Evidence for God's Existence

[WinePusher]

When I first joined this forum I remember McCulloch was creating a series of topics devoted to the various arguments for God's existence. I'd like to explore those issues in this thread and for the purpose of this thread God will be defined as a deistic, supernatural intelligent designer. We will not be using any theistic definition of God.

Teleological arguments prove God's existence based on the design and precise structure of the universe. The universe is structured in an improbable and an unlikely way. The physical laws that govern the universe are fine tuned to an extremely unlikely numerical value, and had these laws been set at any other parameter life could not exist. Statistically speaking, chance/coincidence is not an appropriate explanation, therefore a fine tuner/intelligent designer designed the universe.

Ontological arguments prove God's existence based on the definition of God. God is defined as a maximally great being, meaning that God can have no defects. Nonexistence is a defect, therefore God must exist. First of all, this argument pretty much destroys the ignostic position. Yes, I realize ignostics are willingly ignorant of all the philosophical scholarship surrounding God, but the fact is that the concept of God is pretty well defined. Therefore, the ignostics usergroup should be abolished.

Cosmological arguments prove God's existence based on the fact that the universe began to exist. Meaning, at one point in the distant past, the universe did not exist at all. The universe is itself contingent. Mathematically speaking, it is impossible for the chain of causes to regress backwards infinitely. Therefore, a non contingent first cause must exist. This cause supernatural, in the sense that it must be spaceless and timeless since space and time are bound by the universe.

Moral arguments prove God's existence based on the existence of objective morality. By objective morality I mean a moral statement or declaration. Something like 'killing is an innocent person for fun is wrong.' This is a moral declaration that is objectively true, regardless of any individuals personal opinion. Since an objective moral law exists, there must be a moral law giver. Another version of the moral argument would be the fact that the world would be morally absurd and irrational absent a moral law giver.


Questions:
1) Are these arguments logically valid and sound?

2) In light of these four philosophical arguments, will atheists please stop making the false, disingenuous claim that there is no evidence for God?

3) Are there any arguments against the existence of God?

[WinePusher]

Im going to have to edit through some of your post. I read all of it and it was very well written and captivating, but due to constraints on my time I cant respond to all of it.

If the natural constraints which appear to limit the number of possible universes in which life can evolve and persist are truly the product of God's will, then these constraints cannot have constrained God prior to their creation. How then can it be said that God was ever truly constrained in the number of possible life permitting universes he/she/it could have created prior to the implementation of the constraints which make fine tuning possible in the first place? Moreover, if God is the author of these constraints, then God is certainly sovereign over them. How then, can these contingent constraints prove binding to their omnipotent author in any meaningful fashion? If no a priori (non-logical) constraint restricted the number of possible (life permitting) universes God could have created prior to the creation of natural law, then it seems quite apparent that God was never truly constrained in the number of possible (life permitting) universes he/she/it could have created. Thus God never truly "fine tuned" the universe according to constraints that were, for him/her/it, never truly constraining.

I hate to dismiss what youre arguing since you clearly know a lot about this matter. However, your use of the term constraint is totally incorrect. God would by no means be constrained or bound by the way the universe is ordered. Yes, the natural constraints on life are contingent upon God. If God is indeed the fine tuner, he chose to design the universe in a way where the existence of life would be constrained by an improbable and precise combination of natural laws. But, at the same time God could have easily created a universe where life was not constrained by improbable physical laws. He could have taken more liberty with his creation and allowed life to develop freely, without any constraints whatsoever.

I dont want to gloss over your argument so let me restate it and you tell me if I understand it correctly. To use your safe analogy, you suggested that one individual opens the safe by entering the correct combination. Also, another individual places a restriction on the safe so that only one precise combination can open it. Are you saying that it is impossible for God to manufacture the safe and, at the same time, set a restriction upon opening it by designing it to where only one code is correct? I would say that God created the universe, set forth the precise restrictions on life, and chose to abide by these restrictions. God is not bound to abide by his own restrictions, he voluntarily chooses to abide by them. Like I said he could have easily created another universe where life is completely unrestricted.

This of course leaves open the question concerning why the universal constants hold the values they do. Cosmologists are working to find an answer to this deeply profound question. At present, the most prevalent hypothesis seems to be that of the "multi-verse" (a consequence of both inflationary theory and certain models derived from string theory). Regardless of whether or not this theory proves valid, it appears, none the less, that only from a naturalistic perspective can the notion of (apparent) "fine tuning" be meaningfully applied and understood. For this reason the argument from "fine tuning" remains ill-equipped to demonstrate the existence of a God. If an omnipotent God did exist, "fine tuning" would not.

This is the heart of the issue in my opinion, and I would say that physicists are ill equipped to explain this anomaly. First of all, would you agree that it is an anomaly as to why the universal constants are structured the way they are? Second of all, I think that it is important to note that improbable, unlikely and out of place events do not occur spontaneously by chance. I realize that the watchmaker analogy has been presented ad nauseum, but I still find it to be convincing. I think that it is intellectually dishonest to suggest that an infinite number of beaches exists, and a watch happened to spontaneously generate on one of these beaches. Yet, that is precisely what the multiverse theory states. An infinite number of universes exists, and life happened to come about in one of these universes. Excluding your other objections to fine tuning (which Ive tried to address to the best of my ability) it seems to be entirely appropriate to posit a fine tuner/intelligent designer for an improbable, unlikely and out of place universe just as it is to posit a designer for an improbable, unlikely out of place watch.

This argument is a non sequitor. The fact is that humans are able to make value judgments regarding various degrees of greatness and perfection. In order for us to make any judgments there must exist a perfect, maximally great standard by which everything else is compared too and the theist will claim that this maximally great standard is God. In other words, it is impossible to see a line as crooked unless there is a perfectly straight line to compare it to. The fact that we are able to judge things in this world as being 'less great' or 'more great' requires an objectively great standard to exist, otherwise we have be completely oblivious.

If you assume that this standard is God, then you've presupposed the existence of God in order to argue that a "maximally great being" (God) possibly exists, and therefore necessarily exists in all possible worlds. In other words, you committed the fallacy of begging the question by assuming the conclusion of the ontological argument and positing it as one of the argument's key premises. Thus by positing God as the standard of objective greatness (a postulate you've in no way defended), you've rendered the Ontological argument logically invalid.

Your first objection to this argument dealt with the greatness of God, did it not? You seemed to be asking how God can be defined as maximally great. Well, my point was that God is considered to be the maximal standard. This is the definition of God (according to Philosophers) and I also explained further how we can know that God is maximally great and perfect by showing that various degrees of greatness and perfection exist. Since various degrees of greatness and perfection exist there must be a maximally great and perfect standard, is this something you agree with? In other words, if God is not defined as maximally great in your opinion then what is God exactly? But, if God is maximally great then the premises and the conclusion of the ontological argument are true. Unless you do not consider existence to be one of the properties of maximal greatness.

Subjective consensus does not an objective truth make. At best you've shown that there are certain moral maxims which most (certainly not all) human beings possess a subjective affinity toward (perhaps due to certain biological or pragmatic factors). In order to demonstrate that objective moral values exist, you must demonstrate that such values transcend all subjective opinion, preference, or disposition. Citing subjective consensus as a means of demonstrating this seems to me a rather counter productive method of doing so.

The moral compass of the world seems to perfectly coincide with Christian doctrine, and the moral argument. The claim made by Christians is that humans have within them a shared conscience, and this conscience expresses sentiments that are essentially uniform across the world. This is a view that is shared by thinkers across disciplines, most notably Adam Smith who referred to this conscience as an impartial spectator. What this shows is that there is a universal moral law which would therefore require a universal moral law giver. Also, it seems to be verifiably impossible to prove the existence of objective moral values beyond any reasonable doubt. I am only offering reasons as to why objective moral values are likely to exist. Subjective moral consensus is one good reason in my opinion.
You claim that these values must transcend all subjective opinion, preference and disposition. Well, if you present a human with a certain moral situation they will react a certain way, regardless of their subjective preferences and opinion and dispositions. If you have an adult and a baby in a room and you give the adult a knife, how likely is it that the adult will run over and begin stabbing the baby to death for no reason? This shows that an objective moral truth (do not kill innocent babies for fun) does exist.

Second, actions are judged by their intentions and consequences. Any action that has a good intention behind it and a good consequence can be considered 'objectively good.' Killing an innocent baby for fun can be considered objectively 'bad' because the intention and consequence of the action produces no positive outcome. However, killing a mass killer can be seen as 'objectively good' because the intention is to save innocent lives (which means the outcome from the action is positive.

Positive for who exactly? No doubt the killer would not deem his own demise a "positive" outcome. You seem to be positing a Utilitarian view of morality which is anything but objective. Yes, certain actions may objectively produce certain outcomes, but concepts such as "positive" or "negative", which we assign to these outcomes (which also instruct Utilitarianism), are, at their core, subjective judgements informed by our own subjective values. In the absence of subjective valuers, subjective value judgements such as "good", "bad", "positive" and "negative" cannot logically exist. If such values cannot exist in the absence of a subjective mind, they cannot transcend all subjective opinion, preference or disposition. How then can they be thought of as "objective" in any literal sense of the term?

Positive for the greatest number of people. And yes, you are quite correct to assume that I am applying utilitarianist principles here. I think your point about subjective valuers and subjective judgements is very compelling and it is making me rethink my argument here, but I am hesitant to completely give into what youre saying. To use William Lane Craigs example, if the nazis had taken over the world and brainwashed everybody, including future generations, into believing and supporting things like mass extermination and genocide, would that make it a right action? I would say no, because even though the subjective consensus is that it was right, the objective outcome of the nazis actions is wrong. Would you instead say that it is impossible to make objective judgements concerning morality and that all morality is essentially relative?

Anyways, thank you for the post. You're definitely the best debater on here in my opinion. I wish more people would follow your lead.

[10CC]

[Replying to post 131 by WinePusher]

This looks like the kid in the playground where the kid is WP's god.

Yeah 'course I could beat him at basketball I just don't wanna.

[instantc]

... only from a naturalistic perspective can the notion of (apparent) "fine tuning" be meaningfully applied and understood. For this reason the argument from "fine tuning" remains ill-equipped to demonstrate the existence of a God. If an omnipotent God did exist, "fine tuning" would not.

I don't think this is a valid objection to the fine-tuning argument. The argument states that fine-tuning cannot be explained without positing a conscious designer. Whether or not God and fine-tuning can coherently exist is irrelevant to the argument. The main point is that allegedly naturalism cannot explain the life enabling values of the universal constants while theism can. To suggest that in theism there's no fine-tuning to explain doesn't counter the argument.

The problem of evil can also only be understood from theistic perspective, but that doesn't mean a naturalist couldn't use it to disprove God by pointing out that there is a problem of evil in Christianity. Correspondingly, theists may assert that there is a 'problem of fine-tuning' in naturalism.

[10CC]

To use William Lane Craigs example, if the nazis had taken over the world and brainwashed everybody, including future generations, into believing and supporting things like mass extermination and genocide, would that make it a right action? I would say no, because even though the subjective consensus is that it was right, the objective outcome of the nazis actions is wrong. Would you instead say that it is impossible to make objective judgements concerning morality and that all morality is essentially relative?

Isn't this scenario exactly what the christians have used for their god?

Mass extermination and genocide is the right action according to christians.

Not a very good argument is it?

[FarWanderer]

You're missing the counter-question that neutralizes it:

In the first place, why does life itself require such precise conditions in order to exist?

Theists have no answer besides "God just made us that way". On the other hand, the answer is completely obvious from the perspective of Darwinian thinking.

I've already said this question is wholly irrelevant to the issue. The issue is why are all these constants and conditions set to the precise value that permits life to exist. What explanation have nonbelievers offered for this? You asking a question that is not answerable using our current repository of knowledge. We can say for certain that life requires precise external conditions in order to exist, but we do not know why this is. That is a separate issue that requires further inquiry, but it neither proves or disproves the fine tuning argument.

(responding specifically to the part I bolded)

No, you're pivoting from the assumption that life's requirements are necessarily what they are, while on the other hand you're assuming that the universe's constants could have been different. There's absolutely no logical grounds for this.

The real "issue" is why life's needs and the universe's constants are so well aligned with one another.

We have observed the natural world and the laws that govern it and we have concluded (through scientific observations) that biological life requires precise and exact conditions in order to exist. The question at the heart of this issue is not why does life require these precise and exact conditions to exist, but rather why is the universe structured in such a way that permits biological life to exist. Why do we have the most improbable configuration of the universe (that happens to permit life), as opposed to a more probable configuration (that would not support life).

I'm going to mirror your argument. I don't mean to mock you or anything, but rather just to give you a taste of how your argument looks to me.

We have observed the natural world and the laws that govern it and we have concluded (through scientific observations) that the universe has a specific set of constants. The question at the heart of this issue is not why is the universe structured in such a way that permits biological life to exist, but rather why does life require these precise and exact conditions to exist. Why do we have the most improbable requirements for life to exist (that happen to fit into the universe's constants), as opposed to a more probable set of requirements (that would fit into a wider range of constants).

I hope maybe you see how just asserting that "No, the argument is framed this way!" is completely meaningless to me. And notice how I just throw out that life's requirements are "improbable"- yeah based on what, right?

Like I said last post, you're just dismissing life's needs as non-contingent while asserting the universe's constants as contingent. It's a total double standard.

I thought very hard about it when I wrote that the real "issue" is why life's needs and the universe's constants are so well aligned with one another.

And I am by no means saying that your question has no merit. It does, but it does not refute my argument in anyway whatsoever. Besides, you said that using Darwinian thought (whatever that is) you have come up with an answer that explains why life requires precise and exact conditions to exist. Want to share it with the forum?

It doesn't refute your argument in the sense that it shows a fallacy or anything like that. It merely balances it out: Are the universe's characteristics because of life's characteristics, or are life's characteristics because of the universe's characteristics?

Theistic thought would say the former, and Darwinian thought would say the latter. And I haven't any idea how we could gather evidence for either side, being as we only have 1 universe to study.

If modern physics tells us that the universe didn't come from anything, then it tells us that it didn't come from God.

Modern physics tells us that the universe did not come from any material or natural substance. Again, this is basic physics. The universe had a beginning and prior to the beginning of the universe there was nothing (in the sense that there was no material and natural world).

Modern physics tells us that the universe did not come from anything at all. Again, this is basic physics. The universe has a beginning and prior to the beginning of the universe there wasn't anything (PERIOD).

At most, all science says is that the universe's existence cannot be scientifically explained. It doesn't go out of its way to leave a special place for God to exist; it doesn't make God into an explanation.

No one has ever claimed that God was confined to the material realm and is bound by the laws of nature.

That's right. Which is why science can never provide evidence for God's existence. But yeah, if God were falsifiable, I think he'd be in even more trouble.

The fact that the universe had an external cause means that this cause is supernatural (outside and external to the universe) and supersedes properties such as time and space.

Wait, what? A fact? That's no "fact" in my book, thank you. Maybe the universe had a cause, maybe it didn't. And if it did have a cause, we have no idea what that cause would be like.

The 'initial conditions' are whatever they need to be to mechanistically lead to the current state of existence.

Like what? Matter exists only within the confines of this universe.

How do you know? Multiverse theory is a serious theory you know.

Since all matter, including subatomic matter, exists only within this universe that would mean that prior to the big bang (the beginning of the universe) there was no matter at all. And the question remains, how do you possibly get something from nothing?

You don't. From nothing, nothing comes. Rather, not from anything, something is.

Any materialistic or naturalistic attempt to answer this is futile, so positing a supernatural explanation (God) seems entirely appropriate.

That's all God is good for, "explaining" what is otherwise unexplainable.

[JohnA]

... only from a naturalistic perspective can the notion of (apparent) "fine tuning" be meaningfully applied and understood. For this reason the argument from "fine tuning" remains ill-equipped to demonstrate the existence of a God. If an omnipotent God did exist, "fine tuning" would not.

I don't think this is a valid objection to the fine-tuning argument. The argument states that fine-tuning cannot be explained without positing a conscious designer. Whether or not God and fine-tuning can coherently exist is irrelevant to the argument. The main point is that allegedly naturalism cannot explain the life enabling values of the universal constants while theism can. To suggest that in theism there's no fine-tuning to explain doesn't counter the argument.

The problem of evil can also only be understood from theistic perspective, but that doesn't mean a naturalist couldn't use it to disprove God by pointing out that there is a problem of evil in Christianity. Correspondingly, theists may assert that there is a 'problem of fine-tuning' in naturalism.

I have to disagree here.

The argument states that fine-tuning cannot be explained without positing a conscious designer.

That is not correct. Where does it state that?
In fact, it makes not reference to "if life was an accident, then ....". Therefore it assumes a god, it does not conclude a god.

The main point is that allegedly naturalism cannot explain the life enabling values of the universal constants while theism can.

That is just nonsense.

It is philosophy that imposes their assumptions of methodological naturalism on science. These philosophical assumption can not be proven or dis-proven (shown false or not false), therefore science and the sceintific method pays NO attention to it, it have zero bearing on it, NONE. Science does not operate on assumptions. It tests assumptions to destruction.

Furthermore,

There are many hypotheses that suggest a multi-verse which explains why we observe the laws of nature.
Also, it makes this whole claim of "fine-tuning" redundant. And yes, this "fine-tuning" is a claim it's not a fact - even when or if there are no other "universes".
Theism does not explain it at all. There is no explanation for their god, where he came from, why he is uncreated, why does he exist, why create anything, what is he made of, how can he live inside/outside nothing before he created everything, how can a being not be a being, etc.

The problem of evil can also only be understood from theistic perspective, but that doesn't mean a naturalist couldn't use it to disprove God by pointing out that there is a problem of evil in Christianity. Correspondingly, theists may assert that there is a 'problem of fine-tuning' in naturalism.

Again, that is false.

If there were only good (or only evil) in the universe then the atheist will have a problem to explain this.
But to have good and evil, is easily explained. It is random chance. You do not need something additional to explain something if all the previous explanations consisted of natural laws and chance. Somewhere between 33% and 50% of all scientific discoveries are estimated to have been stumbled upon, rather than sought out. This may explain why scientists so often express that they were lucky *. The simple known is a much better explanation that the complex unknown.
If, for example, there were only "good" then it would tie in with a their claim of a "omnibenevolent god", but it would still not answer the open question on the aseity of god (why did he create everything when he does not need it), and many others (mentioned above).
Imagine, for a few minutes, there is really no god. Why do you think this alleged "fine-tuning" can not be explained by sceintific explanations?


* Source:
Dunbar, K., & Fugelsang, J. (2005). Causal thinking in science: How scientists and students interpret the unexpected. In M. E. Gorman, R. D. Tweney, D. Gooding & A. Kincannon (Eds.), Scientific and Technical Thinking (pp. 57"79). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

[Aetixintro]

By FarWanderer,

At most, all science says is that the universe's existence cannot be scientifically explained. It doesn't go out of it's way to leave room for God; it doesn't make God a better explanation.

To "confirm" the existence of the Universe is as easy as it is to confirm the existence of the Earth as these go together, in Earth, Solar System, (The Milky Way) Galaxy, Galaxy Cluster and all the way to the biggest, the Universe. There's great confidence, plausibility to believe this too, yes, the greatest, scientifically. There is no use in trying, even, to appeal to a kind of Zeno's Paradoxes where one claims that "from inside a larger set you can't prove the larger set that you're inside".

So this has to go down. I merely inform you here. "Please, don't go there!"

[Ionian_Tradition]

... only from a naturalistic perspective can the notion of (apparent) "fine tuning" be meaningfully applied and understood. For this reason the argument from "fine tuning" remains ill-equipped to demonstrate the existence of a God. If an omnipotent God did exist, "fine tuning" would not.

I don't think this is a valid objection to the fine-tuning argument. The argument states that fine-tuning cannot be explained without positing a conscious designer. Whether or not God and fine-tuning can coherently exist is irrelevant to the argument. The main point is that allegedly naturalism cannot explain the life enabling values of the universal constants while theism can. To suggest that in theism there's no fine-tuning to explain doesn't counter the argument.

As we've agreed, the fact that the constants should hold the values they do by chance is exceedingly improbable (provided we do not posit a multiverse). None the less, if the number of values an omnipotent God could assign to a possible life permitting universe are truly infinite (as I've argued), the probability that God should choose any particular set of values out of the infinite number available is 1 in infinity. As such, it is infinitely more improbable that God should arbitrarily choose any particular set of values among this infinite multitude of possible values than the constants should hold the values they do by chance alone.

In other words, if fine tuning cannot exist per theism, then the probability that the constants should hold the values they do by divine fiat is infinitely less than the probability which follows from a naturalistic explanation of these values.

[JohnA]

... only from a naturalistic perspective can the notion of (apparent) "fine tuning" be meaningfully applied and understood. For this reason the argument from "fine tuning" remains ill-equipped to demonstrate the existence of a God. If an omnipotent God did exist, "fine tuning" would not.

I don't think this is a valid objection to the fine-tuning argument. The argument states that fine-tuning cannot be explained without positing a conscious designer. Whether or not God and fine-tuning can coherently exist is irrelevant to the argument. The main point is that allegedly naturalism cannot explain the life enabling values of the universal constants while theism can. To suggest that in theism there's no fine-tuning to explain doesn't counter the argument.

As we've agreed, the fact that the constants should hold the values they do by chance is exceedingly improbable (provided we do not posit a multiverse). None the less, if the number of values an omnipotent God could assign to a possible life permitting universe are truly infinite (as I've argued), the probability that God should choose any particular set of values out of the infinite number available is 1 in infinity. As such, it is infinitely more improbable that God should arbitrarily choose any particular set of values among this infinite multitude of possible values than the constants should hold the values they do by chance alone.

In other words, if fine tuning cannot exist per theism, then the probability that the constants should hold the values they do by divine fiat is infinitely less than the probability which follows from a naturalistic explanation of these values.

I am not sure how anyone can postulate probabilities for having different constants at all.
We have no examples of other universes (yet), so how was these probabilities calculated for our universe?
That, to me, is similar to arguing:
If the number 7 was really 8, or some other number (pic any real number), then.....

The hypothesis in the above conditional statement clearly fails.

The constants are what they are. It can not be any other way for our universe.
It COULD be different for other universes, but that would still only say that the probability that the constants for our universe can have different values or value is exactly 1.

This comes back to the old question:
Did god have a choice in making the universe, our universe?
I am not aware of any answer to it, or if it even makes sense to ask such a question.

[JohnA]

By FarWanderer,

At most, all science says is that the universe's existence cannot be scientifically explained. It doesn't go out of it's way to leave room for God; it doesn't make God a better explanation.

To "confirm" the existence of the Universe is as easy as it is to confirm the existence of the Earth as these go together, in Earth, Solar System, (The Milky Way) Galaxy, Galaxy Cluster and all the way to the biggest, the Universe. There's great confidence, plausibility to believe this too, yes, the greatest, scientifically. There is no use in trying, even, to appeal to a kind of Zeno's Paradoxes where one claims that "from inside a larger set you can't prove the larger set that you're inside".

So this has to go down. I merely inform you here. "Please, don't go there!"

I don't think it read science can not confirm if the universe exists.
The way I read FarWandere's post was that it's saying that science can not explain why the universe exists.

All I can say is that it can not be any other way, if it was then we would not observe the universe at all - so it does not matter, the questions is redundant.

Postulating a god as the explanation why anything exists does not answer it either, because you have no choice to ask then why does the god exist. If you say it can not be any other way, then why propose a god then? Why not stop at the universe, at least we CAN and DO observe it.