mind. None the less, it remains true that in order for the novel concept in question to remain intelligible to the supreme mind which formed it, it must first be derived from a base of prior experiential knowledge from which to acquire context, and thus coherency.

Square circles and painting the sky blue aren't thoughts without experience-based knowledge. They are incoherent because they contradict their own definitions. You're still extrapolating from our minds onto every possible mind without explaining why it must be so.

The force of gravity and the nuclear forces are in a tug-of-war, with gravity trying to pull the book into the center of the earth (and the books into each other), and the nuclear forces away from the surface of the earth (and each other) because the book is in a location where both forces will act accordingly. (I'll eliminate the stack for simplicity's sake since I don't see how it adds to the conversation considering the earth has to be there). What caused the book and the earth to be in their current locations? There are 4 possible conditions.

1) They have always been in their locations for an infinite past.
This results in no cause at all since no states have changed. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)


2) They have always been in their locations for a finite past.
Nothing has happened since the moment that they came into existence. This would require some sort of entity that can bring things into existence. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

3) They have moved into that position some time during an infinite past.
It's unknown what dislodged the book from its previous location. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

4) They have moved into that position some time during an infinite past.
It's unknown what dislodged the book from its previous location. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

A B-theory of time posits that all points along the continuum of time are equally real. As such, no moment in time is causally contingent upon any moment preceding it. This creates the conditions in which a universe, like ours, might exist without ever having been caused at all.

I don't agree with a B-theory of time, so to appeal to it does not good here.

More importantly, even if such a thing was evidence for an non-choosing uncaused causing entity, it seems to me to be an a priori definition of choice that it is any uncaused action by an entity. In that case, the truth of the statement is my starting point, and I would have to see evidence supporting that such a thing existed, not merely conjecture.

Yet you gladly do without evidence in support of the existence of a supreme mind capable of producing coherent concepts from absolutely nothing. Mere conjecture seems to suite your conclusions just fine in this regard.

I think I mentioned before, I'm not assuming a mind, I'm saying that the premises of a first cause (assumed by the OP for the discussion) and that an uncased action by an entity is a choice, and a choice requires a mind, lead to the conclusion that there was a mind behind the first cause. This doesn't include the assumption that this mind must be like a human mind in any way other than having a (not necessarily similar to human) choosing capacity.

For example, I find it to be an a priori statement that I'm not a cyborg. If you make an argument based on me being a cyborg, I'm going to tell you that it's possible, but my position remains unchanged until you show conjure some keyword that makes me stand on my head, or show me an x-ray of my head full of metal.

Duly noted, However, I suggest you apply this same reasoning to the dubious notion that unobserved supreme minds are capable of performing logically impossible feats.... If only for the preservation of consistency on your part.

Like I mentioned above, you haven't explained how feats impossible to our minds must be impossible to any potential mind.

[no evidence no belief]

I've always believed that the argument of first cause/uncaused cause is an unbeatable argument for proving the concept of God.

It doesn't prove whether Christians, Muslims, Jews, or Jainists have the right idea about God. It doesn't prove whether God is good or evil. It doesn't prove whether God is a personal, loving entity or something as impersonal as some self-causing physics concept that propogates the galaxy.

But I think it does prove the existence of God if God is defined as an entity so infinitely powerful that it becomes self-causing by permeating all time and space. I just don't logically see how something could come out of nothing. In my opinion, that's an absolute, self-evident truth the way Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" is. However, I was curious if any of the cynics had anything to say.

Look, either everything is caused by something else, or it isn't.

If everything is caused by something else, then God was caused by something.

If, somehow, in some way we can't fully understand, it's possible for something to exist without being caused, then THE UNIVERSE could be it. It's the simplest solution.

In the absence of any evidence one way or another, to assume that the universe was created a by a God that was created by another God, or to assume that the universe was created by a God that was created by a God that was created by a God, or to assume that the Universe was created by a God, is all laughable.

Why create imaginary untestable entities which require an explanation in their own right, to "explain" that which actually is...

The universe could be the uncaused cause. Why is that an inkling of a weaker argument than the notion that some conceptual untested entity is the uncaused cause?

[StephanM]

Look, either everything is caused by something else, or it isn't.

If everything is caused by something else, then God was caused by something.

If, somehow, in some way we can't fully understand, it's possible for something to exist without being caused, then THE UNIVERSE could be it. It's the simplest solution.

In the absence of any evidence one way or another, to assume that the universe was created a by a God that was created by another God, or to assume that the universe was created by a God that was created by a God that was created by a God, or to assume that the Universe was created by a God, is all laughable.

Why create imaginary untestable entities which require an explanation in their own right, to "explain" that which actually is...

The universe could be the uncaused cause. Why is that an inkling of a weaker argument than the notion that some conceptual untested entity is the uncaused cause?

Hi No Evidence. In this thread, we've been discussing whether or not a first cause implies a god. For a good first-cause discussion, see this other thread

[Ionian_Tradition]

In this situation, the thing itself is completely new, and has some aspects that are common to things we see, and some aspects which are completely foreign. Even then, there could very well be some mind that thinks of something completely new with nothing that we would understand whatsoever.

Perhaps, but in order to do this, this mind must still possess a prior base of experiential knowledge from which to form the concept in question. Simply inserting a concept predicated upon knowledge foreign to the human mind does not address the issue of how concepts form, or more importantly, what they are. To form a novel concept from nothing, is to form a concept bereft of context. Uncontextualized thoughts do not exist as coherent concepts, (context is that which lend coherency to any thought) thus no mind can form a coherent concept in the absence of a prior knowledge base from which to provide the meaningful context it, by nature, requires.

I don't agree that every possible mind must have prior experience to gain knowledge in order to make choices. The way we think, you're making perfect sense, but you haven't explained why every possible mind must think the way we do.

I've explained my rationale for this line of reasoning in my previous response. Knowledge which makes no reference to experience, in even the slightest degree, is knowledge bereft of context. Knowledge lacking context is fundamentally incoherent and therefore cannot be coherently known. You wish to argue that, for example, it is possible for a non-human mind, equipped with the capacity to formulate coherent and intelligible concepts, to fully know the color red without reference to the experience of color in any form. Yet clearly this is impossible given that "color" without reference to appearance (an experience) is fundamentally unintelligible. Colors are defined by their appearance. Divorce color from its appearance and you remove the critical context by which the term "color" is made distinguishable from that which it is not. Therefore, in order to intelligibly know what color truly is, in a coherent fashion, one must know it by appearance and thus by experience. Note that the necessity to know color by way of experience is not born from a deficiency seated solely in the human mind, but rather the necessity emerges from the nature of what color is, which further determines the manner in which it is made distinguishable from non-color.

For a human mind to think of something completely without context, that would seem to me to be non-thought, too.

No human mind has ever, or will ever, do this. I charge you to provide evidence that such a thing has occurred.

I meant that I agree with you here; that it's impossible for a human to do such a thing.

This is a limitation which is not relegated solely to the human mind, but any mind capable of forming coherent concepts.

But then again, I could be wrong. Just because I can't fathom it doesn't mean it can't exist.

True, but would you also affirm the same for square circles? Does your inability to fathom such a thing render it reasonable to assume such an entity is capable of existing? The hidden premise at play here is that uncontextualized concepts are logically possible, and as such, our inability to fathom such concepts does not form an impediment to their existence. But what you've yet to recognize is that uncontextualized concepts are not merely abstruse, they are logically paradoxical. Much in the same way that square circles cannot logically be thought to exist, so too is it logically impossible to consider coherent thoughts, lacking supportive context, a viable construct. This is because context is that which lends a coherent concept its coherency. Remove context from a coherent concept and it effectively ceases to be what it is...coherent. From this it seems clear that the contrivance of a coherent uncontextualized concept is no more logically tenable a notion than the notion of painting a blue sky without the use of color.

If I tell a mentally handicapped person that the moon exists, and he can't fathom that, it doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. If some super-genius tells me that he thought of something completely new, so new that he couldn't even describe it to me, then if I used that argument, it would be completely ineffective. A supreme, ideal mind would have even less potential limit than even the best human mind, so to argue from the human mind without a logical link to all potential minds is pointless.

Regardless how "supreme" (an attribute you've added to the equation without warrant) this mind is, its novel concepts must at least be coherent to itself. It matters not if the human mind is capable of comprehending the context driving the concept in question. We might expect that a supreme mind possesses a knowledge base far more advanced than that of a human mind. None the less, it remains true that in order for the novel concept in question to remain intelligible to the supreme mind which formed it, it must first be derived from a base of prior experiential knowledge from which to acquire context, and thus coherency.

Square circles and painting the sky blue aren't thoughts without experience-based knowledge. They are incoherent because they contradict their own definitions. You're still extrapolating from our minds onto every possible mind without explaining why it must be so.

Knowledge without context is also contradictory. Context must be made in reference to experiential knowledge. Again this is because certain phenomena are defined and distinguished by experiential factors. What is color without its appearance? What is pain without its sensation? What is the occupation of space without its presence? To remove from these terms their experiential context is to render them contradictions in the truest sense of the word. Citing the deficiencies of the human mind and then positing an unknown mind superior to that of our own will not aid you in side stepping the root of the issue. Knowledge without context is a logical contradiction. Regardless of which mind you appeal to, it remains that square circles will never be made a truly logical notion, neither will the notion of uncontextualized knowledge.

The force of gravity and the nuclear forces are in a tug-of-war, with gravity trying to pull the book into the center of the earth (and the books into each other), and the nuclear forces away from the surface of the earth (and each other) because the book is in a location where both forces will act accordingly. (I'll eliminate the stack for simplicity's sake since I don't see how it adds to the conversation considering the earth has to be there). What caused the book and the earth to be in their current locations? There are 4 possible conditions.

1) They have always been in their locations for an infinite past.
This results in no cause at all since no states have changed. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)


2) They have always been in their locations for a finite past.
Nothing has happened since the moment that they came into existence. This would require some sort of entity that can bring things into existence. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

3) They have moved into that position some time during an infinite past.
It's unknown what dislodged the book from its previous location. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

4) They have moved into that position some time during an infinite past.
It's unknown what dislodged the book from its previous location. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

A B-theory of time posits that all points along the continuum of time are equally real. As such, no moment in time is causally contingent upon any moment preceding it. This creates the conditions in which a universe, like ours, might exist without ever having been caused at all.

I don't agree with a B-theory of time, so to appeal to it does not good here.

In what way do you find a B-theory of time to not be a plausible alternative to the conditions you've listed above?

More importantly, even if such a thing was evidence for an non-choosing uncaused causing entity, it seems to me to be an a priori definition of choice that it is any uncaused action by an entity. In that case, the truth of the statement is my starting point, and I would have to see evidence supporting that such a thing existed, not merely conjecture.

Yet you gladly do without evidence in support of the existence of a supreme mind capable of producing coherent concepts from absolutely nothing. Mere conjecture seems to suite your conclusions just fine in this regard.

I think I mentioned before, I'm not assuming a mind, I'm saying that the premises of a first cause (assumed by the OP for the discussion) and that an uncased action by an entity is a choice, and a choice requires a mind, lead to the conclusion that there was a mind behind the first cause. This doesn't include the assumption that this mind must be like a human mind in any way other than having a (not necessarily similar to human) choosing capacity.

You've assumed that this mind is capable of conceiving unconceptualized concepts. But you've not demonstrated this to be possible. A mind which cannot form concepts without reference to experience cannot form the concept of a universe consisting of properties foreign to its own experience. Thus far, you have yet to show that the type of mind you've posited is a logical consequence of an event you believe to be the product of conscious choice.

For example, I find it to be an a priori statement that I'm not a cyborg. If you make an argument based on me being a cyborg, I'm going to tell you that it's possible, but my position remains unchanged until you show conjure some keyword that makes me stand on my head, or show me an x-ray of my head full of metal.

Duly noted, However, I suggest you apply this same reasoning to the dubious notion that unobserved supreme minds are capable of performing logically impossible feats.... If only for the preservation of consistency on your part.

Like I mentioned above, you haven't explained how feats impossible to our minds must be impossible to any potential mind.

I believe I have.


1.If the creation of the universe is the product of choice, it must first have existed as a logical concept within the mind that chose to create it.

2. Logical concepts are by nature coherent.

3. In order for a logical concept to be logically coherent it must possess context.

4. Context requires experiential knowledge.


From this we can form the following syllogism:

1. If the creation of the universe is a product of choice it must have been conceived as a coherent concept predicated upon a prior base of experiential knowledge.

2. Experiential knowledge concerning the properties of the universe could not have been acquired prior to their own existence.

Therefore, the creation of the universe was not a product of choice.

[StephanM]

I misunderstood what you meant by context before. When you put it that way, I agree with the context part completely. What I still don't agree with is that the context necessary for the creation of the universe must be gained by experience.

[Ionian_Tradition]

I misunderstood what you meant by context before. When you put it that way, I agree with the context part completely. What I still don't agree with is that the context necessary for the creation of the universe must be gained by experience.

Consider the concept of "pain". We can see that in order for pain to be differentiated from that which it is not, it must be contextualized in such a way so as to be made fundamentally distinct. The nature of pain renders its intrinsic distinction rooted in a particular sensation. As such, what makes pain fundamentally distinct from pleasure is the manner in which it is felt, or experienced. In the absence of such experiential knowledge, "pain" becomes an incoherent term. This is because pain cannot be understood without reference to its sensation. The same applies for color, sound, texture, etc. All of these terms are defined and distinguished from their antithesis by way of some experiential factor. To divorce color from its appearance is to divorce it from its meaning. The same for any term which is contextualized by way of some experience. From this it seems clear that the context which renders terms like color, sound, pain, etc. coherent cannot be derived from non-experience because it is experience itself which severs to define said terms. Since the concept of a universe like ours requires experiential knowledge of such properties, it is obvious that the universe could not have been conceptualized prior to its own existence (you can't experience something before it exists). It follows then that the creation of the universe was not a product of conscious choice (the choice to act on a concept first requires the existence of the concept).

[Mithrae]

From this it seems clear that the context which renders terms like color, sound, pain, etc. coherent cannot be derived from non-experience because it is experience itself which severs to define said terms. Since the concept of a universe like ours requires experiential knowledge of such properties, it is obvious that the universe could not have been conceptualized prior to its own existence (you can't experience something before it exists). It follows then that the creation of the universe was not a product of conscious choice (the choice to act on a concept first requires the existence of the concept).

Just read the last few posts here, but aren't you equivocating between concepts of experience (colour, sound) and concepts of properties (light, air vibration)? To conceive colour, one needs to see; but it doesn't follow that one needs to see in order to conceive different states of being or 'energy,' among which are the types we know and experience as electro-magnetic radiation and solid (in this case organic) matter.

[Danmark]

I misunderstood what you meant by context before. When you put it that way, I agree with the context part completely. What I still don't agree with is that the context necessary for the creation of the universe must be gained by experience.

Consider the concept of "pain". We can see that in order for pain to be differentiated from that which it is not, it must be contextualized in such a way so as to be made fundamentally distinct. The nature of pain renders its intrinsic distinction rooted in a particular sensation. As such, what makes pain fundamentally distinct from pleasure is the manner in which it is felt, or experienced. In the absence of such experiential knowledge, "pain" becomes an incoherent term. This is because pain cannot be understood without reference to its sensation. The same applies for color, sound, texture, etc. All of these terms are defined and distinguished from their antithesis by way of some experiential factor. To divorce color from its appearance is to divorce it from its meaning. The same for any term which is contextualized by way of some experience. From this it seems clear that the context which renders terms like color, sound, pain, etc. coherent cannot be derived from non-experience because it is experience itself which severs to define said terms. Since the concept of a universe like ours requires experiential knowledge of such properties, it is obvious that the universe could not have been conceptualized prior to its own existence (you can't experience something before it exists). It follows then that the creation of the universe was not a product of conscious choice (the choice to act on a concept first requires the existence of the concept).

This conclusion is not warranted, so nothing that flows from it has been established. There are at least two problems with the line of reasoning that led to this unwarranted conclusion. One is the comparison of a finite 'man' to the infinite. The other is that physicists among others, are able to conceive things they have never experienced.

[Ionian_Tradition]

From this it seems clear that the context which renders terms like color, sound, pain, etc. coherent cannot be derived from non-experience because it is experience itself which severs to define said terms. Since the concept of a universe like ours requires experiential knowledge of such properties, it is obvious that the universe could not have been conceptualized prior to its own existence (you can't experience something before it exists). It follows then that the creation of the universe was not a product of conscious choice (the choice to act on a concept first requires the existence of the concept).

Just read the last few posts here, but aren't you equivocating between concepts of experience (colour, sound) and concepts of properties (light, air vibration)?

You speak of light, air, and vibration as properties and identify them conceptually as separate and distinct from actual experience, yet you unwittingly sneak in a certain contextual framework, which you've derived from your own experience, in order to lend coherency to your terms. You are familiar with concepts of structure, movement and change only because you know structure by appearance, movement by sensation, and change by both. Without this contextual knowledge, terms like "vibration" would become utterly meaningless to you. How could you make sense of matter with no experience of substance or structure? How could you comprehend vibration with no experience of movement or change? What is the occupation of space to you in the absence of spacial presence? Without the contextual knowledge you derive from your experiences, the concept of matter vibrating in space could not be formed.

Now it has been said that the limitations intrinsic to the human mind are what forms this necessity for experiential knowledge to contextualize our thoughts, but I ask by what means would some foreign mind, preceding our universe, contextualize concepts of properties intrinsic to the universe prior to its very existence? What context is there for matter in a realm of existence bereft of it? What context is there for motion in a world devoid of movement? What context is there for spacial location in an existence where space does not exist? I believe we may be taking for granted the fact that we understand certain concepts apart from direct experience and assume therefore that experience plays no part in their formation. We then conclude that a mind foreign to our own should be capable of such a feat all whilst overlooking the fact that the context that lends concepts their coherency is born solely from experience. In the absence of context, no idea is intelligible.

To conceive colour, one needs to see; but it doesn't follow that one needs to see in order to conceive different states of being or 'energy,' among which are the types we know and experience as electro-magnetic radiation and solid (in this case organic) matter.

How would you differentiate "states of being" without experiential knowledge of "being" itself? How could you conceive of a space in which such states of being might exist if occupancy of spacial location was foreign to your experience? What context, apart from experience, could you bring to the term "state of being" to lend it coherency? What context could any mind bring to such a concepts which is not first derived from its own experience?