Can you please provide evidence for these Biblical events?

[Compassionist]

Can you please provide evidence for the following Biblical events?

1. Creation Miracles (Genesis 1–3)

Creation of the universe: God creates light, sky, land, seas, plants, stars, animals, and humans in six days.
Creation of angels: Implied in passages like Job 38:4–7; often considered an early act before physical creation.
Creation of Adam and Eve: God forms Adam from dust and breathes life into him; Eve is made from Adam’s rib.
Creation of other organisms: All species of plants and animals are said to have been created by divine command.
The Garden of Eden: A paradise created for Adam and Eve.
The Fall: The serpent speaks; Adam and Eve eat forbidden fruit and are evicted from Eden; curses are pronounced.

2. Early Genesis Miracles

The mark and protection of Cain (Genesis 4:15).
The longevity of pre-Flood humans (many living 900+ years).
Noah’s Flood (Genesis 6–9): God floods the entire world, saving only Noah, his family, and the animals in the ark.
The rainbow covenant: God sets a rainbow as a sign of the promise never again to flood the earth.
Confusion of languages at Babel (Genesis 11): Humanity’s speech is divided, and people scatter across the world.

3. Miracles in the Patriarchal Era (Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph)

Call of Abram: God speaks directly to Abram (Genesis 12).
Destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah: Fire and brimstone from heaven (Genesis 19).
Lot’s wife turned to salt (Genesis 19:26).
Birth of Isaac to elderly Sarah (Genesis 21).
God’s testing of Abraham: A ram provided in place of Isaac (Genesis 22).
Jacob’s ladder dream and wrestling with God (Genesis 28; Genesis 32).
Joseph’s prophetic dreams and interpretations (Genesis 37–41).

4. Miracles of Moses and the Exodus

The burning bush (Exodus 3).
Staff turned into a serpent (Exodus 4).
The Ten Plagues on Egypt (Exodus 7–12):

1. Water to blood
2. Frogs
3. Gnats or lice
4. Flies
5. Livestock disease
6. Boils
7. Hail
8. Locusts
9. Darkness
10. Death of the firstborn
The Passover protection (Israelites spared).
Parting of the Red Sea (Exodus 14).
Pillar of cloud by day and fire by night, guiding Israel.
Manna and quail were provided in the wilderness.
Water from the rock (Exodus 17).
Mount Sinai theophany: God’s voice, thunder, lightning, and tablets of stone.
Bronze serpent healing (Numbers 21).
Aaron’s rod budding (Numbers 17).
Moses’ radiant face after speaking with God (Exodus 34).

5. Miracles in the Time of Joshua, Judges, and Kings

Jordan River stops flowing so Israel can cross (Joshua 3).
Walls of Jericho fall (Joshua 6).
The sun stands still (Joshua 10).
Gideon’s fleece tests (Judges 6).
Samson’s strength feats (Judges 14–16).
Fire consumes Elijah’s offering on Mount Carmel (1 Kings 18).
Elijah raises the widow’s son (1 Kings 17).
Elijah was taken up to heaven in a whirlwind (2 Kings 2).
Elisha parts the Jordan, purifies water, multiplies oil, raises the Shunammite’s son, feeds 100 men with loaves, heals Naaman’s leprosy, and makes an iron axe-head float (2 Kings 2–6).
The shadow on the sundial goes backwards for King Hezekiah (2 Kings 20).
Angelic destruction of the Assyrian army (2 Kings 19).
Daniel’s survival in the lions’ den (Daniel 6).
Three men survive the fiery furnace (Daniel 3).
Handwriting on the wall (Daniel 5).

6. Miracles in the Intertestamental and New Testament Era

Zechariah was struck mute until John the Baptist’s birth (Luke 1).
Virgin (immaculate) conception of Jesus by the Holy Spirit (Matthew 1; Luke 1).
Star of Bethlehem guiding the Magi (Matthew 2).
Angelic announcements to Mary, Joseph, and the shepherds.
John the Baptist’s prophetic calling before birth.

7. Miracles Performed by Jesus

Turning water into wine (John 2).
Healing the sick, blind, deaf, and lame (many Gospels).
Cleansing lepers (Matthew 8).
Casting out demons (Mark 5, etc.).
Feeding 5,000 (Matthew 14) and feeding 4,000 (Matthew 15).
Walking on water (Matthew 14).
Calming the storm (Mark 4).
Raising Jairus’s daughter (Mark 5).
Healing the centurion’s servant (Matthew 8).
Healing the bleeding woman (Mark 5).
Restoring sight to Bartimaeus (Mark 10).
Raising Lazarus from the dead (John 11).
The Transfiguration (Matthew 17).
Paying temple tax with a coin in a fish’s mouth (Matthew 17).
Cursing the barren fig tree (Mark 11).
The resurrection of Jesus (Matthew 28; Mark 16; Luke 24; John 20).
Post-resurrection appearances (Luke 24; John 21).
Ascension into heaven (Acts 1).

8. Miracles in the Acts of the Apostles

Tongues of fire and the gift of languages at Pentecost (Acts 2).
Peter and John heal a lame man (Acts 3).
Peter raises Tabitha (Dorcas) from the dead (Acts 9).
Paul blinds and heals various people (Acts 13–28).
Earthquake freeing Paul and Silas from prison (Acts 16).
Paul survives a viper bite (Acts 28).
Philip’s teleportation (Acts 8).
Ananias and Sapphira were struck dead for lying (Acts 5).

9. Apocalyptic and Prophetic Miracles

Visions of Heaven and angels (Revelation 4–5).
Trumpet and bowl judgments: cosmic catastrophes, locusts, plagues, blood rivers, darkness.
Two witnesses calling down fire (Revelation 11).
The New Jerusalem descending from heaven (Revelation 21).
Creation of a new heaven and new earth (Revelation 21–22).
God dwelling with humanity eternally - the final miracle of restoration.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #100]

Replying to The Tanager

Thanks — this clarifies where we agree and where the real fault lines are. I’ll respond selectively, focusing on points where I think the disagreement is substantive rather than merely procedural.

A. Explanatory constraint and discrimination

Yes, the supernatural resurrection explanation has questions to answer just like any explanation will.

Agreed. The issue is not whether questions exist, but whether the hypothesis meaningfully constrains answers.

You say you “don’t think the supernatural explanation is as flexible as I think it is,” but so far no concrete forbidden outcomes have been identified. Until the hypothesis specifies what would not be expected if it were true, its explanatory latitude remains a problem.

Saying “we will get to that later” is fine procedurally, but substantively the concern still stands: historical explanations discriminate themselves now by ruling out alternative patterns of evidence. Flexibility at the outset is not epistemically neutral — it weakens inferential traction.

B. Discrimination vs narrative compatibility

I think we have that with the supernatural explanation.

That is precisely what is in question.

The problem is not that the resurrection hypothesis can be narrated in a way that fits the data; many hypotheses can. The problem is that it does not specify outcomes that would have counted against it.

By contrast, hypotheses like legendary development, visionary experience, or theological elaboration do generate differential expectations:
• temporal distance increases embellishment,
• independent corroboration becomes less likely,
• doctrinal harmonization increases over time.

Unless the resurrection hypothesis similarly constrains expectations, it does not outperform its competitors — it merely coexists with them.

C. Epistemic certainty and compulsion

The only way to guarantee certainty is by compulsion.

This is correct — and irrelevant to my argument.

I am not claiming that omnibenevolence requires God to guarantee certainty. I am claiming that gratuitous ambiguity can count against omnibenevolence when additional clarity would reduce harm, fragmentation, or error without eliminating freedom.

This does not require an all-or-nothing model of epistemic goods. It only requires that clarity admits of degrees — which it plainly does.

Your objection targets a stronger claim than the one being made.

D. “A little more clarity would fix it”

Please support that.

The support is comparative, not speculative.

Religious fragmentation, mutually exclusive salvation claims, and conflict over divine intentions all scale with epistemic opacity. The existence of many incompatible traditions claiming divine sanction is exactly what one would expect under ambiguity — and not what one would expect if a benevolent deity were even modestly concerned with minimizing preventable confusion.

This does not imply universal assent, only reduced error. That distinction matters.

E. Metaphysical corrigibility

What do you mean that it inherits a higher evidential burden and why do you think that?

Because invoking a novel metaphysical causal mechanism to explain a concrete historical event introduces additional moving parts.

A hypothesis that posits:
• suspension of well-established regularities,
• intervention by an unobservable agent,
• non-repeatable causal processes

must do more explanatory work than one that does not. Otherwise, it gains explanatory power at the cost of constraint — which is not a trade historical reasoning can afford.

This is not bias toward naturalism; it is proportionality of inference.

F. Historical existence of Jesus

Either Jesus existed or he didn’t.

That binary is trivially true but epistemically unhelpful.

Historical confidence is not measured in absolutes but in graded credences based on evidential density, source independence, and transmission integrity. Saying “we can be as confident as with most ancient figures” obscures important asymmetries — especially the degree of theological filtration in our sources.

I am not denying Jesus’ existence. I am questioning the level of confidence often asserted — particularly when that confidence is then used to scaffold further supernatural claims.

G. The chain-of-beliefs objection

Your general point about rational coherence across accepted premises is valid in the abstract. Where it fails is in assuming that each step in the chain is independently licensed at the same evidential threshold.

Accepting a claim at 70% does not obligate acceptance of downstream claims that:
• introduce new causal kinds,
• conflict with background regularities,
• lack independent corroboration.

Rationality permits reassessment when explanatory cost escalates. That is not special pleading; it is Bayesian hygiene.

H. Background regularities and miracles

But that background is part of what goes into “more likely than not.”

Exactly. And when background regularities are overwhelmingly stable, a hypothesis that requires their suspension must exceed the evidential bar — not merely meet it.

This does not privilege naturalism; it reflects the role of priors in rational inference. Without that constraint, miracle claims become indistinguishable from any other ad hoc explanation.

I. Criterion of embarrassment

Your clarification here is helpful, and I agree with your narrower claim more than you might expect.

My point is not that embarrassment is useless, but that its probative force diminishes once a movement sacralizes a specific form of reversal central to its theology. In that context, embarrassment can no longer function as a standalone discriminator and must be independently corroborated.

That is calibration, not dismissal.

Conclusion

Where we differ is not over whether supernatural explanations are in principle admissible, but over what explanatory work they must do to earn historical assent.

Until the resurrection hypothesis:
• rules out specific alternative evidential patterns,
• generates expectations its rivals do not,
• constrains rather than absorbs ambiguity,

suspension of judgment remains not only rational, but methodologically required.

That is not skepticism. It is discipline.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #101]

A. Questions on the justifying method to be used

1. On coherence vs. correspondence

I think this is what you beginning points are touching upon, but correct any misunderstandings. I agree that we need discrimination (concerning correspondence with reality) rather than mere compatibility (part of the coherence theory of truth). When we get to that step of the discussion (comparing theories that explain the facts), it will be helpful to get more specific examples from on your concerns.

2. On the need for more epistemic clarity

I apologize for my misunderstanding of your claim about the need for certainty. But why would we not expect religious fragmentation, mutually exclusive salvation claims, and conflict over divine intentions in a world with a benevolent deity who gives humans free will?

Humans always try to justify their actions, so if some humans exercise their freedom to do what they want, they will create or seek out justifications that make them feel they are right. Those justifications are different worldviews (not just religious) that fragment, make mutually exclusive claims, and conflict with each other.

3. On supernatural/metaphysical claims having a higher evidential burden

Because invoking a novel metaphysical causal mechanism to explain a concrete historical event introduces additional moving parts.

A hypothesis that posits:
• suspension of well-established regularities,
• intervention by an unobservable agent,
• non-repeatable causal processes

must do more explanatory work than one that does not. Otherwise, it gains explanatory power at the cost of constraint — which is not a trade historical reasoning can afford.

It introduces moving parts that are additional to what? And what do you mean by "constraint"?

4. On the criterion of embarassment

My point is not that embarrassment is useless, but that its probative force diminishes once a movement sacralizes a specific form of reversal central to its theology. In that context, embarrassment can no longer function as a standalone discriminator and must be independently corroborated.

I don't think the criterion of embarassment can ever function as a standalone discriminator of truth and must always have other evidences to support a claim.


B. What are the facts to be explained?

1. Jesus historically existed

I am not denying Jesus’ existence. I am questioning the level of confidence often asserted — particularly when that confidence is then used to scaffold further supernatural claims.

If you aren't denying his existence, then his existence is something that needs to be explained whatever scale of confidence you want to put forth. Somewhere on that scale there is a line that is crossed concerning the binary issue, isn't there? Either you are confident enough that he existed or you are not confident enough and think he probably didn't exist. Or how does your level get around that binary question?

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #102]

Thanks — this helps narrow the discussion to the right pressure points. I’ll respond in the same structured way.

A. Questions on the justifying method

1. Coherence vs. correspondence

We’re aligned here. My concern is not with coherence as such, but with mistaking coherence or narrative fit for correspondence with reality.

A theory can be internally coherent and richly explanatory while still being underdetermined by the evidence. Discrimination requires that rival hypotheses make meaningfully different predictions or assign sharply different probabilities to the same evidential patterns. When we reach the comparison stage, this is the standard I will be applying.

2. Why expect fragmentation under benevolent free will?

I agree that some fragmentation is entirely expected given human psychology, motivated reasoning, and social dynamics. That point is not in dispute.

What matters is the degree, persistence, and structure of fragmentation.

If a benevolent deity were even modestly concerned with reducing preventable harm caused by false beliefs, we would reasonably expect:
• less symmetry between mutually exclusive salvation claims,
• fewer cases where sincere moral agents are punished for epistemic luck,
• clearer differentiation between core moral truths and peripheral theological speculation.

Appealing to free will explains why disagreement exists at all; it does not explain why disagreement is so evenly distributed, so entrenched, and so consequential. The question is comparative: would slightly greater clarity plausibly reduce harm without eliminating freedom? I think the answer is yes, and that is sufficient for the argument.

3. “Additional to what?” and what I mean by constraint

“Additional” relative to hypotheses that explain the same historical data using already-licensed causal resources.

Natural historical explanations appeal to:
• known psychological processes,
• sociological dynamics,
• memory distortion,
• legend formation,
• charismatic leadership effects.

A supernatural intervention hypothesis adds:
• a new causal category,
• an unobservable intentional agent,
• an exception to background regularities.

By “constraint,” I mean limits on what the hypothesis allows. A constrained hypothesis tells us not only what can happen, but what would not happen if it were true. Constraint increases explanatory power by reducing degrees of freedom.

If a hypothesis can accommodate almost any evidential outcome, it risks becoming explanatorily cheap — powerful in appearance but weak in discrimination.

4. Criterion of embarrassment

We are now largely in agreement.

My claim was never that embarrassment functions as a standalone proof. It was that in contexts where reversal or humiliation is theologically valorized, embarrassment loses some of its diagnostic force and must be corroborated.

So we converge here: embarrassment can contribute evidential weight, but only as part of a cumulative case.

B. What are the facts to be explained?

1. Jesus’ historical existence and the binary worry

Yes, there is a binary proposition: either Jesus existed or he did not. But epistemic justification does not operate in binaries; it operates in credences.

My position is:
• the probability that Jesus existed is above the threshold for tentative acceptance,
• but below the level often rhetorically treated as near-certainty,
• and far below what would be required to license further miracle claims.

Crossing the “probably existed” threshold does not obligate treating the claim as maximally secure or using it as a stable foundation for increasingly costly hypotheses.

Historical reasoning routinely accepts claims provisionally while sharply limiting what may be inferred from them. That is how I “get around” the binary: by distinguishing ontological truth from epistemic warrant.

Accepting Jesus’ existence answers one historical question. It does not pre-commit us to any particular explanation of later beliefs about him — still less to supernatural explanations that require additional evidential burdens.

At this stage, I think the core disagreement is not about whether explanations should discriminate, but about how much constraint is required before a hypothesis earns assent.

That is the question we should keep front and center as we move forward.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #103]

A. Questions on the justifying method

1. Coherence vs. correspondence

We’re aligned here. My concern is not with coherence as such, but with mistaking coherence or narrative fit for correspondence with reality.

A theory can be internally coherent and richly explanatory while still being underdetermined by the evidence. Discrimination requires that rival hypotheses make meaningfully different predictions or assign sharply different probabilities to the same evidential patterns. When we reach the comparison stage, this is the standard I will be applying.

I'm with you, although I'll want to be careful with language like "predictions" which seems more scientific than historical.

2. On the need for more epistemic clarity

I agree that some fragmentation is entirely expected given human psychology, motivated reasoning, and social dynamics. That point is not in dispute.

What matters is the degree, persistence, and structure of fragmentation.

If a benevolent deity were even modestly concerned with reducing preventable harm caused by false beliefs, we would reasonably expect:
• less symmetry between mutually exclusive salvation claims,
• fewer cases where sincere moral agents are punished for epistemic luck,
• clearer differentiation between core moral truths and peripheral theological speculation.

Appealing to free will explains why disagreement exists at all; it does not explain why disagreement is so evenly distributed, so entrenched, and so consequential. The question is comparative: would slightly greater clarity plausibly reduce harm without eliminating freedom? I think the answer is yes, and that is sufficient for the argument.

Just asserting that you think the answer is yes is not sufficient for the argument; you've got to show that the answer is most reasonably yes. Give us the argument to consider.

3. On supernatural/metaphysical claims having a higher evidential burden

“Additional” relative to hypotheses that explain the same historical data using already-licensed causal resources.

Natural historical explanations appeal to:
• known psychological processes,
• sociological dynamics,
• memory distortion,
• legend formation,
• charismatic leadership effects.

A supernatural intervention hypothesis adds:
• a new causal category,
• an unobservable intentional agent,
• an exception to background regularities.

But, to you, "hypotheses...using already-licensed causal resources" are solely naturalistic ones because of naturalism being your worldview. I think there are other arguments that point to the existence of the supernatural in explaining historical events, so I would say a supernatural cause is "already-licensed" as a possibility.

If one thinks, "then let's see those other arguments, Tanager" that's not going to solve anything because you'll do the same thing there. Whichever argument I give, you'll be saying that only naturalistic answers are "already-licensed" and so my argument has to jump a higher hurdle. This is favoring one worldview (your own) in answering any question and it's not rational. Our approach should have agnosticism as the default and be more equal than this.

By “constraint,” I mean limits on what the hypothesis allows. A constrained hypothesis tells us not only what can happen, but what would not happen if it were true. Constraint increases explanatory power by reducing degrees of freedom.

If a hypothesis can accommodate almost any evidential outcome, it risks becoming explanatorily cheap — powerful in appearance but weak in discrimination.

Okay. This will come at the later step, but I think the supernatural explanation is more constraining than you are giving it credit for.

4. Criterion of embarrassment

We are now largely in agreement.

My claim was never that embarrassment functions as a standalone proof. It was that in contexts where reversal or humiliation is theologically valorized, embarrassment loses some of its diagnostic force and must be corroborated.

So we converge here: embarrassment can contribute evidential weight, but only as part of a cumulative case.

Thank you for doing the work needed to come to this understanding of each other; not everyone has the kindness and patience to do so.


B. What are the facts to be explained?

1. Jesus’ historical existence

Yes, there is a binary proposition: either Jesus existed or he did not. But epistemic justification does not operate in binaries; it operates in credences.

My position is:
• the probability that Jesus existed is above the threshold for tentative acceptance,
• but below the level often rhetorically treated as near-certainty,

Okay. I think you are objectively wrong, but this seems good enough for our discussion to move forward.

• and far below what would be required to license further miracle claims.

Crossing the “probably existed” threshold does not obligate treating the claim as maximally secure or using it as a stable foundation for increasingly costly hypotheses.

Historical reasoning routinely accepts claims provisionally while sharply limiting what may be inferred from them. That is how I “get around” the binary: by distinguishing ontological truth from epistemic warrant.

Accepting Jesus’ existence answers one historical question. It does not pre-commit us to any particular explanation of later beliefs about him — still less to supernatural explanations that require additional evidential burdens.

I'm not saying Jesus' historical existence alone is enough to get to that Jesus supernatural resurrected. Is that what you are trying to guard against here or am I misreading you? If I'm not misreading you there, it seems we may still need to hash out A2 and A3 above before moving on. If I'm misreading you, then add this to those two to hash out some more.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #104]

Thank you — this is a constructive reply, and I think it helps isolate the remaining points of real disagreement. I’ll address them in turn and try to make progress rather than just restate positions.

A. Questions on the justifying method

1. “Predictions” in historical reasoning

Fair point on terminology. If “predictions” sounds too forward-looking or scientific, substitute:

• Differential expectations.
• Counterfactual sensitivity.
• Evidential asymmetries.

The core idea remains: rival historical hypotheses should not merely be compatible with the evidence but should assign meaningfully different plausibility to alternative evidential patterns. That is the sense in which discrimination operates in historical inquiry.

2. Why think more clarity would plausibly reduce harm?

You’re right to ask for an argument rather than an assertion. Here is the argument in compact form.

1. Many harms associated with religion are downstream of sincere, non-culpable false belief (epistemic luck), not willful rebellion or malice.
2. These false beliefs are often mutually exclusive yet symmetrically supported from the agent’s perspective.
3. Symmetric epistemic situations predict persistent fragmentation, zero-sum salvation claims, and moral punishment for belief rather than conduct.
4. A modest increase in shared epistemic anchors (e.g., clearer differentiation between moral universals and theological speculation) would asymmetrically reduce these harms without compelling assent.
5. Uncoerced will is preserved so long as rejection remains possible; freedom does not require maximal opacity.

Therefore, it is more reasonable than not to think that slightly greater clarity would reduce preventable harm while preserving freedom.

Appealing to uncoerced will explains why disagreement exists at all. It does not explain why belief-stakes are so high, so evenly distributed, and so disconnected from moral character. I used the term uncoerced will, instead of free will because the will of a biological organism is not free from determinants and constraints. The will is both determined and constrained by our genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences.

3. “Already-licensed” causes and worldview bias

This is an important objection, and I want to be precise here.

“Already-licensed” does not mean “naturalism is true.” It means “causal resources independently established within the domain of inquiry.”

In historical reasoning, psychological, sociological, and memory-based mechanisms are licensed because:
• they are independently evidenced,
• they recur across cases,
• they do not require introducing new ontological kinds per case.

By contrast, invoking a supernatural agent as a historical cause introduces:
• a novel intentional actor,
• with unconstrained capacities,
• operating via non-repeatable exceptions.

This is not privileging naturalism as a worldview. It is respecting evidential economy within a method.

Agnosticism is indeed the default — but agnosticism does not require treating all causal categories as evidentially symmetric. Equal metaphysical possibility does not entail equal explanatory burden.

If you think supernatural causation should be considered independently licensed in historical explanation, then the work required is to show:
• how it constrains outcomes,
• how it excludes rivals,
• how it avoids absorbing any evidential pattern.

That is not a higher hurdle because of bias; it is a higher hurdle because of ontological cost.

4. Constraint and the resurrection hypothesis

Noted — and I’m happy to defer the concrete constraints you think the resurrection hypothesis provides until we reach that stage. For now, we agree on the criterion: constraint must be shown, not merely asserted.

5. Criterion of embarrassment

Thank you — and likewise. I think we’ve reached genuine convergence here.

B. What are the facts to be explained?

1. Jesus’ historical existence

I think you are objectively wrong, but this seems good enough for our discussion to move forward.

Fair enough — and I appreciate the candor.

On your final question:

Is Jesus’ historical existence alone what you’re guarding against being used to license the resurrection?

I am guarding against treating Jesus’ existence as a stable foundation onto which increasingly costly hypotheses can be added without recalibrating evidential burden at each step.

Accepting:
• Jesus existed,
• followers believed extraordinary things about him,

does not, by itself, license:
• suspensions of background regularities,
• novel metaphysical causal agents,
• miracle claims with no independent constraint.

Each step must earn its keep.

I agree with you that Jesus’ existence alone is insufficient for resurrection — and I’m glad we are aligned on that. The remaining work, as you say, lies in A2 and A3: epistemic clarity and evidential burden.

That’s where the real disagreement now lives, and I’m content to focus there next.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #105]

A. Questions on the justifying method

1. Coherence vs. Correspondence

The core idea remains: rival historical hypotheses should not merely be compatible with the evidence but should assign meaningfully different plausibility to alternative evidential patterns. That is the sense in which discrimination operates in historical inquiry.

I agree.

2. On the need for more epistemic clarity

You’re right to ask for an argument rather than an assertion. Here is the argument in compact form.

1. Many harms associated with religion are downstream of sincere, non-culpable false belief (epistemic luck), not willful rebellion or malice.
2. These false beliefs are often mutually exclusive yet symmetrically supported from the agent’s perspective.
3. Symmetric epistemic situations predict persistent fragmentation, zero-sum salvation claims, and moral punishment for belief rather than conduct.
4. A modest increase in shared epistemic anchors (e.g., clearer differentiation between moral universals and theological speculation) would asymmetrically reduce these harms without compelling assent.
5. Uncoerced will is preserved so long as rejection remains possible; freedom does not require maximal opacity.

Therefore, it is more reasonable than not to think that slightly greater clarity would reduce preventable harm while preserving freedom.

Thanks for putting it in argument form. Why do you think these harms result from non-culpable false beliefs?

3. On supernatural/metaphysical claims having a higher evidential burden

This is an important objection, and I want to be precise here.

“Already-licensed” does not mean “naturalism is true.” It means “causal resources independently established within the domain of inquiry.”

In historical reasoning, psychological, sociological, and memory-based mechanisms are licensed because:
• they are independently evidenced,
• they recur across cases,
• they do not require introducing new ontological kinds per case.

By contrast, invoking a supernatural agent as a historical cause introduces:
• a novel intentional actor,
• with unconstrained capacities,
• operating via non-repeatable exceptions.

This is not privileging naturalism as a worldview. It is respecting evidential economy within a method.

But I think there is evidence that supernatural mechanisms are independently evidenced, recur across cases, and don't require introducing new ontological kinds per case. The actor isn't novel as this actor has been the cause of multiple historical events. This actor has constrained capacities (it can't do the logically impossible). This actor doesn't operate via non-repeatable exceptions.

If you think supernatural causation should be considered independently licensed in historical explanation, then the work required is to show:
• how it constrains outcomes,
• how it excludes rivals,
• how it avoids absorbing any evidential pattern.

That is not a higher hurdle because of bias; it is a higher hurdle because of ontological cost.

Can you lay out how a specfic natural cause does those three things to help me better see exactly what you mean?


B. What are the facts to be explained?

1. Jesus’ historical existence

I am guarding against treating Jesus’ existence as a stable foundation onto which increasingly costly hypotheses can be added without recalibrating evidential burden at each step.

Accepting:
• Jesus existed,
• followers believed extraordinary things about him,

does not, by itself, license:
• suspensions of background regularities,
• novel metaphysical causal agents,
• miracle claims with no independent constraint.

Each step must earn its keep.

I completely agree here.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #106]

Thank you — this is a good narrowing of the issues. I’ll focus on the two places where you’re asking for clarification rather than restating agreement.

A. Questions on the justifying method

2. Why think these harms result from non-culpable false belief?

Because the structure of the harms tracks epistemic position rather than moral character.

More specifically:

1. Many religious harms are imposed on people who are:
• sincere,
• morally conscientious,
• and epistemically constrained by upbringing, culture, and testimony.

2. In such cases, the agents causing or suffering harm are not acting out of malice but out of what they reasonably take to be moral or salvific obligation.

3. When punishment, exclusion, or moral condemnation is tied to belief rather than conduct, outcomes depend heavily on epistemic luck — which religion you were born into, which authorities you trust, which experiences you’ve had.

4. That pattern is exactly what we observe:
• symmetrical confidence across incompatible traditions,
• high moral stakes attached to belief,
• punishment or reward disconnected from character or harm reduction.

If the harms were primarily due to culpable rebellion, we would expect:
• clearer correlations with moral vice,
• convergence on core truths among sincere seekers,
• disagreement clustered around edge cases rather than central claims.

We do not see that. The distribution of harm tracks sincere false belief under symmetric evidence conditions, which is why increased clarity at the epistemic level plausibly reduces harm without addressing freedom at all.

3. Supernatural causes and evidential licensing

You say you think supernatural mechanisms are independently evidenced, recurrent, and constrained. That’s a substantive claim — but notice that making it doesn’t yet solve the methodological issue.

To clarify what I mean by constraint, exclusion, and non-absorption, here is a concrete natural example.

Example: Grief-induced bereavement visions

This is a natural psychological explanation often proposed for post-mortem appearance claims.

How it constrains outcomes
It predicts that:
• experiences cluster temporally after loss,
• occur more often under emotional stress,
• vary across individuals,
• lack public, repeatable verification.

It does not predict:
• mass simultaneous shared perceptions,
• long-term physical interactions,
• stable public artifacts.

How it excludes rivals
If appearances occurred:
• decades later,
• to enemies rather than followers,
• without emotional proximity,

this hypothesis would lose plausibility.

How it avoids absorbing any pattern
It cannot explain:
• empty tomb traditions,
• coordinated group narratives,
• early high-stakes proclamation by skeptics,

without additional auxiliary hypotheses.

That is what explanatory constraint looks like.

Now compare this to a supernatural agent explanation as typically offered. Unless it specifies:
• when intervention would not occur,
• to whom appearances would not be granted,
• what forms manifestation would not take,

it risks accommodating any evidential pattern equally well.

You say the supernatural actor is constrained (e.g., cannot do the logically impossible). That is a logical constraint, not a historical one. It does not generate differential expectations among rival historical hypotheses.

If you think the resurrection hypothesis does provide those constraints, then the next step is to spell them out explicitly in this same format:
• what it predicts,
• what would count against it,
• what patterns it cannot absorb.

That’s the standard being applied — not because of worldview bias, but because without it, explanatory comparison cannot get off the ground.

B. What are the facts to be explained?

1. Jesus’ historical existence

I’m glad we’re fully aligned here. That agreement removes a major source of confusion and lets us keep the focus where it belongs: on how evidential burdens escalate as explanatory commitments increase.

At this point, the disagreement is no longer about whether discrimination, constraint, or evidential economy matter.

It’s about whether — and how — a supernatural historical explanation can meet those standards in practice.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #107]

A. Questions on the justifying method

2. On the need for more epistemic clarity

P1. Many harms associated with religion are downstream of sincere, non-culpable false belief (epistemic luck), not willful rebellion or malice.

Because the structure of the harms tracks epistemic position rather than moral character.

More specifically:

1. Many religious harms are imposed on people who are:
• sincere,
• morally conscientious,
• and epistemically constrained by upbringing, culture, and testimony.

...

First, for this critique you have agreed that humans aren't epistemically determined. That means that they have the freedom to explore alternatives and come to the true belief. If they don't; they are ultimately culpable. Yes, it may be more difficult for some than others, but the chance is still there.

Second, if there were individuals who could not possibly overcome that upbringing and, therefore, rejected God, what does the Bible say about them? Nothing, because it doesn't address that question directly. Various Christians (and non-Christians) have formed their own answers to that question, for sure. I, personally, don't think God would hold such individuals accountable and would welcome them in.

I'm not convinced that such individuals exist. Part of that may be because while I think the path to God goes through Jesus, I don't think people necessarily have to know it went through Jesus to join up. Ultimately, I think what is required is that people realize their limitations and that they were designed to overcome those limitations through a constant relationship with and reliance on their creator who knows everything and is perfectly loving and good. Eventually, either before or after death, they will realize this comes to them through Jesus. The Bible is not an encyclopedia or fact book to be learned and assented to. It is a collection of meditation literature designed to lead people in this constant relationship rather than just getting epistemic clarity on necessary propositions.

3. On supernatural/metaphysical claims having a higher evidential burden

You say you think supernatural mechanisms are independently evidenced, recurrent, and constrained. That’s a substantive claim — but notice that making it doesn’t yet solve the methodological issue.

But it doesn't fail simply because you disagree that they are independently evidenced, recurrent, and constrained. You are saying I have a higher bar for my explanation because my worldview includes things yours doesn't. Why couldn't we flip that to say that your view has a higher bar because it takes things away from my worldview?

To clarify what I mean by constraint, exclusion, and non-absorption, here is a concrete natural example.

Example: Grief-induced bereavement visions

This is a natural psychological explanation often proposed for post-mortem appearance claims.

How it constrains outcomes
It predicts that:
• experiences cluster temporally after loss,
• occur more often under emotional stress,
• vary across individuals,
• lack public, repeatable verification.

It does not predict:
• mass simultaneous shared perceptions,
• long-term physical interactions,
• stable public artifacts.

How it excludes rivals
If appearances occurred:
• decades later,
• to enemies rather than followers,
• without emotional proximity,

this hypothesis would lose plausibility.

How it avoids absorbing any pattern
It cannot explain:
• empty tomb traditions,
• coordinated group narratives,
• early high-stakes proclamation by skeptics,

without additional auxiliary hypotheses.

That is what explanatory constraint looks like.

Example: Supernatural bodily resurrection of Jesus

This is a theological-historical explanation often proposed to account for early Christian resurrection claims.

How it constrains outcomes
It predicts that:
• appearances occur after death and burial, not before
• appearances are physically and temporally bounded
• involves recognizable continuity with Jesus before his death
• provides a reason for early proclamation in spite of social, political, and personal cost
• that this is a singular, unrepeatable event rather than a general pyschological phenomenon

It does not predict:
• indefinite or ongoing apparitions across centuries
• appearances only to those already emotionally primed to believe
• private, non-embodied experiences

How it excludes rivals
If the historical record showed:
• resurrection claims emerging many decades later with no early proclamation
• appearances reported only by grieving followers and never skeptics/opponents
• claims were purely metaphorical from the outset
• no central role given to bodily resurrection in early preaching

this hypothesis would lose plausibility.

How it avoids absorbing any pattern
It cannot explain:
• resurrection-like visions of unrelated figures across cultures
• purely internal, non-embodied spiritual experiences interpreted as resurrection
• absence of a proclaimed resurrection in other martydom cases
• arbitary resurrection claims without narrative continuity

without additional auxiliary hypotheses (such as special divine purpose, unique messianic identity, etc.)


B. What are the facts to be explained?

1. Jesus’ historical existence

We are agreed Jesus probably existed

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #108]

Thank you — this is a serious attempt to meet the standards I laid out, and that’s appreciated. I’ll respond to the two substantive sections in turn.

A. On epistemic clarity and culpability

Your response hinges on this claim:

Humans aren't epistemically determined. That means that they have the freedom to explore alternatives and come to the true belief. If they don't; they are ultimately culpable.

This is precisely where we diverge.

The mere logical possibility of exploring alternatives is not sufficient for epistemic culpability. What matters is whether agents have a reasonable epistemic path to the truth given their constraints.

Several points here:

1. Opportunity is not access
An agent can have abstract freedom to explore while lacking:
• reliable exposure to alternatives,
• trustworthy sources,
• psychological safety to question,
• cognitive or emotional resources to sustain doubt.

If epistemic outcomes track upbringing, culture, testimony, and affective conditioning far more strongly than individual effort, then culpability is attenuated even if logical alternatives exist.

2. Symmetry matters
Sincere seekers across incompatible religious traditions report:
• prayer,
• moral striving,
• perceived divine guidance,

yet converge on mutually exclusive conclusions. If each side judges the other culpable, the symmetry strongly suggests epistemic luck rather than moral failure.

3. Your inclusivist theology concedes the core point
You say you personally think God would welcome those who:
• did not explicitly know Jesus,
• but lived in humility and moral seriousness,
• and eventually realize the truth post-mortem.

That position implicitly acknowledges that:
• explicit doctrinal belief is not reliably accessible to all,
• moral character and epistemic access come apart,
• punishment for false belief would be unjust.

That is already a concession that harms tied to belief-tracking (social exclusion, condemnation, fear of damnation) are not tracking culpability.

My argument does not depend on whether such individuals “exist in large numbers.” It depends on whether the structure of the world makes sincere false belief plausible and widespread. On that, the evidence is overwhelming.

B. On evidential burden and worldview symmetry

You ask:

Why couldn't we flip that to say that your view has a higher bar because it takes things away from my worldview?

Because evidential burden tracks what a hypothesis adds, not what it subtracts.

Removing entities does not increase explanatory cost. Introducing new causal kinds does.

If two explanations account for the same data, and one requires:
• a new ontological category,
• a unique agent with special powers,
• exceptions to background regularities,

then that explanation must do proportionally more discriminative work. This is not worldview favoritism; it is methodological parsimony.

C. On your resurrection example

You’ve now done the right thing: you’ve tried to specify constraints. That allows us to evaluate them.

Here is the problem: many of the listed “constraints” are not constraints in the relevant sense.

1. Many constraints are restatements of the claim

For example:
• “appearances occur after death”
• “recognizable continuity with Jesus”
• “bodily resurrection is central”

These are not independent expectations; they are definitional features of the resurrection narrative. A hypothesis cannot earn evidential credit for predicting what it builds in by stipulation.

2. Several exclusions are historically disputable

You say the resurrection hypothesis does not predict:
• appearances only to the emotionally primed,
• private, non-embodied experiences.

But historically:
• appearances are overwhelmingly to insiders,
• Paul’s experience is visionary,
• the narratives vary sharply in physicality.

So the hypothesis already tolerates significant variance, which weakens its constraining force.

3. “Singular, unrepeatable event” weakens discrimination

Labeling the event as unique and unrepeatable reduces falsifiability rather than increasing it.

If something happens once by special divine purpose:
• absence of parallels becomes expected,
• lack of recurrence is explained away,
• failure to observe similar events elsewhere carries little weight.

This is the opposite of evidential constraint.

4. Auxiliary hypotheses do the real work

You note that rival resurrection-like claims would require auxiliary hypotheses (e.g., “special divine purpose”).

But the resurrection hypothesis itself already relies on:
• special messianic identity,
• unique salvific intent,
• selective divine action.

Once those auxiliaries are admitted, the hypothesis becomes highly flexible. Flexibility is not fatal — but it does reduce discriminatory power.

D. Comparison with the bereavement-vision model

The key difference remains:

The natural explanation risks falsification if certain patterns appear.
The resurrection explanation explains those patterns by appeal to uniqueness and divine intent.

That asymmetry is methodological, not metaphysical.

Conclusion

You’ve made real progress by articulating constraints explicitly — that’s the right move.

But at present:
• many “constraints” are narrative restatements,
• uniqueness functions as insulation rather than risk,
• auxiliary theological commitments absorb disconfirming data.

So while the resurrection hypothesis can be made coherent and meaningful within a theological framework, it still does not yet outperform natural rivals on explanatory discrimination alone.

That is the standard I’m applying — and now, finally, we’re evaluating the same thing.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #109]

A. Questions on the justifying method

2. On the need for more epistemic clarity

P1. Many harms associated with religion are downstream of sincere, non-culpable false belief (epistemic luck), not willful rebellion or malice.

The mere logical possibility of exploring alternatives is not sufficient for epistemic culpability. What matters is whether agents have a reasonable epistemic path to the truth given their constraints.

I agree. Humans who don’t have reliable exposure to alternatives need to pursue them and if they don’t, they are to blame. Humans who don’t have trustworthy sources, need to seek those out; if they don’t, they are to blame. And the same with all of your other points. You are simply stating mere logically possible obstacles that may not be able to be overcome by some (yet people do as evidenced by Christian conversions from every worldview in existence). No rational person should be overwhelmed by that “evidence” because, as you say above, mere logical possibility is not enough. You’ve got to do more than that to remain rational in your claim.

But even if you happen to be right, if such people do exist, the Bible does not say those people would be rejected by God.

3. Your inclusivist theology concedes the core point
You say you personally think God would welcome those who:
• did not explicitly know Jesus,
• but lived in humility and moral seriousness,
• and eventually realize the truth post-mortem.

That position implicitly acknowledges that:
• explicit doctrinal belief is not reliably accessible to all,
• moral character and epistemic access come apart,
• punishment for false belief would be unjust.

That is already a concession that harms tied to belief-tracking (social exclusion, condemnation, fear of damnation) are not tracking culpability.

Yes, Christianity (I think) is not about explicit doctrinal belief, it’s about a Person. It’s about us trusting God to fix things and clinging to Him even if you don’t see how He does it instead of trying to do it ourselves. Yes, our moral character is not what earns us eternal life, but what follows from it. Yes, punishment for (non-culpable) false belief would be unjust. But we all have epistemic access to the fact that we mess things up, can’t fix it all ourselves, and need God’s help. Access to that does not come apart to anyone.


3. On supernatural/metaphysical claims having a higher evidential burden

Why couldn't we flip that to say that your view has a higher bar because it takes things away from my worldview?

Because evidential burden tracks what a hypothesis adds, not what it subtracts.

Removing entities does not increase explanatory cost. Introducing new causal kinds does.

If two explanations account for the same data, and one requires:
• a new ontological category,
• a unique agent with special powers,
• exceptions to background regularities,

then that explanation must do proportionally more discriminative work. This is not worldview favoritism; it is methodological parsimony.

And so we are back to your ‘parsimony” which you haven’t justified. You have the same complexity of explanation, you’ve just traded an ontological kind for something else (such as explaining an illusory level of reality that wasn’t there before the attempted explanation). Then you simply keep asserting that this trade-off improves things. Why?

You’ve now done the right thing: you’ve tried to specify constraints. That allows us to evaluate them.

Here is the problem: many of the listed “constraints” are not constraints in the relevant sense.

1. Many constraints are restatements of the claim

For example:
• “appearances occur after death”
• “recognizable continuity with Jesus”
• “bodily resurrection is central”

These are not independent expectations; they are definitional features of the resurrection narrative. A hypothesis cannot earn evidential credit for predicting what it builds in by stipulation.

On recognizable continuity, I was thinking of things like comparing it to the twin theory or an imposter type theory. While physical appearance could be maintained on the twin theory (and to a lesser extent on an imposter theory), there would still be other differences that would not be continuous.

On the other two, how is “appearances occur after death” any different from your “visions occur temporarily after loss”? Here is a key difference: my example and constraint were two distinct events (resurrection and appearances later, resurrection and Christian movement), while yours spoke of the same event (the vision itself). So why is mine not independent expectations, but yours is?

2. Several exclusions are historically disputable

You say the resurrection hypothesis does not predict:
• appearances only to the emotionally primed,
• private, non-embodied experiences.

But historically:
• appearances are overwhelmingly to insiders,
• Paul’s experience is visionary,
• the narratives vary sharply in physicality.

So the hypothesis already tolerates significant variance, which weakens its constraining force.

But the resurrection hypothesis offers appearances to outsiders (Jesus’ brother James) and Paul’s is the only one that was after Jesus’ bodily ascension.

3. “Singular, unrepeatable event” weakens discrimination

Labeling the event as unique and unrepeatable reduces falsifiability rather than increasing it.

If something happens once by special divine purpose:
• absence of parallels becomes expected,
• lack of recurrence is explained away,
• failure to observe similar events elsewhere carries little weight.

This is the opposite of evidential constraint.

If the event is repeatable, that may strengthen it, but the reverse is not true. We would not expect an event that purports to be unique to have other instances; you can’t fault it for simply being unique. A unique event should still be accepted or rejected based on the merit of the evidence.

4. Auxiliary hypotheses do the real work

You note that rival resurrection-like claims would require auxiliary hypotheses (e.g., “special divine purpose”).

But the resurrection hypothesis itself already relies on:
• special messianic identity,
• unique salvific intent,
• selective divine action.

Once those auxiliaries are admitted, the hypothesis becomes highly flexible. Flexibility is not fatal — but it does reduce discriminatory power.

This was about how the supernatural resurrection theory avoids absorbing particular data as support for itself. If special divine favor was shown through, say, the clouds formed into words that Krishna’s stories were true, if someone else showed more claim to being Messiah, if the early Christian experiences were all claimed to be non-embodied, if the gospel narratives said one thing about Jesus and totally something contradictory about Jesus afterwards, etc. Those are details the supernatural resurrection theory couldn’t absorb and remain true.