The "Supernatural": Burden of Proof?

[boatsnguitars]

Question:
Why should the burden of proof be placed on Supernaturalists (those who believe in the supernatural) to demonstrate the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural, rather than on Materialists to disprove it, as in "Materialists have to explain why the supernatural can't be the explanation"?

Argument:

Placing the burden of proof on Supernaturalists to demonstrate the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural is a logical and epistemologically sound approach. This perspective aligns with the principles of evidence-based reasoning, the scientific method, and critical thinking. Several key reasons support this stance.

Default Position of Skepticism: In debates about the supernatural, it is rational to start from a position of skepticism. This is in line with the philosophical principle of "nullius in verba" (take nobody's word for it) and the scientific principle that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Therefore, the burden of proof should fall on those making the extraordinary claim of the existence of the supernatural.

Presumption of Naturalism: Throughout the history of scientific inquiry, the default assumption has been naturalism. Naturalism posits that the universe and its phenomena can be explained by natural laws and processes without invoking supernatural entities or forces. This presumption is based on the consistent success of naturalistic explanations in understanding the world around us. After all, since both the Naturalist and Supernaturalist believe the Natural exists, we only need to establish the existence of the Supernatural (or, whatever someone decides to posit beyond the Natural.)

Absence of Empirical Evidence: The supernatural, by its very nature, is often described as beyond the realm of empirical observation and measurement. Claims related to the supernatural, such as deities, spirits, or paranormal phenomena, typically lack concrete, testable evidence. Therefore, it is incumbent upon those advocating for the supernatural to provide compelling and verifiable evidence to support their claims.

Problem of Unfalsifiability: Many supernatural claims are unfalsifiable: they cannot be tested or disproven. This raises significant epistemological challenges. Demanding that Materialists disprove unfalsifiable supernatural claims places an unreasonable burden on them. Instead, it is more reasonable to require Supernaturalists to provide testable claims and evidence.

In conclusion, the burden of proof should rest on Supernaturalists to provide convincing and verifiable evidence for the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural. This approach respects the principles of skepticism, scientific inquiry, and parsimonious reasoning, ultimately fostering a more rational and evidence-based discussion of the supernatural in the context of understanding our world and its mysteries.

If they can't provide evidence of the supernatural, then there is no reason for Naturalists to take their claims seriously: Any of their claims that include the supernatural. That includes all religious claims that involve supernatural claims.

I challenge Supernaturalists to defend the single most important aspect at the core of their belief. We all know they can't (they would have by now), but the burden is on them, and it's high time they at least give an honest effort.

Please note: Arguments from Ignorance will be summarily dismissed.

[The Tanager]

So the agent personality, wants or past experiences does not cause the choice in a deterministic way.

The free will neither has al least some uncaused elements that are independent of the agent's personality, wants or past experiences to it for would make problems for KALAM.

Q: How exactly does the choice appear?

The will is just another name for the agent’s wants. These wants are affected by their personality and past experiences, but those two things were also previously affected by their previous will/wants.

I’m not sure I understand the question, if it’s disconnected from what I just said.

Clearly said :
"There are maybe parts of the "omniverse" which are not temporal and gave rise to our temporal 4 dimensional manifold which makes our local universe."

Yes, but we must still get to an ultimate cause. In analyzing what this cause must be like, this “omniverse,” if it is a term to pick out the cause, isn’t material or impersonal (and the other characteristics I’ve listed). If we agree on the characteristics, you can give it any title you want as long as one doesn’t then equivocate on the term. I did already give some thoughts as to why it is personal and you didn't respond. Feel free to do so or wait until William and I reach that part of the conversation.

Any event or thing can have countless explanations for its existence.
Saying one cannot think of a naturalistic one does not mean there is not one or many.
Look at past ancient people: they could not think of the explanations that science has provided us today and explain how Earth formed, the Sun and stars formed, how the day night cycle works, how storms and rivers work.
I bet they were like you. I am ignorant of things, can't think of explanations. Therefore God.

You are doing the same thing they did, just disagreeing on what gets put after the “therefore”. They threw in God(s). You are throwing in your worldview. I think doing this kind of thing, wherever it leads one, is the problem. I'm not doing that. I'm saying there are good reasons to think God explains these things we are not ignorant of.

Choosing Allah would be choosing the simpler choice between competing theories.
Both are on the same footing: written ancient first/second/third/ ... testimonial evidence, claims of miracles, billions of believers.
So much for choosing the simpler choice between competing theories.

I do not think they are on the same footing, so it never comes down to simplicity for me on that issue. I could be wrong, but I’m being consistent in my approach to beliefs and the role of simplicity.

Sir if I am doing an exercise that perfectly resembles what is known as squats but I am denying doing them because I am a moron.
Q: Am I doing squats or not?

But the question is whether the exercise does perfectly resemble a squat. We don't agree it does, so asking that question just becomes empty rhetoric if continued. Show they resemble a squat instead of just acting like it obviously does.

[The Tanager]

OK, let me be very clear (again, as I feel I've covered this):
Philosophy is a process of investigating and trying to rephrase questions to ask the right questions and to try to understand complex issues - which doesn't mean come to an answer (necessarily) but to be able to see the whole problem laid bare - to learn how little you actually know.

Apologetics is a form of argumentation and debate that attempts to use Philosophy (and other tools) as a weapon to defend a fixed position.

You keep doing the latter - as if your questions to non-experts will arrive at some form of truth.

Why do you think philosophy is about learning how little you actually know? That is, itself, a philosophical belief. And a self-defeating one because if philosophy is about learning how little you actually know instead of also including things you do actually know (in the “beyond reasonable doubt” sense rather than 100% certainty), then there is no reason to think that belief is true.

I suppose what I am hoping from you is that you simply pull back from trying to arrive at a solution (as, you appear to force all unknowns to your favor) and simply tell us all what you feel the entire discussion entails - with or without God, since, as you must agree: One possible truth is that we live in a Universe in which there is no God, so why try to discount it?

At no time have I tried to force an unknown (in the sense I just talked about in the last bit) to my favor. I believe there are knowns that point to the belief in the supernatural and I’m going to lay that out for people to consider and critique. Any unknowns point nowhere and I won’t use any I am aware of. If you want to show it is an ‘unknown’ then I’m listening. My goal here is truth, whatever follows from that. I’m after truth, not trying to discount any particular thought because I don’t like it or whatever.

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #240]

If by "transcend" you are meaning it goes beyond the range or limits of anything which has a beginning, (such as The Universe - Bubble) I would agree with that assessment.

I mean that (at least at one point) it was immaterial and timeless.

That is too much of a jump of assumption.
I can agree that an eternal cause would have to be timeless, but there is nothing to say it would have to be immaterial.

1. An Immaterial Cause as the Source of Material is a contradiction and also invokes magic thinking by claiming material is able to be produced from nothing whereas a material cause has the material available in and of itself (eternally) and thus there is neither contradiction or magical thinking involved.

1. How is there a logical contradiction? Define the words and show the logical contradiction because I don’t see one.

The logical contradiction is taken at face value based upon your claim. Before your questions can be answered, you will first have to explain why you think it isn't a logical contradiction to claim that "at least at one point the eternal cause was immaterial".

I have already provided reasons as to why it needn't be thought of in that manner but can't add to that any fuller answer the question you ask, without more information from you first.

Since you do not understand why it is a contradiction, you need to give your own reasons for the claim in order to show it is not a logical contradiction, and if you cannot do so, then there is no reason why I need to explain any further than I have.

[The Tanager]

1. An Immaterial Cause as the Source of Material is a contradiction...

How is there a logical contradiction?

The logical contradiction is taken at face value based upon your claim. Before your questions can be answered, you will first have to explain why you think it isn't a logical contradiction to claim that "at least at one point the eternal cause was immaterial".

I have already provided reasons as to why it needn't be thought of in that manner but can't add to that any fuller answer the question you ask, without more information from you first.

Since you do not understand why it is a contradiction, you need to give your own reasons for the claim in order to show it is not a logical contradiction, and if you cannot do so, then there is no reason why I need to explain any further than I have.

Definition of a square = a plane figure with four equal straight sides and four right angles
Definition of a circle = a round plane figure whose boundary consists of points equidistant from a fixed point

A square circle is a logical contradiction because these two definitions cannot conceptually coexist. A plane figure cannot both have four right angles and equal straight sides and the boundary be equidistant from the center.

Immaterial cause = something non-physical that gives rise to an action, phenomenon, or condition.
Material effect (i.e., the source of material) = something physical that is the result or consequence of a cause.

You can combine these two concepts with no logical contradiction. These two definitions can conceptually coexist. Something non-physical giving rise to an action, phenomenon, or condition that is physical. No logical contradiction that I can see.

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #244]

You still haven't explained what an "immaterial" thing is, and until your do so, one cannot logically agree to its existence.

Immaterial cause = something non-physical that gives rise to an action, phenomenon, or condition.
Material effect (i.e., the source of material) = something physical that is the result or consequence of a cause.

If you are unable to explain an immaterial thing, then we should not assume that the eternal cause is immaterial.

You are not being asked to explain what an immaterial thing isn't, because like a square isn't a circle, both are still understood as physical things - real in their own right.
But how do you go about explaining something which is immaterial and caused material things?

If it is not a logical contradiction, the concept still logically contradicts what we know about physics. Only physical things cause other physical things.

So we can agree that the eternal cause is timeless but you have provided no logical reason as to why we should regard that cause as being immaterial.

You can combine these two concepts with no logical contradiction. These two definitions can conceptually coexist.

The existence of material is not a "concept" but a known fact. I do not think anyone can truly combine the concept of immaterialism with the actually of material - the fact of matter.

These two definitions can conceptually coexist.

Just because we can think up things does not mean that those things are true. The existence of material is not something we conceptualize. If you can really conceptualize an immaterial thing, then you should be able to explain what it is you see and how such can cause material to happen.

Something non-physical giving rise to an action, phenomenon, or condition that is physical. No logical contradiction that I can see.

In order for my accepting your presumption that the eternal cause is immaterial, you have no choice but to explain your concept fully and if you are unable to do so, then we can agree to drop the concept as useless/unnecessary to discussion and focus on the idea that the eternal cause is material.

Immaterial cause = something non-physical that gives rise to an action, phenomenon, or condition.

There is nothing known which fits this description. It is a made up thing about a made up concept.

Material effect (i.e., the source of material) = something physical that is the result or consequence of a cause.

This is an untrue description as all material effects = something that is the result/consequence of a material cause.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to William in post #245]

1. Why isn’t a negative definition a valid definition? Do you not understand terms like nobody, nowhere, infinite? If you do, then it’s not reasonable to fault my argument because it uses a negative concept.

2. Why must one be able to explain how an immaterial thing works to know whether it exists or not? Do you not believe anything works until you (or some expert) knows exactly how it works? Of course not. Medicinal chemicals worked long before we knew how they worked. It’s not reasonable to fault my argument because I’m not first detailing how the causation works.

3. Why is it a problem that something non-physical doesn’t conform to physics? Do you expect Tolkien’s works to give us truth about our history? Of course not. That’s because Tolkien’s works, by definition, are fictional and fictional works don’t conform to history. It’s not reasonable to fault my argument because non-physical things don’t act like physical things do; by definition they aren’t physical.

4. I agree that logical contradictions and whether something exists are two different things. We were talking about the first one because that is the first critique you brought up. Once you realize these above mistakes (or come back with a rebuttal to further the conversation to show me my mistakes), then we can move on to your claim of “magical thinking” if it was something in addition to your critique of “logical contradiction” and then, after that, the limitations comment (if something different still), and then what science tells us about matter.

[William]

[Replying to William in post #245]

1. Why isn’t a negative definition a valid definition? Do you not understand terms like nobody, nowhere, infinite? If you do, then it’s not reasonable to fault my argument because it uses a negative concept.

The terms are understood philosophically to be concepts rather than real things. If the definitions can be shown through philosophical argument to be necessary or unnecessary, then they can be accepted or rejected. This is why you have been asked to explain why such concepts are logically necessary in describing the eternal cause as being “necessarily immaterial”.

Your other questions and observations are beside the point. If there are no logical reasons for believing the eternal cause is immaterial, we do not have to wonder about it, so knowing how something works is related to that. Arguing "we don't know how it works" while asserting the assumption of its nature should be regarded as "immaterial" is simply a strawman argument.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to William in post #247]

Okay, to clarify, you don’t think the following three critiques are good critiques of my view?:

1. It’s not reasonable to believe the cause is immaterial because ‘immaterial’ is meaningless since it is a negative definition

2. It’s not reasonable to believe the cause is immaterial because it doesn’t conform to physics.

3. It’s not reasonable to believe the cause is immaterial because an immaterial cause producing a material effect is a logical contradiction.

I’m unsure of if you think this is a good critique:

4. It’s not reasonable to believe the cause is immaterial because we don’t know all the specifics of how an immaterial cause would create a material effect.

If you aren’t saying 1-4 are good critiques, then we can move on to the last thing I said a few posts back as reason for the cause being immaterial.

I said that science seems to show us that matter is, by its nature, temporal. If we are talking about the cause of all matter and matter is temporal, then matter needs a cause. The cause of matter would logically have to be immaterial.

So, are we only talking about this last bit? Or do you think any of 1-4 are still good critiques of my conclusion that the cause must be immaterial?

[William]

For now we will simply focus on your understanding of the universe as temporal matter.

We will have to revisit this because it seems we still need to agree on the definition of the universe as I think that may have something to do with the apparent confusion.

In short the matter is eternal and the universe bubble is organised matter or matter that is organised into objects and the space between the objects is also made of matter.

Thus the temporal matter you are referring to is the same as the organized matter I am referring to.

[The Tanager]

For now we will simply focus on your understanding of the universe as temporal matter.

We will have to revisit this because it seems we still need to agree on the definition of the universe as I think that may have something to do with the apparent confusion.

In short the matter is eternal and the universe bubble is organised matter or matter that is organised into objects and the space between the objects is also made of matter.

Thus the temporal matter you are referring to is the same as the organized matter I am referring to.

Do you mean 'eternal' as a synonym of 'timeless' here? If so, I'm saying matter, by its nature, is time-bound versus timeless. It seems to be that matter is the kind of stuff, where its particles are in constant motion. It's not just that it is logically possible it could be moving, but a feature of being matter is that its particles are in motion. To then say that there is this matter, but remove that element to get the eternal matter, would seem to change what matter is to where we shouldn't call the eternal stuff the same 'matter' as the matter in 'organized matter'.