Are there any non-fallacious arguments for non-theism?

[EduChris]

Let's assume for sake of argument that if non-theism were the objective reality, we would be able to offer some positive and non-fallacious argument to support the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism.

In this discussion, we will use the following definitions:

Theism: the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.

Non-theism: the philosophical viewpoint that theism need not be the case.

God: the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility.

Our universe and our selves constitute the evidence, and we must provide arguments as to why, given this evidence, we should adopt the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism. In this thread we are not allowed to rely on some supposed "default position of non-theism"; rather, we must provide an actual, non-fallacious argument for non-theism.

After all, if non-theism can be asserted (or adopted, or held) without evidence, then non-theism can be dismissed without evidence.

[EduChris]

...let's use an analogy of a gameshow...Say there was a gameshow where there are two doors (door number 1 and door number 2). One of these doors contains a million dollars...

We would need to add the following in order to make the analogy work.

We peek behind both doors; we can't see which door gives us the million dollars, but we can see that behind door #1 there is an IRS agent, and behind door #2 there is a contract stipulating that if you win the prize, you will be subject to fines and penalties far exceeding the prize amount.

Non-theists don't like the IRS, and so they pick door #2. Theists, on the other hand, don't assume the IRS agent will force them to pay more taxes than they actually owe. And so theists pick door #1.

We don't know who gets the prize, but the theist makes the more justified choice.

[Ooberman]

When in reality, we peek behind the door and there is nothing there and the theist yells, "see! I told you it was God!"

[Ionian_Tradition]

...you're arguing that context precedes the very subjects from which it is derived. Such is the equivalent of arguing that it is reasonable to presume that marriage may very well precede bachelorhood...

If there is a mind which conceived of marriage before any humans existed, then marriage (as a concept) obviously does precede the bachelorhood of any particular human individual.

You seem to be missing the point. We were speaking of ontological priorities were we not? My point was to show by analogy that just as bachelorhood necessarily precedes marriage, so too does context necessarily precede concept.

With that said, Marriage (as concept) could in no way precede the bachelorhood of any particular individual. This is because the concept of marriage requires the existence of subjects in order to be made intelligible. In the absence of human beings possessing the capacity to engage in marital union, the concept of marriage is made meaningless. What is marriage in the absence of people after all?

...My argument...pointing out the logical necessity for experiential context to precede conceptual thought...

You have no argument; your conclusion is exactly the same as your initial assumptions. My response is simply this: if one shares your initial assumptions, then one will necessarily arrive, without any argument at all, at your conclusion.

But the problem is, there is no valid reason for anyone to share your initial assumptions. As James Jeans said, "I incline to the idealistic theory that consciousness is fundamental, and that the material universe is derivative from consciousness, not consciousness from the material universe... In general the universe seems to me to be nearer to a great thought than to a great machine."

Sir James is certainly entitled to his opinions, but merely asserting that "consciousness precedes the universe" is hardly compelling evidence that such is indeed the case. My argument is built upon one foundational axiom (fundamental to all logic) which I have used to test the consistency of Theism as you have defined it. The conclusions drawn from this assessment have, I believe, adequately shown your brand Theism to be, at the very least, without logical merit. You may deny this if you wish, such is your right of course, however I believe our readers have seen your argument for what it is, and have thus found it to be lacking in cogency.

[Ionian_Tradition]

You have asserted that there are necessary limits to that process, but that's all you've got to offer. I say that concepts of magnitude or space - concepts of non-temporal relationships between things - could proceed plausibly, or even necessarily, from concepts of quantity or numbers. You say that they could not. So I guess that's where the discussion must end.

I've asked you to demonstrate how this might plausibly be the case. You've yet to do so.

A concept of quantity or numbers by definition is a concept of non-temporal relationship between things (post 288). You say that this cannot be considered equivalent to what we experience as 'space' and magnitude, and could not produce such concepts in the mind itself. I can respect your incredulity, but your assertions certainly haven't proven your point.

I believe appealing the fundamental dichotomy which exists, by definition, between quantitative value and spacial location is hardly assertion born from incredulity. Nor do I believe my contention that "thought, of any kind, cannot be experienced prior to thought's existence" is tantamount to hand waving assertion. I regret that you see it as such. I do, however, respect your opinion.

Beyond this, you've also yet to show how experiential knowledge of quantity can be acquired without the aid of particular thoughts (which themselves require some form of experiential context in order to manifest).

Whatever else might be said of whatever originated our reality - whether we hypothesize a mind or something else - it cannot be homogenous, else reality would be homogenous. That diversity within this hypothetical mind's nature would constitute experience of differences, of 'this' aspect of being and 'that' aspect of being, which is the same basis (albeit simpler) by which to conceive quantity and numbers as we have. I have said this in every post, right back to the earlier thread in which we discussed it.

Yes but you've yet to demonstrate that such a mind can even differentiate between aspects of it own being without the use of thought. Nor have you shown by what apparatus this mind might be capable of experiencing aspects of being external to its thoughts...Or what these aspects of being might be. This depiction of Idealism seems more a product of wild speculation than a cogent and robust worldview.

In addition you've yet to adequately address the problem of infinite thought regression (which renders the entire notion of an infinite mind conjuring up the concept which produced our universe a logical impossibility). Your only response has been to name it a necessary absurdity...but this is hardly compelling evidence of Idealism's veracity, let alone its plausibility. Perhaps this discussion is an end, but I do not believe it has met its end with a robust defense of Idealism.

Again in post 288 I very clearly stated that there are three possible types of 'absurdity' of which any speculation about an ultimate origin of reality must necessarily consist, and I said that an infinite regress seemed least plausible to me also. One of the alternatives explicitly includes the logical possibility that a mind and its experience/thoughts of itself come into being simultaneously, without precedent (or, of course, that matter and its characteristics/behaviour come into being simultaneously.. or whatever else floats your boat).

Why then prefer a randomly emerging mind over a randomly emerging universe? If you say that both are logically possible, which I'm not sure you've demonstrated in the slightest, why should idealism be preferable to all similar alternatives?

You continue to appeal to your supposedly impossible infinite regress and "the existence of meaning prior to the very subjects to which it refers" not because they answer or refute what I've proposed, but because you have evidently chosen not to read my responses.

Neverthless I appreciate the opportunity to explore these notions and further refine my thoughts

Perhaps I had missed your appeal to spontaneous emergence in response to the problem of infinite regress, if so I apologize. I cannot claim I find it remotely persuasive but if this is indeed your response, then I accept fault for overlooking it. With that said, I too appreciate the opportunity to explore this topic with you and look forward to any future discourse I may be so fortunate to share with you. Be well Mithrae.

[Ionian_Tradition]

...Your position assumes that meaning can exist in the absence of subjects, and flagrantly asserts this blatant contradiction...

You have gotten it entirely backward: I assume that subjectivity is found only in subjects, as opposed to arising from objects-only, as you seem to suppose.

"Meaning" is present in thoughts. Where do you find "meaning" which is divorced from thought? It seems to me that anyone who points to this or that, as an ostensible example of "meaning without thought," has necessarily thought about that example--which entails that no such example can be produced apart from thought.

Are we not presuming, for the sake of argument, that your hypothetical mind exists in order to test the logical consistency of your claims? The question is, and has always been, how can such a mind logically ascribe coherent meaning to objects, or subjects, prior to the existence of anything to which such meaning might refer? You are without answer.

[EduChris]

...My argument is built upon one foundational axiom...The conclusions drawn from this...

Again, your conclusion is the same as your "foundational axiom." There is no difference between the two; they are one and the same, without remainder.

Axioms cannot be argued, since if they could be argued they wouldn't be axioms. Axioms are either accepted or not. Therefore, to be useful in any argument, axioms should be acceptable to most reasonable people. If you ignore this requirement, if your argument starts with a highly controversial axiom (which turns out to be the same as your conclusion) why should you be surprised when people disagree with you?

Question for you: Are there not numerous philosophers and scientists, far more studied than you, who reject your axiom-conclusion?

[Justin108]

You are wrong. I do not argue that non-theism makes the assumption that the universe is necessary. In fact, non-theists often begin with the (quite reasonable) assumption that the universe is contingent.

Non-theism however, contends that agency is no more justified than non-agency. Thus, they contend that the universe could have come about through non-agental causation--i.e., either chance or necessity.

But "chance" is a lack of explanation, rather than an explanation. "Chance" is the position that fundamentally there exists no reason why the universe came to be. But since rational agents have an obligation to adopt rational explanations wherever such can be found, the "chance" option can only be adopted if no rational explanation can be found. So standard epistemic principles argue against the hasty adoption of "chance."


.

Chance is an explanation. If I picked the winning lottery numbers, did I not do so by chance? Just because you dislike chance, does not unmake it an explanation. "Chance" is not hastily adopted. It is merely held as a possibility.

This leaves the non-theists with the causal factor of "necessity." However, if this is the explanation for the universe, then it turns out that not only is our universe logically necessary (it cannot not be) but also an infinitude of unobservable universes is also logically necessary.

Wrong. Assuming the universe is necessary, it does not follow that therefore, an unlimited amount of universes exist. Who's to say our universe isn't the only logically necessary universe? Determinism (which you have not successfully argued against) would support a single necessary universe.

But standard epistemic principles note that logical necessity assumes more than contingency.

I have never heard of any such epistemic principle.

And you contradict yourself. You rejected "chance" as a possible origin yet "chance" falls under contingency. So either chance is a very plausible explanation (which assumes contingency), or there is no reason to assume contingency above necessity.

Moreover, not only has non-theism rendered our universe logically necessary, but also it has rendered an infinity of other unobservable universes logically necessary. You can't find a more profligate assumption set than this. So again, standard epistemic principles argue against the adoption of "necessity."

Which means that the non-theist has run out of options. Theism starts with no more assumption than non-theism, and only theism results in a conclusion that does not violate standard epistemic principles. Therefore, theism is more justified than non-theism.

Assuming chance is not an option (which I disagree with), wouldn't that make "necessity" a conclusion instead of an assumption?

You complained when I called agency an assumption because you supposedly "concluded" agency instead of "assuming" agency. Well if your process of elimination is sound and you logically eliminate chance as an option, then necessity would no longer be an assumption; instead it would be a conclusion.

[Justin108]

Justin108 wrote:
...Assuming Theism is the case, where would the Agent come from?...



Theism does not need to explain the "agent," since all theism does is allow agency as a possible causal factor operating within the logically necessary source of all possibility.
.

Then why does Atheism need to explain non-agency?

Don't dodge the question. Just as you have "eliminated" various possibilities within non-agency, why can I not eliminate various possibilities within agency?

The causal factors operative within the source of all possibility are there because they cannot not be.

Ergo, if an Agent exists, it exists out of Necessity. Eliminating "Agency only". The options are then Agency+Necessity vs. Necessity only.

[Justin108]

We would need to add the following in order to make the analogy work.

We peek behind both doors
.

Wrong. Can we peek at the origin of the universe?

we can't see which door gives us the million dollars, but we can see that behind door #1 there is an IRS agent, and behind door #2 there is a contract stipulating that if you win the prize, you will be subject to fines and penalties far exceeding the prize amount.

You definitely need to justify why you'd make these specific adjustments.

Non-theists don't like the IRS, and so they pick door #2.

Are you assuming Atheists merely dislike God so they choose to not believe in him?

[JoeyKnothead]

From the OP:

Are there any non-fallacious arguments for non-theism?

Can you show your god's 'there'?

I propose such is a non-fallacious argument, at least until the theist is shown to be capable of showing his own argument is the non-fallacious'n.

Alas, we get all manner of how you ain't thinking right just 'cause you don't accept some goofy tale about some goofy individual the theist can only point up to the sky and say such as, "There he sits!"

And then you ask, "Where?"

And the theist gets all incredulous, 'cause there he sits, he done spent all that money going to some fancy god school, and his finger don't even work!

"Fallacious argument?"

Why heck yeah! I propose it's fallacious'ner'n all get out to declare there's a god 'up there', but dangitall, ya just can't show ya speak truth when ya declare it.