The "Supernatural": Burden of Proof?

[boatsnguitars]

Question:
Why should the burden of proof be placed on Supernaturalists (those who believe in the supernatural) to demonstrate the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural, rather than on Materialists to disprove it, as in "Materialists have to explain why the supernatural can't be the explanation"?

Argument:

Placing the burden of proof on Supernaturalists to demonstrate the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural is a logical and epistemologically sound approach. This perspective aligns with the principles of evidence-based reasoning, the scientific method, and critical thinking. Several key reasons support this stance.

Default Position of Skepticism: In debates about the supernatural, it is rational to start from a position of skepticism. This is in line with the philosophical principle of "nullius in verba" (take nobody's word for it) and the scientific principle that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Therefore, the burden of proof should fall on those making the extraordinary claim of the existence of the supernatural.

Presumption of Naturalism: Throughout the history of scientific inquiry, the default assumption has been naturalism. Naturalism posits that the universe and its phenomena can be explained by natural laws and processes without invoking supernatural entities or forces. This presumption is based on the consistent success of naturalistic explanations in understanding the world around us. After all, since both the Naturalist and Supernaturalist believe the Natural exists, we only need to establish the existence of the Supernatural (or, whatever someone decides to posit beyond the Natural.)

Absence of Empirical Evidence: The supernatural, by its very nature, is often described as beyond the realm of empirical observation and measurement. Claims related to the supernatural, such as deities, spirits, or paranormal phenomena, typically lack concrete, testable evidence. Therefore, it is incumbent upon those advocating for the supernatural to provide compelling and verifiable evidence to support their claims.

Problem of Unfalsifiability: Many supernatural claims are unfalsifiable: they cannot be tested or disproven. This raises significant epistemological challenges. Demanding that Materialists disprove unfalsifiable supernatural claims places an unreasonable burden on them. Instead, it is more reasonable to require Supernaturalists to provide testable claims and evidence.

In conclusion, the burden of proof should rest on Supernaturalists to provide convincing and verifiable evidence for the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural. This approach respects the principles of skepticism, scientific inquiry, and parsimonious reasoning, ultimately fostering a more rational and evidence-based discussion of the supernatural in the context of understanding our world and its mysteries.

If they can't provide evidence of the supernatural, then there is no reason for Naturalists to take their claims seriously: Any of their claims that include the supernatural. That includes all religious claims that involve supernatural claims.

I challenge Supernaturalists to defend the single most important aspect at the core of their belief. We all know they can't (they would have by now), but the burden is on them, and it's high time they at least give an honest effort.

Please note: Arguments from Ignorance will be summarily dismissed.

[The Tanager]

Sure, would you likewise agree that good philosophy requires scientific commitments to be true?

Seems to me they need each other, equally, and one suffers without concurrence from the other.

While we're on the topic, can you tell me how the Supernatural fits in this calculus?

While I don't think all good philosophy must include scientific knowledge (some questions of truth just aren't scientific or built on science), I do agree that philosophy should be built off of correct science when relevant.

As to where the supernatural fits in, what topic/question are you talking about? When I used calculus in talking to alexxJCRO about why the pyschopath is wrong? Or in the supernatural's role in philosophy? Or something else?

[alexxcJRO]

So, you are saying there is matter that doesn’t occupy space or doesn’t involve change of any kind?

I am saying there could multiple dimensions past the 4 we know of ergo not all temporal or complete separate parts that are not temporal or other countless explanations that eludes us.
I am saying there could be parts of the omniverse that are not the same kind of material as our local 4 dimensions manifold universe.

But you can’t just assume something, you’ve got to show it to be the best explanation.

There is no best explanation.
The subject is heavily debated.
I have showed this with theory of time.
The fact that we don't know if we really have free will shows plenty this: you can't say which free will hypotheses is best explanation.

How is this any different than what I just said? The Kalam’s conclusion should not be accepted (i.e., the Kalam fails to get us rationally to that conclusion) because there is disagreement on the premises that go into it (i.e., there are various logically possible views on the premises). If there weren’t various logically possible views, then there wouldn’t be disagreement.

From the start I said the argument is bogus and useless. Cannot be used for "therefore God".

No, according to the psychopath, suffering X isn’t bad for the same objective reason because the reason comes from this question: “who is undergoing the suffering?” not our question: “what is the experience like for the one undergoing suffering?” The psychopath has a different calculus than us, but he remains consistent with that calculus. You’ve got to show why our calculus is objectively better than his.

But it is the case that the psychopath views Suffering X as bad for the same objective reason:
-when experiencing Suffering X he is experiencing excruciating pain same as other people.
He can't say it's a bad thing when I the psychopath experience it but its a good thing when others experience it.
It's a bad thing in both cases or good in both cases(cenobite logic). You cannot have it both ways.

[boatsnguitars]

Sure, would you likewise agree that good philosophy requires scientific commitments to be true?

Seems to me they need each other, equally, and one suffers without concurrence from the other.

While we're on the topic, can you tell me how the Supernatural fits in this calculus?

While I don't think all good philosophy must include scientific knowledge (some questions of truth just aren't scientific or built on science), I do agree that philosophy should be built off of correct science when relevant.

As to where the supernatural fits in, what topic/question are you talking about? When I used calculus in talking to alexxJCRO about why the pyschopath is wrong? Or in the supernatural's role in philosophy? Or something else?

You tell me how the Supernatural plays a role. And, if like the Natural, it can be confirmed - or is that not the point of the supernatural? that one makes something up and speculates, then asserts it as fact?

[William]

My argument has more to do with the question whether we exist within a created thing and how the Kalam - if not based in Supernaturalism - still points folk in that direction (of thinking about things).

String theory is taken seriously and funded. Perhaps it is true that a fundamental attribute to the existence of The Universe, such as a field of vibrating unknown material exists yet isn’t treated as any more relevant to physical science than is God, and for the same reason. It cannot be physically tested and confirmed.

A type of “God of the gaps”, only “string”.

The only difference between the two appear to be that String Theory leaves out the idea that the vibrations re the underlying field from which The Universe might derive, is mindful.

So, in a way, those who argue for The Kalam are arguing from a strictly Materialist view of the universe and thus the “supernatural” explanation arises as the one that Supernaturalist Theists endorse because it is (even if indirectly) supported by current scientific materialism.

The argument from supernaturalists is that anything that moves is part of The Universe, and therefore, even if String Theory were correct, and even if the Field itself were mindful, it still would not be “God”, because God “has to be” timeless (non-temporal) and immaterial, based on the evidence of current Materialistic science.

So, my overall point is that supernaturalists depend upon Materialist scientific interpretation to fix their beliefs upon, because “science is simply confirming” the supernaturalist idea of “The Cause”.
The Materialist science (indirectly) endorses the more ancient idea of supernaturalism, and string theory (even if one day is shown to be true and that the underlying field is mindful), will still be regarded by supernaturalists as “not God” because a supernatural God “has to be” non-temporal and immaterial. This because, supernaturalism has always thought of God in those terms – even before Materialism came along and (indirectly) endorsed supernaturalism.

[The Tanager]

I am saying there could multiple dimensions past the 4 we know of ergo not all temporal or complete separate parts that are not temporal or other countless explanations that eludes us.
I am saying there could be parts of the omniverse that are not the same kind of material as our local 4 dimensions manifold universe.

I realize you are saying that; my point is that even if there are more, it’s still including spatial and temporal dimensions and it is those dimensions that point to that thing needing a cause outside of itself. The only way those dimensions could be the cause is if they are a separate thing and that thing would have to be immaterial and timeless.

There is no best explanation.
The subject is heavily debated.
I have showed this with theory of time.
The fact that we don't know if we really have free will shows plenty this: you can't say which free will hypotheses is best explanation.

Being heavily debated doesn’t mean there isn’t a best explanation. People often accept lesser explanations for any number of reasons and will want to justify/defend their view with great vehemence. All you’ve done is say the theory of time is debated and free will is debated; you haven’t shown that the explanations are equally good.

From the start I said the argument is bogus and useless. Cannot be used for "therefore God".

Yes, you have said that. But you were just trying to say that you weren’t saying the Kalam fails; this sounds like you are saying the Kalam fails. How are you not saying that?

But it is the case that the psychopath views Suffering X as bad for the same objective reason:
-when experiencing Suffering X he is experiencing excruciating pain same as other people.
He can't say it's a bad thing when I the psychopath experience it but its a good thing when others experience it.
It's a bad thing in both cases or good in both cases(cenobite logic). You cannot have it both ways.

The psychopath agrees on what constitutes suffering, yes, but that is not the moral disagreement. He absolutely can and does say that when he experiences suffering, it’s bad but when he benefits from someone else experiencing suffering it’s good. You and I disagree with that, but we can’t just assume we are correct. You still aren’t giving us any objective reason that the psychopath is wrong in exactly what he says.

[The Tanager]

You tell me how the Supernatural plays a role. And, if like the Natural, it can be confirmed - or is that not the point of the supernatural? that one makes something up and speculates, then asserts it as fact?

Plays a role in WHAT? I’m missing the context of your question. Is it how the supernatural plays a role in showing the psychopath is wrong? Philosophical reasoning in general? What is the context of your question?

As to whether it can be confirmed, if you mean that it can be 100% established as true, then no, but if you mean that it can be established as through inference to the best explanation, that is, that it is the most reasonable position to hold, then, yes, I think it can be confirmed.

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #406]

If you mean that it can be established as through inference to the best explanation, that is, that it is the most reasonable position to hold, then, yes, I think it can be confirmed.

[alexxcJRO]

I realize you are saying that; my point is that even if there are more, it’s still including spatial and temporal dimensions and it is those dimensions that point to that thing needing a cause outside of itself. The only way those dimensions could be the cause is if they are a separate thing and that thing would have to be immaterial and timeless.

For example: F-theory models 12-dimensional spacetime with two dimensions of time.
Things can be very weird.
Maybe we could have timeless components in the omniverse that are separate from the parts with time.
Maybe we could have one time dimensions universes and two time dimensions universes and so on. Or we could have timeless universes.
Maybe we could have a material cause(timeless, beginningless, mindless, absolute and objective randomness) that is characterized by being inside the omniverse and that lays at the fundamental level of reality. Which lays outside the one time dimensions universes, two time dimensions universes, timeless universes and is the cause for all this universes.

Being heavily debated doesn’t mean there isn’t a best explanation. People often accept lesser explanations for any number of reasons and will want to justify/defend their view with great vehemence. All you’ve done is say the theory of time is debated and free will is debated; you haven’t shown that the explanations are equally good.

Q: Best explanation according to who?
Some will say A-theory is best. Some will say B-theory is best.
Some will argue for one Free Will hypothesis. Some for other.
Some will prefer the Copenhagen interpretation. Some many-worlds interpretation.

Yes, you have said that. But you were just trying to say that you weren’t saying the Kalam fails; this sounds like you are saying the Kalam fails. How are you not saying that?

Saying someone can't say KALAM does not fail is not saying KALAM fails.
It is useless and bogus.

The psychopath agrees on what constitutes suffering, yes, but that is not the moral disagreement. He absolutely can and does say that when he experiences suffering, it’s bad but when he benefits from someone else experiencing suffering it’s good. You and I disagree with that, but we can’t just assume we are correct. You still aren’t giving us any objective reason that the psychopath is wrong in exactly what he says.

He could say anything. It does not follow its correct.
You cannot make a moral consistent system with psychopathic logic.
You have to define what is a bad thing-evil. To make a moral system like utilitarianism, Kantian duty-based ethics and so on.
You said the psychopath can justify his actions as a morally good action.
He cannot for he cannot have a consistent moral system which to use to make such determination.

[boatsnguitars]

You tell me how the Supernatural plays a role. And, if like the Natural, it can be confirmed - or is that not the point of the supernatural? that one makes something up and speculates, then asserts it as fact?

Plays a role in WHAT? I’m missing the context of your question. Is it how the supernatural plays a role in showing the psychopath is wrong? Philosophical reasoning in general? What is the context of your question?

As to whether it can be confirmed, if you mean that it can be 100% established as true, then no, but if you mean that it can be established as through inference to the best explanation, that is, that it is the most reasonable position to hold, then, yes, I think it can be confirmed.

The thread is about the burden of proof on Supernaturalists. I understand there is no evidence for the Supernatural, only idle musings that Supernaturalists label "Philosophy." If there were more to it, I wouldn't be asking these questions - or you'd be providing them.

How about you make the case for Supernaturalism - a positive case (not "it's non-natural"). After all, I could simply label Quantum Mechanics, Dark Matter, etc. as "Supernatural" and I'd have loads of evidence it exists. Of course, we'd all disagree on calling that Supernatural.

I'm still trying to figure out what the Supernatural is, and apparently, Supernaturalists have been to for thousands of years.

As close as I can discern, the closest thing that Supernaturalism can be described as "a feeling that there is something else, and it's like magic."

[The Tanager]

For example: F-theory models 12-dimensional spacetime with two dimensions of time.
Things can be very weird.
Maybe we could have timeless components in the omniverse that are separate from the parts with time.
Maybe we could have one time dimensions universes and two time dimensions universes and so on. Or we could have timeless universes.
Maybe we could have a material cause(timeless, beginningless, mindless, absolute and objective randomness) that is characterized by being inside the omniverse and that lays at the fundamental level of reality. Which lays outside the one time dimensions universes, two time dimensions universes, timeless universes and is the cause for all this universes.

That these theories exist doesn’t mean they make sense, so you’ve got to do more than just name them and say, if it is true, the Kalam would be defeated. What does it mean for their to be two dimensions of time, for instance?

Q: Best explanation according to who?
Some will say A-theory is best. Some will say B-theory is best.
Some will argue for one Free Will hypothesis. Some for other.
Some will prefer the Copenhagen interpretation. Some many-worlds interpretation.

According to any individual trying to come to a rational conclusion on the soundness of the Kalam. That there are different theories is not a rational reason to reject the Kalam. If one thinks there are good reasons for one of these theories and, if true, that theory would defeat the Kalam, go for it, but not just stating that there are disagreements as though that takes one off the hook for their conclusions.

He could say anything. It does not follow its correct.
You cannot make a moral consistent system with psychopathic logic.
You have to define what is a bad thing-evil. To make a moral system like utilitarianism, Kantian duty-based ethics and so on.
You said the psychopath can justify his actions as a morally good action.
He cannot for he cannot have a consistent moral system which to use to make such determination.

I agree that just because he says it, that doesn’t make it true. But his moral system is consistent, by your standards above. This is how he defines what is a bad thing/evil: “if it causes suffering to me.” And he defines good as: “if it causes benefit to me”. He consistently applies that to everything. This is consistent. That doesn't make it right, but it does counter your claim that he's being inconsistent. Yes, he doesn't have the same moral principle as you to judge the act by, but that's because he has a different moral system; it's still consistent.