The "Supernatural": Burden of Proof?

[boatsnguitars]

Question:
Why should the burden of proof be placed on Supernaturalists (those who believe in the supernatural) to demonstrate the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural, rather than on Materialists to disprove it, as in "Materialists have to explain why the supernatural can't be the explanation"?

Argument:

Placing the burden of proof on Supernaturalists to demonstrate the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural is a logical and epistemologically sound approach. This perspective aligns with the principles of evidence-based reasoning, the scientific method, and critical thinking. Several key reasons support this stance.

Default Position of Skepticism: In debates about the supernatural, it is rational to start from a position of skepticism. This is in line with the philosophical principle of "nullius in verba" (take nobody's word for it) and the scientific principle that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Therefore, the burden of proof should fall on those making the extraordinary claim of the existence of the supernatural.

Presumption of Naturalism: Throughout the history of scientific inquiry, the default assumption has been naturalism. Naturalism posits that the universe and its phenomena can be explained by natural laws and processes without invoking supernatural entities or forces. This presumption is based on the consistent success of naturalistic explanations in understanding the world around us. After all, since both the Naturalist and Supernaturalist believe the Natural exists, we only need to establish the existence of the Supernatural (or, whatever someone decides to posit beyond the Natural.)

Absence of Empirical Evidence: The supernatural, by its very nature, is often described as beyond the realm of empirical observation and measurement. Claims related to the supernatural, such as deities, spirits, or paranormal phenomena, typically lack concrete, testable evidence. Therefore, it is incumbent upon those advocating for the supernatural to provide compelling and verifiable evidence to support their claims.

Problem of Unfalsifiability: Many supernatural claims are unfalsifiable: they cannot be tested or disproven. This raises significant epistemological challenges. Demanding that Materialists disprove unfalsifiable supernatural claims places an unreasonable burden on them. Instead, it is more reasonable to require Supernaturalists to provide testable claims and evidence.

In conclusion, the burden of proof should rest on Supernaturalists to provide convincing and verifiable evidence for the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural. This approach respects the principles of skepticism, scientific inquiry, and parsimonious reasoning, ultimately fostering a more rational and evidence-based discussion of the supernatural in the context of understanding our world and its mysteries.

If they can't provide evidence of the supernatural, then there is no reason for Naturalists to take their claims seriously: Any of their claims that include the supernatural. That includes all religious claims that involve supernatural claims.

I challenge Supernaturalists to defend the single most important aspect at the core of their belief. We all know they can't (they would have by now), but the burden is on them, and it's high time they at least give an honest effort.

Please note: Arguments from Ignorance will be summarily dismissed.

[boatsnguitars]

You are the one appealing to ignorance here. You are using supposed problems which arise from supposed ignorance about the nature of time to critique the Kalam. You aren’t arguing B-theory is true (which would defeat the Kalam) but arguing that since you don’t know what theory of time is true, you can conclude that the Kalam is false. No, figure out what theory of time is most reasonable to you and then, if that is B-theory, use that to argue against the Kalam.

This is definitely NOT the way to do philosophy. You don't pick what seems reasonable, and then carry on your merry way to argue against things.

You acknowledge the problem and understand all the implications. The point is to think about things in depth, not satisfy your religious beliefs.

To wit:
Time: A-theory or B-theory?
Other 542 / 931 (58.2%)
Accept or lean toward: B-theory 245 / 931 (26.3%)
Accept or lean toward: A-theory 144 / 931 (15.5%)
https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl

Most (58.2%) Philosophers don't lean towards A or B. William Lane Craig (apparently who you want to echo) simply decides it, and carries on his merry way - because he's not a philosopher. He's an Apologist. He only wants to find ways to support his preconceived beliefs.

Choosing A-Theory simply shows you have an agenda.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to boatsnguitars in post #201]

Of course you acknowledge the problem and understand all implications, thinking about things in depth; I’m not suggesting otherwise. What I said is you don’t just throw out logical possibilities as though that is enough to defeat an argument. If one thinks there are good reasons to believe in B-theory, then share them.

As to the philosophical survey, if anyone is viewing the “Other” category as something equivalent to a C-theory, D-theory, etc., then the 2020 survey is clearer on this issue: https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4918. 27% lean towards A-theory, 38% towards B-theory, 23% are agnostic, 3% accepted a combination of views, 3% accepted an alternative view, 4% said the question was too unclear to answer, 4% said there is no fact, and 1% chose ‘other’.

I was upfront that I think the Kalam relies on A-theory being true and am willing to talk about the nature of time, so there hasn’t been any “I’m simply deciding A-theory is true” nonsense. I believe A-theory for separate reasons from the Kalam. If I didn’t, I wouldn’t accept the Kalam as true and argue for it. If you want to reject the Kalam because you think a different theory of time is better, then bring that into the discussion instead of just assuming I've got an agenda and you can wave it away by sharing your pop-pyschologizing. Saying it’s logically possible that A-theory is false isn’t enough to avoid the conclusion of the Kalam. Remember that I’m not arguing that the Kalam is 100% certain (which is an irrational standard), but that it is the most reasonable conclusion to have.

[boatsnguitars]

[Replying to boatsnguitars in post #201]

Of course you acknowledge the problem and understand all implications, thinking about things in depth; I’m not suggesting otherwise. What I said is you don’t just throw out logical possibilities as though that is enough to defeat an argument. If one thinks there are good reasons to believe in B-theory, then share them.

As to the philosophical survey, if anyone is viewing the “Other” category as something equivalent to a C-theory, D-theory, etc., then the 2020 survey is clearer on this issue: https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4918. 27% lean towards A-theory, 38% towards B-theory, 23% are agnostic, 3% accepted a combination of views, 3% accepted an alternative view, 4% said the question was too unclear to answer, 4% said there is no fact, and 1% chose ‘other’.

I was upfront that I think the Kalam relies on A-theory being true and am willing to talk about the nature of time, so there hasn’t been any “I’m simply deciding A-theory is true” nonsense. I believe A-theory for separate reasons from the Kalam. If I didn’t, I wouldn’t accept the Kalam as true and argue for it. If you want to reject the Kalam because you think a different theory of time is better, then bring that into the discussion instead of just assuming I've got an agenda and you can wave it away by sharing your pop-pyschologizing. Saying it’s logically possible that A-theory is false isn’t enough to avoid the conclusion of the Kalam. Remember that I’m not arguing that the Kalam is 100% certain (which is an irrational standard), but that it is the most reasonable conclusion to have.

The reason to reject Kalam is that it makes unsubstantiated claims.

1. All swans are black.
2. Joe has a swan.
3. Therefore, Joe's swan is black.

If you decide that you ascribe to some A-Theory of color, in which all color is ultimately black, then you can go on your merry way and believe Joe's swan is black.

This is why I think you have an agenda. You believe there is a thing called the "Supernatural," you believe in a God, you realize that A-Theory gets Kalam working towards that goal - and WLC, the great Apologist - agrees, so I believe you have decided that as a package, they all go together to support your view. Then you come to a Debate site to make your assertions, even though in private you know you are playing leap frog with all your logical leaps, one after another.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to boatsnguitars in post #203]

If I was analyzing an argument that depended on an “A-theory of color,” one way to defeat that would be if I have a good reason to reject the A-theory of color. If I wanted to join an online discussion about that argument, and I felt that was its flaw, then I’d share why I reject the A-theory of color.

Or if I was agnostic on theories of color, I’d say something like “this argument seems to rely on the A-theory of color, but I’m agnostic there; I’d love to hear why you think the A-theory of color is true.” And then, if I'm not persuaded, I'd say B-theory seems the stronger theory for such-and-such reasons.

I would not say “it’s possible the B-theory of color is true, so your argument fails” because that isn’t a reasonable move. It’s not reasonable to reject something because there is some theory that, if true, would mean it is wrong, even though I don’t think it’s true. I also would not pop-pyscho-analyze my opponent because that isn’t a rational way to defeat the argument. Instead, it’s an ad hominem attack that ignores the rational analysis of the argument under question.

[boatsnguitars]

[Replying to boatsnguitars in post #203]

If I was analyzing an argument that depended on an “A-theory of color,” one way to defeat that would be if I have a good reason to reject the A-theory of color. If I wanted to join an online discussion about that argument, and I felt that was its flaw, then I’d share why I reject the A-theory of color.

Or if I was agnostic on theories of color, I’d say something like “this argument seems to rely on the A-theory of color, but I’m agnostic there; I’d love to hear why you think the A-theory of color is true.” And then, if I'm not persuaded, I'd say B-theory seems the stronger theory for such-and-such reasons.

I would not say “it’s possible the B-theory of color is true, so your argument fails” because that isn’t a reasonable move. It’s not reasonable to reject something because there is some theory that, if true, would mean it is wrong, even though I don’t think it’s true. I also would not pop-pyscho-analyze my opponent because that isn’t a rational way to defeat the argument. Instead, it’s an ad hominem attack that ignores the rational analysis of the argument under question.

So, let's get back to the OP. The issue is that you have a burden of proof to show the Supernatural exists. Perhaps one way you have decided to defend your claim is to use Kalam. In using Kalam, you simply picked a theory of time that is a minority view to support your case.

Since you have simply decided that you prefer A-Theory of time, and have no support to show it is more viable than the others, I can reject Kalam (since you admit it won't work with other theories of time). I think both theories, and the others, are compelling and can see why they are entertained by philosophers - but I don't have the training, or ability, to prove one theory over another - nor do experts.

If the experts can't come to a consensus, then I'd be a fool to decide for myself.

Further, even if A-Theory is true - Kalam doesn't lead to the Supernatural.

Now we are back to the beginning. You still haven't supported your claim that the Supernatural exists. You haven't defined it beyond the negative definition which I easily destroyed, and so I am still wondering why anyone has any reason to believe the Supernatural exists.

[William]

As I wrote "We can discuss the notion to agree for arguments sake that "The Universe" only refers to the bubble we are experiencing" and I agree that this appears to have had a beginning.

If you think I'm only talking about "the bubble we are experiencing," then you aren't understanding what I'm saying. My definition is not limited to the form of spatio-temporal matter that we are currently experiencing, but all of spatio-temporal matter in its entire history.

Explain that "entire history" you are refferring to.

[Replying to The Tanager in post #199]

I'm not putting any content into what the entire history consists of, if that is what you are asking for. I'm saying anything it actually consists of whether that began at the Big Bang, went on forever before the Big Bang, began at some point prior to the Big Bang, however many stages or cycles it has gone through, etc. "Entire history" just means "whatever it has been".

So how does this relate to your definition of The Universe? You appear to be saying "The Universe" doesn't mean the current manifestation we are experiencing but its "entire history" which you are unable to define - even to a point where it had a beginning.

How is this helpful re our current attempt at coming to a mutual agreement re defining "The Universe" that we can even discuss the notion re "Premise 2: The universe began to exist"? if the history of this "Universe" you are speaking about, has no context/content?

How could this thing without content which "may have began at the Big Bang, went on forever before the Big Bang, began at some point prior to the Big Bang, however many stages or cycles it has gone through, etc" be pointed to and proclaimed to have begun to exist"?

[alexxcJRO]

You are the one appealing to ignorance here. You are using supposed problems which arise from supposed ignorance about the nature of time to critique the Kalam. You aren’t arguing B-theory is true (which would defeat the Kalam) but arguing that since you don’t know what theory of time is true, you can conclude that the Kalam is false. No, figure out what theory of time is most reasonable to you and then, if that is B-theory, use that to argue against the Kalam.

Nonsensical ramblings devoid of any acuracy and nuance.
It like the difference between lacking a belief in God and having a disbelief in God.
Off course you would straw man or simply unable to understand small details.

Q: Can you comprehend the difference between having no justification or rational reason for having a belief and therefore lacking one to outright saying you have a disbelief?

Determinism is the doctrine that all events are ultimately determined by causes external to the human will. Libertarian free will says some events are ultimately determined by the human will. Libertarian free will is non-determinism without some element being uncaused by anything.

Q: But how does a choice apear sir?
Q: If I did not chose X because of cumulative past deterministic experiences, what triggers the choice?
It clear as day Libertarian free will needs to have some uncaused elements to it.

The quantum field is the material cause; without that there are no virtual particles.

Nonsense sir.
"However, the point is the timing of the event cannot be predicted yet and is potentially causeless. Saying they occur in a medium, in this case the quantum vacuum, is not relevant since the media does not explain the timing of the occurrence. Given current scientific understanding, it is difficult to say if some quantum events have a cause or not. This counter-argument still does not establish the argument premise with certainty."
https://religions.wiki/index.php/Not_al ... ave_causes

Could you rephrase this because I’m not understanding your point here. It sounds like since an alternative premise could be true, the premise I gave isn’t true.

One cannot use something he cannot know its true to prove another thing.

Our understanding of causality includes an efficient cause recombining pre-existing material (like a human…the efficient cause…making a computer out of already existing material...the material cause) and (possibly) non-efficient causation of recombining pre-existing material (like virtual particles in the quantum field having no efficient cause). This is all a part of “everything that begins to exist has a cause”. Then when “the universe has a cause” premise is referred to, it refers to the same. In further analysis of this cause, it is determined that it is has no material cause and, through argument for the cause being personal, excludes non-efficient causation.

There are no examples of causality where we do not have recombination of pre-existing entities and properties (material cause) involved in the process.
So we have equivocation between causality with the efficient cause/non-efficient causation + material cause and causality with only efficient cause.
We have a non-sequitor logical fallacy present too.

The Kalam’s ‘universe’ includes if our observable part of the multiverse is part of a multiverse. ‘Universe’ refers to all spatio-temporal matter, whether the multiverse is true or not.

When one says : "the universe began to exist" refers to Big Bang and/or A-theory time supposed problems.
But the omniverse might ultimatelly not suffer from this problems, ultimatelly being uncaused and begginless.
You cannot claim monopoly on the idea of uncaused and begginless omnithingy.

I didn’t say Occam’s razor trumps all. Simplicity is only valid if there is no other evidence to consider. One ultimate cause of the spatio-temporal universe versus multiple ultimate causes of the spatio-temporal universe is one of those situations.

Simplicity isn’t about what are maximally great making attributes. It’s about explaining some phenomena with the fewest assumptions because more assumptions means more unexplained things one could be wrong about which one’s theory is resting on with no support for that unexplained thing being true.

This exchange is simply ridiculous as this point.
1.
You cannot have it both ways.
Sir a one God is simpler then a triune one. QED.
2.
A naturalistic explanation is simpler because we know through observation that the physical natural world exist.
Adding a supernatural one on top of that adds to complexity.
QED.
3. Please don't ignore this:
Q: What does reality has to do with subjective thoughts of simplicity?
Reality does not care of our subjective thoughts of simplicity

Yes, I said that. And then you gave this example:

“Let's say I was accused of murder. But I am innocent of this fact. I have in fact not murdering anyone.
The state punishes me with the death penalty. The state benefits in killing me.
The state is wrong in doing so.

You keep saying but how is the state wrong! So dumb!”

Are you saying (1) the state is punishing you even though it thinks you are innocent or (2) the state is punishing you because it thinks you are guilty?

If (1), then why are you using the word ‘punishing’ when we’ve agreed that word shouldn’t be used in that situation? The state is harming you even though it thinks you are innocent. That would be a good analogy of my situation with Pete that you quoted above.

If (2), then that is clearly not a good analogy because I said Pete doesn’t think the mentally impaired individual is guilty of anything that deserves punishment.

You said: "He’s not punishing the mentally impaired individual, he thinks that individual is innocent and hasn't done anything to deserve the harm, it's just that harming that individual will benefit Pete and that's why he does "
1.
The above prompted this: "Let's say I was accused of murder. But I am innocent of this fact. I have in fact not murdering anyone.
The state punishes me with the death penalty. The state benefits in killing me.
The state is wrong in doing so."
Replace Pete with the state and voila analogy emerges.
QED.

2.
"If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck."
I could say I am not punishing you but practically I am doing just that.
Saying so does not make it so.
Evidence prove otherwise.


3. The dishonesty continues:
Sir did you forgot you asked me: "How does philosophical and logical analysis tell us punishing non-moral agents is wrong? What is that reasoning?"

[The Tanager]

[Replying to William in post #206]

It relates in that it takes away secondary questions so that the definition can be properly focused. A definition of a cat is something like: a small, carnivorous mammal with soft fur, a short snout, and retractable claws. The entire history of cats is not a part of that definition; that’s a separate question. It is the same with ‘universe’. Especially if “it’s history” is part of the question being asked after agreeing on a definition so that we can avoid begging that question by the definition.

[The Tanager]

Q: Can you comprehend the difference between having no justification or rational reason for having a belief and therefore lacking one to outright saying you have a disbelief?

Yes, I can. You said you disbelieve the Kalam, right? Why? One reason you offered is your lack of belief about the nature of time. That’s not a rational reason for disbelieving the Kalam.

Q: But how does a choice apear sir?
Q: If I did not chose X because of cumulative past deterministic experiences, what triggers the choice?
It clear as day Libertarian free will needs to have some uncaused elements to it.

A: The choice appears to be freely chosen.

A: Your will triggered the choice

What is the uncaused, non-deterministic element in Libertarian free will?

Nonsense sir.
"However, the point is the timing of the event cannot be predicted yet and is potentially causeless. Saying they occur in a medium, in this case the quantum vacuum, is not relevant since the media does not explain the timing of the occurrence. Given current scientific understanding, it is difficult to say if some quantum events have a cause or not. This counter-argument still does not establish the argument premise with certainty."
https://religions.wiki/index.php/Not_al ... ave_causes

This confuses efficient cause and material cause. No one is claiming the material cause (the medium) is the efficient cause (which determines the timing). Current scientific understanding isn’t clear on if there is efficient causation, but there is clearly a material cause (the medium).

One cannot use something he cannot know its true to prove another thing.

Thank you for clarifying that for me. Are you referring to A-theory here? If so, I think there is very good reason to believe A-theory is the proper nature of time. If I didn’t, I’d reject the Kalam.

There are no examples of causality where we do not have recombination of pre-existing entities and properties (material cause) involved in the process.
So we have equivocation between causality with the efficient cause/non-efficient causation + material cause and causality with only efficient cause.
We have a non-sequitor logical fallacy present too.

It is not an equivocation. In the premise “everything that begins to exist has a cause”, what is being claimed is that there is at least an efficient or material cause always present for things that begin to exist. Your statement above supports that being true.

That coupled with spatio-temporal matter having a beginning means that there is at least an efficient or material cause for spatio-temporal matter. But, logically, it can’t have a material cause because that would mean matter would be pre-existing the existence of matter, which is obviously illogical.

When one says : "the universe began to exist" refers to Big Bang and/or A-theory time supposed problems.
But the omniverse might ultimatelly not suffer from this problems, ultimatelly being uncaused and begginless.
You cannot claim monopoly on the idea of uncaused and begginless omnithingy.

The ‘universe began to exist’ doesn’t answer the question of when the ‘universe’ (spatio-temporal matter) began. It could have begun at the Big Bang. It could have preceded the Big Bang within some multiverse.

Are you proposing an omniverse that houses our universe is made up of spatio-temporal matter or that it’s not made up of that?

1.
You cannot have it both ways.
Sir a one God is simpler then a triune one. QED.
2.
A naturalistic explanation is simpler because we know through observation that the physical natural world exist.
Adding a supernatural one on top of that adds to complexity.
QED.
3. Please don't ignore this:
Q: What does reality has to do with subjective thoughts of simplicity?
Reality does not care of our subjective thoughts of simplicity

Simplicity isn’t subjective; it’s objective. That reality consists of the natural alone is objectively simpler than that reality consists of a natural world and a supernatural world. And I’ve agreed all along that reality doesn’t have to have the simplest explanations; it often won’t. What I’ve claimed is that if there is no other evidence or all the evidence points to a tie between competing theories, then the rational person will choose the simpler theory because there are less unexplained assumptions that make that theory work. Unexplained assumptions have no rational support for them and, therefore, have a good chance of being wrong. We want less of those in our theories.

I could say I am not punishing you but practically I am doing just that.
Saying so does not make it so.
Evidence prove otherwise.

It looks like you are just wanting to change the argument, so you can defeat it. How would you be practically punishing me? Punishing me for what? What does Pete really think the mentally impaired person did wrong and he’s lying about?

3. The dishonesty continues:
Sir did you forgot you asked me: "How does philosophical and logical analysis tell us punishing non-moral agents is wrong? What is that reasoning?"

I already noted that I didn’t initially catch us talking past each other with the term ‘punishing’ and how I should have used ‘harming’ to better reflect what I was asking you about.

[William]

[Replying to William in post #206]

It relates in that it takes away secondary questions so that the definition can be properly focused. A definition of a cat is something like: a small, carnivorous mammal with soft fur, a short snout, and retractable claws. The entire history of cats is not a part of that definition; that’s a separate question. It is the same with ‘universe’. Especially if “it’s history” is part of the question being asked after agreeing on a definition so that we can avoid begging that question by the definition.

The definition you offer is itself problematic and potentially begs questions. Since you define "The Universe" as including its entire history but leave the content of that history unspecified, this lack of specificity introduces ambiguity and opens the door to assumptions or implicit biases in discussions about the beginning of the universe.
In essence your argument allows for a double standard and as such must be rejected as sound and logical.
I contend that we should only work with what is available to us as clear evidence and define “The Universe” as that bubble mentioned and leave aside any of those notions you have mentioned which cannot be directly evidenced.