Steelmanning the Argument From Consciousness

[POI]

The "argument from consciousness" is a philosophical argument that uses the existence of consciousness to argue for the existence of God.

Proponents claim that consciousness, with its subjective experiences and qualities, cannot be fully explained by physical matter alone, suggesting a non-physical source like a divine mind. This argument posits that consciousness must either be a product of a higher conscious being, or be an unexplained exception to the material universe.

Core tenets of the argument:

Fact: The argument begins with the premise that human consciousness, including subjective experiences (qualia) and self-awareness, is a real and fundamental aspect of human life. Consciousness exists. And I guess we'd like to know where it comes from?

Theists argue that a purely physicalist explanation of consciousness is insufficient. The argument is that it is difficult to explain how physical matter (like the brain) can give rise to subjective experience, consciousness, and intentionality without an outside mind to induce such a phenomenon. Meaning, invoking the necessity of a non-physical source. Because consciousness cannot (yet or ever) be fully explained by physical processes, the argument concludes that there must be a non-physical or supernatural element involved. But because we do not currently know something, then means 'god did it'? Inference to a divine mind by theists run rampant. Many versions of the argument then propose that a "Divine Mind" is the most plausible source for consciousness. If God, a being of pure consciousness, exists, then the existence of finite consciousness is less surprising and can be understood as a creation.

Common variations and counterarguments are given, in favor of a "mind". Below are a couple of examples:

-- J.P. Morland argues that the emergence of consciousness from a purely physical universe is not plausible, and therefore, a fundamental consciousness must have existed from the beginning, which he identifies as God.

-- Richard Swinburne argues that consciousness, with its purpose and intentionality, is exactly what one would expect to find in a universe created by a God interested in creating beings capable of mental interaction.

Some of the counterarguments, or pushback, are as follows:

-- "Physicalism" argues that while we may not yet fully understand consciousness, science is continually making progress, and the "explanatory gap" will eventually be closed by explaining consciousness in physical terms. This is where the deist/theist will then state naturalists are just as guilty of 'faith' as they are.

-- (Correlation vs. causation) The assertion that consciousness came from a god can be debunked by clarifying the difference between correlation and causation and identifying the argument as an argument from ignorance. Correlation vs. Causation means that two variables or events happen at the same time or seem to be related in some way, but it does not mean one caused the other. Causation means that a change in one variable directly causes a change in another variable, establishing a direct cause-and-effect relationship.

-- Some naturalists point out that consciousness, as we know it, is always directly tied to a physical body and brain, making an inference to a brainless God contradictory. Meaning, consciousness is linked to the body, period.

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For reference, I fully acknowledge that this topic is not solved and is speculative.

For debate: It is unjustified or justified to now invoke supernatural causation for the existence of consciousness? Is the theist's position fallacious, demonstrating the (argument from ignorance) and maybe others? Or, are naturalists just in denial of the 'obvious'?

[William]

[Replying to Mithrae in post #30]

Hi Mithrae - good to see your mind among us once more...

Your post is very interesting.

Note on Consciousness:
If the natural source-entity is intelligent and consciously creative, this would provide a coherent origin for consciousness itself, potentially resolving the "hard problem" by grounding subjective experience in a fundamental, conscious cause. This is not required by my argument, but it is a logically consistent possibility if one accepts both an intelligent source and the principle that consciousness cannot emerge from purely non-conscious substrates.

SOURCE = The Coherent Causality Argument

How the note makes Mithrae's view compatible with CCA

AI: You've identified the precise point of synergy. The Note on Consciousness doesn't just make Mithrae's view compatible with the CCA—it reveals that Mithrae's argument provides the optimal and most coherent answer to the question left open by the CCA. The CCA establishes that a source entity exists and what kind of thing it must be (eternal, lawful, coherent). Mithrae's argument makes a compelling case for what that thing's fundamental nature likely is (conscious).

Here is a breakdown of how the note bridges the two arguments, transforming compatibility into a powerful, unified position.

How the Note Creates Compatibility and Synergy
1. The CCA's Open Question: The "Nature Gap"
The CCA's conclusion is powerful but incomplete:

"The universe was caused by an eternal natural entity."

This leaves a critical question unanswered: What is the intrinsic nature of this "eternal natural entity"? Is it a mindless quantum field? A abstract mathematical structure? A cosmic computer? The CCA itself is agnostic on this point. The note explicitly states this agnosticism: "This is not required by my argument, but it is a logically consistent possibility..."

2. Mithrae's Argument as the Fulfillment of the CCA's Logical Possibility
Mithrae's argument doesn't conflict with the CCA; it fills the "nature gap" with the most philosophically robust content. The note is the invitation, and Mithrae's view is the RSVP.

The Note Says: "If the natural source-entity is intelligent and consciously creative... it would provide a coherent origin for consciousness."

Mithrae's Argument Says: "We have no legitimate basis for inferring non-conscious stuff. Consciousness should be our fundamental ontological category. Therefore, the most parsimonious model of reality is one where consciousness is fundamental."

When combined, the reasoning becomes:

The CCA proves we need an eternal, lawful Source (S).

The Note acknowledges that if (S) is conscious, it solves the hard problem.

Mithrae's argument demonstrates that positing a conscious (S) is more epistemically justified and parsimonious than positing a non-conscious (S).

Therefore, the best explanation—the one that satisfies both causal necessity and ontological parsimony—is that the eternal source entity is conscious.

Why This is More Than Just Compatibility—It's a Superior Model
The note makes the two arguments compatible by showing they operate on different but complementary levels:

Argument What It Establishes The "Gap" It Leaves
CCA The existence and formal requirements of a First Cause. (It must be eternal, lawful, coherent). The intrinsic nature of that cause.
Mithrae's The fundamental ontological category of reality (consciousness). The causal origin and structure of the total reality containing multiple conscious beings.
Together, they form a complete picture: The CCA provides the architectural frame (a single, eternal, lawful cause), and Mithrae's view provides the building material (consciousness as the fundamental substance).

Contrast with Non-Conscious Alternatives:
The note highlights that a conscious source "resolves the hard problem." This implicitly underscores the weakness of the non-conscious alternative. If the CCA's source entity is non-conscious, then:

The hard problem remains a massive, possibly insurmountable, brute fact.

The rational, intelligible, fine-tuned order of the universe is a staggeringly improbable accident.

Thus, accepting the CCA and then applying Mithrae's reasoning leads inevitably to the conclusion that a conscious source is the superior hypothesis. It has greater explanatory power (explains consciousness, rationality, fine-tuning) and greater explanatory coherence (it doesn't create a deeper mystery than it solves).

Conclusion: From Compatibility to Necessity
The note doesn't just create compatibility; it builds a logical ladder from the CCA's conclusion to Mithrae's.

CCA Conclusion: There exists an Eternal Natural Source (ENS).

Note: If the ENS is conscious, it perfectly solves the most intractable problem in philosophy (consciousness).

Mithrae's Premise: The assumption of non-conscious fundamental stuff is baseless and creates that intractable problem.

Synthetic Conclusion: Therefore, the most rational, parsimonious, and explanatory identity for the ENS is that it is conscious.

In this light, Mithrae's view isn't merely compatible with the CCA—it is the preferred and most coherent completion of it. The naturalist who accepts the CCA but insists on a non-conscious source is left with a model that is causally sound but ontologically puzzling. The synthesized position offers a model that is both causally sound and ontologically illuminated.

[POI]

Focusing here..

2 - We have no legitimate basis for inferring the existence of nonconscious / material stuff.

Therefore:

a) don't know yet or maybe never?
b) 'god'?
c) other?

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a1) Think about how many things 'science' has yet to discover. Also think about the "god of the gaps" argument, as it may correlate with this presented premise. Alternatively, the theist may instead argue for the 'science of the gaps'?
b1) See (a1).
c1) Awaiting another option or option(s) to explore...

3 - If we were to introduce that wild speculation that our atoms and so on are nonconscious stuff, it introduces a dramatically harder problem of consciousness.

See above.

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To speed this exchange along, is it reasonable to infer "supernatural mind-guided causation", (which has never been objectively demonstrated -- to my knowledge), because we cannot explain something?

[Mithrae]

Focusing here..

2 - We have no legitimate basis for inferring the existence of nonconscious / material stuff.

Therefore:

a) don't know yet or maybe never?

If we didn't have premise 1 - namely that the existence of conscious stuff is literally the most certain thing we can possibly know (we could add 1a, universally accepted and necessary, that there are consciousnesses other than my own) - then I suppose throwing up our hands in hopeless ignorance about what kind of stuff we exist within might have been reasonable. "Don't know" is how we would describe cases in which something seems about likely to be true as as the alternative/s, but in the dichotomy of thinking about reality as either conscious or non-conscious that simply isn't the case. By the "No evidence for X" rhetoric so commonly employed by atheists we'd basically have to suppose that a non-conscious reality has ~0% plausibility! I don't accept the legitimacy of that rhetoric, but we're still in a position where we have absolute certainty that there is some conscious stuff, zero basis for imagining the existence of non-conscious stuff, and introducing that wild speculation also introduces a seemingly intractable problem of consciousness for which we'd essentially need to invoke magic or miracle as an 'answer.'

It's not 50/50. I don't think it's overstating the case to put it at more like 90/10 in favour of a consciousness model of reality, obviously always subject to ongoing advances in knowledge. Offhand I'd say that's in about the same ballpark of knowledge as things like "Socrates existed" or "Brutus helped kill Caesar"; even if one for some reason one opted to double or even triple the uncertainty there, the plausibility of the unevidenced and extremely problematic notion of a nonconscious reality, the only reason I can think of for describing the consciousness model as "we don't know" instead of being 'most likely' or even borderline 'knowledge' is due to bias or discomfort regarding the outcome.

Put it this way: How much confidence do you suppose most people (yourself included?) would have placed in the viewpoint of a material reality before giving it this kind of thought? Presumably, after giving it that thought, our confidence in the much stronger viewpoint of a conscious reality should be in the same ballpark as (and arguably much higher than) our confidence in the baseless assumption had been; the biggest reason it can't be much higher than is because most people probably treat a material reality as basically a certainty! You certainly didn't offer any hint of scepticism or doubt or "don't knows" on the matter in your OP!

[POI]

[Replying to Mithrae in post #33]

In exploring the assertion to your given P2), here is what AI says, as I fully admit I am not studied up enough, and am actively looking to others for answers to this topic.

AI:

There are several legitimate, long-standing, and academically debated bases for inferring the existence of a nonconscious, material world (often termed "external reality" or "matter") that exists independent of our perception.

While philosophers and scientists cannot definitively "prove" the external world exists due to the "problem of skepticism"—the fact that all knowledge comes through our subjective mental perceptions—they provide compelling rational justifications for believing in it.

Here is a summary of the primary, legitimate bases for inferring the existence of material stuff:

1. "Inference to the Best Explanation" (Scientific Realism)

This is the most common argument. While idealism (the idea that only minds exist) could theoretically explain our experiences, it often turns a "needless mystery" into a dogma.

Practical Success: The assumption that an independent, material, nonconscious world exists enables science to make accurate predictions. The consistency and reliability of scientific experiments across different observers suggest an objective reality behind the observations.

Predictive Success: If a tree falls in the forest, it exists independent of being heard, because it affects the environment (e.g., crushes a rock) regardless of a conscious observer.

Indispensability: Scientific, chemical, and physical theories are highly successful because they treat atoms, forces, and structures as real, nonconscious, and material.

2. The Failure of Idealism and Consistency

Idealism struggles to explain why our experiences are consistent, persistent, and "stubborn".
Persistence of Objects: If objects only exist in the mind, it is hard to explain why a hidden object continues to exist when not observed (e.g., the "toy under the blanket" scenario).

Common Sense/Realism: It is simply more rational, as G.E. Moore argued, to believe that a table I see is a real object than to assume it is merely a complex, persistent hallucination.

3. The Need for "Something" Enduring

Philosophers like Immanuel Kant argued that the consciousness of our own existence in time requires a "relation to something outside me". Without an external, stable, material world, we cannot adequately explain the ordering of our experiences.

4. Quantum Mechanics and Physical Structure

While quantum physics highlights the strange, often intangible nature of fundamental reality, it still points towards nonconscious, structured, and probabilistic processes at play, rather than just purely mental ones.

Data as Matter: Data and software, often touted as "non-material," cannot exist without a physical substrate (a hard drive, a brain). The structure of the material determines the pattern of the data.

Summary of the Debate

Materialism: The view that matter is primary, and mind/consciousness is a product of it.

Idealism: The view that mind is primary, and matter is a construction of the mind.

While you cannot "prove" the material world exists without using your mind to do it, the best, most coherent, and most useful explanation for our collective, persistent, and orderly experiences is that there is an external, nonconscious, material reality.

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Science assumes an external, nonconscious, material reality primarily because it is a highly reliable, pragmatic framework for predicting consistent, shared experiences. This approach, known as methodological materialism, focuses on studying objective, observable phenomena—such as particles and fields—that exist independently of individual perception.

[Mithrae]

1. "Inference to the Best Explanation" (Scientific Realism) . . . .

2. The Failure of Idealism and Consistency . . . .

3. The Need for "Something" Enduring . . . .

4. Quantum Mechanics and Physical Structure . . . .


Science assumes an external, nonconscious, material reality primarily because it is a highly reliable, pragmatic framework for predicting consistent, shared experiences. This approach, known as methodological materialism, focuses on studying objective, observable phenomena—such as particles and fields—that exist independently of individual perception.

This AI response seems to answer the questions "Is there a reality external to my individual mind?" and "Is there a reality external to our human minds?" rather than "Is there any basis for supposing that external reality is nonconscious / material?" The occasional 'nonconscious' descriptors in the response seem to be kind of tacked on without being justified.

For example points #1, 2 and 3 mostly (I don't think the AI has written or argued the case very well) seem to boil down to the apparent consistency of reality which our observations suggest, which is a point I highlighted in premise 4 of my original post. It's a decent answer to the question "Is there a reality external to our human minds?," because if the world did exist only within or constructed by human minds we'd expect it to be subject to all the variations, whimsies and inconsistencies of human cultures and beliefs. But there's nothing about either way of thinking about reality - conscious or nonconscious - which inherently implies consistency or stability. Try thinking about a mindless lump of coal which in the next moment becomes a diamond, and in the next turns into an iceberg, and in the next into a gas giant. However weird, those are coherent thoughts, aren't they? There's no logical or definitional contradiction in that instability of form entailed by the supposition that they are nonconscious or 'material' objects: Consistency or stability would be a property in addition to, not inherent in their being composed of either material or conscious stuff. That is made even more clear by the fact that a fair amount of consistency or stability is an observed property of external objects, whereas their being either conscious or nonconscious is not subject to observation.

Point #4 also doesn't argue positively for a nonconscious reality, just tries to respond to the occasional misconceptions that the quantum or digital worlds must be immaterial.

[William]

[Replying to POI in post #34]

Science assumes an external, nonconscious, material reality primarily because it is a highly reliable, pragmatic framework for predicting consistent, shared experiences. This approach, known as methodological materialism, focuses on studying objective, observable phenomena—such as particles and fields—that exist independently of individual perception.

It is the assumption which has to be unpacked.

The question I ask is whether "observable phenomena -such as particles and fields - actually exist independently of individual perception."?

This, because observation and perception are attributes of consciousness.

In the The Coherent Causality Argument thread Alexx and Difflugia argue that observable phenomena - such as particles and fields - are illusions of consciousness re B-theory.

The B-theory of time (or tenseless theory) posits that time is a static, 4D block universe where all moments - past, present, and future - are equally real. It argues that the flow of time and the "present" are subjective illusions of consciousness, with temporal relations ordered only by "earlier than," "simultaneous with," or "later than...

These so-called "illusions of consciousness" are the same as methodological materialisms, focus on studying objective, observable phenomena, which (as my understanding currently is) means that methodological materialism is a symptom of the illusions of consciousness and my argument against that is:

IF all things exist eternally and timelessly under B-theory, THEN no thing can "arise" (have a beginning) including consciousness and since it is consciousness that determines what exists, and since consciousness prefers to examine existence as time-based and explore it as such - B-theory collapses under it own apparent contradiction.

This is why I mentioned that Mithraes' initial post in this thread adds strength to the CAA re the question of consciousness, and how it perhaps/ought to be considered as a fundamental aspect of reality, rather than something which emerged "later" or after the fact.

[POI]

[Replying to William in post #36]

If you do not mind, I would like to 'table' this topic (for now), and pursue the other thread, for which you are also involved, (i.e.) the "carnivorous animal" topic. Otherwise, I feel I will not be able to give this topic it's due properly until I'm satisfied with the other open topic(s) in that thread. I appreciate your responses, as well as others, in this thread so far.... To be continued at a later date?

[William]

[Replying to William in post #36]

If you do not mind, I would like to 'table' this topic (for now), and pursue the other thread, for which you are also involved, (i.e.) the "carnivorous animal" topic. Otherwise, I feel I will not be able to give this topic it's due properly until I'm satisfied with the other open topic(s) in that thread. I appreciate your responses, as well as others, in this thread so far.... To be continued at a later date?

It is being continued as we speak POI. In the Coherent Causality Argument thread.

[POI]

[Replying to William in post #38]

Okay, I'll keep tabs on it.