The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

[John J. Bannan]

[bluegreenearth]

I don't think the vast majority of experts say logic is just a type of language. They say there is a language of logic. Logic is prescriptive, while the language of logic is descriptive of that reality. The language of logic concerns observations that aren't physical observations.

I think you are describing the same thing as what I've described. The only difference is that you label reality as "Logic." For the record, though, there are multiple types of logic such as "Fuzzy Logic" and "Many-Valued Logic" where none are any more logical than any other. We just traditionally use classical logic.

We don't need an example of such a thing prior to an argument for its existence. Either the argument shows it's probable existence or it doesn't. We didn't need an example of an electron existing prior to the experiments scientists use to argue for the existence of the electron. An argument like Craig's is the argument for the existence of an immaterial being (premise 4 carries that weight and we'll get to it). Are you expecting physical evidence of an immaterial being?

In the case of Craig's argument, we do need an example of such a thing because the 2nd premise claims all fundamental material things began to exist at the moment of the Big Bang which assumes without evidence that only immaterial things could have existed prior to the Big Bang. We can't justify that assumption by smuggling the conclusion of Craig's argument into the 2nd premise. Because the 2nd premise is an empirical claim, the only way to justify that underlying assumption is by providing an example of an immaterial thing that can be demonstrated to exist in the absence of any material thing.

Note: The argument for the existence of electrons was not what justified belief in their existence. The justification for belief in the existence of electrons was not obtained until after electrons were demonstrated to exist through experimentation.

That is my understanding as well. I know of no one claiming the quantum field is immaterial or timeless.

Don't ask me to explain the following example because it is far beyond my understanding, but the "Amplituhedron" by Nima Arkani-Hamed and Jaroslav Trnka is claimed to be a possible quantum field that has no spacetime dependent material components: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amplituhedron

Craig's formulation, as I understand it, is not primarily about a cause of the Big Bang, but of matter itself. Assume a quantum field actually existed prior to the Big Bang and the argument still goes through the same.

I don't understand how the argument would be the same because I'm unaware of a reason to presume that a fundamental quantum field had a beginning if it existed prior to the Big Bang. The only reason we accept that our observable spacetime material universe had a beginning is because it can be traced back to the moment of the Big Bang. What reason is there to presume a fundamental quantum field had its own separate "Big Bang" event where it began to exist prior to the moment of the known Big Bang event at the beginning of our observable spacetime material universe?

[The Tanager]

2. The universe began to exist.

We don't need an example of such a thing prior to an argument for its existence. Either the argument shows it's probable existence or it doesn't. We didn't need an example of an electron existing prior to the experiments scientists use to argue for the existence of the electron.

Note: The argument for the existence of electrons was not what justified belief in their existence. The justification for belief in the existence of electrons was not obtained until after electrons were demonstrated to exist through experimentation.

The "argument for the existence of electrons" is "the demonstration through experimentation"; they are two ways to say the same thing. That kind of demonstration is fitting for physical things. It is not fitting for immaterial things. My point is that Craig's argument is meant as a demonstration of an immaterial being existing. You seem to be saying that we need to have an example of an immaterial being existing before Craig's argument should be considered. That's analogical to asking the scientist to prove the electron exists before demonstrating through experimentation. I think that is an unreasonable ask.

Don't ask me to explain the following example because it is far beyond my understanding, but the "Amplituhedron" by Nima Arkani-Hamed and Jaroslav Trnka is claimed to be a possible quantum field that has no spacetime dependent material components: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amplituhedron

I don't pretend to understand the theory itself but, from the article you linked to, it still seems to be describing material things. Yes, it challenges locality and unitarity, but what are those concepts? Locality apparently refers to being directly influenced by one's immediate surroundings. Unitarity seems to refer to when one adds up the probabilities of finding a particle in a specified space, that we'd get 1. One article I found says that non-unitarity could include things like a particle being in two different universes. [https://sureshemre.wordpress.com/2014/0 ... mechanics/]. Neither of those things counter the quantum field being material.

In the case of Craig's argument, we do need an example of such a thing because the 2nd premise claims all fundamental material things began to exist at the moment of the Big Bang which assumes without evidence that only immaterial things could have existed prior to the Big Bang. We can't justify that assumption by smuggling the conclusion of Craig's argument into the 2nd premise. Because the 2nd premise is an empirical claim, the only way to justify that underlying assumption is by providing an example of an immaterial thing that can be demonstrated to exist in the absence of any material thing.

The premise does not claim that. Craig has argued that, scientifically speaking, the Big Bang is most likely the beginning of all material, but he does not limit his argument to that being true. One can assume that material existed prior to the Big Bang and the argument does not change.

I don't understand how the argument would be the same because I'm unaware of a reason to presume that a fundamental quantum field had a beginning if it existed prior to the Big Bang. The only reason we accept that our observable spacetime material universe had a beginning is because it can be traced back to the moment of the Big Bang. What reason is there to presume a fundamental quantum field had its own separate "Big Bang" event where it began to exist prior to the moment of the known Big Bang event at the beginning of our observable spacetime material universe?

The strongest argument, I think, is the "argument from the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition." Here is how Craig formulates it:

1. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite.
2. The temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition.
3. Therefore, the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite.

If an actual infinite can't be formed by successive addition, then the series of past events (whether that extends to the Big Bang or to a previous material state) must be finite. I don't want to presume you understand it or don't understand it, so I'll pause here for questions or thoughts.

[bluegreenearth]

The "argument for the existence of electrons" is "the demonstration through experimentation"; they are two ways to say the same thing. That kind of demonstration is fitting for physical things. It is not fitting for immaterial things. My point is that Craig's argument is meant as a demonstration of an immaterial being existing. You seem to be saying that we need to have an example of an immaterial being existing before Craig's argument should be considered. That's analogical to asking the scientist to prove the electron exists before demonstrating through experimentation. I think that is an unreasonable ask.

In the case of electrons, there was an observable physical phenomenon that scientists were attempting to understand. They were speculating that the fundamental components of the observable physical phenomenon were electrons. So, to be analogous, it would be like asking the scientists to prove the observable physical phenomenon exists before demonstrating it is comprised of electrons. Nevertheless, the main point was that the conclusion of Craig's argument seems to be smuggled into the 2nd premise because it assumes without evidence that only immaterial things could have existed prior to the Big Bang.

I don't pretend to understand the theory itself but, from the article you linked to, it still seems to be describing material things. Yes, it challenges locality and unitarity, but what are those concepts? Locality apparently refers to being directly influenced by one's immediate surroundings. Unitarity seems to refer to when one adds up the probabilities of finding a particle in a specified space, that we'd get 1. One article I found says that non-unitarity could include things like a particle being in two different universes. [https://sureshemre.wordpress.com/2014/0 ... mechanics/]. Neither of those things counter the quantum field being material.

From the linked description:
"While amplituhedron theory provides an underlying geometric model, the geometrical space is not physical spacetime and is also best understood as abstract."

Unless you are suggesting that abstract things are material things, then the Amplituhedron Theory would appear to be demonstrating the possibility of an immaterial quantum field.

The premise does not claim that. Craig has argued that, scientifically speaking, the Big Bang is most likely the beginning of all material, but he does not limit his argument to that being true. One can assume that material existed prior to the Big Bang and the argument does not change.

Once again, I don't understand how the argument doesn't change if there is no justification to presume any material thing that existed prior to the Big Bang had its own beginning from a separate Big Bang. If Craig wants to assert that any material thing existing prior to the Big Bang must have also begun to exist by some cause, where is his supporting argument? We have no justifiable reason to believe, just because material things in our universe began to exist at the moment of the Big Bang, that any material thing existing prior to the Big Bang also began to exist.

The strongest argument, I think, is the "argument from the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition." Here is how Craig formulates it:

1. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite.
2. The temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition.
3. Therefore, the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite.

If an actual infinite can't be formed by successive addition, then the series of past events (whether that extends to the Big Bang or to a previous material state) must be finite. I don't want to presume you understand it or don't understand it, so I'll pause here for questions or thoughts.

The argument is conditional to a temporal series of events formed by successive addition that would extend to the "time" before the Big Bang. However, what reason is there to presume a temporal series of events formed by successive addition would or should extend to a fundamental quantum field that could possibly exist without a spacetime component?

[The Tanager]

2. The universe began to exist.

Nevertheless, the main point was that the conclusion of Craig's argument seems to be smuggled into the 2nd premise because it assumes without evidence that only immaterial things could have existed prior to the Big Bang.

Where does it do that? The 'universe' seems to me to cover all spatio-temporal matter. Assuming material things existed prior to the Big Bang does not change the argument.

From the linked description:
"While amplituhedron theory provides an underlying geometric model, the geometrical space is not physical spacetime and is also best understood as abstract."

Unless you are suggesting that abstract things are material things, then the Amplituhedron Theory would appear to be demonstrating the possibility of an immaterial quantum field.

I have a very limited understanding of this, but from a quick search the amplituhedron seems to be abstract in that it's not a thing, but a way to model the interactions between physical particles that makes calculations easier for physicists and they hope it will help with quantum gravity. But if it is an immaterial thing, I don't see how this affects the argument. The next quote/response continues this line of thought.

The argument is conditional to a temporal series of events formed by successive addition that would extend to the "time" before the Big Bang. However, what reason is there to presume a temporal series of events formed by successive addition would or should extend to a fundamental quantum field that could possibly exist without a spacetime component?

If the Big Bang was the start, then t=1 (the Big Bang itself) would be that first event. If this quantum field existed prior to it, it is either eternal or an event that should be called t=1, where t=2 would be the Big Bang. We could assume it is immaterial either way and the argument isn't affected. Craig's argument says there must be an immaterial personal cause in premise 4. It is there that he offers support that would rule out an immaterial quantum field, which would be impersonal. Before getting to that, I want to make sure we fully cover possible snags at premise 2 (and premise 3, although that seems to logically follow from 1 and 2 to me).

[bluegreenearth]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #24]

I'm not convinced that premise 2 is sufficiently supported. So, we can't proceed further until you can convince me that the universe (including a potential non-spatio-temporal quantum field that pre-existed the Big Bang) began to exist.

[The Tanager]

2. The universe began to exist.

I'm not convinced that premise 2 is sufficiently supported. So, we can't proceed further until you can convince me that the universe (including a potential non-spatio-temporal quantum field that pre-existed the Big Bang) began to exist.

I'm not exactly sure what you see as the problem for premise 2. The "universe" refers to all spatio-temporal matter. The non-spatio-temporal quantum field (if there is such a thing) would not be included in that term. At this stage of the argument, it would be a candidate for the cause of the "universe". Are you thinking that the argument is using "universe" as an antonym of "God," or something like that?

[bluegreenearth]

I'm not exactly sure what you see as the problem for premise 2. The "universe" refers to all spatio-temporal matter. The non-spatio-temporal quantum field (if there is such a thing) would not be included in that term. At this stage of the argument, it would be a candidate for the cause of the "universe". Are you thinking that the argument is using "universe" as an antonym of "God," or something like that?

I had the impression you were arguing that a fundamental non-spatio-temporal quantum field must have a begun to exist prior to the Big Bang and would not be accepted as a candidate.

[The Tanager]

I had the impression you were arguing that a fundamental non-spatio-temporal quantum field must have a begun to exist prior to the Big Bang and would not be accepted as a candidate.

I apologize for giving that impression. With this clarification, do you have further disagreements on premise 2? Or the inference to premise 3?

[bluegreenearth]

I apologize for giving that impression. With this clarification, do you have further disagreements on premise 2? Or the inference to premise 3?

I need another clarification. It is my understanding that the inference to premise 3 refers to the "universe" as everything back to the moment of the Big Bang. Is that correct?

[The Tanager]

I need another clarification. It is my understanding that the inference to premise 3 refers to the "universe" as everything back to the moment of the Big Bang. Is that correct?

That is not my understanding. I mean, it could, if the Big Bang is the actual start of all spatio-temporal matter, but it does not have to be as far as the argument is concerned.