Atheist Bart Ehrman gets the historicity of miracles wrong.

[Paul of Tarsus]

I've watched the Ehrman vs Craig: Evidence for Resurrection debate video on YouTube several times, and as usual I am less than impressed with the polemics of Bart Ehrman. This time his fallacy involves the historicity of miracles and in particular the miracle of Christ's resurrection. His reasoning goes something like the following:

1. Miracles are the least likely correct explanation for any supposed historical event.
2. The story of the resurrection of Christ is a narrative of an event that if true requires a miraculous explanation.
Conclusion: Any naturalistic explanation of the story of Christ's being raised from the dead is more likely correct than an explanation that allows for the supernatural.

Is it true that miracles are so unlikely that any non-supernatural explanation for a claimed event is more likely true? I'm not sure why Ehrman seems to think miracles are so unlikely. While it's true that miracles are evidently rare, how probable they may be depends on the evidence for them. Ehrman seems to maintain a naturalistic view of miracles based more on an atheistic assumption than on any kind of evidence for them. That's not good reasoning.

I'd like to conclude this OP by pointing out that since I've been debating atheists, I can see that their reasoning is often as bad if not worse than the arguments made by apologists. It seems to me that there would be more atheists in the world if people stopped trying to disprove God.

[nobspeople]

[Replying to Paul of Tarsus in post #4]

Is it true that miracles are so unlikely that any non-supernatural explanation for a claimed event is more likely true?

Probably. I would think we'd need to understand more about the universe than we really do to answer it more completely.

It's not so much about the probability that some event was a miracle or not, as I see it we have no verified accounts establishing that any so-called miracle has ever actually occurred. Claims are a dime a dozen and do not constitute evidence.

I don't disagree, in total. My 'probably' was as way to say 'hhhmm...might be.' But for some claims, they might be real, we just don't yet understand the possible method of said miracle. In other words, I won't discount it because it can't be shown to be FALSE, but weigh it against the current thinking and decide at that point.

[brunumb]

But for some claims, they might be real, we just don't yet understand the possible method of said miracle. In other words, I won't discount it because it can't be shown to be FALSE, but weigh it against the current thinking and decide at that point.

That sounds a lot like 'miracle of the gaps'. There is no reason to introduce miracles to explain what we don't understand in much the same way as we don't need gods either. The unlikely and the unexplained are just that. People use the idea of miracles via some sort of divine intervention to prop up their religious belief.

[bluegreenearth]

[Replying to Paul of Tarsus in post #31]

First, it should be noted that in most of Dr. Ehrman's lectures, debates, and books, he doesn't claim his purpose or goal is to disprove the existence of God or to disabuse people of their faith in God. My understanding could be in error, but Dr. Ehrman doesn't seem to claim that a miracle could not have possibly occurred either. Instead, I suspect his intention was to point out where the historical method cannot reliably determine the probability that a genuine miracle historically occurred. The problem is the fact that many miracle claims have no implicit empirical basis for historians to know if the described events could even be possible in reality or not. If historians cannot know if miracles could possibly occur in reality or not, how can they calculate the probability that an unexplained historical even was caused by a miracle?

For instance, the probability of a coin toss landing on one particular side of the coin is calculated by dividing the number of events (one coin toss) by the number of possible outcomes (landing on one side of the coin or the other). We know it is possible for a tossed coin to land on either the "heads" side or the "tails" side. Therefore, we can calculate the probability that a tossed coin will land on one particular side of the coin is 50% (1 event / 2 possible outcomes). However, if we replace the coin with another object that has an unknown number of sides which cannot be observed for us to know if any of its sides features a "heads" or a "tails" or a series of dots or an alpha-numeric symbol or a picture of a duck, etc., what would be the probability of the object landing on the color blue when tossed? It is impossible to calculate that probability because we don't know if the color blue is featured on any of the object's unknown number of sides for us to know it is even a possible candidate. While it is logically possible for the color blue to be featured on one of the object's sides, the mere logical possibility alone doesn't allow us to know if it appears on one of the sides in reality. Equivalently, historians cannot calculate the probability of a particular miracle being the cause of an unexplained historical event because such a miraculous event has never been reliably demonstrated to occur in reality for it to be considered a possible candidate explanation, much less the most probable explanation. Once again, it is important to note this reasoning does not imply that it would be impossible for a miracle to be the cause of an unexplained historical event, but there doesn't appear to be sufficiently reliable evidence to demonstrate it is possible either. In other words, agnosticism appears to be the only justifiable perspective at this point.

Even if someone were to reliably and convincingly demonstrate the possibility for a genuine miracle to occur in reality, it will be impossible to distinguish an unexplained historical event that was caused by a genuine miracle from the vast majority of other unexplained events that have been mistakenly identified as miraculous. This is because we know it is possible for people to mistake an event they couldn't explain at the time for a miraculous event. As such, given a set of equivalently supported miracle claims, a historian has no method by which to determine which claims describe historical events that were caused by genuine miracles and which claims mistakenly describe unexplained historical events as being caused by miracles. So, is it your expectation that experts such as Dr. Ehrman declare particular miracle claims to be historical without having a reliable way to know if they are even possible or without a reliable way to distinguish those unexplained events from other unexplained events which have been mistakenly identified as miraculous?

Furthermore, unlike the evidence supporting falsifiable natural explanations for seemingly miraculous events, the types of evidence many theists insist should be sufficient for a historian to establish the historicity of a miracle claim would eventually produce multiple competing or contradictory conclusions when consistently applied to all equivalently supported miracle claims. If historians agreed to operate within the criteria and methods you and other theists have suggested and declared various miracle claims from competing religious traditions to be historical events, would you become a polytheist in accordance with that outcome? If not, what would be your justification for accepting the historicity of miraculous events claimed by one particular religious tradition while, at the same time, rejecting the historicity of equivalently supported claims of miracles by other religious traditions? If someone were to suggest the miraculous events claimed by the other religions were also historical but were the product of demonic supernatural forces trying to mislead people away from the one true God, what would be a reliable method for distinguishing between an unexplained event caused by the one true God, an unexplained event caused by a supernatural demon, and an unexplained event caused by an unknown natural cause?

For the reasons expressed and implied above, historians must either default to falsifiable natural explanations for seemingly miraculous historical events or remain agnostic regarding the question of whether miracles have historically occurred or not. Would it be intellectually honest and wise for theists to do the same?

Is it possible that the sunk cost fallacy many theists have constructed for themselves facilitates confirmation bias in the evaluation of evidence supporting their particular miracle claims? Could that possibility explain why many theists are able to recognize where logical fallacies and other errors exist in all arguments except for their own?

[Stelar_7]

Is it true that miracles are so unlikely that any non-supernatural explanation for a claimed event is more likely true?

Yes,

Until such time as miracles are demonstrated to actually happen there is no method to place any number for the likelihood of a miracle.

[Mithrae]

That sounds a lot like 'miracle of the gaps'. There is no reason to introduce miracles to explain what we don't understand in much the same way as we don't need gods either. The unlikely and the unexplained are just that. People use the idea of miracles via some sort of divine intervention to prop up their religious belief.

Except of course for those - such as myself - without religious belief who have nevertheless concluded the probability that miracles do occur.

In yet a fourth discussion on the subject (fifth actually, including the one on probability linked earlier) the notion of 'unexplained' events became an interesting point of discussion. It seems a common error or rhetorical device to conflate the idea of something being scientifically unexplained or naturally unexplained with just being unexplained period. Explaining observed phenomena means situating them within a broader, coherent theory based on metrics of (a) parsimony/elegance/simplicity, (b) breadth/scope/comprehensiveness and (c) depth/specificity/predictive capacity. Scientific explanations strive towards all three of these metrics and are obviously the best explanations, where available; but even scientific explanations are rarely if ever final or absolutely conclusive, and many viable non-scientific explanations are far from absolute. Thus in the case of the thoroughly investigated instances of rapid, medically unexplained cures of serious illnesses which have been documented at Lourdes for example, they cannot be situated within a theory of naturalism without various ad hoc suppositions (at the expense of parsimony) which contribute little or nothing towards understanding of other observations (hence having little breadth of explanatory power), although in some cases may have some depth or specificity regarding the speculated mechanism for the healing. On the other hand they could be situated within a theory of theism as miraculous healings with excellent parsimony, a view whose scope obviously has the potential to cover a range of different otherwise-unexplained events as well, albeit with little depth, specificity or predictive capacity as to how and when such miracles occur.

So would declaring that those observed healings are 'unexplained' merely because they can't be situated very well within a theory of philosophical or scientific naturalism (while they can be situated reasonably well within a theory of theism, and obviously have been by many people) be an accurate description of the facts, or more of a rhetorical ploy stemming from the baseless presumption that only naturalist explanations are viable?

[nobspeople]

But for some claims, they might be real, we just don't yet understand the possible method of said miracle. In other words, I won't discount it because it can't be shown to be FALSE, but weigh it against the current thinking and decide at that point.

That sounds a lot like 'miracle of the gaps'. There is no reason to introduce miracles to explain what we don't understand in much the same way as we don't need gods either. The unlikely and the unexplained are just that. People use the idea of miracles via some sort of divine intervention to prop up their religious belief.

Yes and no. I think it depends on where one comes: if you're less scientifically minded, the idea that these might be miracles is a desirable one. On the other hand, as you say, what's the point of entertaining the idea of miracles if there's nothing pointing to that conclusion? Other than to make one content. Sometimes, being 'content' is all a person wants

[Mithrae]

the fact that many miracle claims have no implicit empirical basis for historians to know if the described events could even be possible in reality or not.

You and I discussed the 'presumption of impossibility' angle at length back in August:

• Bluegreenearth wrote: To demonstrate where an explanation is possible is to disprove the potential for the explanation to be impossible. If you cannot disprove the impossibility of the explanation, then it is unfalsifiable and cannot be known as possible or impossible.
  
  Mithrae wrote: Perhaps it would help in clarifying what you even mean if we consider the proposition that "it impossible that all matter and energy in the universe behaves and interacts identically under identical circumstances; as explanations for observed phenomena, that kind of appeal to physical laws simply cannot work." How would you go about disproving the potential for a 'physical laws' explanation to be impossible? This was my third original objection to your argument, obviously - how would you prove an explanation such as physical laws to be 'possible' - to which you objected that science is not in the business of proving unfalsifiable claims... but now you're asserting that demonstrating such a thing to be possible is really the disproof of its potential impossibility.
  
  Bluegreenearth wrote: The observed existence of the universe's physical properties (i.e. laws) disproves the claim that their existence is impossible.
  
  Mithrae wrote: No it doesn't. It proves the behaviour/properties of the things which we observe; it doesn't prove or even imply anything about the behaviour or properties of things which we haven't observed (or 'disprove the impossibility' of those behaviours/properties in things we haven't observed) without first adopting the presumption that matter and energy behave and interact the same ways in distinct but comparable circumstances... which is exactly the idea whose impossibility you are trying to disprove.
  
  Pending a non question-begging response to this difficulty, it seems clear that the problem I raised all the way back in post #5 still stands unchallenged no matter how many double negatives are thrown at it: Your argument that we must first have "a reliable demonstration that claim X is empirically possible" undermines the idea of universal physical laws (or presumption of consistent behaviour/properties beyond the scope of observation) as much if not moreso than specific observations explained as miraculous.

[bluegreenearth]

the fact that many miracle claims have no implicit empirical basis for historians to know if the described events could even be possible in reality or not.

You and I discussed the 'presumption of impossibility' angle at length back in August:

• Bluegreenearth wrote: To demonstrate where an explanation is possible is to disprove the potential for the explanation to be impossible. If you cannot disprove the impossibility of the explanation, then it is unfalsifiable and cannot be known as possible or impossible.
  
  Mithrae wrote: Perhaps it would help in clarifying what you even mean if we consider the proposition that "it impossible that all matter and energy in the universe behaves and interacts identically under identical circumstances; as explanations for observed phenomena, that kind of appeal to physical laws simply cannot work." How would you go about disproving the potential for a 'physical laws' explanation to be impossible? This was my third original objection to your argument, obviously - how would you prove an explanation such as physical laws to be 'possible' - to which you objected that science is not in the business of proving unfalsifiable claims... but now you're asserting that demonstrating such a thing to be possible is really the disproof of its potential impossibility.
  
  Bluegreenearth wrote: The observed existence of the universe's physical properties (i.e. laws) disproves the claim that their existence is impossible.
  
  Mithrae wrote: No it doesn't. It proves the behaviour/properties of the things which we observe; it doesn't prove or even imply anything about the behaviour or properties of things which we haven't observed (or 'disprove the impossibility' of those behaviours/properties in things we haven't observed) without first adopting the presumption that matter and energy behave and interact the same ways in distinct but comparable circumstances... which is exactly the idea whose impossibility you are trying to disprove.
  
  Pending a non question-begging response to this difficulty, it seems clear that the problem I raised all the way back in post #5 still stands unchallenged no matter how many double negatives are thrown at it: Your argument that we must first have "a reliable demonstration that claim X is empirically possible" undermines the idea of universal physical laws (or presumption of consistent behaviour/properties beyond the scope of observation) as much if not moreso than specific observations explained as miraculous.

The point you attempted to make at the time was unclear to me. Reading it again, I still don't understand your objection. Instead of referring to another older conversation, please describe your objection in the context of this topic. Hopefully, I'll understand your point this time around. Are you suggesting that it is possible to calculate the probability of a miracle without knowing if a miracle is possible or not?

[Mithrae]

The point you attempted to make at the time was unclear to me. Reading it again, I still don't understand your objection. Instead of referring to another older conversation, please describe your objection in the context of this topic. Hopefully, I'll understand your point this time around.

As its core my objection is that you have not demonstrated any genuine problem with the viability of miracle explanations. Your claim that something must be "reliably demonstrated to occur in reality for it to be considered a possible candidate explanation" is quite simply incorrect. If you still don't understand why it's incorrect that's obviously a bit of a problem in terms of discussion - our last exchange didn't end particularly well, as you may recall - but obviously the onus falls primarily on you to demonstrate why some reported observations or explanations should be excluded from consideration.

The section of our exchange which I quoted above (the third of four main counter-points which I raised in the August thread) seems straightforward enough: Your reasons for excluding the miraculous from consideration would apparently exclude the notion of physical laws/consistency of nature as much if not moreso. An untenable conclusion implies an untenable argument. I can't see why that is difficult to understand, but I don't think it's possible to express it any simpler than that.

Are you suggesting that it is possible to calculate the probability of a miracle without knowing if a miracle is possible or not?

Until such time as miracles are demonstrated to actually happen there is no method to place any number for the likelihood of a miracle.

So that we can first establish a baseline of what we're all talking about here, how would you guys calculate a number for the likelihood of any human behaviour? If you're merely pointing out the uncertainty and imprecision inherent in the case of miracle explanations, to greater or lesser extents the same is obviously true for all non-scientific and most scientific explanations also, particularly those involving agency. That's obviously not a problem distinguishing and excluding the miraculous from consideration.

Alternatively (as suggested and linked in post #14) this may be simply a misapplication of a frequentist view of probability which will be problematic in the case of most singular, rare or nonexistent phenomena: The idea that probabilities can be estimated or at least compared through the relative frequency of events (eg. arson versus spontaneous combustion, erosion versus earthquakes) is a useful one, but can't really be applied validly in cases where there's not enough information to infer the statistical significance of the data points. Obviously that also is not a unique issue which should exclude the miraculous from consideration, simply a case of trying to use the wrong tool for the job.

[Paul of Tarsus]

That may be true for some people, but I won't put faith in any claim that lacks good reason and evidence.

Would you please share some of those good reasons and evidence that has convinced you that some of the claimed miracles actually occurred.

Again, this is not a debate about proving miracles, but just for the record, Christian miracles are evidenced by eyewitness accounts and documentation.