One of the best arguments for God

[AquinasForGod]

One of the best arguments for God is the response to the modal ontological argument.

To read my full argument, go here - https://www.freelymeditate.com/single-p ... ts-for-god

And to read about ontological arguments and the modal ontological argument go to the Standard Encyclopedia of Philosophy - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/onto ... n%20alone.

Question for Debate: Can atheists prove God is impossible?

The reason that is the question for debate is because that is the counter to Plantinga's ontological argument. If you read the link to the SFP, provided above, you will notice that his ontological argument is valid. This means that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. Thus to show the argument is not sound, you must show one of the premises are untrue. The only premise that you can really do that with is the first premise, which is that God is possible.

You could reject modal logic, I suppose, but that doesn't seem reasonable.

Also, the so-called defeater to this argument is why this argument is so good. It runs the argument in reverse, called a symmetry breaker. However, to run this argument in reverse is simply to state that God is impossible. Who argues that? Thus my question for debate. Can you argue that God is impossible?

If you wish to use the so-caleld symmetry breaker to the modal ontological argument to claim you defeated the argument, then you must defend the first premise, which is that God cannot exist in any possible world, yet that seems wrong. Why would God be impossible?

If you cannot defend the first premise, then you haven't defeated the argument. In other words, if you agree that God is possible, then Plantinga's argument goes through. It is sound and thus God is true.

In other words, you have to claim Plantinga's first premise is not true, which states that God is possible. If that premise is false, then you are saying God is impossible.

His argument is so powerful because it only leaves you with a few options.

1. God exists.
2. God is impossible, and cannot possibly exist. (Good luck trying to argue that. )
3. Reject modal logic.

[AquinasForGod]

When one of the "best arguments" is "it's possible", I'll just start using that when the pretty thing asks if I picked up the yard like she told me.

It's possible I'm me the smartest one here among us. How many of y'all're willing to hang your hat on that hook?

Now take us from your possibly being the smartest person to you actually being the smartest person because that is what Plantinga's argument does for God.

[JoeyKnothead]

When one of the "best arguments" is "it's possible", I'll just start using that when the pretty thing asks if I picked up the yard like she told me.

It's possible I'm me the smartest one here among us. How many of y'all're willing to hang your hat on that hook?

Now take us from your possibly being the smartest person to you actually being the smartest person because that is what Plantinga's argument does for God.

Do you know what "possibly" means?

If not, wanna play some poker?

A possible god is hardly a confirmation.

That's like saying it's possible the pretty thing won't get upset if I told her I was the one one that broke the lamp after she said no football in the house. Sure, it's possible she won't get upset, but who wants to take that chance?

[The Tanager]

Consider first what possible and necessary means in modal logic, since Plantinga is using a modal argument.

Possible - complete and consistent to the world being described. All the propositions about the possible world need to be consistent.
Necessary - The propositions are true in every possible world, i.e. consistent in every possible world.

You can try to do it. Come up with propositions about a unicorn and see if they can be consistent in every world. Can we imagine a world in which this unicorn doesn't exist or could have existed never obtained? If so, then it is not necessary.

The propositions about God is that God is maximally great. God is all powerful, for example. This is consistent with a possible world. Is there any possible world where it is inconsistent for there to exist a being that is all powerful? It doesn't seem so. No one is arguing for such an impossibility. What would a an all powerful being be in conflict with?

Because God is consistent with every possible world, then God is possibly necessary.

I'm still not seeing the difference between imagining a necessary unicorn and a necessary God. Why can't we imagine a world without a necessary God, if we can imagine a world without a necessary unicorn? Is there any possible world where it is inconsistent for there to exist a unicorn that has necessary existence?

[benchwarmer]

[Replying to AquinasForGod in post #1]

We've somewhat beaten this topic to death in previous threads. Here is one for your perusal if interested:

Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=38217&start=190

The main issue (regarding your point of possible versus impossible), is that we don't in fact know if a god is possible or not. We colloquially say "sure, it's possible", but that just really means "I don't know".

So, you would have to show that it's ACTUALLY possible for a god (however you want to define it) can exist or we have the same issue as with 'impossible'. It may not actually be physically possible for this god people are imagining to actually exist. Maybe it is. We don't actually know.

There is a built in 'bait and switch' going on with the word 'possible' in this argument. When we can't actually know whether to plug in 'possible' or 'impossible', then that premise is kind of dead. At the very least, whatever conclusion pops out the bottom of the argument MUST carry with it the same uncertainty as the premise. You can't go from "I don't know" to "God is real!".

That is not what possible and impossible mean in modal logic.

A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world could have been. In other words, a possible world is a logical world.

Ok, fair enough, however:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_logic

In classical modal logic, a proposition is said to be

possible if it is not necessarily false (regardless of whether it is actually true or actually false);
necessary if it is not possibly false (i.e. true and necessarily true);
contingent if it is not necessarily false and not necessarily true (i.e. possible but not necessarily true);
impossible if it is not possibly true (i.e. false and necessarily false).

So 'possible' still means we don't know if it's actually true or false. Any premise that uses that word is equivalent to "We don't know". i.e. We don't know if a god (or God) is possible in the modal sense either. It's just a proposition. You can crank a "we don't know" premise through whatever logical argument you like, that doesn't somehow change it to a "We know" premise at the end.

That's all before we get to "maximally great" which is really defined however the person wants it to be. i.e. they load whatever they want to fall out the bottom of the argument into the premises. Maybe I think it's maximally great to be maximally tall. However, a maximally great being in my definition can't walk under a maximally low bar. So how maximally 'great' is it really? We can crank whatever definition we want through the same argument and arrive at different entities. That should be a red flag to the issue.

Example:

From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/onto ... %20perfect.

The “victorious” modal ontological argument of Plantinga 1974 goes roughly as follows: Say that an entity possesses “maximal excellence” if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. Say, further, that an entity possesses “maximal greatness” if and only if it possesses maximal excellence in every possible world—that is, if and only if it is necessarily existent and necessarily maximally excellent. Then consider the following argument:

There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
(Hence) There is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.

My argument using the exact same template:

Say that an entity possesses “maximal evilness” if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally bankrupt. Say, further, that an entity possesses “maximal badness” if and only if it possesses maximal evilness in every possible world—that is, if and only if it is necessarily existent and necessarily maximally evil. Then consider the following argument:

There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal badness.
(Hence) There is an entity which possesses maximal badness.

Well how about that? Now we have two omnipotent, omniscient beings with the opposite moral compass. We can keep going and poof into existence however many different entities we want using this method. Fun

[JoeyKnothead]

[Replying to AquinasForGod in post #1]

We've somewhat beaten this topic to death in previous threads. Here is one for your perusal if interested:

Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=38217&start=190

The main issue (regarding your point of possible versus impossible), is that we don't in fact know if a god is possible or not. We colloquially say "sure, it's possible", but that just really means "I don't know".

So, you would have to show that it's ACTUALLY possible for a god (however you want to define it) can exist or we have the same issue as with 'impossible'. It may not actually be physically possible for this god people are imagining to actually exist. Maybe it is. We don't actually know.

There is a built in 'bait and switch' going on with the word 'possible' in this argument. When we can't actually know whether to plug in 'possible' or 'impossible', then that premise is kind of dead. At the very least, whatever conclusion pops out the bottom of the argument MUST carry with it the same uncertainty as the premise. You can't go from "I don't know" to "God is real!".

That is not what possible and impossible mean in modal logic.

A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world could have been. In other words, a possible world is a logical world.

Ok, fair enough, however:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_logic

In classical modal logic, a proposition is said to be

possible if it is not necessarily false (regardless of whether it is actually true or actually false);
necessary if it is not possibly false (i.e. true and necessarily true);
contingent if it is not necessarily false and not necessarily true (i.e. possible but not necessarily true);
impossible if it is not possibly true (i.e. false and necessarily false).

So 'possible' still means we don't know if it's actually true or false. Any premise that uses that word is equivalent to "We don't know". i.e. We don't know if a god (or God) is possible in the modal sense either. It's just a proposition. You can crank a "we don't know" premise through whatever logical argument you like, that doesn't somehow change it to a "We know" premise at the end.

That's all before we get to "maximally great" which is really defined however the person wants it to be. i.e. they load whatever they want to fall out the bottom of the argument into the premises. Maybe I think it's maximally great to be maximally tall. However, a maximally great being in my definition can't walk under a maximally low bar. So how maximally 'great' is it really? We can crank whatever definition we want through the same argument and arrive at different entities. That should be a red flag to the issue.

Example:

From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/onto ... %20perfect.

The “victorious” modal ontological argument of Plantinga 1974 goes roughly as follows: Say that an entity possesses “maximal excellence” if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. Say, further, that an entity possesses “maximal greatness” if and only if it possesses maximal excellence in every possible world—that is, if and only if it is necessarily existent and necessarily maximally excellent. Then consider the following argument:

There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
(Hence) There is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.

My argument using the exact same template:

Say that an entity possesses “maximal evilness” if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally bankrupt. Say, further, that an entity possesses “maximal badness” if and only if it possesses maximal evilness in every possible world—that is, if and only if it is necessarily existent and necessarily maximally evil. Then consider the following argument:

There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal badness.
(Hence) There is an entity which possesses maximal badness.

Well how about that? Now we have two omnipotent, omniscient beings with the opposite moral compass. We can keep going and poof into existence however many different entities we want using this method. Fun

Brilliant.

We can frame "possible" to reach any conclusion we want.

Like a hair lip mule who takes top billing at the Grand Ole Opry.

[POI]

One of the best arguments for God is the response to the modal ontological argument.

Is this argument then why most people become God believers? Probably not.

Heck, do (many/most/all) believers know what this argument even is and proposes? Probably not.

Does this then mean people are coming to their beliefs in god for inferior/lesser reasons?

So if it's the best argument, why is it not a "house hold" one? Too difficult to understand, other?

[TRANSPONDER]

[Replying to TRANSPONDER in post #4]

You don't seem to be familiar with the arguments. You should read the link I provided, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Anselm's ontological argument is not the same as Plantinga's modal ontological argument. Modal logic did not exist in Anselm's day.

Plantinga's modal ontological argument is valid. That is not in question. The question is if it is sound. To argue against the soundness of it, you must show a premise is false, which hasn't been done yet. Running the argument in reverse doesn't show the first premise is false. It shows the argument can run in reverse, which it can. However, if there is no defense for the first premise, God is impossible, then the argument is not shown to be sound.

If we try to place a perfect Island or perfect human into Plantinga's argument, it doesn't work because these things are not necessary. We can imagine a possible world where a human is the best a human can possibly be, but we can also imagine a world where humans never exist, so a perfect human is not possible in all worlds, thus a perfect human is not necessary.

There is no world where a maximally great being is impossible, thus it is necessary because it possibly exist in every world. If this is wrong, please argue for the world where a maximally great being is not possible.

BTW, in modal logic a possible world means a consistent world in logic. And impossible world is a world that is not consistent in logic.

Well, you apparently didn't trouble to follow up the 'link' i suggested to see why the ontological argument is absurd. The thing is that Anselm (from what I read) knows that claiming what can be imagined must exist is absurd, so tries to fiddle some waffle about there must be some greater thing that makes it impossible that we could imagine the (apparently lesser) greater thing if the greater didn't exist.

Certainly, the basis appears absurd, and I have already remarked before that a valid but absurd (or unsound) proposition requires that the criteria or parameters be re - checked. And that seems to come down to what can be imagined doesn't have to exist, and Anselm's waffle trying to argue that it must seems nonsense. And nonsense no matter whether it is Anselm or Plantinga's repackaging of it.

I needn't reiterate the question of'which god?'as we know that the idea is to wangle the 'god' label into apparent credibility ready for the Leap of faith to Biblegod. But it may be that we may well..in fact,do...have a greater reality than what we know of, which is existing reality. But while that is just bigger (aka 'greater'- which doesn't have to mean 'more perfect') that doesn't make it 'God'. So the problem may be yet again assuming as the logical basis what the logical proposition is supposed to prove; again the circular argument that renders so much theist apologetic invalid before it even gets started.

Well, I'll watch how we go, as you should have every chance to make this argument work, but for me, on the axiomatic three levels it fails before it even starts.

(the apologetic fails before it even starts as it depends on a circular Faith argument, and Philosophy, even when sound, is only hypothetical (and 'what is possible' or can't be proved impossible means nothing. and you can save the 'prove god doesn't exist'argument. The burden of proof is on you.) unlilscience validates this or that claim. Philosophy comes a cropper when it tries to act like research science. And even if one could validate a god (which requires intelligence, not just being a greater thing, which is more likely 'nature') you'd still have to show which one.

It looks to me like you have so many problems that a priori godfaith has that you ignore or not see, but you can't ignore them.

[AquinasForGod]

[Replying to TRANSPONDER in post #17]

There are many different arguments that are called ontological arguments. They are not the same arguments said by different people in different words. They are actually totally different arguments. I am speaking of Plantinga's modal ontological argument, which is valid, according to logicians. You can see this if you read the standard link I provided.

[AquinasForGod]

Consider first what possible and necessary means in modal logic, since Plantinga is using a modal argument.

Possible - complete and consistent to the world being described. All the propositions about the possible world need to be consistent.
Necessary - The propositions are true in every possible world, i.e. consistent in every possible world.

You can try to do it. Come up with propositions about a unicorn and see if they can be consistent in every world. Can we imagine a world in which this unicorn doesn't exist or could have existed never obtained? If so, then it is not necessary.

The propositions about God is that God is maximally great. God is all powerful, for example. This is consistent with a possible world. Is there any possible world where it is inconsistent for there to exist a being that is all powerful? It doesn't seem so. No one is arguing for such an impossibility. What would a an all powerful being be in conflict with?

Because God is consistent with every possible world, then God is possibly necessary.

I'm still not seeing the difference between imagining a necessary unicorn and a necessary God. Why can't we imagine a world without a necessary God, if we can imagine a world without a necessary unicorn? Is there any possible world where it is inconsistent for there to exist a unicorn that has necessary existence?

The problem is, a unicorn cannot be necessary because there are logically possible worlds where unicorns never obtain. Necessary ins modal logical means that the thing exists in every possible world.

Modal logical terms.

Possible: Proposition(s) true in at least one world.
Necessary: Proposition(s) true in every world.

Putt necessary in front of a random word doesn't make it necessary. We have to show why it is true in every possible world. We have to show how it cannot be otherwise. We have to show that there is no world in which the proposition is false.

The proposition that unicorns exists can be true in a logically possible world. However, it could also be untrue in a possible world, such as our world. It is possible in a world that unicorns never obtain.

The proposition that a maximally great being is true can be true in a possible world. If it is possible that a Maximally Great being Obtain in some world, then it is possible he can Obtain in all worlds because he is maximally great. He is all powerful, infinite, etc.

It is not possible that a unicorn can obtain in every possible world because it is limited.

Existence is an example of if it is possible in any world, then it is possible in all worlds, for there would be no world if there was no existence. Any world that obtains is an example of existence, so existence is necessary because it can exist in all worlds.

So to say something is necessary is to say that it could not have failed to exist.

One could argue for the necessity of numbers, for example.

Numbers possibly exist in a world. (Mathematical realism)
Numbers possibly exist in every world.
Numbers exist.

I am skipping steps because anyone familiar with modal logic knows why this works. However, I will briefly explain the second premise. How are numbers possible in ever world if they are possible in one world? Remember this is talking of numbers existing independently of minds. That numbers exists as abstract entities, similar to platonic forms. If numbers exist as real, abstract entities, then any world with a number of things will have real numbers, for in this view, real numbers like Platonic forms are how things are more than one.

Any world that could obtain, will consist of more than one thing, even if it was just space, for space is made up of many points. Now even if one wishes to say, no there could exist a world in which only space exist, or say only one thing exist, then the argument would only need to be modified to say numbers exist in all worlds that have more than one thing in them. Thus numbers are necessary in any world with more than one thing, and thus numbers exist in our world.

Someone could easily defeat this argument by arguing that mathematical realism is impossible. They would need to argue that numbers cannot exist in any world. They would thus argue for something like numbers are merely a human construct.

But notice to defeat the argument, they must argue for the impossibility of numbers existing. So when we argue for something that is possibly necessary, the only way to really defeat it is to argue for the impossibility of the things. With numbers this sort of works. One can be reasonable and claim numbers are merely a human construct.

But can they reasonably claim that God is impossible? Remember, this means God is not possible in any world. God could never obtain in any world. What might that argument look like?

[AquinasForGod]

One of the best arguments for God is the response to the modal ontological argument.

Is this argument then why most people become God believers? Probably not.

Heck, do (many/most/all) believers know what this argument even is and proposes? Probably not.

Does this then mean people are coming to their beliefs in god for inferior/lesser reasons?

So if it's the best argument, why is it not a "house hold" one? Too difficult to understand, other?

Does the title say it is the best or one of the best?