Are there any non-fallacious arguments for non-theism?

[EduChris]

Let's assume for sake of argument that if non-theism were the objective reality, we would be able to offer some positive and non-fallacious argument to support the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism.

In this discussion, we will use the following definitions:

Theism: the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.

Non-theism: the philosophical viewpoint that theism need not be the case.

God: the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility.

Our universe and our selves constitute the evidence, and we must provide arguments as to why, given this evidence, we should adopt the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism. In this thread we are not allowed to rely on some supposed "default position of non-theism"; rather, we must provide an actual, non-fallacious argument for non-theism.

After all, if non-theism can be asserted (or adopted, or held) without evidence, then non-theism can be dismissed without evidence.

[EduChris]

...By your argment, theism must insist that for for each and every possible universe, there is be some element of personal agency involved in the way for the actualization of that universe...

It could be that the choice to actualize one possible world might entail the necessary actualization of some other possible world. Or it might be that the choice to actualize a world with some self-determining capacity would automatically entail a certain unavoidable capacity for evil within that world. In these cases, elements of both agency and necessity would seem to be involved.

...I assume one thing, that no element of personal agency is involved. You assume the opposite, that some element of personal agency is involved. Either way your standard and normal epistemological rules argument is debunked.

You are mistaken. The claim that "no element of personal agency is involved" entails the assumption that all possible worlds involve necessary causation alone. This assumes much more than there mere possibility that a single universe involves personal causation. As far as epistemology is concerned, the assumption of "impossible" is always more profligate than the assumption of "possible."

[Artie]

...there's no point in him trying to use epistemology or logic to arrive at the conclusion that a god or personal agent must exist when this God or personal agent can do whatever He wants and doesn't have to stick to his logic or epistemology.

God may be able to do whatever God whats, but epistemology deals with the types of claims we are justified in making.

This is what is called a circular argument. Because God has produced a universe in which logic and epistemology work the way they do you try to use them to deduce the existence of God.

Non-theism assumes more than theism. By itself this doesn't mean that theism is the case, but it does mean that theism is a justified belief, since it is epistemically superior to non-theism.

No it doesn't. You are just trying to make it appear that way.
http://www.rejectionofpascalswager.net/baroque.html

[EduChris]

...the big thing Educhis is missing in his 'in all possible world' scenario, is any evidence that in ANY possible word there is ANY 'God'.

As I mentioned in the OP, our universe and our selves constitute the evidence. Theism and non-theism are varying interpretations of the very same evidence.

Also, the typical non-theist seemingly is unable to let go of the erroneous idea that theism is primarily about some entity called "God" that "exists" within this or that universe. To the contrary, God is the logically necessary source and fount of all possibility which transcends and undergirds all contingent reality.

[Ionian_Tradition]

Greetings Mithrae,

I was hoping I would here from you again concerning this topic.

Hi Ionian Tradition. I never got 'round to replying to our discussion on this topic from last week. But since this in particular is a point which I addressed in our discussion, I think it's worth throwing in my two cents here. And I'll first say again that you do raise a very good point with this line of thinking, which at the least is a crippling challenge to notions of 'God' being omniscient in the usual sense.

Nevertheless, I think I might be able to condense my response into three points which I don't think you have sufficiently answered in this or the other thread. As long as our hypothetical original mind was not completely homogenous - ie, it must have more than one aspect of its being (as indeed it must to be a thinking thing at all!) - I think it remains possible (or even plausible) as an explanation for the rest of existence. The three points which I feel need to be addressed are:

1> Concepts form not only from direct experience, but also from extrapolation and negation of experience (and existing concepts)
Concepts of dragons, faeries and so on amply demonstrate this

I believe I agreed with this statement during our previous discussion. My only caveat was that such concepts require a particular set of experiential references in order to form. Without the proper experiential referent, certain concepts cannot logically be conceived. Take the concept of a "fearsome fire breathing dragon in flight", for instance. The concept of a "fearsome fire breathing dragon in flight" is certainly an extrapolation upon prior experiences (visual perceptions of color, fire, size, flight, etc. coupled with sensory experience of heat, fear, breath, etc.). However, I ask you, if such experiences were completely foreign to the mind to which we ascribe this concept, could such a concept logically have been formed? Can the concept of a dragon in flight exist in the absence of the aforementioned referents? I personally believe the answer is simply no. There is no context by which to lend coherency to the concept of a fire breathing dragon in the absence of experiential knowledge concerning color, fire, size, flight, heat, breath etc.

2> We cannot arbitrarily define limits on what might be conceived by extrapolation and negation (and relationships between subsequent concepts)
For example, it's probable that with no limit on time a mind with concepts only of 1 and 2 could ultimately conceive of thousands, billions, and arithmetic, and algebra. On this point, and related to what you above dismiss as a "set of utterly absurd contradictions," your response to my earlier argument seems uncertain/incredulous at best:

• Mithrae wrote: Could adding and subtracting numbers plausibly produce some concept of linear space?
  
  Ionian_Tradition wrote: I think at best mere addition and subtraction will produce an increasing range of values. Notions of linear space however are contextualized by spacial existence...Something our hypothetical mind would surely lack, provided it preceded the physical universe. I'm not sure a strong correlation can be drawn between purely quantitative values and spacial occupancy.

I'm not so sure. Its not an appeal to incredulity to state that a knowledge of quantitative values cannot provide the necessary context required to render concepts of linear space intelligible. Quantitative value and spacial location are, by definition, two very different things. The extrapolation of quantity will certainly produce a greater range of values and may also produce increasingly intricate ways in which said values relate to one another, but to marry quantity with spacial location requires that some concept of space already exist. Abstract quantity, in and of itself, carries with it no notion of spacial occupancy. It is only when we introduce spacially located objects that we can apply abstract notions of quantity to such objects in order quantify to how they relate to each other within the space they occupy. In the absence of experiential knowledge concerning spacial occupancy, the notion of applying abstract quantitative values to spacial objects would utterly lack coherency, and thus could not logically constitute a truly intelligent thought.

3> A hypothetical original mind needn't experience or even conceive everything we experience and conceive; it need only conceive the reality from which our experience is drawn
Earlier in the thread I commented...
Mithrae wrote: But as far as I can imagine the simplest form which any metaphysical theories could take would have to involve both substance and behaviour (and arguably a substrate, or place to be and happen, such as the dimensions of time and space).

But as I suggested to you in our discussion, time and space are ways of describing relationships between things which (despite our perception of them) current physics suggests may be inter-related. And since behaviour merely describes changes in state of being over time, it's possible that every objective thing might be reduced down to different states of being and the description of relationships between them.

The idea that everything might be broken down to numbers may not be as absurd as it seems.

I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "different states of being", in regard to an immaterial mind. Perhaps you mean that such a mind might think one thought and then another and this shift in thought would constitute a "shift in states"? The fact remains that the intrinsic state of immaterial being does not shift or change in the sense you imply. Immaterial entities, are by definition, bereft of constituent parts. In the absence of any and all constituent parts, there is nothing intrinsic to an immaterial mind's being which would constitute an actual shift in state, such that an entirely new state of being ( a material or spacial state of being) could be derived. I'm just not convinced you've shown that knowledge concerning quantitative values, acquired within the context of an unchanging state of immaterial being, provides the necessary experiential context required to render concepts like "matter" and "space" even remotely coherent.

Long and short, I think you make a good case that our hypothetical original mind couldn't conceive pain or pleasure, nor even colour or sound. But I don't think you've shown that it couldn't - by a long progression of extrapolation and negation from the different aspects of its own being - eventually conceive the states of being and relationships between them which make up the reality from which our sight and pain are drawn.

I think I've shown the logical inconsistency which follows from this line of reasoning. Until it can be shown that numbers can effectively provide necessary context to concepts regarding states of being totally antithetical to what numbers imply, without borrowing context born from other non-quantitative experiences, I think my argument remains pertinent. With that said, I would like to return to a point regarding the problem of infinite regress which I made during our previous discussion. If I'm not mistaken, you've yet to comment on it and I would like to hear your response. I said the following:

The problem here is there could be no meaningful context from which to coherently conceive a state of being "different" from its own. From what experience might it derive context regarding the concept of additional states of being which are fundamentally antithetical to the only states of being it possesses an experiential referent for? How could spacial existence be meaningfully implied from a non-spacial framework? How could the concept of "matter" be conceived from a state in which there is nothing from which to provide the term meaningful context?

Now I suppose this mind might derive the concept of finitude from witnessing its own thoughts come in and out of being. Perhaps this also might imply causality. However, this notion would prove lethal to the argument for the simple reason that if we assume this mind has always been thinking finite thoughts causally connected to corresponding antecedent thoughts, then it would seem that our eternal mind would suffer the problem of an infinite regress of thoughts which would prevent the concept of a "physical universe" from ever arising. In other words, there would always be an infinite number of antecedent thoughts preceding the thought which prompted the choice to create the universe. Thus the universe could never come about.

If you posit an eternally thinking mind which conceives increasingly complex concepts over time, by way of extrapolation, then you place before the concept which prompted the creation of our universe an infinite number of preceding thoughts from which it was extrapolated. It seems to me the problem of an infinite thought regression proves fatal to any notion of a Theistic mind, conjuring up the universe through extrapolated thought. What say you?

[EduChris]

...Without the proper experiential referent, certain concepts cannot logically be conceived. Take the concept of a "fearsome fire breathing dragon in flight", for instance. The concept of a "fearsome fire breathing dragon in flight" is certainly an extrapolation upon prior experiences (visual perceptions of color, fire, size, flight, etc. coupled with sensory experience of heat, fear, breath, etc.). However, I ask you, if such experiences were completely foreign to the mind to which we ascribe this concept, could such a concept logically have been formed? Can the concept of a dragon in flight exist in the absence of the aforementioned referents?...[emphasis added]

Essentially, you are assuming that anything and everything other than the "eternal mind" itself would remain forever unknown to that mind. You are asking, "How would such a mind even know how to formulate an idea of "what is possible" if it can't conceive of anything other than itself.

Two points: firstly, this is an argument from ignorance. We don't know whether such a mind could or could not know something other than itself, because we know nothing at all of a mind unhindered by the arbitrary limitations of our minds.

Secondly, if a mind cannot conceive of such things, why should it be more likely that an impersonal "universe generator" would be able to determine what sorts of universes it must spit out? Who writes the rules about which universes are necessary? Earlier we had a poster mention the "Great Quantum Nothing" in which nothing allegedly exists and yet everything is allegedly possible. If logic and necessity alone can determine which types of universe can be generated, why should it be the case that a logically necessary context for such laws be ignorant, merely by the fact that this context involves an element of personal choice?

[Ionian_Tradition]

...Without the proper experiential referent, certain concepts cannot logically be conceived. Take the concept of a "fearsome fire breathing dragon in flight", for instance. The concept of a "fearsome fire breathing dragon in flight" is certainly an extrapolation upon prior experiences (visual perceptions of color, fire, size, flight, etc. coupled with sensory experience of heat, fear, breath, etc.). However, I ask you, if such experiences were completely foreign to the mind to which we ascribe this concept, could such a concept logically have been formed? Can the concept of a dragon in flight exist in the absence of the aforementioned referents?...[emphasis added]

Essentially, you are saying that anything and everything other than the "eternal mind" itself would remain forever unknown to that mind. You are asking, "How would such a mind even know how to formulate an idea of "what is possible" if it can't conceive of anything other than itself.

Two points: firstly, this is an argument from ignorance. We don't know whether such a mind could or could not know something other than itself, because we know nothing at all of a mind unhindered by the arbitrary limitations of our minds.

We know that, by definition, immaterial minds lack the means to experience physical sensations. This is evidenced by the fact that such sensations would require that the physical world PHYSICALLY interact with that which is intrinsically non-physical in order to produce a physical experience. This is a blatant contradiction. A non-physical entity cannot PHYSICALLY interact with a physical entity lest it cease to be what it is, non-physical or immaterial. Moreover, even if this were possible, such interaction would require the existence of the universe prior to its own existence. A immaterial mind cannot logically experience a material world prior to forming the concept which lead to its creation. The same applies for anything which exists external to this mind. If this mind is the fount of all possibilities then naturally it precedes all possibilities. Thus it cannot experience anything which it causally precedes....Which according to your argument, would be EVERYTHING other than itself.

Secondly, if a mind cannot conceive of such things, why should it be more likely that an impersonal "universe generator" would know what sorts of universes it could spit out?

Why are you assuming that an impersonal reality in which existing things reside should "know" anything? Why is conceptual knowledge requisite for natures to be what they are?

Who writes the rules about which universes are necessary?

Who says the rules are "written" in any sense familiar to us? Why should your anthropomorphic vision of a personal agency penning existence into being be the only means by which things come to be as they are? THIS sound far more like an argument from ignorance, in my opinion.

Earlier we had a poster mention the "Great Quantum Nothing" in which nothing allegedly exists and yet everything is allegedly possible. If logic and necessity alone can determine which types of universe can be generated, why should it be the case that a logically necessary context for such laws be ignorant, merely by the fact that this context involves an element of agency?

Logic and necessity do not "determine" natures in the sense you imply. They are not personal agencies capable of formulating abstract concepts upon which to act, and thus are not subject to the limitations of conceptual thought.

[Bust Nak]

It could be that the choice to actualize one possible world might entail the necessary actualization of some other possible world. In this case, elements of both agency and necessity would seem to be involved.

Well there you go, you are making assumption on all possible worlds. You are assuming that some of them are caused by necessarity some are caused by personal actualization.

You are mistaken. The claim that "no element of personal agency is involved" entails the assumption that all possible worlds involve necessary causation alone.

Sure, and the claim that "some element of personal agency is involved" entails the assumption that all possible worlds involve some element of personal agency."

This assumes much more than there mere possibility that a single universe involves personal causation.

Sure, but compare that to the assumption that this universe involve no personal causation.

You keep switching between one claim on that meta "God" and multi-claims on all possible worlds; compare like with like and we see the theistic and non-theistic position is equivalent.

As far as epistemology is concerned, the assumption of "impossible" is always more profligate than the assumption of "possible."

Yeah, you can stop bring that up. That's not being disbute.

[EduChris]

...We know that, by definition, immaterial minds lack the means to experience physical sensations...

Perhaps given your definition, but we need not adopt your definition. There is no reason to suggest that the source and fount of all possibility is "immaterial" per the definition you provide.

...This is evidenced by the fact that such sensations would require that the physical world PHYSICALLY interact with that which is intrinsically non-physical in order to produce a physical experience. This is a blatant contradiction. A non-physical entity cannot PHYSICALLY interact with a physical entity lest it cease to be what it is, non-physical or immaterial...

You are simply assuming that the immaterial cannot interact with the material, just because you say so. This is an argument from ignorance; more than that, it contradicts our own daily experience of personal agency.

...If this mind is the fount of all possibilities then naturally it precedes all possibilities. Thus it cannot experience anything which it causally precedes....Which according to your argument, would be EVERYTHING other than itself...

This is just circular reasoning. If possibilities can be imagined, those same possibilities can be actualized via some causation. You are denying the capacity for imagination, which is to assume that the source and fount of all possibility must be less than personal...because it must be less than personal.

...Why are you assuming that an impersonal reality in which existing things reside should "know" anything? Why is conceptual knowledge requisite for natures to be what they are?...

Why is there something rather than nothing? Because, at some point, something was possible and something was actualized. There is information which is acted upon by some means. You are simply asserting that the conscious processing of information is somehow more limited than the unconscious processing of that same information.

...Who says the rules are "written" in any sense familiar to us? Why should your anthropomorphic vision of a personal agency penning existence into being, be the only means by which things come to be as they are? THIS sound far more like an argument from ignorance...

I do not say "only." I say only that, so far as we can tell from our own experience, both necessity and agency can cause things to occur. You are the one attempting to rule out agency, even though that is the one causal mechanism which we experience every day in unmediated fashion.

...Logic and necessity do not "determine" natures in the sense you imply. They are not personal agencies capable of formulating abstract concepts upon which to act, and thus are not subject to the limitations of conceptual thought.

There is information, and then there is the processing of information. You are simply asserting that consciousness hinders information processing. Our daily experience indicates otherwise. Imagination adds to experience; the lack of imagination detracts from experience.

[EduChris]

...you are making assumption on all possible worlds. You are assuming that some of them are caused by necessarity some are caused by personal actualization...

I am simply allowing for the possibility of each type of causation. Non-theism, by contrast, makes the profligate assumption that one type of causation is impossible altogether.

...the claim that "some element of personal agency is involved" entails the assumption that all possible worlds involve some element of personal agency."...

I am not saying that all possible worlds are actualized via personal agency. I am saying that if even one possible world is actualized via some sort of personal agency, then the source and fount of all possibility is not-less-than-personal.

...this universe involve no personal causation...You keep switching between one claim on that meta "God" and multi-claims on all possible worlds; compare like with like and we see the theistic and non-theistic position is equivalent...

You keep trying to evade the force of the argument that non-theism insists that personal agency is impossible, whereas theism makes the more justified claim that it is possible.

As far as epistemology is concerned, the assumption of "impossible" is always more profligate than the assumption of "possible."

Yeah, you can stop bring that up. That's not being disbute.

But you are disputing it, that's why I keep bringing it up. Theism cares not for whether this or that universe is actualized via necessity or agency; rather, it is solely focused on the nature of the source of all possibility. If the source of all possibility is personal, then it is personal whether or not this universe was actualized via necessity.

[no evidence no belief]

ARGUMENT FROM HUMAN NECESSITY
(1) Atheists say that they don't need God.
(2) Which just goes to show that they need God.
(3) Therefore, God exists.

ARGUMENT FROM HUMAN NECESSITY
(1) People say that they don't need Santa.
(2) Which just goes to show that they need Santa.
(3) Therefore, Santa exists