The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.

That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?

[marco]

If it is possible that a maximally great nation exists, then a maximally great nation exists at some moment in history.

The concept of maximality is derived from the quality. A nation is composed of individuals and this introduces other factors, so I don't see that it holds. However as I said, it acts as a parody of the premise proposed, with which I disagree in any case.

Quite right. Of course you can't. But the the objective is to try and get the author of the OP to understand why that is so.

A harder task, I suspect. A line from The Merchant of Venice comes to mind about asking the wolf why he has made the ewe bleat for the lamb. Go well.

[For_The_Kingdom]

According to the OP, if we can imagine stuff, that makes that stuff real.



OP / For_The_Kingdom accuses others of covering their ears, and hollerin' to drown out the noise of dissent.

I propose it's OP / For_The_Kingdom who cups hands to ears, screaming madly at all arguments that refute his goofy, illogical OP.

Face it, make believe don't mean stuff's real.

OP / For_The_Kingdom, should be forever known as the hypocrite who accused, and lacked the intelligence to know when he's beat.

If you can imagine the nonexistence of a necessary being, then the being was never necessary in the first place.

[For_The_Kingdom]

Thank you for the reply. I see that according to the rules, I was conceiving of a contingent being previously for P1. But the best I can do is conceive of a contingent being. The reason for this is that for any being that I conceive of that I believe to be maximally great, it follows that I can conceive of a possible world without said being. So the being must have been contingent from the start.

Right. You can't conceive of a possible world at which an omnipresence being doesn't exist, because if you can, then the being was never omnipresent in the first place.

The being that you conceive isn't the same was the being that that is allegedly omnipresent.

But I have a different argument.

A conceived world is made up of thoughts.

Ok.

These thoughts are not in and of themselves a MGB.

Ok.

It follows that a MGB does not exist in a conceived world (the different thoughts that compose the conceived world are not a MGB by themselves or combined in any way, they are nothing more than thoughts). Since a MGB can not exist in a conceived world (only a conception of a MGB can exist in these worlds), then the only possible world where a MGB's existence comes into question is the actual world.

So P2 is false. The MGB does not exist in the possible world produced from P1 via conception.

I don't follow.

[jgh7]

[Replying to For_The_Kingdom]

I'll try explaining in a different way. Firstly, I hold that P1 is impossible for me (the best I can do is conceive of contingent beings), but I'm still willing to grant that some special person can do it for the sake of advancing the argument.

Next comes P2: "If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world". P2 is an "if, then" statement. I'm focused on the "then" part of it which is: "then a maximally great being exists in some possible world".

Firstly, it is vague in that it says "exists in some possible world". Perhaps it's obvious, but I just want to be clear that the possible world it is referring to is the one that was conceived during P1, correct?

Going off of that, the possible world created in P1 is a conception (a collection of coherent thoughts). Part of that conception is the thoughts that compose the properties of the MGB. This is the conception of the MGB. I think the error lies in saying that a conception of a MGB existing in a possible world is the same as the actual MGB existing in said possible world. That is the crux of my argument against P2. I believe P2 should be rewritten to say:

"If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a conception of a maximally great being exists in some possible world."

It does not follow that the actual MGB exists in that possible world, only the conception of a MGB is known to exist in that possible world.

[For_The_Kingdom]

Not my problem, never felt the need to excuse them, it's your gloating I was commenting on.

Like I said, gloating. Well they have since denied P1, where does that leave the MOA? Enough to impress believers, not enough to convince skeptics, that's where.

Yeah, and with the denial simultaneously came the adjustment.

No, I am asking you to prove it is possible for 2+2=4, why are you enquiring about disproving it?

If a proposition is true, then it is possible for it to be true, right? Or am I in the twilight zone?

Nop. I said "even if."

Cool...and despite that, you've still yet to give me reasons why P1 isn't true.

A fact that you can conceive it? Prove it.

Prove it? You want me to take the thoughts out of my brain and give them to you on a silver platter?

So you'd like us to believe. Prove it like I asked you.

Again^

Your assertions are not good enough.

You've got nothing, sir.

Exactly the point - whether god can exist or not, depends on how one defined it. Are you forgetting that it was you who claimed "how God was defined has NOTHING to do with whether or not it is possible for God to exist?" You were wrong.

Again, what does how YOU defined your being have to do with the way that the being in the MOA is defined? Nothing.

Incorrect. I did that pages ago, which in turn, was a repeat of the same proof presented a year ago in that old thread. And I would point out once again the point that you granted: it's not up to us to disprove it, you have to prove it.

Well, that syllogism was terrible, and if that is your proof and thus the best you've got, then I guess I should gloat some more.

And another thing; this whole notion of "its not up to us to disprove it, you have to prove it" is false. When you say "P1 is false", that is a statement of knowledge...that is a proposition that is either true or false...and once it is made, it is up to YOU to prove it false.

It is a claim...a claim of knowledge..and to show how easy it is to demonstrate my point...all I have to do is ask "How do you know P1 is false"...and of course, you are unable to answer such a question.

Save that for another thread. I have repeatedly told you, the point was that we have long denied the possibility of God, despite your postulation that we only changed our stance after you brought the MOA to our attention.

Oh, so I guess that any of you who would have granted P1 prior to the creation of this thread did not long deny the possibility of God..because if they did, they wouldn't have granted the premises, would they?

There goes that same implication again: those of us who deny the possibility of God are not intellectually honest enough. Back that up or retract it.

To whom it apply to, let it apply to.

Also note the bait and switch from the God as defined in the MOA, to the one as defined in Christian theism.

That is just my personal opinion. The MGB is nameless and faceless in the MOA.

Exactly. Hence 40 pages worth of attacks on said definition.

Nothing is wrong on the definition. The definition of the MGB didn't get attacked until we were well into the thread and the implication of granting P1 was realized.

No, just pointing out the obvious: The god that people can actually conceive of, is contingent; where as the one defined in the preamble is necessary. It's not me who is conflating the two, but those who presented the MOA.

Well, I gave the definition of the MGB, and I defined it as necessary. But that doesn't matter, tho, because the existence of such a being is either possible, or impossible. Can't be both.

At best that mere tells us you can convenience of a prayer answering god, not the one that is defined in the MOA. Prove the being you are praying to, is not merely contingent. What would happen if the god you are praying to didn't exist?

Then the concept of a MGB is absurd, and P1 is false....but quite the contrary regarding both.

At worse that on the same level of some hypothetical crazy guy who sets up a shrine in his basement to worship square circles. That doesn't mean square circles are possible now, does it?

Right, and if the guy set up a syllogism regarding the MOA and his squared circle gods, I will be right with you in telling the guy like "Hey dude, P1 is demonstrably false, bruh."

That's a red herring. I already know that it is logical impossibilities cannot be conceived. You just need to prove a necessary god is conceivable, with something more than your assertion.

You know what, I think you've made history. This has to be the first time since the creation of man that a person was ever asked to "prove that you can think of X".

Again, I don't know what you want me to do, take the thoughts out of my head and just hand them to you?

Simple, because you've mistaken a contingent god with a necessary one. I stated that ages ago.

A contingent god is one that was created and exists based upon contingent circumstances, right? Well, a necessary god is one that WASN'T created and has existed forever. There, I've just made the distinction, which means that I can clearly conceive of both concepts.

Now, how is it that 'I've "mistaken a contingent god with a necessary one", when I am the one that made the distinction between BOTH concepts in the OP and CLEARLY defined the being that I am advocating and have been CONSISTENTLY correcting you guys on conflating the terms??

No, because both are impossible.

Mere assertion.

Well, lets just say your standard is rather low. I was expecting something more than your insistence that you can conceive it.

I don't know how I can prove to someone that I can perceive the thought of an entity.

I would draw God, but I don't know how to draw the concept of "existing forever"...or the concept of "existing necessarily".

That doesn't make P2 false, it just means no beings match the definition.

2) A world that has no sentient beings is one such possible world where MGB does not exist.


It is false. There cannot be a possible world at which a MGB does not exist...yet the statement is giving a scenario at which the MGB does not exist.

So yes, it is a false statement.

Besides, you are still affirming P2 with the part I bolded, when you acknowledges a possible world without sentient beings.

Yeah, "other" sentient beings, obviously not including the MGB, which is a sentient being. Of course, I can imagine a world at which God did not create mankind in any universe...but God would still exist, right?

Also, I would like to point out you previously accepted P2 when you didn't know what "for all X" meant, I just love the sweet irony re: "cool to grant P2 until the implications hit home."

I don't recall granting P2, first of all...and even if I did, it is based on a misunderstanding that I had, because I had to reread it several times just to understand what it meant.

It isn't as if you gave a preface explaining stuff before you presented the syllogism, you know, like I did.

Not sure what "change" you are seeing, the definition of MGB is consistent through out. The point is, a being defined as necessary leads to a logical contradiction. i.e. impossible, inconceivable.

Yet I am still scratching my head at where you've proven the contradiction.

You say that like I haven't already won back on page 3. Of course I claim victory.

Dude, you couldn't win a staring contest against a drip of water if you were the sun.

Pointing out difference doesn't make the similarities disappear - my analogy refers only to their similarity - both are defined as necessary.

The contention was; you can't define a being into existence. That is what you'v said, and that is what you've maintained.

I maintained that no one is being defined into existence. In the same way I can't define Artie into having a necessary existence, is the same way I can't define a MGB into a necessary existence.

The MOA is based entirely on the truth value of P1. Nothing more, nothing less. If P1 is true, the God exists.

Ok, then simply answer this this;

P3 is: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

How true can P3 be, if P1 is false? Just tell me that, please.

It can be 100% true.

i.e. The same way "if a chair is human, then the chair is mortal" is 100% true, even when we all know chairs are not human. I already give you an example, did that not make sense to you? Do you know what "conditional" mean in logic? Would it be fair to say you have no formal training in logic and all you know about the MOA came from apologetics?

Of course it makes sense..but what doesn't makes sense is WHY you are taking P3 at face-value instead of corresponding it with the preceding two premises.

According to the ARGUMENT, as laid out on the MOA, P3 cannot be true, while P1 is false. Even though it is true, if taken on face value, that theoretically P3 is true, it would not be true in light of the P1 being false.

That is like saying..

1. Mary Jenkins is my mother
2. If Mary Jenkins is my mother, then I am her son

Now, at face value, #2 is true regardless of whether #1 is there or not...but #1 cannot be false, while #2 remains true.

If it is not possible for a MGB to exist, then a MGB cannot exist in ANY possible world, much less some.

If you grant P1, then we don't even need to discuss the possibility of P3, because P3 is automatically granted by default. So again, I don't know why you even mentioned P3...sounds like you just needed new ground to fight on after a losing battle with P1.

As far as my knowledge of modal logic is concerned. I know just as much as I need to know based on what I am advocating for.

No, it doesn't. P3 depends SOLELY on the definition presented in your preamble.

A possibly necessarily existing God is an actual existing God. Plain and simple.

Right, which is why I kept telling you: You cannot define God into existence.

Nonsense. I can give a definition of a sea serpent, but whether or not there is a serpent in the sea that matches my definition is an entirely different story.

My challenge was literally the first thing I posted in this thread. What do you think "you cannot define God into existence" is, if not a challenge on the definition?

I can challenge someone's definition of big foot, that doesn't mean that I think the definition is incoherent..that just means that I don't believe that such a being, as being defined, exists.

Two different things.

That's trivial, what is conceivable is possible, the two terms are synonymous.

And all possible necessary truths must be actually true. So you are treading in deeps waters. So make the necessary adjustments.

However, proving you can conceive such a thing would be quite a different matter.

I already did. The fact that your tune is now "prove you can think of X"...goes to show how desperate you've become.

Not so big when all you have is back P3 is a definition you provided.

Huh?

[For_The_Kingdom]

Alright, gang

Almost 50 pages into the thread, and I'd say that the thread has ran its course. I'd like to take the time to thank everyone that have participated in these intellectual slug-fests.

Hopefully, the argument has given everyone on here a chance to critically think..and if I am able to plant any seeds of Christianity with anyone on here, no matter how remote or how small the seed is...I've done my part for the Kingdom.

I won't be making any more posts on this thread after it reaches 50 pages in. I will now turn my attention to the KCA thread that I've been aching to create...and I hope to see most of you there.

Thank you all, again. It was a pleasure.

[Willum]

[Replying to post 481 by For_The_Kingdom]

Or, reinforced the realization that Christianity must use ploys and spurious logic to trap folks.

[Danmark]

Alright, gang

Almost 50 pages into the thread...

And none of it new or orgininal. The argument dates at least as early as St. Anselm in the 11th Century. It has been effectively criticized from the beginning and is interesting as a trick of logic, but it is ultimately "no good," to quote Russell. The argument never touches base wth reality but tickles the mind of some.

Critiques of ontological arguments begin with Gaunilo, a contemporary of St. Anselm. Perhaps the best known criticisms of ontological arguments are due to Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason. Most famously, Kant claims that ontological arguments are vitiated by their reliance upon the implicit assumption that existence is a predicate. However, as Bertrand Russell observed, it is much easier to be persuaded that ontological arguments are no good than it is to say exactly what is wrong with them.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontol ... arguments/

[Bust Nak]

Yeah, and with the denial simultaneously came the adjustment.

That changes nothing. Those who granted P1 have since retracted it, the MOA is question begging and can't convince people who are familiar with modal logic, either from prior experience or through evaluating the MOA.

If a proposition is true, then it is possible for it to be true, right?

Of course, but that still doesn't explain why you asked what you asked though.

Or am I in the twilight zone?

Talk about twilight zone, I wasn't the one who ask about disproving 2+2=4. That was you.

Cool...and despite that, you've still yet to give me reasons why P1 isn't true.

That's false and you know it. You've been responding to the reasons I gave in this very thread. That you judged my reasons to be "bad," doesn't make them non-existent now does it? So much for challenging other people on their intellectual honesty.

Prove it? You want me to take the thoughts out of my brain and give them to you on a silver platter?

Not my problem. You figure out how to prove it then get back to me. Until you do, all you have is your mere assertion, no better than someone who claims they can imagine a square circle.

You've got nothing, sir.

Exactly my sentiment: I was waiting on you to provide support for the MOA. I waited and got nothing, no thanks to you.

Again, what does how YOU defined your being have to do with the way that the being in the MOA is defined? Nothing.

That's the same red herring as before. You claimed how God was defined has NOTHING to do with whether or not it is possible for God to exist. I have demonstrated otherwise. How God was defined is relevant as to whether it is possible or not.

Well, that syllogism was terrible, and if that is your proof and thus the best you've got, then I guess I should gloat some more.

Gloating is pretty much all you brought to the table. I won't go back and count the number of times I commented on your trash talk.

And another thing; this whole notion of "its not up to us to disprove it, you have to prove it" is false.

You have just contradicted yourself - in post#435 you acknowledged that it was not up to us to disprove it, you have the burden to prove it.

When you say "P1 is false", that is a statement of knowledge...that is a proposition that is either true or false...and once it is made, it is up to YOU to prove it false.

And even if I couldn't, it's still up to you to prove it. Yours is a classical case of argument from ignorance fallacy. You are shifting the burden of proof and unapologetically so.

It is a claim...a claim of knowledge..and to show how easy it is to demonstrate my point...all I have to do is ask "How do you know P1 is false"...

I don't need to know P1 is false to challenge the truth value of P1, you have burden of proof, this is debate 101.

and of course, you are unable to answer such a question.

The record will show otherwise. You can't prove P1 true, and I can prove P1 false.

Oh, so I guess that any of you who would have granted P1 prior to the creation of this thread did not long deny the possibility of God..because if they did, they wouldn't have granted the premises, would they?

That depends on how God is defined in each instance. You were informed of this when you enquired about it earlier.

To whom it apply to, let it apply to.

I note your continual failure to justify your accusation.

That is just my personal opinion. The MGB is nameless and faceless in the MOA.

Are you forgetting that you questioned our intellectual honesty based on the apparent inconsistence in accepting the possibility of God outside of the MOA while rejecting the possibility of the MOA MGB? Here you are admitting it's your opinion that the two gods are one and the same. That invalidated your whole challenge.

Nothing is wrong on the definition. The definition of the MGB didn't get attacked until we were well into the thread and the implication of granting P1 was realized.

You are still speaking as if the implication wasn't known until you brought it to our attention. Let me remind you that when I counted there were only 4 atheists who wasn't sure what P1 was actually saying.

Well, I gave the definition of the MGB, and I defined it as necessary. But that doesn't matter, tho, because the existence of such a being is either possible, or impossible. Can't be both.

But it does matter, because the possibility of such a being depends on how it is defined.

Then the concept of a MGB is absurd, and P1 is false....but quite the contrary regarding both.

It is? Prove it. More importantly, that you can conceive of a scenario where the concept of a MGB is absurd and P1 being false, is enough to demonstrate that it is possible for the MGB to fail to exist.

You know what, I think you've made history. This has to be the first time since the creation of man that a person was ever asked to "prove that you can think of X".

Just so you know, debating whether something is can be thought of, is common in philosophy. Most notably with the "philosophical zombie" regarding dualism.

Again, I don't know what you want me to do, take the thoughts out of my head and just hand them to you?

I want you to admit that you cannot prove P1 true.

A contingent god is one that was created and exists based upon contingent circumstances, right?

Yes, but a non-created God can also be a contingent one.

Well, a necessary god is one that WASN'T created and has existed forever. There, I've just made the distinction, which means that I can clearly conceive of both concepts.

That's just another misconception on your part. An eternal god can be contingent.

Now, how is it that 'I've "mistaken a contingent god with a necessary one", when I am the one that made the distinction between BOTH concepts in the OP and CLEARLY defined the being that I am advocating and have been CONSISTENTLY correcting you guys on conflating the terms??

It's all too apparent that you aren't familiar with modal logic. With this latest attempt at "correcting" us, it's now more obvious than ever that the God you are conceiving is a contingent one.

I don't know how I can prove to someone that I can perceive the thought of an entity.

Then tell us explicitly that you cannot prove that you can conceive of an necessary being.

I would draw God, but I don't know how to draw the concept of "existing forever"...or the concept of "existing necessarily".

Not my problem.

2) A world that has no sentient beings is one such possible world where MGB does not exist.

It is false. There cannot be a possible world at which a MGB does not exist...yet the statement is giving a scenario at which the MGB does not exist.

Hence the contradiction. It is that simple.

So yes, it is a false statement.

Not false, just contradicts the premise.

Yeah, "other" sentient beings, obviously not including the MGB, which is a sentient being. Of course, I can imagine a world at which God did not create mankind in any universe...but God would still exist, right?

Not necessarily, it could be a world where God doesn't exist.

I don't recall granting P2, first of all...and even if I did, it is based on a misunderstanding that I had, because I had to reread it several times just to understand what it meant.

It isn't as if you gave a preface explaining stuff before you presented the syllogism, you know, like I did.

My bad. I assumed incorrectly that you were familiar with formal logic, given the technical explanation on modal logic in the OP. It has now became clear that the explanation was regurgitated without real understanding.

Yet I am still scratching my head at where you've proven the contradiction.

That's when you entertained the idea of a possible world where no sentient beings existed.

The contention was; you can't define a being into existence. That is what you'v said, and that is what you've maintained.

Exactly, that applies to both God and Artie, despite their differences. That should have been obvious.

I maintained that no one is being defined into existence. In the same way I can't define Artie into having a necessary existence, is the same way I can't define a MGB into a necessary existence.

I know, that's why the MOA fails. It is an attempt in defining God into existence.

The MOA is based entirely on the truth value of P1. Nothing more, nothing less. If P1 is true, the God exists.

Not without defining said god as necessary.

Of course it makes sense..but what doesn't makes sense is WHY you are taking P3 at face-value instead of corresponding it with the preceding two premises.

Because the truth of P3 is independent from the two preceding premises.

According to the ARGUMENT, as laid out on the MOA, P3 cannot be true, while P1 is false.

That's the same mistake as before. P3 can be true while P1 is false.

Even though it is true, if taken on face value, that theoretically P3 is true, it would not be true in light of the P1 being false.

That is like saying..

1. Mary Jenkins is my mother
2. If Mary Jenkins is my mother, then I am her son

Now, at face value, #2 is true regardless of whether #1 is there or not...but #1 cannot be false, while #2 remains true.

That is incorrect and trivially so: #1 can be false, while #2 remains true exactly because #2 is true regardless of whether #1 is there or not.

Mary Jenkins is not my mother, therefore #1 is false. If Mary Jenkins is my mother, then I am indeed her son, #2 remains true.

Just to make it doubly clear:

1. Bust Nak is For_The_Kingdom's mother.
2. If Bust Nak is For_The_Kingdom's mother, then For_The_Kingdom is Bust Nak's child.

Ask yourself, is #1 true? Is #2 true?

If it is not possible for a MGB to exist, then a MGB cannot exist in ANY possible world, much less some.

Exactly. You were informed of this as early as page 1.

If you grant P1, then we don't even need to discuss the possibility of P3, because P3 is automatically granted by default. So again, I don't know why you even mentioned P3...sounds like you just needed new ground to fight on after a losing battle with P1.

I mentioned P3 because it became clear you have some misconception about the MOA: You were and are still suggesting that P3 is follows from P1, when P3 actually depends solely on the definition provided in the preamble.

As far as my knowledge of modal logic is concerned. I know just as much as I need to know based on what I am advocating for.

Lets just say, your posts speak for themselves.

A possibly necessarily existing God is an actual existing God. Plain and simple.

Sure, which is why you had to define God as necessary for the MOA to be valid. Hence the accusations of "you cannot define God into existence."

Nonsense. I can give a definition of a sea serpent, but whether or not there is a serpent in the sea that matches my definition is an entirely different story.

Exactly. Which is why I kept telling you: You cannot define God into existence. You know why the MOA doesn't work, yet you are still cheer leading for it.

I can challenge someone's definition of big foot, that doesn't mean that I think the definition is incoherent..that just means that I don't believe that such a being, as being defined, exists.

Two different things.

That depends entirely on how exactly "big foot" was defined by that someone now, doesn't it?

And all possible necessary truths must be actually true. So you are treading in deeps waters. So make the necessary adjustments.

Commonly accepted as axiomic in S5 modal system. No adjustment required.

I already did. The fact that your tune is now "prove you can think of X"...goes to show how desperate you've become.

"Prove you can conceive of X" is synonymous with "prove you can think of X." The fact that you characterised that as a change of tune goes to show how desperate you are; and the fact that you think an assertion of "I can think of X" is enough to prove "I can conceive of X" goes to show how the MOA is just one huge exercise in begging the question.

[rikuoamero]

"Prove you can conceive of X" is synonymous with "prove you can think of X." The fact that you characterised that as a change of tune goes to show how desperate you are; and the fact that you think an assertion of "I can think of X" is enough to prove "I can conceive of X" goes to show how the MOA is just one huge exercise in begging the question.

Kingdom, if you're still here, this is the problem.
When it comes to the term 'married bachelor', you cannot think of it, conceive of it, is that right? Yes or no?
If yes, the reason being that the words, the definition of 'married bachelor' is contradictory. If one is married, they are not a bachelor. If one is a bachelor, they are not married. The terms cancel each other out.
When it comes to the MGB, you define it as existing in all possible worlds. However, there are possible worlds without beings. We know in the past there was such a world, before the first life-forms arose. So, just like with 'married bachelor', we are facing a contradiction and hence, cannot conceive of it.
When you say to us here that you can conceive of the MGB, you sound just as crazy as someone saying they can conceive of a 'married bachelor'.