Knowledge of Good and Evil

[William]

Q: Without knowledge of good and evil, can we have morality?

[The Tanager]

Bottom line: human morality, just as human knowledge and human reasoning is the best we got, and religious faith, apologetixcs and Dogma deserves nothing but censure when it seeks to belittle it in hopes to make the god - claims the only option.

If it is the best we’ve got, then the validity here: flat-earthers’ beliefs are worse than spherical-earthers’ beliefs does not exist concerning morality. In other words, the invaders’ desires are not worse (or better) than our desires for invasions to not take place.

This is where you seem to think I'm saying that, therefore, subjective morality is invalid and worse than objective morality since objective morality can get us to a truth that the invaders' desires are worse. In no way have I said that or believe that. There simply is no way to objectively compare the two in that way.

[otseng]

I think you are being tricky, evasive and disingenuous

It is hard for me to see that as incomprehension on your part; it has to be deliberate obfuscation.

So stop your disgusting apologetics games

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[TRANSPONDER]

I think you are being tricky, evasive and disingenuous

It is hard for me to see that as incomprehension on your part; it has to be deliberate obfuscation.

So stop your disgusting apologetics games

Moderator Warning



Please do not make negative personal comments about others.

Please review our Rules.



______________



Moderator warnings count as a strike against users. Additional violations in the future may warrant a final warning. Any challenges or replies to moderator postings should be made via Private Message to avoid derailing topics.

Otseng, you are doing it again. I know you own the place and can sic mods onto me, but please stop trying to misread criticisms of methodology, not personal attacks, as a way of manipulating the narrative. I know you can use redwarnings to try to sit on me, but try to be honest.

My cards on the table; you own the place and we atheists are grateful that we are allowed to post here. I have been on a theist site where i got banned twice for such bad and biased reasons that the posters (mostly Christians) intervened to have me brought back (1); and you can do what you like here, but you deserve better than to misuse Moderator rules to shut me up or down. It is critique of the method, not of Tanager, JW or 1213 or of you, even when i called you out over your evasion of the Exodus discussion.

I accept the warning as reminder, by the way. But I remind you that critique of the methods - denialist, obfuscating or indeed not honest arguments are not personals.

Now, you can do what you like, even ban me in a fit of Theist pique. It wouldn't be the first time it has happened to me (2). But I appeal to you as an intelligent person or even a religious person, to be fair and not biased, so you can look at yourself in a mirror and think 'That is a good, honest, fair, person'.

Over to you. sir, Stomp on me, I'll survive, but everyone will know what you did.

(1) tentmaker or In pursuit of God, if anyone thinks I am doing a trump and making up a story.

(2) one Mod got me banned because i was critical of Woke. Being a Mod does not make them all honest. or unbiased

[Difflugia]

You’ve misunderstood. Anyone can say theism (or naturalism) leads to X being objectively true. I’m saying both of us need to say what our ‘mechanism’ is and how that logically gets us to morality being objective.

I’m saying God is my ‘mechanism’ and that the logical path is through (1) God creating us with a specific nature and (2)purpose from which we can logically get that (3) X is objectively good or bad. What is your naturalistic ‘mechanism’ and what is the logical path to (3)?

You've also said, "I have never claimed that God being super big and powerful is what makes His decrees about morality objective." If "mechanism" is part of the conversation, that means that you have to show that the "specific nature and purpose" are somehow features of the universe independent of your assertion of God's fiat declaration. The problem for this distinction is that you and I both live in the same universe. If it's true in yours independent of your claims about God, it's also true in mine.

And once again, you're not quite aligning yourself with the philosophical notion of objective morality. Once we get past our definitions (which we still haven't resolved), I only have to show that the standard is true for all people everywhere, regardless of their feelings on the subject. Atheist frameworks of objective morality often have tenets like "maximum utility" and "minimum pain." These things are arguably real and arguably quantifiable, so there's nothing implausible about basing an objective morality on them. Other criteria might be better or these might fail in some other way, but that's not where we're at. We're still examining your contention that "objective good and evil can’t be gained from a natural basis."

My guess is that you're still trying to tie the very act of performing the analysis to subjectivity if it's done by people, but again, that's not what "objective" in "objective morality" means.

Help me to understand the difference you see between being an objective source and being an objective standard.

If Jesus is real and created the universe such that the highest moral goal is to do what you earnestly believe God wants you to do, then that's an objective source (Jesus) with a subjective standard ("do what you think is best").

I’m not saying that the Earth couldn’t have been objectively spherical if naturalism is true. Here I’m simply saying that if God exists and created the Earth so that it would have an objective shape, that God is the ground of the Earth’s objectivity, not because God looks at it and gets it right, but because God made it that way.

OK. I'm not sure what that gets you, though. If that's an analogy for your morality argument, then you'd have to prove that God is real to make that point.

We can see that the Earth is objectively round by empirically measuring it. You can declare that the reason it's objectively so is because God made it, just like I can declare it's objectively so because Winnie the Pooh made it that way. If that's your argument, though, we're at a stalemate. The evidence that our respective reasons are true is of exactly the same quantity and quality.

The "why" is a different argument,

No, it’s not a different argument.

It absolutely is. Whether or not something is true is independent of why it might be true. You just made that very claim about the shape of the Earth.

Why is that goal the goal we should be pursuing as humans? If the answer is because some of us prefer that, although others prefer something else and that’s all we’ve got, then we have subjectivity.

You need to be way more precise in your definitions. Otherwise, you will leave the door open (intentionally or not) to equivocation. Not all utilitarians agree on how minimizing pain, maximizing pleasure, and maximizing agency should be prioritized relative to each other, for example. That doesn't mean that the resulting moral frameworks are necessarily subjective in a philosophical sense, though. If a moral judgement can be treated like a math problem where everyone gets the same answer, it's an objective moral framework. If how you or I feel factors into the calculation, it's a subjective framework.

If by "prefer," you mean that I think that one moral framework is better than another, that doesn't make either of those frameworks subjective. If, however, you use "prefer" to mean that I choose my actions based on some feeling that is unique to me or the moment, than that would be subjective.

but even so, if it's there, it's there whether a god put it there or not. If you can find some sort of evidence for that in "creation," then its existence is just as much a part of any naturalistic construction. If you don't have any evidence for it, then it's just made up.

The evidence I think is there is that (1) we have a specific nature and (2) we have a specific purpose. Those two things work together. God can give us both. Naturalism doesn’t give us (2) purpose, right? That’s a difference.

If we have a specific nature and specific purpose, you should be able to show that independent of any other claims about God or nature, right?

How is that subjective? It’s relative to the situation (i.e., not absolute morality), but not relative to the person. Subjective morality is relative to the person. Objective morality is not.

Paul's telling you what the objective standard would be (it's OK to eat meat sacrificed to idols because idolatrous gods aren't real). He's also giving you a subjective part of the standard: if you don't feel right about it, don't do it. That's subjective by definition.

But what someone thinks is not actually part of the calculus. I can understand the confusion, but the calculus is if one is in uncertainty, do X. Your confusion comes from putting something more specific into the first bit and then judging that specific moral issue. You've changed it from being about uncertainty to being about one's particular view on eating meat sacrificed to idols (or whatever) and then judged the second thing. That second thing (eating meat) isn't the first thing (uncertainty). You've completely changed the issue to claim subjectivity.

I think we're disagreeing about what Paul meant. "For whatever does not proceed from faith is sin," means that if you eat meat out of love for God and I eat meat to spite God, you've acted morally and I've acted immorally. From a philosophical standpoint, that's a subjective standard and I think that's what Paul meant.

[The Tanager]

You've also said, "I have never claimed that God being super big and powerful is what makes His decrees about morality objective." If "mechanism" is part of the conversation, that means that you have to show that the "specific nature and purpose" are somehow features of the universe independent of your assertion of God's fiat declaration. The problem for this distinction is that you and I both live in the same universe. If it's true in yours independent of your claims about God, it's also true in mine.

We live in the same universe, yes, but we are talking about which of two very different universes we live in. If theism is true, then the universe we exist in would be different in various ways than if naturalism is true. If God’s existence can logically get us objective morality, that says nothing about whether objective morality can be had in a universe where God doesn’t exist. So, it’s not ‘true in one, true in the other’.

And once again, you're not quite aligning yourself with the philosophical notion of objective morality. Once we get past our definitions (which we still haven't resolved), I only have to show that the standard is true for all people everywhere, regardless of their feelings on the subject. Atheist frameworks of objective morality often have tenets like "maximum utility" and "minimum pain." These things are arguably real and arguably quantifiable, so there's nothing implausible about basing an objective morality on them. Other criteria might be better or these might fail in some other way, but that's not where we're at. We're still examining your contention that "objective good and evil can’t be gained from a natural basis."

Yes, they have those tenets, but they need to ground those tenets as being actual. I’m not saying they need to prove they are actually that way, but talking about just the conceptual logic of it. Maximum utility requires a goal to gauge utility off of. That goal needs to be established as the objective goal humans are supposed to be going after. Only when you have that, can one work out what the maximum utility or minimum pain is.

My guess is that you're still trying to tie the very act of performing the analysis to subjectivity if it's done by people, but again, that's not what "objective" in "objective morality" means.

I’m not tying it to that and never have.

If Jesus is real and created the universe such that the highest moral goal is to do what you earnestly believe God wants you to do, then that's an objective source (Jesus) with a subjective standard ("do what you think is best").

I agree. All along (unless I’ve only said this in another thread where I’m having the same kind of discussion), I’ve said some theisms lead to objective morality but not all. The one you describe would have God giving us a subjective morality.

OK. I'm not sure what that gets you, though. If that's an analogy for your morality argument, then you'd have to prove that God is real to make that point.

If my point has only been that God’s existence could make morality objective, why would I have to prove God actually exists? We are just analyzing what worldviews lead to in regards to morality, not what is actually the case. The same with analyzing what naturalism leads to on the morality question.

We can see that the Earth is objectively round by empirically measuring it. You can declare that the reason it's objectively so is because God made it, just like I can declare it's objectively so because Winnie the Pooh made it that way. If that's your argument, though, we're at a stalemate. The evidence that our respective reasons are true is of exactly the same quantity and quality.

That’s simply a different question. Yes, of course, one should support their answer to each question by offering support instead of just saying “it’s so,” but that isn’t the question I’ve been addressing or asking naturalists to address. I’m asking naturalists and theists to support their answer to the question as to how their worldview could get us objective morality if it were assumed true.

It absolutely is. Whether or not something is true is independent of why it might be true. You just made that very claim about the shape of the Earth.

If that is your comparison, then I think you mistakenly called my argument a ‘why’ argument. I’ve been addressing whether or not something would be objective/subjective if theism/naturalism is true. That’s not about either view being true or why it could be true.

Back in this particular context you understood me to be saying that God saying it makes it objective and you saying it makes it subjective. I said that wasn’t my argument. My argument was that having an objective goal/purpose is one way that morality would be objective. There could be other ways, although I’m aware of none. Morality could also be subjective. Both theism (although not my version) and naturalism could produce subjective morality.

You need to be way more precise in your definitions. Otherwise, you will leave the door open (intentionally or not) to equivocation. Not all utilitarians agree on how minimizing pain, maximizing pleasure, and maximizing agency should be prioritized relative to each other, for example. That doesn't mean that the resulting moral frameworks are necessarily subjective in a philosophical sense, though. If a moral judgement can be treated like a math problem where everyone gets the same answer, it's an objective moral framework. If how you or I feel factors into the calculation, it's a subjective framework.

I’m not saying that I have the most precise definitions, but people can misunderstand even precise definitions and equivocate on them. I agree with the rest.

If by "prefer," you mean that I think that one moral framework is better than another, that doesn't make either of those frameworks subjective. If, however, you use "prefer" to mean that I choose my actions based on some feeling that is unique to me or the moment, than that would be subjective.

I don’t mean ‘prefer’ in either of these senses. It’s more like the second, but it doesn’t have to be unique to you or the moment.

If we have a specific nature and specific purpose, you should be able to show that independent of any other claims about God or nature, right?

That’s the question. I think it’s clear that God can give us a specific purpose. I think it’s clear that nature doesn’t give us a specific purpose. Can some other mechanism give us another way to reach objective morality? Logically possible, but I’ve never seen one.

Paul's telling you what the objective standard would be (it's OK to eat meat sacrificed to idols because idolatrous gods aren't real). He's also giving you a subjective part of the standard: if you don't feel right about it, don't do it. That's subjective by definition.

Yes, he’s made an objective moral claim that it’s okay to eat meat sacrificed to idols (notice this isn’t the same as one must or must not eat meat sacrificed to idols). He then goes outside of morality and says that, even though it is moral, if you don’t feel right about it, don’t do it. That’s not a contradiction.

I think we're disagreeing about what Paul meant. "For whatever does not proceed from faith is sin," means that if you eat meat out of love for God and I eat meat to spite God, you've acted morally and I've acted immorally. From a philosophical standpoint, that's a subjective standard and I think that's what Paul meant.

But Paul would still be making one, consistent objective, relative moral claim:

It is moral to eat meat sacrificed to idols, unless you are doing it to spite God.

[Difflugia]

We live in the same universe, yes, but we are talking about which of two very different universes we live in. If theism is true, then the universe we exist in would be different in various ways than if naturalism is true.

If that's important to your argument, then explain what those differences are and show that reality reflects the state that you're claiming for theism.

If God’s existence can logically get us objective morality, that says nothing about whether objective morality can be had in a universe where God doesn’t exist. So, it’s not ‘true in one, true in the other’.

It is if you're trying to claim that morality is derived from an objective property of the universe. Otherwise, you're still defining your objective morality as deriving from God's fiat, which is what you earlier claimed that you weren't doing.

At its core, what you're proposing to "show" is the same as every other apologetic based on a circular argument. If God created the Universe with an objective morality, then there's an objective morality. No matter how many other premises you add, it's still a circular argument if you can't find a way to get rid of that one.

[The Tanager]

If that's important to your argument, then explain what those differences are and show that reality reflects the state that you're claiming for theism.

The important bit for my argument is about nature and purpose. If theism is true (at least Christian theism and some others), then humans have (1) an objective nature that can be benefited and harmed in specific ways (physical, mental, emotional) and (2) are given a specific, objective purpose concerning how to live. If naturalism is true, we get a (1), but not a (2). That’s the difference.

Points (1) and (2) together, I think, can logically lead to objective morality. But (1) by itself cannot, succumbing to the is-ought gap. There may be another way than (1) plus (2) to get to objective morality, but I haven’t seen it presented.

Whether Christian theism or naturalism is actually the case, that reality reflects that, is irrelevant to that discussion.

It is if you're trying to claim that morality is derived from an objective property of the universe. Otherwise, you're still defining your objective morality as deriving from God's fiat, which is what you earlier claimed that you weren't doing.

Points (1) plus (2) is not defining objective morality (A) via God’s fiat, but (A') via nature and purpose. Yes, (A') doing it via nature and purpose (B) comes from God’s fiat, but whether morality is objective or subjective is about (A') or (A), not (B).

At its core, what you're proposing to "show" is the same as every other apologetic based on a circular argument. If God created the Universe with an objective morality, then there's an objective morality. No matter how many other premises you add, it's still a circular argument if you can't find a way to get rid of that one.

No, that is a misunderstanding. I’m proposing that (X) if God created humans with an objective nature and purpose, then (Y) there’s objective morality. That’s not circular.

[TRANSPONDER]

It is absolutely circular because it comes out as ' Human morality is Objective - because it was goven by God. We know it was given by God, so it is objective.

Of course, you put it as a hypothetical which gets you out of the circular claim, but completely scuppers your whole argument by saying 'If'. So If God did not give human morals (and there is no good reason to think that any god dictated morality) then there is no reason to see human morality as objective, any more than dictated by evolved instinctive preferences and logical conclusions, such as it is better to share resources than fight over them, something that humans have never been able to resist evolved instinct (tribalism) from driving them.

[Difflugia]

The important bit for my argument is about nature and purpose. If theism is true (at least Christian theism and some others), then humans have (1) an objective nature that can be benefited and harmed in specific ways (physical, mental, emotional) and (2) are given a specific, objective purpose concerning how to live. If naturalism is true, we get a (1), but not a (2). That’s the difference.

You haven't established either of these. First, if you think that theism implies either an objective nature or purpose for humanity, then that's already a part of your premise and the first huge part of your circular argument.

Second, you haven't defined "purpose" well enough, so for your argument, I'm not sure what "purpose" you're claiming that naturalism doesn't provide. Things like objective senses of pleasure and pain imply that human beings have something driving us toward particular actions. Is this different than your "purpose?"

Points (1) and (2) together, I think, can logically lead to objective morality. But (1) by itself cannot, succumbing to the is-ought gap. There may be another way than (1) plus (2) to get to objective morality, but I haven’t seen it presented.

We're defining the "ought." States involving pleasure and pain, for example, are the "is." If maximizing those are the "ought," then human beings can define the rules, but still have the overall framework be considered philosophically objective.

I still feel like you're equivocating on pretty much every term you're trying to use. I'm trying to narrow down what you mean by the terms you're using, but I'm being repeatedly told that I'm misunderstanding them. That's certainly true, but at the same time, you're using the terms as though the definitions you have in mind are self-evident.

Whether Christian theism or naturalism is actually the case, that reality reflects that, is irrelevant to that discussion.

Then you and I aren't using the word "objective" in the same way. Objective morality must be reflected in reality in the same way that objective mathematics is. The math equation "2+2=4" is objectively true and is reflected in reality: two apples plus two apples can be measured to be four apples. "Because God wants it" is unlikely to be measurable, so unlikely to be a part of an objective morality. If my proposed moral framework is based on maximum overall pleasure, though, that might in principle be measurable (maybe with an fMRI of everyone involved?).

I still think that you're trying to define "objective" in such a way that it requires a god in the form of a nonhuman agent that can arbitrate between moral judgements. This is the reason for your "purpose" prong of your morality and what lies behind the circular argument.

Points (1) plus (2) is not defining objective morality (A) via God’s fiat, but (A') via nature and purpose. Yes, (A') doing it via nature and purpose (B) comes from God’s fiat, but whether morality is objective or subjective is about (A') or (A), not (B).

You're just adding an extra step. If the purpose is itself objective, you should be able to identify it in reality whether or not it was defined by God in the first place.

No, that is a misunderstanding. I’m proposing that (X) if God created humans with an objective nature and purpose, then (Y) there’s objective morality. That’s not circular.

As long as you're still claiming that such "nature and purpose" can't be defined without somehow referring to the fiat of God, then the argument is circular. This is the source of your different universes, but that are nonetheless indistinguishable. Your way of distinguishing them is one of your own definition. That's the circular argument.

[bluegreenearth]

If that's important to your argument, then explain what those differences are and show that reality reflects the state that you're claiming for theism.

The important bit for my argument is about nature and purpose. If theism is true (at least Christian theism and some others), then humans have (1) an objective nature that can be benefited and harmed in specific ways (physical, mental, emotional) and (2) are given a specific, objective purpose concerning how to live. If naturalism is true, we get a (1), but not a (2). That’s the difference.

The philosophical concept of "objectivity" only applies to truths about reality that exist independently of any agent's personal judgements, biases, or opinions. Conversely, the philosophical concept of "subjectivity" applies to relative truths that are necessarily derived from an agent's personal judgements, biases, or opinions. Because the concept of "purpose" in the context of your argument necessarily entails a god's (i.e., an agent's) personal judgement, bias, or opinion about how humans ought to live, it is inherently subjective. Accordingly, if theism were true, it would be the objective reality that a god had an originally intended purpose in mind for humanity, but the specified purpose itself would be a subjective notion. There is no deriving an "ought" from an "is" under those circumstances.

At its core, what you're proposing to "show" is the same as every other apologetic based on a circular argument. If God created the Universe with an objective morality, then there's an objective morality. No matter how many other premises you add, it's still a circular argument if you can't find a way to get rid of that one.

No, that is a misunderstanding. I’m proposing that (X) if God created humans with an objective nature and purpose, then (Y) there’s objective morality. That’s not circular.

Even if "objective purpose" was a coherent concept, the argument still commits the tautological definition fallacy. You've defined objective morality (Y) to be the combination of objective purpose (A) and objective nature (B). Therefore, given this proprietary definition, it is merely a tautology to propose that a god creating humans with the combination (X) of an objective purpose (A) and an objective nature (B) would produce an objective morality (Y) if theism is true:

[(X = A+B) ∧ (A+B = Y)] → (X = Y) or (A+B = A+B)

This tautology is fallacious because the premise that claims humans can have an objective purpose (A) under theism is asserted but not logically justified in the argument. As previously stated, I'm not sure if the concept of an "objective purpose" is even logically coherent.