Can Atheism ground objective morality?

[The Tanager]

In my exploration and discussions, I have not seen an atheistic worldview be able to logically account for morality being objective. The closest I've seen is an atheistic platonic kind of moral system, but while that seems to be able to account for the existence of 'good' and 'evil', it still doesn't seem to account for why humans would be obligated to choose Good over Evil. I'd love to hear cases from those who think atheism can account for objective morality to make sure I haven't missed (or misunderstood) thoughts in my exploration.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Vilferatus in post #50]

However, the problem I pointed out remains: it is the specific methodological error you used to argue in favor of the model in that instance.

When discussing whether a specific framework (theism) can rationally ground objective reality or morality, you cannot insert an impossible premise that logically destroys the very nature of that model just to illustrate a point. Proposing a hypothetical scenario where the Absolute operates as a liar or is ignorant of reality is a structural contradiction within the theistic framework.

There are various theistic frameworks, not just one. I was not making a comment about particular theistic frameworks within which it’s impossible for a creator god to lie.

I was commenting on a general principle that a creator god’s commands would determine objectivity. I made a comment about how this would obviously not be true if that creator god could lie. I then made a comment about how even if this creator god couldn’t lie, the objectivity wouldn’t come from the post-creation command.

Stating that you 'were not assuming that God exists for that part of the discussion' is an epistemological penalty. You cannot switch the rules of the board mid-game. If a premise requires you to compromise the ontological definition of the Absolute to function, then the hypothetical example is invalid from the start. You cannot defend a model by utilizing a premise that destroys it.

I fully support your conclusion about design and objectivity, but we must maintain total rigor in the steps we take to get there.

I don’t see why you think I changed the rules mid-game. The “rules” this thread started with where there is no theistic Absolute. If you are saying this discussion must take note of a theistic Absolute, then you are changing the rules and losing total rigor in the steps.

[Vilferatus]

[Replying to Vilferatus in post #50]

However, the problem I pointed out remains: it is the specific methodological error you used to argue in favor of the model in that instance.

When discussing whether a specific framework (theism) can rationally ground objective reality or morality, you cannot insert an impossible premise that logically destroys the very nature of that model just to illustrate a point. Proposing a hypothetical scenario where the Absolute operates as a liar or is ignorant of reality is a structural contradiction within the theistic framework.

There are various theistic frameworks, not just one. I was not making a comment about particular theistic frameworks within which it’s impossible for a creator god to lie.

I was commenting on a general principle that a creator god’s commands would determine objectivity. I made a comment about how this would obviously not be true if that creator god could lie. I then made a comment about how even if this creator god couldn’t lie, the objectivity wouldn’t come from the post-creation command.

Stating that you 'were not assuming that God exists for that part of the discussion' is an epistemological penalty. You cannot switch the rules of the board mid-game. If a premise requires you to compromise the ontological definition of the Absolute to function, then the hypothetical example is invalid from the start. You cannot defend a model by utilizing a premise that destroys it.

I fully support your conclusion about design and objectivity, but we must maintain total rigor in the steps we take to get there.

I don’t see why you think I changed the rules mid-game. The “rules” this thread started with where there is no theistic Absolute. If you are saying this discussion must take note of a theistic Absolute, then you are changing the rules and losing total rigor in the steps.

Ok, I understand your intention, but I just dont understand how you could use a premise that destroy theism when trying to prove theism. Maybe I got late into the conversation and missed the reason why you used that premise even tho it doesnt make any logical sense in the theistic framework... as far as I know, there is none that claims God is a liar.

[The Tanager]

Ok, I understand your intention, but I just dont understand how you could use a premise that destroy theism when trying to prove theism. Maybe I got late into the conversation and missed the reason why you used that premise even tho it doesnt make any logical sense in the theistic framework... as far as I know, there is none that claims God is a liar.

Perhaps I need clarity on what you see as my premise and why you think that it destroys theism. If it's something like, "God makes commands contrary to reality," I'm not claiming that. If it's something like "bare commands don't ground truth," that is what I'm claiming, but it doesn't entail atheism. My hypothetical wasn't about what any theistic framework actually claims or about what God could do or does or an attempt to prove theism.

My hypothetical is a counterfactual test for the specific thought/theory that moral truth is grounded in God's bare commands (after creation). The hypothetical is simply meant to isolate what does the grounding. When some people analyze objective morality concerning a God who cannot lie and makes perfect commands about what is good/bad, I think they can fail to isolate things properly and end up confusing epistemology and ontology. Commands (qua commands) can tell us something about a being's knowledge, desires, etc., but not necessarily about the ontology of things. But if we strip out the perfect knowledge/desires bit, maybe one can see there is a distinction between ontology and epistemology, even when talking about God.

That's what I was going for, at least.

[Vilferatus]

Ok, I understand your intention, but I just dont understand how you could use a premise that destroy theism when trying to prove theism. Maybe I got late into the conversation and missed the reason why you used that premise even tho it doesnt make any logical sense in the theistic framework... as far as I know, there is none that claims God is a liar.

Perhaps I need clarity on what you see as my premise and why you think that it destroys theism. If it's something like, "God makes commands contrary to reality," I'm not claiming that. If it's something like "bare commands don't ground truth," that is what I'm claiming, but it doesn't entail atheism. My hypothetical wasn't about what any theistic framework actually claims or about what God could do or does or an attempt to prove theism.

My hypothetical is a counterfactual test for the specific thought/theory that moral truth is grounded in God's bare commands (after creation). The hypothetical is simply meant to isolate what does the grounding. When some people analyze objective morality concerning a God who cannot lie and makes perfect commands about what is good/bad, I think they can fail to isolate things properly and end up confusing epistemology and ontology. Commands (qua commands) can tell us something about a being's knowledge, desires, etc., but not necessarily about the ontology of things. But if we strip out the perfect knowledge/desires bit, maybe one can see there is a distinction between ontology and epistemology, even when talking about God.

That's what I was going for, at least.

Makes perfect sense to me, and as I said, I agree with your conclusion, I just thought you were defending theism. The reaons is: How can you talk about say something that presupose God, withouth assuming a theistic framework?

But i completly understand your point now, ty.

[Vilferatus]

Ok, I understand your intention, but I just dont understand how you could use a premise that destroy theism when trying to prove theism. Maybe I got late into the conversation and missed the reason why you used that premise even tho it doesnt make any logical sense in the theistic framework... as far as I know, there is none that claims God is a liar.

Perhaps I need clarity on what you see as my premise and why you think that it destroys theism. If it's something like, "God makes commands contrary to reality," I'm not claiming that. If it's something like "bare commands don't ground truth," that is what I'm claiming, but it doesn't entail atheism. My hypothetical wasn't about what any theistic framework actually claims or about what God could do or does or an attempt to prove theism.

My hypothetical is a counterfactual test for the specific thought/theory that moral truth is grounded in God's bare commands (after creation). The hypothetical is simply meant to isolate what does the grounding. When some people analyze objective morality concerning a God who cannot lie and makes perfect commands about what is good/bad, I think they can fail to isolate things properly and end up confusing epistemology and ontology. Commands (qua commands) can tell us something about a being's knowledge, desires, etc., but not necessarily about the ontology of things. But if we strip out the perfect knowledge/desires bit, maybe one can see there is a distinction between ontology and epistemology, even when talking about God.

That's what I was going for, at least.

Also wanted to answer the original dilema:

The ultimate resolution to this dilemma lies in the nature of value itself: the real value of anything is entirely relative to the Absolute.

Things are not good or bad because of an arbitrary whim, nor do they possess value independent of the source of reality. Things are objectively good or bad based on whether they serve or align with the Absolute Foundation (God) and its cosmic Order.

Therefore, a command from the Absolute cannot be contrary to objective morality, because the command itself is the expression of what serves the ultimate purpose of existence. To suggest that God could command something 'immoral' is a structural contradiction in terms; it would mean the Absolute is acting against its own nature, which is logically impossible.

[bluegreenearth]

Also wanted to answer the original dilema:

The ultimate resolution to this dilemma lies in the nature of value itself: the real value of anything is entirely relative to the Absolute.

Things are not good or bad because of an arbitrary whim, nor do they possess value independent of the source of reality. Things are objectively good or bad based on whether they serve or align with the Absolute Foundation (God) and its cosmic Order.

Therefore, a command from the Absolute cannot be contrary to objective morality, because the command itself is the expression of what serves the ultimate purpose of existence. To suggest that God could command something 'immoral' is a structural contradiction in terms; it would mean the Absolute is acting against its own nature, which is logically impossible.

For the sake of the argument, let's grant your assertion above. All moral behaviors exhibited or commanded by the god are an objective good by definition, even when they could be subjectively perceived as immoral by some humans. So, if the god were to drown human babies in a global flood, such a divine action would necessarily be an objective good despite some people subjectively perceiving it as immoral. Similarly, if the god were to command a human army to invade a neighboring country and kill all the men, women, pregnant women, infants, children, and livestock before keeping the remaining young virgin girls for themselves, then the behavior of those soldiers would be objectively good as well. Am I understanding your argument correctly? If your answer is "yes," then there is no need for any further explanation because it is already entailed in the logic of your argument. If your answer is "no," then please identify where I've misunderstood your argument.

[Vilferatus]

Also wanted to answer the original dilema:

The ultimate resolution to this dilemma lies in the nature of value itself: the real value of anything is entirely relative to the Absolute.

Things are not good or bad because of an arbitrary whim, nor do they possess value independent of the source of reality. Things are objectively good or bad based on whether they serve or align with the Absolute Foundation (God) and its cosmic Order.

Therefore, a command from the Absolute cannot be contrary to objective morality, because the command itself is the expression of what serves the ultimate purpose of existence. To suggest that God could command something 'immoral' is a structural contradiction in terms; it would mean the Absolute is acting against its own nature, which is logically impossible.

For the sake of the argument, let's grant your assertion above. All moral behaviors exhibited or commanded by the god are an objective good by definition, even when they could be subjectively perceived as immoral by some humans. So, if the god were to drown human babies in a global flood, such a divine action would necessarily be an objective good despite some people subjectively perceiving it as immoral. Similarly, if the god were to command a human army to invade a neighboring country and kill all the men, women, pregnant women, infants, children, and livestock before keeping the remaining young virgin girls for themselves, then the behavior of those soldiers would be objectively good as well. Am I understanding your argument correctly? If your answer is "yes," then there is no need for any further explanation because it is already entailed in the logic of your argument. If your answer is "no," then please identify where I've misunderstood your argument.

The answer is yes, it is impossible in that framework that a commandment from a perfect God is immoral.

[Bradskii]

Yes, but this is subjectivism, not objectivism. Your “ought not to” is really just a way to redefine that phrase to mean “I don’t like it”. In the same way you don’t like pistachio ice cream (or whatever flavor you don’t like). And that desire of yours is equal in value to the desire of the one who wants to beat you to get whatever benefit they see in it.

This is where I tend to depart from Sam Harris. His view is that 'I don't like to be beaten' can be described as an objective fact. Akin to saying that if you beat me I will feel pain. Which is an objective fact. So to prevent me from feeling pain, you ought not to do it. It kinda works if you squint really hard and bend the definitions a little. But I'm not a fan of that line of reasoning.

Okay, so then you agree that atheism can’t provide objective morality, right?

It's not so much that it cannot provide it. It's that it doesn't exist. So there's nothing to provide.

What one believes about the shape of the earth is a personal decision, but that doesn’t make the shape of the earth subjective. Both subjective and objective morality (or other categories) include the concept of having personal decisions. Thus, it's not true that "it's definitely a personal decision, and hence subjective."

Subjective refers to you having an opinion on a matter. It doesn't reference facts. It's not my opinion that the earth is round. It's an objective fact. That you might be wrong in thinking it's flat doesn't change that. It's not a fact that vanilla is better than chocolate, but in my opinion it might be. Hence relative.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Bradskii in post #58]

This is where I tend to depart from Sam Harris. His view is that 'I don't like to be beaten' can be described as an objective fact. Akin to saying that if you beat me I will feel pain. Which is an objective fact. So to prevent me from feeling pain, you ought not to do it. It kinda works if you squint really hard and bend the definitions a little. But I'm not a fan of that line of reasoning.

Yes, redefining things means it doesn’t actually work. If you have to change the rules/definitions to make it work, then you are answering a different issue, not the one that was being talked about.

It's not so much that it cannot provide it. It's that it doesn't exist. So there's nothing to provide.

These are two different things. (1) Do you think that if objective morality existed, atheism has something (beyond blind faith) that could account for it? And (2) does objective morality exist?

I’ve been asking the first. If you want to assert the second, then I’d love to see your reasoning that shows that claim to be the most rational position.

Subjective refers to you having an opinion on a matter. It doesn't reference facts. It's not my opinion that the earth is round. It's an objective fact. That you might be wrong in thinking it's flat doesn't change that. It's not a fact that vanilla is better than chocolate, but in my opinion it might be. Hence relative.

I don’t think that is what ‘subjective’ refers to. It’s not in opposition to fact. I think subjective (in our sense) means a fact of reality is based on or shaped by each person’s perspective on the matter, rather than being independent of the person.

Vanilla being better than chocolate is a subjective fact of reality. That means that the truth of that statement depends on each individual’s perspective/taste/feeling (some even use ‘opinion’ in this sense). No matter our view, it is true for everyone that for Johnny, chocolate is good and vanilla is bad. If we like vanilla more, Johnny still isn’t wrong about liking chocolate better. If we think flavor preference is subjective, then we are saying chocolate is truly good for Johnny and vanilla is truly bad, even though it's different in our individual sphere.

Now put that to morality. Johnny’s individual perspective/tastes involves gaining pleasure out of beating other people and taking their money. If we think morality is subjective, then we would be saying that it is truly good for Johnny to beat other people and take their money. That’s why I think most people aren’t really subjectivists. They think their own perspective is how other people should also be rather than leaving them to their own preferences (as we do with ice cream flavors); but that’s a form of objectivism.

[Bradskii]

These are two different things. (1) Do you think that if objective morality existed, atheism has something (beyond blind faith) that could account for it? And (2) does objective morality exist?

I’ve been asking the first. If you want to assert the second, then I’d love to see your reasoning that shows that claim to be the most rational position.

I honestly can't answer the first. I hope you don't see this as a means to avoid answering, but the question makes no sense to me. As regards the second, no - as I have already said, my position is that it doesn't exist. And I'm not saying that I don't believe that it exists, I'm stating it as an objective fact. Primarily because it's not logically possible.

It would mean that for every moral question there is an answer: Yes, it's morally acceptable, no, it's not. There may be occasions when we may not know what the answer could be but it would still be one or the other. And there's an infinite number of variables for every event. So no continuum. Black or white. On or off. Yes or no. And in that case, how on earth is it possible to know which variables make it moral and which make it immoral? An objective morality can't say 'Well, it might be OK in this case'.

Let's say that a father punishes his child for some misdemeanour. The kid is sent to her room for the evening. Is that morally acceptable? Say he sends her to her room for 24 hours? Is it still acceptable? I'm sure you can see where this goes...at some time we'd all say that what the father is doing is immoral. Keeping her locked up for 5 years would obviously be so. But if there's an objective morality, it can't be that it's kinda OK at this point, but maybe not at some other. If we individually decide then it's relative. Objective morality means that it has to be acceptable in one instance and unacceptable in another. How do we know at what point that happens?

But...the theist may say that it's God's decision. But the bible cannot give guidance to every act. So how would one know that God has determined it? If I ask Jim, he might say that God has told him it's ok. If I ask Jill, she might say just the opposite. And we both know of countless examples when different theists hold to opposing views on moral matters. So there's only one conclusion: If someone wants to argue that objective morality exists, then they'd have to admit that it's unknowable. That seems to me to be a nonsensical position to hold.

And let's say that God is clear about an aspect of morality. 'Honour your mother and father' for example. If a girl has been sexually assaulted by her father since very young, is it immoral not to honour him? How do we know what the objective morality is in that situation?

I don’t think that is what ‘subjective’ refers to. It’s not in opposition to fact. I think subjective (in our sense) means a fact of reality is based on or shaped by each person’s perspective on the matter, rather than being independent of the person.

Vanilla being better than chocolate is a subjective fact of reality. That means that the truth of that statement depends on each individual’s perspective/taste/feeling (some even use ‘opinion’ in this sense). No matter our view, it is true for everyone that for Johnny, chocolate is good and vanilla is bad. If we like vanilla more, Johnny still isn’t wrong about liking chocolate better. If we think flavor preference is subjective, then we are saying chocolate is truly good for Johnny and vanilla is truly bad, even though it's different in our individual sphere.

Now put that to morality. Johnny’s individual perspective/tastes involves gaining pleasure out of beating other people and taking their money. If we think morality is subjective, then we would be saying that it is truly good for Johnny to beat other people and take their money. That’s why I think most people aren’t really subjectivists. They think their own perspective is how other people should also be rather than leaving them to their own preferences (as we do with ice cream flavors); but that’s a form of objectivism.

This is the argument that Harris uses. That a fact that is relative to me - I don't like being beaten, is in some way an objective fact. From memory, the example he uses is female circumcision. He says that the pain experienced is relative to the girl, but we all know that it's wrong to cause pain, therefore it's wrong in itself, hence objectively so. I don't agree with that. I don't like the 'we all know'. You can't vote on an objective fact.

So I wasn't saying that subjective is in opposition to facts about the world. They are entirely different. So it's a fact that I think chocolate is better than vanilla. And that's a relative position because it's just my preference. But it's not an objective fact about the world that chocolate is better.