The Modal Ontological Argument

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For_The_Kingdom
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The Modal Ontological Argument

Post #1

Post by For_The_Kingdom »

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.

That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.


Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?

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Re: The Modal Ontological Argument

Post #331

Post by For_The_Kingdom »

Blastcat wrote: [Replying to post 285 by For_The_Kingdom]

Hi, For_The_Kingdom

It must be true if it's true, but if it's not true then it must not be true

For_The_Kingdom wrote:A necessary truth would not be true if and only if it wasn't possible for it to be true...but the existence of a MGB IS possible...and all possible necessary truths must be true.
How do you know that a MGB is actually possible?... I don't.
What if it isn't possible, then what happens to your argument?

:)
I've addressed this already, countless times, cat. Of course, I will say this again; notice the shift? In the beginning of the thread, it was cool to grant P1...now 30+ pages into it, now it is time to deny P1.

This is an obvious adjustment to the argument. It is plain as day. SMH. If the argument was false, there wouldn't be ANY adjustments to be made, would there?

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Post #332

Post by Blastcat »

For_The_Kingdom wrote:
Artie wrote: Kingdom,

I can imagine a being. I can imagine that this being has all the properties you describe. Please use your own words explaining why this being would have to exist in the real world.
If P1 is true, then the implication of 2-6 is undeniable.

FTK.. he isn't asking IF P1 is true, he is asking WHY P1 is true.

:)
Polemics with a smile

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Re: The Modal Ontological Argument

Post #333

Post by Zzyzx »

.
For_The_Kingdom wrote: If it existed nowhere, it can't be an actual being, can it? Cmon now, people. You are doing too much, here. It was fun at first, but now it is beginning to be ridiculous.
Discussions of hypothetical supernatural entities often become ridiculous -- particularly when some claim knowledge of one or more of the thousands of proposed invisible, undetectable "gods".

Many purport to KNOW about a favorite "god" in some detail -- but cannot support their claims with anything more substantial than unverified ancient tales, testimonials, conjectures, opinions and emotional appeals.

Therefore, discussions are mere conjecture about hypothetical entities -- that often become more and more extreme.
.
Non-Theist

ANY of the thousands of "gods" proposed, imagined, worshiped, loved, feared, and/or fought over by humans MAY exist -- awaiting verifiable evidence

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Post #334

Post by Willum »

In addition to my "perfection" request, I'd like to know which MGB we are to believe in?
The first? Amon-Ra?
Zeus?
Serapis?
Krishna (the trinity).
God?

One conceived by a Vulcan, logically?

However, since it is conceivable for there to be only one APE, it must be every APE, I'm sure, after considering it, you'll agree. Have you ever considered, the beliefs of an APE? Are they Catholic or Buddhist?

Have you ever deconflicted what an APE would have to be? How would an APE b different it it were Ra, vice, Serapis, vice Zeus?

How could they be different? Is one theoretical APE different from another... ah so many paradoxes that, once investigated destroy the MOA as well.

But those don't count, right?

Ra! Ra!
Ie Zeus!
Blessed be the trinity of Krishna, Serapis, and the Holy Ghost...
and so on.

Blessed be...
I will never understand how someone who claims to know the ultimate truth, of God, believes they deserve respect, when they cannot distinguish it from a fairy-tale.

You know, science and logic are hard: Religion and fairy tales might be more your speed.

To continue to argue for the Hebrew invention of God is actually an insult to the very concept of a God. - Divine Insight

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Re: The Modal Ontological Argument

Post #335

Post by For_The_Kingdom »

Kenisaw wrote: Salient point, Artie. What people tend to either forget or not realize in the first place is that proving something true in a logical argument does not actually make it true in reality. You can get a true statement in logic/philosophy that is completely false in the real world. Even if the Modal argument was shown to be true, it still doesn't mean there actually is such a creature as an MGB...
Again, you are failing to distinguish the difference between necessary propositions and contingent propositions.

If you actually made the distinction, you wouldn't still be on here making statements like "you can get a true statement in philosophy that is completely false in the real world".

Now, that is an actual true statement, but it applies to CONTINGENT propositions..but it is a NECESSARY proposition that is in question, and with necessary propositions, it can't be true in philosophy and false in the real world...in the same sense that 2+2 isn't true in mathematics but false in actual reality (real life situations).

So your objection doesn't reflect the actual argument, and therefore it is a straw man.

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Post #336

Post by For_The_Kingdom »

Kenisaw wrote:
Says the guy who wouldn't address some of my points until I answered a question about atheists viewpoint on free will. Do as I say, not as I do, eh?
Say what?

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Re: The Modal Ontological Argument

Post #337

Post by Blastcat »

[Replying to post 327 by For_The_Kingdom]

Hello, For_The_Kingdom

I've changed my mind. Things like that happen in debates.

It's too bad, though, that you don't bother to answer my two rather direct questions. That doesn't help with your case at all. I hope that you reconsider answering them.

1. WHY should we agree with P1?
2. What happens to your argument if we don't?

For_The_Kingdom wrote:A necessary truth would not be true if and only if it wasn't possible for it to be true...but the existence of a MGB IS possible...and all possible necessary truths must be true.
How do you know that a MGB is actually possible?... I don't.
What if it isn't possible, then what happens to your argument?

:)
For_The_Kingdom wrote:I've addressed this already, countless times, cat. Of course, I will say this again; notice the shift? In the beginning of the thread, it was cool to grant P1...now 30+ pages into it, now it is time to deny P1.
Yeah, well, things change.

I am fully willing to grant P1 if you are just as willing to grant ~P1. But you don't seem to be able to do that.. so we question why we should grant P1 anymore. Sorry. Goose and gander kind of thing.

You don't grant US our premise, so we can't grant yours. Tit for tat.

And if you HAVE addressed the question before, it wasn't satisfactory, because we are STILL ASKING the very same question.

Why should we accept P1?
It only presents one of the possibilities about MGB.
For_The_Kingdom wrote:This is an obvious adjustment to the argument.
No, it's an obvious adjustment to our REACTION to your argument.
I was one of those atheists who were willing to grant P1 but then noticed that ~P1 can be just as true. You haven't explained why P1 is true but ~P1 isn't.

And you haven't told us why oh why A maximally great being HAS to be a necessary being. I don't think it's necessary at all. Can you explain that?

Why does MGB have to be a necessary being? ...

For_The_Kingdom wrote:It is plain as day. SMH. If the argument was false, there wouldn't be ANY adjustments to be made, would there?
Well, as weird as it may seem to you, I have changed my mind about the possibility of MGB.

I've adjusted my thinking by thinking about it more, and reading the posts. Imagine THAT! Some people get locked into a way of thinking and never WANT TO CHANGE. Too bad for them. You seem to be under the misapprehension that P1 has to be true. It's a conditional statement, it doesn't HAVE TO BE TRUE. It might be that there is NO maximally Great Being the way you seem to be able to imagine there MUST be.

MAYBE it's the case that:

1. There is a MGB.. This necessary being you can imagine.
2. There is a MGB, but it's only contingent.Who knows, right?
3. There is NO MGB ... just doesn't exist in ANY possible worlds.
4. And of course, it may be the case that there is no "Great Being" of any kind whatsoever, contingent OR necessary, maximal or less than maximal. I'd say that possible and also very likely.

There MIGHT BE an MGB and there MIGHT NOT BE an MGB. I sure haven't been given a reason to think that one might actually exist. THIS HERE ARGUMENT you are presenting is supposed to provide some. It's fails to do so.

It's just a tedious exercise in rhetoric and sophistry, as far as I can tell. You keep repeating the MGB has to be necessary.. and you haven't provided one bit of reason why. It all seems that you define it necessary .... so it must be. Well, that wont ever convince an outsider to your faith. I don't have to agree with your definition that the MGB ( which is just a hypothetical entity ) IS necessary.... It might be. It might NOT be. The MGB might NOT exist in any possible world.

You seem to only be able to think that there might BE one.. but not able to think that there MIGHT NOT be one. If that's the case, too bad for you, my imagination works better than yours does.

We are IMAGINING MGB here. We have to, because there is no empirical evidence for one. That's a point that's not in favor or there being one in a possible world. If there IS an MGB, we don't have any evidence for one HERE.. in this contingent world. And that is ALL the facts at our disposal. THE REST is mere hypothesis.

I can imagine that one exists, and I can also imagine that one DOESN'T exist. What is wrong with your imagination? Is it stuck on the "ON" position?

If so, that's not a working logic gate.

So, I will repeat the two questions that I would LOVE a direct answer to:

1. WHY should we agree with P1?
2. What happens to your argument if we don't?

:)

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Post #338

Post by For_The_Kingdom »

Furrowed Brow wrote: This is true in S5 and without checking every alternative it is very likely possibly necessarily true but actually false is not a theorem in any plausible modal logic.
Well, I'm sorry you feel that way. I issued a challenge; use whatever theorem, modal logic, or WHATEVER...use WHATEVER you want to explain to me how 2+2 is true our world, but not other possible worlds.

If you do that, I will grant your point.
Furrowed Brow wrote: However, for its denials to not be a general theorem there need only be one set of conditions on which possible necessarily true but actually false plausibly holds true. It does not matter how obscure, it only matters that there is some condition on which the proposition is a plausible interpretation.
Ok, so whatever point you are attempting to get across, it is regarding the fact that other forms of modal logic may not allow for 2+2=4.

Fine....please explain.
Furrowed Brow wrote: Here is a counter example: right this moment Fred's future is possibly necessary, but right this moment Fred future is not actually true.
Fred can die at any moment, can't he? Therefore, the premise that "Fred's future is possibly necessary" is not a necessary truth...it is contingent.

As I said before, any proposition will fall under the realm of necessity, or contingency. There is not middle ground here.
Furrowed Brow wrote: Another example: a cure for cancer on some random future date is possibly necessarily true, and a cure for cancer on some random future date is actually false.
*Sigh*...these are contingent truths, bruh. It is the same thing, post after post....smh.

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Post #339

Post by For_The_Kingdom »

Artie wrote: Kingdom:

I can imagine in my mind a MGB with all the properties you describe. I can also imagine in my mind an enormous fire-breathing dragon. Can't you just use your own words and explain why the MGB would have to exist in the real world but not the dragon...
If the fire-breathing dragon's existence is necessary, then this "dragon" that you are thinking of is actually God, manifested as a fire-breathing dragon, which is something an omnipotent being can do.

Still trying, eh, Artie?

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Re: The Modal Ontological Argument

Post #340

Post by For_The_Kingdom »

Artie wrote: OP can be reduced too:

1. "God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist)."

Note that Kingdom doesn't give any rational reason why such a being is necessary he just pronounces that such a being cannot fail to exist.
Because the truth value of P1 is independent of any questions of "why". As I told someone else, even if I don't know why such a being is necessary, that has NOTHING to do with whether it is POSSIBLE for a being to exist necessarily...which is the contention of P1.

Since the truth value of P1 is irrelevant to "why", I am under no obligation to answer it.
Artie wrote: 2. "1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists"

3. "Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist."

And all we need to do is say "hang on a minute, you haven't given us any logical reason why a MGB is necessary in its existence in the first place..."
Doing everything in your POWER to disprove the argument, eh, Artie? It aint happening.

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