Subjective Morality

[The Tanager]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

[Bust Nak]

What do you mean by "subjectively wrong"?

It's meaningless under moral objectivism, it's only meaningful if morality is subjective. Given the premise of subjectivism, it means, the speaker disapprove of it.

I think the term 'morality' would be the reason. I think moral objectivists and moral subjectivists use that term differently than simple subjectivists. For moral subjectivists the morality of lying is not always the same: it is moral for some, immoral for others. For clarity's sake, I don't think we should use "the morality of lying" to refer to our personal opinions...as personal opinions...on an issue. In making a statement of simple subjectivism one should say something like "my view on lying is always the same." This would still need clarifying concerning absolutism vs situationalism.

"It is moral for some, immoral for others" needs clarification. Did you mean, some people believe lying is moral, while others believe it is immoral" or "it is moral if this group of people lies, while it is immoral if this other group of people lies?"

I'm not sure what you are asking. The "before he was promoted to link it to gods" is confusing me, I think. Socrates asks Euthyphro what piety is. Euthyphro then offers this "proof."

He is just stating his stance at that point, he hasn't started to offer proof until he Socrates asks him to for the definition of pious.

If you dislike music X, food X, painting X, etc. you act one way. If you dislike ethic X, you act differently than that.

No, I do not. If I dislike music X, food X, painting X, ethic X. I act the same way - take steps to stop my dislikes from impacting on me. Steps such as, tuning to another station, throwing things in the bin, locking people up.

[The Tanager]

It's meaningless under moral objectivism, it's only meaningful if morality is subjective. Given the premise of subjectivism, it means, the speaker disapprove of it.

So, are you claiming that Euthyphro is only trying to tell Socrates that he (Euthyphro) disapproves of his family's opinion on the matter? That this is Euthyphro's understanding?

"It is moral for some, immoral for others" needs clarification. Did you mean, some people believe lying is moral, while others believe it is immoral" or "it is moral if this group of people lies, while it is immoral if this other group of people lies?

I think it's probably a third thing. To me simple subjectivism observes "some people believe lying is moral, while others believe it is immoral." I think moral objectivism and moral subjectivism both agree with this observation and make a further point. Moral objectivists say that one of these claims corresponds to reality outside of one's own mind. Moral subjectivists say that neither claim corresponds to reality outside of one's own mind.

Regarding the shape of the earth, we have simple subjectivism when we observe that we have flat-earthers and spherical-earthers. Objectivists believe that one of these claims corresponds to reality outside the flat-earthers and spherical-earthers' minds. Subjectivists believe that neiter claim corresponds to reality outside of one's own mind. There is no shape of the earth outside of an individual's belief about that shape is subjectivism.

He is just stating his stance at that point, he hasn't started to offer proof until he Socrates asks him to for the definition of pious.

It's Euthyphro's confidence in his claim that "...if [murdered] unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him...And my father and family are angry with me...They say...I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father...how little they know what the gods think about piety and impiety" that brings about Socrates asking for the definition, so he can apply it to his own situation. Euthyphro then offers Zeus and Cronos as his proof.

No, I do not. If I dislike music X, food X, painting X, ethic X. I act the same way - take steps to stop my dislikes from impacting on me. Steps such as, tuning to another station, throwing things in the bin, locking people up.

A moral situationist could phrase their belief in a way that says they always act in the same way. In situation X, Y, Z, I take steps to act morally. But if they lie in situation X and tell the truth in situation Y, then they aren't really acting the same way.

This seems parallel to what you are doing here. In situation X (Jim listens to rap music) you are okay with Jim indulging in his likes. In situation Y (Jim fiddles with a kid) you are not okay with him indulging in his likes. You aren't acting in the same way in these two situations. Yes, you can phrase it as just another dislike, but it's a different kind of dislike. You don't dislike Jim's taste in rap music in the same way you dislike Jim's taste in kiddy fiddling.

[Bust Nak]

So, are you claiming that Euthyphro is only trying to tell Socrates that he (Euthyphro) disapproves of his family's opinion on the matter? That this is Euthyphro's understanding?

Socrates was giving Euthyphro an option. Either accept that Euthyphro) disapproves of his family's opinion on the matter, or dissociate morality from the likes and dislikes of individual beings.

I think it's probably a third thing. To me simple subjectivism observes "some people believe lying is moral, while others believe it is immoral." I think moral objectivism and moral subjectivism both agree with this observation and make a further point. Moral objectivists say that one of these claims corresponds to reality outside of one's own mind. Moral subjectivists say that neither claim corresponds to reality outside of one's own mind.

So far so good, but I would say that "simple subjectivism" as you called it is so trivial that it's not worth debating. We are only interested in the further point re: correspondence to reality outside of one's mind, right?

Regarding the shape of the earth, we have simple subjectivism when we observe that we have flat-earthers and spherical-earthers. Objectivists believe that one of these claims corresponds to reality outside the flat-earthers and spherical-earthers' minds. Subjectivists believe that neiter claim corresponds to reality outside of one's own mind. There is no shape of the earth outside of an individual's belief about that shape is subjectivism.

Right, but that's moot since there aren't any shape subjectivist here.

Which camp do you fall into, regarding the tastiness of pineapple on pizzas? We have simple subjectivism when we observe that we have people who like adding pineapple and those who reject it. Objectivists believe that one of these claims corresponds to reality outside the pizza tasters' minds. Subjectivists believe that neither claim corresponds to reality outside of one's own mind. There is no such thing as tastiness of pizza outside of an individual's belief about that taste is subjectivism.

It's Euthyphro's confidence in his claim that "...if [murdered] unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him...And my father and family are angry with me...They say...I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father...how little they know what the gods think about piety and impiety" that brings about Socrates asking for the definition, so he can apply it to his own situation. Euthyphro then offers Zeus and Cronos as his proof.

Right, and that's after Socrates prompted him to clarify his stance.

A moral situationist could phrase their belief in a way that says they always act in the same way. In situation X, Y, Z, I take steps to act morally. But if they lie in situation X and tell the truth in situation Y, then they aren't really acting the same way.

This seems parallel to what you are doing here. In situation X (Jim listens to rap music) you are okay with Jim indulging in his likes. In situation Y (Jim fiddles with a kid) you are not okay with him indulging in his likes. You aren't acting in the same way in these two situations. Yes, you can phrase it as just another dislike, but it's a different kind of dislike. You don't dislike Jim's taste in rap music in the same way you dislike Jim's taste in kiddy fiddling.

Again, how is this any more significant than In situation X (classical music comes on the radio) I am okay with listening to it. In situation Y (rap music comes on the radio) I am not okay with listening to it. I don't dislike classical music in the same way I dislike rap music. It's a different kind of dislike, because situation X isn't a dislike at all.

You feel this exact same thing with country music, are you acting inconsistently? Is there anything odd or incomprehensible with how you feel here?

[The Tanager]

Socrates was giving Euthyphro an option. Either accept that Euthyphro) disapproves of his family's opinion on the matter, or dissociate morality from the likes and dislikes of individual beings.

I agree that Socrates is trying to show Euthyphro how Euthyphro's view is subjective, but Euthyphro is trying to show that his (Euthyphro's) view is objectively true. Maybe I missed your point here?

So far so good, but I would say that "simple subjectivism" as you called it is so trivial that it's not worth debating. We are only interested in the further point re: correspondence to reality outside of one's mind, right?

Yes, I agree. I'm having a hard time of distinguishing your view from simple subjectivism at times by how you frame things.

Right, but that's moot since there aren't any shape subjectivist here.

It was an analogical point, so there does not have to be a shape subjectivist for it not to be moot.

Which camp do you fall into, regarding the tastiness of pineapple on pizzas? We have simple subjectivism when we observe that we have people who like adding pineapple and those who reject it. Objectivists believe that one of these claims corresponds to reality outside the pizza tasters' minds. Subjectivists believe that neither claim corresponds to reality outside of one's own mind. There is no such thing as tastiness of pizza outside of an individual's belief about that taste is subjectivism.

I'm a subjectivist on the tastiness of pineapple on pizzas.

Right, and that's after Socrates prompted him to clarify his stance.

I think we may have different "promptings" in mind and are talking past each other a bit. What is your argument in bringing this up?

Again, how is this any more significant than In situation X (classical music comes on the radio) I am okay with listening to it. In situation Y (rap music comes on the radio) I am not okay with listening to it. I don't dislike classical music in the same way I dislike rap music. It's a different kind of dislike, because situation X isn't a dislike at all.

You feel this exact same thing with country music, are you acting inconsistently? Is there anything odd or incomprehensible with how you feel here?

Yes, how you act between 'likes' and 'dislikes' are different and should be. But different likes should be similar to each other and different dislikes should be similar with each other. You act differently towards aesthetic and ethical dislikes. Comparing two aesthetic 'dislikes,' (say, rap music and bitter gourds) we observe that they lead to the exact same way of acting (not indulging, but allowing those that want to indulge to do so). But an ethical 'dislike' leads to a different way of acting from the aesthetic 'dislikes' (not indulging and not allowing those who want to indulge to do so). That seems to show that the you act different, in principle, to ethical dislikes from the way you act towards aesthetic dislikes.

[Bust Nak]

I agree that Socrates is trying to show Euthyphro how Euthyphro's view is subjective, but Euthyphro is trying to show that his (Euthyphro's) view is objectively true. Maybe I missed your point here?

I am saying Euthyphro's view wasn't developed at the onset of the dialogue. It developed during the conversation. The idea that objectivity can be tied to the preference to gods got shot down as soon as it was conjured.

I'm a subjectivist on the tastiness of pineapple on pizzas.

So what is so difficult in applying the same logic to morality, in understanding the difference between disliking the tastiness of pineapple on pizzas, and disliking the fact that people put pineapples on pizzas? The first is taste with regard to food, the latter is taste with regard to thoughts and actions.

You act differently towards aesthetic and ethical dislikes. Comparing two aesthetic 'dislikes,' (say, rap music and bitter gourds) we observe that they lead to the exact same way of acting (not indulging, but allowing those that want to indulge to do so). But an ethical 'dislike' leads to a different way of acting from the aesthetic 'dislikes' (not indulging and not allowing those who want to indulge to do so).

I do not act differently though. You are talking about four different dislikes here:

a) I dislike rap music - with corresponding action of tune to another station.
b) I dislike bitter gourds - with corresponding action of throwing it in the trash.
c) I dislike child abuse - with corresponding action of not indulging in abusing children.
d) I dislike that child abuse happens at all - with corresponding action of not allowing child abuse.

As you can see, they all fall nicely into the same pattern. You are getting the latter two mixed up. The following wouldn't fall into that pattern, it would be fundamentally different to the others, but it also isn't a thing:

[strike]e) I dislike child abuse - paired with the action of punishing pedo-priests.[/strike]

Had I dislike that people make rap music, then I would be punishing rap musicians. Just as I would punish child abusers.

Had I dislike that bitter gourds is grown, then I would be punishing gourd farmers. Just as I would punish child abusers.

But I happen to not dislike those two things.

[The Tanager]

I am saying Euthyphro's view wasn't developed at the onset of the dialogue. It developed during the conversation. The idea that objectivity can be tied to the preference to gods got shot down as soon as it was conjured.

Euthyphro surely had not deeply thought through his own view, but I don't remember that he ever admits to the weakness Socrates keeps trying to point out.

So what is so difficult in applying the same logic to morality, in understanding the difference between disliking the tastiness of pineapple on pizzas, and disliking the fact that people put pineapples on pizzas? The first is taste with regard to food, the latter is taste with regard to thoughts and actions.

I don't think it is difficult to do so. I think that you claim to treat ethical and aesthetic issues the same way, but don't actually treat them the same. You are okay with what people do with their tastes in aesthetic issues, but not in ethical issues.

I do not act differently though. You are talking about four different dislikes here:

a) I dislike rap music - with corresponding action of tune to another station.
b) I dislike bitter gourds - with corresponding action of throwing it in the trash.
c) I dislike child abuse - with corresponding action of not indulging in abusing children.
d) I dislike that child abuse happens at all - with corresponding action of not allowing child abuse.

Phrasing it this way is an incomplete way to phrase things. It ignores that (c) and (d) are both about the same kind of action. It is two facets of one ethical issue. Just like (a) would also have (x): I like that rap music happens at all [where that means that you are okay with rap music happening].

In aesthetic issues, you attach (x) kind of statements to your dislikes. In ethical issues you attach (d) kind of statements to your dislikes. You have an extra kind of dislike in ethical issues. Your phrasing treats (c) and (d) as unconnected, when they are not.

[Bust Nak]

Euthyphro surely had not deeply thought through his own view, but I don't remember that he ever admits to the weakness Socrates keeps trying to point out.

Right, and going back to my original point, it's not until later on, that objectivism being tied to a god that can create moral truths, becomes a thing.

I don't think it is difficult to do so. I think that you claim to treat ethical and aesthetic issues the same way, but don't actually treat them the same. You are okay with what people do with their tastes in aesthetic issues, but not in ethical issues.

How is that any more significant than I am okay with classical music, but not bitter gourds? Why is it such a big deal that I am okay with some things but not okay with other things? While I can't think of a single thing in aesthetic issues where I am not okay with people having, there are plenty of things in ethical issues that I am okay with.

Phrasing it this way is an incomplete way to phrase things. It ignores that (c) and (d) are both about the same kind of action.

So what if they are about the same kind of action? I am okay with the texture of bitter gourds in my hands, but I am not okay with the taste of bitter gourds in my hands. Yet both are about the same gourds.

It is two facets of one ethical issue.

No, it's not - me not liking child abuse is not an ethical issue at all, it's an entertainment issue - it's not something I found fun, it's something decidedly not fun, therefore I don't do it.

Just like (a) would also have (x): I like that rap music happens at all [where that means that you are okay with rap music happening].

That's already included right at the bottom of my last post, I said that if I am not okay with that, then I would be punishing rap musician, just like I would child abuser.

In aesthetic issues, you attach (x) kind of statements to your dislikes.

No I don't. They are also separated, like I said in my last post.

[The Tanager]

Right, and going back to my original point, it's not until later on, that objectivism being tied to a god that can create moral truths, becomes a thing.

What do you mean "becomes a thing"? Euthyphro doesn't start the conversation claiming the gods make morality objective, but that's different than saying he didn't have that view to begin with.

How is that any more significant than I am okay with classical music, but not bitter gourds? Why is it such a big deal that I am okay with some things but not okay with other things? While I can't think of a single thing in aesthetic issues where I am not okay with people having, there are plenty of things in ethical issues that I am okay with.

I'm not saying the dislike as dislike is different, but how you react to those dislikes are different. That's the big deal. You allow some kinds of distastes, but not others. The ones you don't come from the ethical category, not the aesthetic ones.

So what if they are about the same kind of action? I am okay with the texture of bitter gourds in my hands, but I am not okay with the taste of bitter gourds in my hands. Yet both are about the same gourds.

But you react to other people's likes/dislikes in the same way for both...in a way that is different than how you react to other people's likes/dislikes in ethical issues.

No, it's not - me not liking child abuse is not an ethical issue at all, it's an entertainment issue - it's not something I found fun, it's something decidedly not fun, therefore I don't do it.

I thought you were saying that moral subjectivism has that the ethics of child abuse is all about personal likes/dislikes.

That's already included right at the bottom of my last post, I said that if I am not okay with that, then I would be punishing rap musician, just like I would child abuser.

And the desire for punishing comes when you are not okay with ethical issues, but not aesthetic issues. Yet, you keep saying that you react the same to both kinds of issues. I don't think your descriptions bear that out, in spite of your phrasing of choice.

In aesthetic issues, you attach (x) kind of statements to your dislikes.

No I don't. They are also separated, like I said in my last post.

I know you separated them into different statements, but that doesn't mean they are actually separate. If you did dislike that people make and listen to rap music, then you would seek punishment. But you don't. You don't have this kind of dislike with aesthetic issues. You have them with ethical issues. That's because ethics is different. Yet, you keep saying that you react the same to both kinds of issues and that ethics and aesthetics are not different for you.

I don't think we are saying anything new to each other on that front. We are trying to share our thoughts in slightly different ways to make our points and we've had plenty of attempts to do so. I'm fine if we end (at least that part) here. Thank you for trying to help me see your view as you see it and for your patience with me.

[Bust Nak]

What do you mean "becomes a thing"? Euthyphro doesn't start the conversation claiming the gods make morality objective, but that's different than saying he didn't have that view to begin with.

I don't know what view he had, but it's not well developed. By becomes a thing I meant developed into a coherent thesis.

I'm not saying the dislike as dislike is different, but how you react to those dislikes are different. That's the big deal. You allow some kinds of distastes, but not others. The ones you don't come from the ethical category, not the aesthetic ones.

How is that a big deal? How I act to music I dislike is different to how I act to food I dislike. I allow some kinds of music on my radio but not others. The ones I don't come from the rap category, not the classical ones.

But you react to other people's likes/dislikes in the same way for both...in a way that is different than how you react to other people's likes/dislikes in ethical issues.

Again how is that significant? I react to different pieces of classical music the same way... in a way that is different than how I react to rap music.

I thought you were saying that moral subjectivism has that the ethics of child abuse is all about personal likes/dislikes.

Sure, but I don't get what your point is.

And the desire for punishing comes when you are not okay with ethical issues, but not aesthetic issues.

Yes, and? You deal with ethical issues by banning them or allowing them. That's analogous to than dealing with musical issue by tuning to another station or keep listening. It's the same kind of reaction.

I know you separated them into different statements, but that doesn't mean they are actually separate.

Well I think they are separate and treat them as such. You can charge me with having an incorrect presumption, but you cannot charge me with inconsistency.

If you did dislike that people make and listen to rap music, then you would seek punishment. But you don't. You don't have this kind of dislike with aesthetic issues. You have them with ethical issues. That's because ethics is different.

Same old question, how is that significant? I like some stuff, I dislike others, and meh yet other stuff. Big whoop. I react the same say to both kinds of issues and that ethics and aesthetics are different for me only in the sense that rap music and classical music is different, i.e. I don't mind classical but positively dislike rap.

I'm fine if we end (at least that part) here.

I am not though, inconsistency between action, words or beliefs is a serious charge.

[The Tanager]

Well I think they are separate and treat them as such. You can charge me with having an incorrect presumption, but you cannot charge me with inconsistency.

I'm not sure I would use the word 'presumption' to describe what I think is your flaw. I don't think you are inconsistent with your own understanding. I think your understanding of the concept is off, so that you think your view is consistent when it is not (just like Socrates thinks Euthyphro's view is inconsistent, but Euthyphro thinks his own view is consistent). I will continue to share my critique as long as you want, trying to say it in different ways if I can. I will gladly change my view should you share your thoughts in a way that I feel warrants such a change. As long as you know that I am aware that my posts here are redundant at times.

I don't know what view he had, but it's not well developed. By becomes a thing I meant developed into a coherent thesis.

I would say that Socrates helped pull out Euthyphro's initial view and then critiqued it in a way to send Euthyphro scrambling into confusion as he tried to maintain his original view.

How is that a big deal? How I act to music I dislike is different to how I act to food I dislike. I allow some kinds of music on my radio but not others. The ones I don't come from the rap category, not the classical ones.

From what you've shared, how you act toward other people's music tastes that you dislike is the same way you act toward other people's food tastes that you dislike, both of these being different than how you act toward other people's ethical tastes that you dislike, at least on some ethical issues like child abuse.

Again how is that significant? I react to different pieces of classical music the same way... in a way that is different than how I react to rap music.

Concerning music, you react differently when talking about whether you personally indulge or not, but when talking about whether you let others indulge in music you like and music you dislike, there is no difference: whether you personally like it or not, you allow others to indulge in their personal tastes in music. You say that you treat ethical issues the same way you treat aesthetic issues. This is true in talking about whether you personally indulge or not, but seems false when talking about whether you let others indulge in their personal likes.

I thought you were saying that moral subjectivism has that the ethics of child abuse is all about personal likes/dislikes.

Sure, but I don't get what your point is.

You said that you not liking child abuse was an entertainment issue, not an ethical issue. But moral subjectivism says that you not liking child abuse is what ethics boils down to.

Yes, and? You deal with ethical issues by banning them or allowing them. That's analogous to than dealing with musical issue by tuning to another station or keep listening. It's the same kind of reaction.

I disagree. Dealing with musical choices you dislike, if it was analogous to what you do with ethical choices you dislike, would mean banning people from making and listening to rap music...and you haven't directly said it, but probably whether they are around you or not (i.e., you want the abuser you know nothing about to stop abusing the child you know nothing about).