Are there any non-fallacious arguments for non-theism?

[EduChris]

Let's assume for sake of argument that if non-theism were the objective reality, we would be able to offer some positive and non-fallacious argument to support the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism.

In this discussion, we will use the following definitions:

Theism: the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.

Non-theism: the philosophical viewpoint that theism need not be the case.

God: the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility.

Our universe and our selves constitute the evidence, and we must provide arguments as to why, given this evidence, we should adopt the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism. In this thread we are not allowed to rely on some supposed "default position of non-theism"; rather, we must provide an actual, non-fallacious argument for non-theism.

After all, if non-theism can be asserted (or adopted, or held) without evidence, then non-theism can be dismissed without evidence.

[EduChris]

...There is nothing wrong with my question. It merely demonstrates the limits of Logic..."Can an agent who can do anything do something which is impossible?"

If there is an agent who can do anything, then the word "impossible" is meaningless. Your question might just as well be, "Can an agent who can do anything do #$%^&*? The question is meaningless because "#$%^&*" doesn't have a referent.

...there cannot be a triangle with four sides...

Again this is a language issue, a definitional truth (same as "unmarried bachelor"). If our questions are to mean anything, our words must mean something. And "four-sided triangle" and "unmarried bachelors" are simply words strung together without meaning.

[Ionian_Tradition]

...Experiential referent precedes conceptualization...

You are simply asserting that the chicken must come before the egg, without stopping to consider that perhaps the egg comes before the chicken.

Context cannot logically precede that from which it is derived. This isn't merely a case of the chicken coming before the egg, you're arguing that context precedes the very subjects from which it is derived. Such is the equivalent of arguing that it is reasonable to presume that marriage may very well precede bachelorhood. Literal nonsense.

Again, I see that you are quite smitten with your assertions, but unless you can work them into some sort of a valid argument we're never going to be able to discuss the matter intelligently. You can't just assume the consequent and then suppose you have resolved the matter.

There are no assumptions at work here save those you employ in service of your argument. Your brand of theism demands we simply accept logically untenable speculation concerning the feats attainable by a mind you admit is well beyond your comprehension. My argument has, and continues to, expose the logical deficiencies in your reasoning by pointing out the logical necessity for experiential context to precede conceptual thought. Your position assumes that meaning can exist in the absence of subjects, and flagrantly asserts this blatant contradiction as if doing so were somehow an intelligent rebuttal of my critiques. I am inclined to agree that intelligent discussion has indeed been compromised between us...If for no other reason that I can simply make no good sense of the Theism you posit.

[Ionian_Tradition]

There's no logical contradiction in the idea of thoughts whose only initial content concern the different attributes of the mind which thinks them. There's no logical contradiction in acknowledging that thoughts can coherently extend far beyond direct experience, through extrapolation and negation of what is experienced.

There is a contradiction in assuming that a mind is capable of perceiving the only aspects of mind which render its existence discernible (thought) prior to the existence of thought itself. Idealism, implies this very thing.

No it doesn't. Whichever ultimate absurdity we might prefer - some kind of infinite regress, some kind of eternal or necessary being, some kind of spontaneous or random existence - we can't talk meaningfully of something prior to that, whether we're talking about mind or matter. You're trying introduce a temporal sequence where you cannot even comprehend such an idea, in order to show absurdity. Obviously that's not an absurdity of idealism, but of your argument.

Can you not see that logic demands the existence of certain ontological priorities in order for concepts to be made intelligible? Is it not evident that logic requires that all subjects exist ontologically prior to their meaning? Last I checked our purpose here was to have a rational discussion concerning the logical tenability of both theism and non-theism. If you continue to appeal to some incoherent metaphysic which posits the existence of meaning prior to the very subjects to which it refers, have you not brought rational discourse between us to a definitive end?

...a mind cannot choose what does not first exist...objects of choice will always precede choice itself...some non-choosing entity will always exist ontologically prior to thoughtful choice...If there is no experiential context available from which to form a particular concept (e.g. spacial location), it cannot be conceived.

This is the heart of the problem with your argument. Our finite minds have a beginning, and therefore we need to learn; but why should you or anyone else suppose the same should be true of a mind which has no beginning and which intrinsically conceives or creates all possibilities?

This has been explained numerous times over the course of this discussion. Uncontextualized thoughts cannot logically exist as coherent/intelligible thought (the concept of "pain" is meaningless without reference to sensation"). Context is only derived through experience (sensation can only be known through experience).

You can keep repeating that, but I've shown it to be untrue. Context is often derived by extrapolation and negation from experience.

I respectfully assert you've done nothing of the sort. Context isn't derived from extrapolation so much as extrapolation is derived from context. You can't extrapolate upon a thought which does not first exist, and I've shown that in order for any intelligible thought to exist, there must first exist some form of context (derived from a prior base of experiential knowledge) from which to lend thought its coherency. You haven't shown that our hypothetical mind possesses the means to have experiences of thing which exist separate from its own thoughts, nor have you shown that experience of thought, or negation, can be derived prior to thought's very existence.

You have asserted that there are necessary limits to that process, but that's all you've got to offer. I say that concepts of magnitude or space - concepts of non-temporal relationships between things - could proceed plausibly, or even necessarily, from concepts of quantity or numbers. You say that they could not. So I guess that's where the discussion must end.

I've asked you to demonstrate how this might plausibly be the case. You've yet to do so. Beyond this, you've also yet to show how experiential knowledge of quantity can be acquired without the aid of particular thoughts (which themselves require some form of experiential context in order to manifest). In addition you've yet to adequately address the problem of infinite thought regression (which renders the entire notion of an infinite mind conjuring up the concept which produced our universe a logical impossibility). Your only response has been to name it a necessary absurdity...but this is hardly compelling evidence of Idealism's veracity, let alone its plausibility. Perhaps this discussion is an end, but I do not believe it has met its end with a robust defense of Idealism.

[EduChris]

...you're arguing that context precedes the very subjects from which it is derived. Such is the equivalent of arguing that it is reasonable to presume that marriage may very well precede bachelorhood...

If there is a mind which conceived of marriage before any humans existed, then marriage (as a concept) obviously does precede the bachelorhood of any particular human individual.

...My argument...pointing out the logical necessity for experiential context to precede conceptual thought...

You have no argument; your conclusion is exactly the same as your initial assumptions. My response is simply this: if one shares your initial assumptions, then one will necessarily arrive, without any argument at all, at your conclusion.

But the problem is, there is no valid reason for anyone to share your initial assumptions. As James Jeans said, "I incline to the idealistic theory that consciousness is fundamental, and that the material universe is derivative from consciousness, not consciousness from the material universe... In general the universe seems to me to be nearer to a great thought than to a great machine."

[Mithrae]

You have asserted that there are necessary limits to that process, but that's all you've got to offer. I say that concepts of magnitude or space - concepts of non-temporal relationships between things - could proceed plausibly, or even necessarily, from concepts of quantity or numbers. You say that they could not. So I guess that's where the discussion must end.

I've asked you to demonstrate how this might plausibly be the case. You've yet to do so.

A concept of quantity or numbers by definition is a concept of non-temporal relationship between things (post 288). You say that this cannot be considered equivalent to what we experience as 'space' and magnitude, and could not produce such concepts in the mind itself. I can respect your incredulity, but your assertions certainly haven't proven your point.

Beyond this, you've also yet to show how experiential knowledge of quantity can be acquired without the aid of particular thoughts (which themselves require some form of experiential context in order to manifest).

Whatever else might be said of whatever originated our reality - whether we hypothesize a mind or something else - it cannot be homogenous, else reality would be homogenous. That diversity within this hypothetical mind's nature would constitute experience of differences, of 'this' aspect of being and 'that' aspect of being, which is the same basis (albeit simpler) by which to conceive quantity and numbers as we have. I have said this in every post, right back to the earlier thread in which we discussed it.

In addition you've yet to adequately address the problem of infinite thought regression (which renders the entire notion of an infinite mind conjuring up the concept which produced our universe a logical impossibility). Your only response has been to name it a necessary absurdity...but this is hardly compelling evidence of Idealism's veracity, let alone its plausibility. Perhaps this discussion is an end, but I do not believe it has met its end with a robust defense of Idealism.

Again in post 288 I very clearly stated that there are three possible types of 'absurdity' of which any speculation about an ultimate origin of reality must necessarily consist, and I said that an infinite regress seemed least plausible to me also. One of the alternatives explicitly includes the logical possibility that a mind and its experience/thoughts of itself come into being simultaneously, without precedent (or, of course, that matter and its characteristics/behaviour come into being simultaneously.. or whatever else floats your boat).

You continue to appeal to your supposedly impossible infinite regress and "the existence of meaning prior to the very subjects to which it refers" not because they answer or refute what I've proposed, but because you have evidently chosen not to read my responses.

Neverthless I appreciate the opportunity to explore these notions and further refine my thoughts

[EduChris]

...Your position assumes that meaning can exist in the absence of subjects, and flagrantly asserts this blatant contradiction...

You have gotten it entirely backward: I assume that subjectivity is found only in subjects, as opposed to arising from objects-only, as you seem to suppose.

"Meaning" is present in thoughts. Where do you find "meaning" which is divorced from thought? It seems to me that anyone who points to this or that, as an ostensible example of "meaning without thought," has necessarily thought about that example--which entails that no such example can be produced apart from thought.

[Justin108]

Listen now, because I have repeated this over and over. I expect you to listen carefully here because there is simply no point continuing a discussion with you unless you are making a good-faith effort to understand what I am saying.

Theism does not assume that "a universe cannot exist in the absense of an Agent." That statement is false. That statement is a misrepresentation of everything that I have argued, repeatedly, on this thread and elsewhere. Theism evaluates all of the available options and concludes that agency is more justified than necessity-only.

Theism is a conclusion arrived after evaluation of all available options. You might not agree with the conclusion, but it is flat-out wrong to speak of a conclusion as though it were an assumption.

Ok let me settle this...

For argument sake, let's assume the only options are Necessity and Agency.

Your argument (and correct me if I'm wrong) is:

Atheism makes the assumption that the universe is necessary. Because Atheism makes an assumption, it is an inferior theory. Therefore, the remaining theory (Theism) can be concluded as the more likely position.

So let's summarize:

Atheism assumes necessity
Assumptions make an argument weak
The only remaining argument (Theism) is therefore the conclusion.


Here's your problem:

An Atheist can make the following argument:

Theism makes the assumption that there is an Agent. Because Theism makes an assumption, it is an inferior theory. Therefore, the remaining theory (Atheism) can be concluded as the more likely position.

So let's summarize:

Theism assumes agency
Assumptions make an argument weak
The only remaining argument (Atheism) is therefore the conclusion.

Objecting to the Atheist version of the argument would make you a hypocrite because it is the EXACT same argument you're making.


As you can see, both parties call the opposing position an "assumption" while calling their own position a "conclusion". Just as your argument turns Theism into a conclusion instead of an assumption, the Atheist argument I presented turns Atheism into a conclusion instead of an assumption.


To illustrate the issue, let's use an analogy of a gameshow.
Say there was a gameshow where there are two doors (door number 1 and door number 2). One of these doors contains a million dollars.

You're argument would be as follows:

If I pick door number 1, then I would be assuming door number 1 has the money. This is a poor argument since it is based on assumption. Therefore, the only remaining door (door number 2) is more likely to have the money.


Do you see the problem with this method? The "conclusion" depends on which door you pick first. If I picked door number 2 first, then door number 1 would be the "conclusion".

If you start by calling atheism an assumption and therefore "concluding" theism as more justified then you are using the exact same method. An atheist would instead start by calling theism an assumption and concluding atheism to therefore be superior.

[Justin108]

...There is nothing wrong with my question. It merely demonstrates the limits of Logic..."Can an agent who can do anything do something which is impossible?"

If there is an agent who can do anything, then the word "impossible" is meaningless. Your question might just as well be, "Can an agent who can do anything do #$%^&*? The question is meaningless because "#$%^&*" doesn't have a referent.

...there cannot be a triangle with four sides...

Again this is a language issue, a definitional truth (same as "unmarried bachelor"). If our questions are to mean anything, our words must mean something. And "four-sided triangle" and "unmarried bachelors" are simply words strung together without meaning.

Ok if you disagree with my Logic argument, I have a different argument for you.

The question is:
Assuming Theism is the case, where would the Agent come from?


The Agent can logically exist for only one of two reasons:

Necessity or Arbitrariness.

Either the Agent exists out of necessity (as in it cannot not exist)
Or it exists randomly (Arbitrariness)





Assuming Atheism is the case, where would the universe come from?


The universe can then logically exist for only one of two reasons:

Necessity or Arbitrariness.

Either the universe exists out of necessity (as in it cannot not exist)
Or it exists randomly (Arbitrariness)




As you can see, both positions are again very similar. As you can also see, I added "Arbitrariness" but if you insist, you can remove it as an option. However, if you do that, you must remove it as an option on both sides: Theism AND Atheism. Thereby, the only way for the Agent to exist is out of Necessity.

If, however, you change your mind and keep Arbitrariness as an option, then it must be an option in both Theism AND Atheism. In this case, the total options would be:

Agency+Arbitrariness

Agency+Necessity

Arbitrariness only

Necessity only


In this case, Theism would have 2/4 and Atheism would also have 2/4

50/50

[EduChris]

...Your argument (and correct me if I'm wrong) is...Atheism makes the assumption that the universe is necessary...

You are wrong. I do not argue that non-theism makes the assumption that the universe is necessary. In fact, non-theists often begin with the (quite reasonable) assumption that the universe is contingent.

Non-theism however, contends that agency is no more justified than non-agency. Thus, they contend that the universe could have come about through non-agental causation--i.e., either chance or necessity.

But "chance" is a lack of explanation, rather than an explanation. "Chance" is the position that fundamentally there exists no reason why the universe came to be. But since rational agents have an obligation to adopt rational explanations wherever such can be found, the "chance" option can only be adopted if no rational explanation can be found. So standard epistemic principles argue against the hasty adoption of "chance."

This leaves the non-theists with the causal factor of "necessity." However, if this is the explanation for the universe, then it turns out that not only is our universe logically necessary (it cannot not be) but also an infinitude of unobservable universes is also logically necessary. But standard epistemic principles note that logical necessity assumes more than contingency. Moreover, not only has non-theism rendered our universe logically necessary, but also it has rendered an infinity of other unobservable universes logically necessary. You can't find a more profligate assumption set than this. So again, standard epistemic principles argue against the adoption of "necessity."

Which means that the non-theist has run out of options. Theism starts with no more assumption than non-theism, and only theism results in a conclusion that does not violate standard epistemic principles. Therefore, theism is more justified than non-theism.

[EduChris]

...Assuming Theism is the case, where would the Agent come from?...

Theism does not need to explain the "agent," since all theism does is allow agency as a possible causal factor operating within the logically necessary source of all possibility. The causal factors operative within the source of all possibility are there because they cannot not be.

Theism and non-theism both start out with a logically necessary source of all possibility; this source of all possibility necessarily involves causation; this source of all possibility cannot be contingent, since it is impossible for it not to be, given that something (i.e., our universe and our selves) does exist. And since the source of all possibility is logically necessary, it neither requires nor permits further explanation.

Theism and non-theism also start out with a contingent universe, which is a lesser assumption than logical necessity. However, by their arbitrary rejection of agency, non-theists end up with a logically necessary universe and a logically necessary infinitude of unobservable universes.

At the end of the day, theism begins with a logically necessary source of all possibility, and ends with a rational explanation for a contingent universe in accordance with standard epistemic principles.

Non-theism also begins with a logically necessary source of all possibility, but then (because it arbitrarily dismisses agency) it ends up with either:

1) no explanation at all (contra standard epistemic principles)
2) a logically necessary universe and a logically necessary unobservable multi-verse (profligate per standard epistemic principles)

Therefore, theism and non-theism both start out with the same assumptions. Non-theism then tacks on the assumption that agency is not needed as a causal factor, with the end result that their conclusion violates standard epistemic principles.

So theism starts out with no more assumptions than non-theism. Theism tacks on no additional assumptions. And theism ends up with a better justified conclusion than non-theism.