If God is good...Why do good?

[Ionian_Tradition]

I've often heard it posited by theists, in response to the all too popular modification of Plato's "Euthyphro dilemma", that it is God's intrinsic nature which forms the objective foundation for human morality. It is said that moral virtues such as honesty, kindness, self-sacrifice, and fairness are "good" because they are attributes of God's essential nature. In other words: God, being defined as omni-benevolent, is "good" by nature, thus any actions conducive with his/her/its nature are also by definition "good". From this notion emerges a standard, or rule of measurement, which allows us to juxtapose our actions with the character of God to determine if in fact our actions are a reflection of God's nature (and thus "good") or a privation of that nature (and thus evil). Hence an objective standard of "good" and "evil" is derived from God's nature....but I would argue that this standard is established at the expense of any objective requirement to do what is morally "good".

Granting the central premise of the argument, the assertion "God is good" provides us with, at most, a moral fact...but do moral facts beget moral duties? Can an "ought" be derived from an "is". If God IS "good" by nature, why is it objectively true that one OUGHT to do good by acting in accordance with that nature? Establishing God's nature as the objective source of good in no way demonstrates that human beings possess an objective obligation to perform actions which reflect that nature. So why do "good" at all? If one is by nature "evil", what objective moral duty requires one to abandon one's own nature in order to conform to the nature of another (God)?

The theist may retort that the threat of divine retribution provides proper intensive to do "good" and not "evil", but this "might makes right" mentality only serves to underscore the subjective nature of any moral duties which may be derived from such a notion. The threat of punishment for failing to acquiesce to the subjective desire of a God to conform to his/her/its own nature is hardly grounds upon which to establish an objective moral duty to do so. Though it may be objectively true that God subjectively desires for man to do "good", it is not objectively true that man ought to do as God desires.

The implications of this, I believe, render the terms "good" and "evil" devoid of moral substance, in that "good" and "evil" become merely descriptive terms, referring to actions which do or do not conform to God's intrinsic nature. They carry with them no objective moral obligation to prefer one over the other, and as such, they cannot instruct moral behavior. If God's nature is by definition "good"...Objective moral duties have yet to be accounted for as a result of that fact.

Question for debate: If God's intrinsic nature is the objective standard of "good", why is it OBJECTIVELY true that a man ought to conform to God's nature and do "good"?

[Ionian_Tradition]

I think "refinement" can easily become an endless loop. For instance, in your own proposed definition; how does one determine the meaning of the words "happiness," "cooperative," "unnecessary/gratuituous," "harm" and "suffering"? Is there any way to objectively verify the meaning of any of those words without reference to subjective human opinions, either individual or consensus?

Again, these words are mere labels. Their substance lies in that to which they refer. Labels are, of course, arbitrary and are subjectively attributed to particular phenomena by human consensus. However, the phenomena themselves do objectively exist, regardless of the label we assign to them. The phenomena are not predicated upon subjective opinion. They exist independently from human consensus. Just as the physical characteristics of an apple would not cease to exist if we were, by consensus, to arbitrarily label those characteristics "orange" instead. Whatever nomenclature we assign to these phenomena they will continue to be what they are by virtue of their own nature. So to answer your question, the objective verification regarding the meaning of these words is found within the traits and characteristic inherent within the phenomena to which these terms refer.

Take the word "cooperation" for example. "Cooperation" is just a label, but it refers to a particular action which has existential value. The act of two human beings working together to accomplish a mutual goal objectively exists. So whatever arbitrary label we assign to this type of action, the action itself will continue to be what it is and its nature will never change in response to subjective opinion regarding the label we assign it. The same holds true for the terms "moral" and "immoral", if you wish to verify the objective meaning of these words, look to the phenomena from which they derive their substance... Phenomena which objectively exist despite subjective opinion.

Further: even if we accept it, is such a utilitarian definition as yours not still dependent on consensus, or on the benefit to the majority? Here's a very old question that illustrates the problem: Suppose it were possible to guarantee the health, happiness, security, justice and peace of the entire world at the cost of the continuous torture of one small child. As long as a child is being burned, or flayed, or slowly torn to pieces with red-hot pincers -- choose your medieval technique -- the world will be a perfect Paradise for everyone else in it; but if that torment stops, the world returns to its normal chaotic, unjust, miserable and warring state. In that thought experiment, would torturing one child after another to death be right, or wrong? By your standard, it seems to me, it would be right. I rather disagree.

Child torture, in this context, does not fulfill the criteria necessary to constitute as "moral", as it has been defined, by virtue of the fact that it does not promote human happiness (which I believe would be better substituted with the term "wellness"), and health in its totality (the wellness and health of the children is certainly not being promoted through torture). Nor does it promote cooperation in achieving this result shared between individuals (the children and those subjecting the children to torture). I would also question whether it is objectively true that child torture is the only viable method for promoting prosperity within a given society. If it cannot be irrefutably demonstrated that peace and prosperity cannot be acquired through some other means (perhaps through a societal paradigm shift which opens up the possibility for exploring other practical methods for actualizing these desired conditions which would not require the torture of children), then it cannot be said that child torture is a necessary form of human harm/suffering....Unless of course you're appealing to magic.

With that said, it is obvious that you do not believe this type of action is sufficient in serving as the objective phenomenon to which the term "moral" refers...why then posit it as a viable option? Given your supposed affinity for practical moral application, I would have expected something far less whimsical from you. Did I not ask for YOUR definition of "morality", not this fairy tale scenario which in no way accurately depicts our present moral landscape? Regardless, whatever we label the actions taken in the scenario you've presented, those actions do not serve to promote human health, wellness and cooperative exchange between both individuals and societies COLLECTIVELY. It is also debatable as to whether child torture is an objectively necessary form of human suffering. Thus these acts objectively are NOT "moral" acts (or whatever term you deem to assign them). They are either objectively "immoral" or something other than the actions conducive with actualizing the state of affairs I have mentioned. Now, if you would be so kind, would you please provide me with a definition of morality conducive with reality that has actually acquired YOUR approbation?

I don't see that your definition is any more useful than "concerned with right and wrong" or "good and evil." We're still dealing with the question I asked in the first place: If "morality" -- or "right and wrong" if you like, using whatever definition we choose -- cannot be determined by subjective human thought, and if there is no Divine authority to which we may appeal, how DOES one "objectively verify" ANY conclusion or judgment on such questions? IS there a way to do that? Why not just cut to the chase and answer that rather simple question?

It does not seem to me that that question depends on specific meanings or standards or "nuances," but on HOW one is to "objectively verify" ANY judgment one makes, by ANY standard.

You asked how one might verify an objective moral judgement in practical terms. If you'll indulge me, we may yet uncover a method through which that end might be achieved. If you were hoping that I would provide you with a black and white moral standard which is not predicated upon circumstance in some regard then you will be disappointed. I have yet to be convinced that any such standard exists, regardless of whether or not a God exists. I must reiterate however, that this does not imply that objective moral judgements cannot be derived and practically applied within a societal context. Isn't that what you're after?

[cnorman18]

I think "refinement" can easily become an endless loop. For instance, in your own proposed definition; how does one determine the meaning of the words "happiness," "cooperative," "unnecessary/gratuituous," "harm" and "suffering"? Is there any way to objectively verify the meaning of any of those words without reference to subjective human opinions, either individual or consensus?

Again, these words are mere labels. Their substance lies in that to which they refer. Labels are, of course, arbitrary and are subjectively attributed to particular phenomena by human consensus. However, the phenomena themselves do objectively exist, regardless of the label we assign to them. The phenomena are not predicated upon subjective opinion. They exist independently from human consensus. Just as the physical characteristics of an apple would not cease to exist if we were, by consensus, to arbitrarily label those characteristics "orange" instead. Whatever nomenclature we assign to these phenomena they will continue to be what they are by virtue of their own nature. So to answer your question, the objective verification regarding the meaning of these words is found within the traits and characteristic inherent within the phenomena to which these terms refer.

Of course the DEFINITION is objectively verifiable; but whether or not those words apply, and to what extent, is NOT verifiable in the same way. That JUDGMENT is subjective; how would one “objectively verify� such a judgment? See below.

Take the word "cooperation" for example. "Cooperation" is just a label, but it refers to a particular action which has existential value. The act of two human beings working together to accomplish a mutual goal objectively exists. So whatever arbitrary label we assign to this type of action, the action itself will continue to be what it is and its nature will never change in response to subjective opinion regarding the label we assign it. The same holds true for the terms "moral" and "immoral", if you wish to verify the objective meaning of these words, look to the phenomena from which they derive their substance... Phenomena which objectively exist despite subjective opinion.

But the question on the table is how we “objectively verify� a particular judgment, not the correct definition. To use your example, you might say that we are “cooperating� in this effort to find some conclusions here; I might disagree and say that we are NOT cooperating and that we have different agendas in mind. How can the correct judgment be “objectively verified�?

Similarly, agreeing on a definition of "moral" may be simple enough; but some define certain acts -- abortion, circumcision, divorce, e.g. -- as ALWAYS being immoral, and very many in every case would disagree and say that in certain circumstances, each of those actions can yield a positive benefit and would therefore be moral. How are we to "objectively verify" which opinions are OBJECTIVELY true and which OBJECTIVELY false?

Further: even if we accept it, is such a utilitarian definition as yours not still dependent on consensus, or on the benefit to the majority? Here's a very old question that illustrates the problem: Suppose it were possible to guarantee the health, happiness, security, justice and peace of the entire world at the cost of the continuous torture of one small child. As long as a child is being burned, or flayed, or slowly torn to pieces with red-hot pincers -- choose your medieval technique -- the world will be a perfect Paradise for everyone else in it; but if that torment stops, the world returns to its normal chaotic, unjust, miserable and warring state. In that thought experiment, would torturing one child after another to death be right, or wrong? By your standard, it seems to me, it would be right. I rather disagree.

Child torture, in this context, does not fulfill the criteria necessary to constitute as "moral", as it has been defined, by virtue of the fact that it does not promote human happiness (which I believe would be better substituted with the term "wellness"), and health in its totality (the wellness and health of the children is certainly not being promoted through torture). Nor does it promote cooperation in achieving this result shared between individuals (the children and those subjecting the children to torture).

“Greatest good for the greatest number.� Were you saying that only acts which promote the happiness -- or “wellness,� if you like -- of ALL people can be defined as “moral�?

I would also question whether it is objectively true that child torture is the only viable method for promoting prosperity within a given society. If it cannot be irrefutably demonstrated that peace and prosperity cannot be acquired through some other means (perhaps through a societal paradigm shift which opens up the possibility for exploring other practical methods for actualizing these desired conditions which would not require the torture of children), then it cannot be said that child torture is a necessary form of human harm/suffering....Unless of course you're appealing to magic.
With that said, it is obvious that you do not believe this type of action is sufficient in serving as the objective phenomenon to which the term "moral" refers...why then posit it as a viable option? Given your supposed affinity for practical moral application, I would have expected something far less whimsical from you. Did I not ask for YOUR definition of "morality", not this fairy tale scenario which in no way accurately depicts our present moral landscape? Regardless, whatever we label the actions taken in the scenario you've presented, those actions do not serve to promote human health, wellness and cooperative exchange between both individuals and societies COLLECTIVELY. It is also debatable as to whether child torture is an objectively necessary form of human suffering. Thus these acts objectively are NOT "moral" acts (or whatever term you deem to assign them). They are either objectively "immoral" or something other than the actions conducive with actualizing the state of affairs I have mentioned. Now, if you would be so kind, would you please provide me with a definition of morality conducive with reality that has actually acquired YOUR approbation?

It’s a thought experiment, not a real-world example, and a very old one; it’s not original with me. The point of such an experiment is in the “what-if," not in the "how-could.� I don’t think anyone felt that Einstein was obligated to show how the train could actually attain the speed of light in his thought experiments. The point was to think about what would obtain IF it could.

This was, I think rather obviously, given as a theoretical and a thought experiment to investigate something about your definition of “morality.� If it’s not to your taste, never mind; no need to twist it into something it wasn’t intended to be.

I’ve already given you my definition of “moral,� and proposed that the question at hand is not about "definitions." It's about objective verification of moral judgments.

I don't see that your definition is any more useful than "concerned with right and wrong" or "good and evil." We're still dealing with the question I asked in the first place: If "morality" -- or "right and wrong" if you like, using whatever definition we choose -- cannot be determined by subjective human thought, and if there is no Divine authority to which we may appeal, how DOES one "objectively verify" ANY conclusion or judgment on such questions? IS there a way to do that? Why not just cut to the chase and answer that rather simple question?

It does not seem to me that that question depends on specific meanings or standards or "nuances," but on HOW one is to "objectively verify" ANY judgment one makes, by ANY standard.

You asked how one might verify an objective moral judgement in practical terms. If you'll indulge me, we may yet uncover a method through which that end might be achieved.

I'm indulging, but it appears that we are essentially agreed on that. See below.

If you were hoping that I would provide you with a black and white moral standard which is not predicated upon circumstance in some regard then you will be disappointed.

I wasn’t. Is there a reason you think I was?

I have yet to be convinced that any such standard exists, regardless of whether or not a God exists.

Then was I not right in my first post to this thread when I remarked that you seemed to be trying to “redefine ‘good’ and ‘evil’ out of existence�?

I must reiterate however, that this does not imply that objective moral judgements cannot be derived and practically applied within a societal context. Isn't that what you're after?

Sure -- except that some time ago, you denied that there is such a thing as “objective moral judgments� derived in that manner. Thus:

Opinions, be they held by the individual or agreed upon by communal consensus, are still by nature subjective. Simply because a collection of individuals communally share a particular moral opinion does not mean that this collection of identical opinions somehow shed their subjectivity in light of mutual consensus. What you really have is a group of many subjective opinions disguised as one by virtue of the fact that they're all alike.

In truth, this line of reasoning seems little more than the old "argumentum ad populum"...a logical fallacy. The fact remains, though the community may mutually agree that a particular moral tenet is "right", their shared opinion is not enough to validate it as such...Not in any objective sense....which would leave you with the alternative. There is no middle ground between objective truth and subjective opinion my friend...No matter how many subjective minds you throw into the mix.

Therefore, by your own reckoning, “moral judgments� “derived and practically applied within a social context� cannot be “objective.�

I think I’ll stand by my opinion, expressed three pages back; Morality is not objective. It cannot be derived from some Divine and unchanging authority, and neither can it be left up to the whims of the individual. Therefore, the only meaningful moral standard is the collective consensus of the society in which we live. Imperfect; sometimes the individual must dissent from the consensus, as in Nazi Germany or the antebellum South (and therein lies yet another problem); but at least that consensus exists and can be determined.

It sounds rather like you are agreeing with me on that point, in practical terms, anyway; and that rather implies that you also agree with my remark that “looking more deeply,� or “seeking objective verification of a moral judgment,� in this case, amounts to pointless, in practical terms, “intellectual boardgaming� -- because, when one looks “more deeply,� one finds -- nothing at all. No such thing. Can’t be done.

What say you? Why am I wrong?

[Ionian_Tradition]

I think "refinement" can easily become an endless loop. For instance, in your own proposed definition; how does one determine the meaning of the words "happiness," "cooperative," "unnecessary/gratuituous," "harm" and "suffering"? Is there any way to objectively verify the meaning of any of those words without reference to subjective human opinions, either individual or consensus?

Again, these words are mere labels. Their substance lies in that to which they refer. Labels are, of course, arbitrary and are subjectively attributed to particular phenomena by human consensus. However, the phenomena themselves do objectively exist, regardless of the label we assign to them. The phenomena are not predicated upon subjective opinion. They exist independently from human consensus. Just as the physical characteristics of an apple would not cease to exist if we were, by consensus, to arbitrarily label those characteristics "orange" instead. Whatever nomenclature we assign to these phenomena they will continue to be what they are by virtue of their own nature. So to answer your question, the objective verification regarding the meaning of these words is found within the traits and characteristic inherent within the phenomena to which these terms refer.

Of course the DEFINITION is objectively verifiable; but whether or not those words apply, and to what extent, is NOT verifiable in the same way. That JUDGMENT is subjective; how would one “objectively verify� such a judgment? See below.

cnorman, my point is that labels and their application are not of primary concern to us at the moment. Our concern lies with phenomena. There is a phenomenon to which the term "morality" could refer. This phenomenon objectively exists. We can call it anything we like. The judgments we derive from it are not predicated upon the words we use to label it. Tell me cnorman, are the actions you take, which you deem to be "moral", predicated upon the words "moral", "good", "right", "ethical" alone? Would you rape if by consensus such an act was named "moral", "good", "right", or "ethical"?. Or would you instead base your actions, not upon labels, but rather upon the implications which follow from the ACT (phenomenon) of rape itself? If the later, then what we truly seek to verify is not an objective way to go about arbitrarily assigning labels , but rather what objective judgments we can derive from the phenomena we arbitrarily label...Judgments which will serve to instruct behavior.

Remember, the term "moral", in and of itself, is meaningless. I use it for the sake of moving the conversation along. What truly interests us is phenomenon (in this case actions in conjunction with their implied results) conducive with your values. From these, our judgments are formed

But the question on the table is how we “objectively verify� a particular judgment, not the correct definition. To use your example, you might say that we are “cooperating� in this effort to find some conclusions here; I might disagree and say that we are NOT cooperating and that we have different agendas in mind. How can the correct judgment be “objectively verified�?

If by "cooperating" you mean the act of working together for the purpose of achieving a mutual goal (in this case, working together to discover a method of verifying an objective moral judgment), then it would seem that it is OBJECTIVELY true that you are indeed not "cooperating" with me if your actions here are made in service of some contrary agenda. This underscores my point quite nicely. It is from the objectively existent phenomenon we've arbitrarily labeled "cooperating" that we derive an objective truth. If your actions and intent are not conducive with the phenomenon we've labeled "cooperating", it is objectively true that you and I are not "cooperating". We could relabel "cooperating" however we wish, but regardless of our subjective opinion on the matter, it will remain objectively true that, whatever we label the phenomenon formerly known as "cooperating", your actions are not conducive with the phenomenon itself, thus it is objectively true that you are not "fill in the blank". This judgment we've derived IS objectively verifiable. What to name this phenomena is matter of arguing over verbal real estate. Judgments are not born from labels, but from that to which labels refer.

Similarly, agreeing on a definition of "moral" may be simple enough; but some define certain acts -- abortion, circumcision, divorce, e.g. -- as ALWAYS being immoral, and very many in every case would disagree and say that in certain circumstances, each of those actions can yield a positive benefit and would therefore be moral. How are we to "objectively verify" which opinions are OBJECTIVELY true and which OBJECTIVELY false?

Each of these acts must be dealt with on a case by case basis. The variables that factor into these scenarios are manifold. However, an assessment of personal values and their relationship to objectively existing phenomena will allows us to begin distinguishing objective truths from their negation. Again, this is made simpler when we define our terms. It may prove useful to ask the question: What phenomenon do we ascribe "moral" value to? From there we can determine if these acts are, or are not, objectively conducive with the phenomenon in which our values are rooted.

If you like, perhaps we could use you as a test subject to determine if an objective judgment can be derived from the manner in which the actions you listed above correlate with the phenomena you assign "moral" value to. Using the methodology we'll apply in assessing your values, and their correlation with objectively existing phenomena, we can match it to the scenario above and perhaps get a few answers.

So I ask...again...Please define "morality" cnorman. (the quality of acts (phenomenon) to which you assign value in regards to human conduct.)

“Greatest good for the greatest number.� Were you saying that only acts which promote the happiness -- or “wellness,� if you like -- of ALL people can be defined as “moral�?

No, only acts which promote human wellness while simultaneously reducing unnecessary human harm or suffering are "moral" as I have defined it. Your scenario could not prove that child torture was objectively necessary and thus, the children were not disqualified from having their own wellness promoted.

It’s a thought experiment, not a real-world example, and a very old one; it’s not original with me. The point of such an experiment is in the “what-if," not in the "how-could.� I don’t think anyone felt that Einstein was obligated to show how the train could actually attain the speed of light in his thought experiments. The point was to think about what would obtain IF it could.

This was, I think rather obviously, given as a theoretical and a thought experiment to investigate something about your definition of “morality.� If it’s not to your taste, never mind; no need to twist it into something it wasn’t intended to be.

I've addressed your scenario in a theoretical respect and have, I believe, adequately demonstrated why child torture does not constitute as "moral conduct" as per the definition I have provided. However, given your obvious disdain for theoretical musings regarding matters you deem practical, I was a bit surprised you would have resorted to a theoretical thought experiment so very impractical. I distinctly remember your rancorous censure when I myself dealt in theoreticals..Why the double standard?

I’ve already given you my definition of “moral,� and proposed that the question at hand is not about "definitions." It's about objective verification of moral judgments.

You provided me a list of labels, nothing more. How can you hope to determine if a judgment is objectively "moral" if you have yet to establish the phenomena to which this label refers? I can't honestly believe you do not have at least a working definition of "morality" beyond a list of mere labels.

I don't see that your definition is any more useful than "concerned with right and wrong" or "good and evil." We're still dealing with the question I asked in the first place: If "morality" -- or "right and wrong" if you like, using whatever definition we choose -- cannot be determined by subjective human thought, and if there is no Divine authority to which we may appeal, how DOES one "objectively verify" ANY conclusion or judgment on such questions? IS there a way to do that? Why not just cut to the chase and answer that rather simple question?

Objective moral judgments can be verified in conjunction with phenomena upon which we place value. These judgments are not derived through consensus nor are they a product of subjective opinion. Value IS a product of subjective opinion..Even still, how one ought to conduct oneself so as to remain consistent with one's values can be objectively verified. If we define morality in accordance with phenomena which reflect our values, we can verify objective moral judgments concerning how to conduct ourselves. This is about as practical as it gets. It is very much contingent upon circumstance and is not the black and white standard of morality you seek, but we've both agreed such cannot be shown to exist. In light of this, the truth still remains that objective moral judgments regarding human conduct can be verified once we've determined both our values and the phenomena which embody them.

Then was I not right in my first post to this thread when I remarked that you seemed to be trying to “redefine ‘good’ and ‘evil’ out of existence�?

Showing what "good" and "evil" are, in a particular context, is not an act of redefining them out of existence.

I must reiterate however, that this does not imply that objective moral judgements cannot be derived and practically applied within a societal context. Isn't that what you're after?

Sure -- except that some time ago, you denied that there is such a thing as “objective moral judgments� derived in that manner. Thus:

Opinions, be they held by the individual or agreed upon by communal consensus, are still by nature subjective. Simply because a collection of individuals communally share a particular moral opinion does not mean that this collection of identical opinions somehow shed their subjectivity in light of mutual consensus. What you really have is a group of many subjective opinions disguised as one by virtue of the fact that they're all alike.

In truth, this line of reasoning seems little more than the old "argumentum ad populum"...a logical fallacy. The fact remains, though the community may mutually agree that a particular moral tenet is "right", their shared opinion is not enough to validate it as such...Not in any objective sense....which would leave you with the alternative. There is no middle ground between objective truth and subjective opinion my friend...No matter how many subjective minds you throw into the mix.

Therefore, by your own reckoning, “moral judgments� “derived and practically applied within a social context� cannot be “objective.�

You initially asserted that mutual consensus was not subjective in nature. I demonstrated that is was. This in no way implied that objective moral judgments could not be verified regarding how to conduct one's self in light of subjective values. My intention was to show that unconditional, objective "rights" and "wrongs" do not exist and surely cannot be established through joined consensus. Again, this does not imply that objective judgments regarding how to conduct oneself so as to remain consistent with one's subjective values do not exist. This is morality at its most practical. I already told you that black and white, unconditional objective standard of "right" and "wrong" cannot be demonstrated to exist. If you've been looking for an argument to support the converse, I cannot aid you. If, however, you're looking for a method to objectively verify a proper moral judgment, which derives its substance from objectively existing phenomena, and is predicated upon your own core values, then perhaps I can point to such a method. That is all I endeavored to do. You said you preferred the practical....I've given you practical.

I think I’ll stand by my opinion, expressed three pages back; Morality is not objective. It cannot be derived from some Divine and unchanging authority, and neither can it be left up to the whims of the individual. Therefore, the only meaningful moral standard is the collective consensus of the society in which we live. Imperfect; sometimes the individual must dissent from the consensus, as in Nazi Germany or the antebellum South (and therein lies yet another problem); but at least that consensus exists and can be determined.

Consensus alone is not sufficient to provide an objective moral obligation to conduct oneself in a certain manner. Only a through a definition of morality which is rooted in an objectively existing phenomenon upon which subjective value has been placed, can an objective moral judgment regarding conduct be derived. The standard of what ought and ought not be done is defined by the object of value. If I value actions which promote human health, wellness and cooperation, which also reduce unnecessary human suffering, I objectively ought not torture children in order to remain consistent with my values. Doing so would be deleterious in fully bringing about the societal conditions I wish to actualize. This is true regardless of whether or not the community has agreed through consensus that child torture is beneficial. The community itself is not the standard concerning what objectively ought to be done. A definition of morality rooted in an objectively existing phenomenon is.

It sounds rather like you are agreeing with me on that point, in practical terms, anyway; and that rather implies that you also agree with my remark that “looking more deeply,� or “seeking objective verification of a moral judgment,� in this case, amounts to pointless, in practical terms, “intellectual boardgaming� -- because, when one looks “more deeply,� one finds -- nothing at all. No such thing. Can’t be done.

What say you? Why am I wrong?

When one looks deeply one begins to see things as they truly are, not as they wish them to be. It is only when the truth has been excavated that we can apply it practically. In looking deeply you come to discover what you have available to you, and with it, you can begin to construct an honest moral philosophy of the greatest practical value. This is far from finding "nothing at all".


Speaking of "intellectual boardgaming" I'm beginning to get the unsettling impression that all of this was little more than an attempt on your part to have me stumble over my own words. I trust this is not the case, but if perchance it is, allow me to be clear on my stance:

I reject the notion that an unconditional, objective standard of morality can be verified to exist. I believe knowledge of this allows us to construct an honest moral philosophy which exposes our limitations and sheds light on the condition of our present moral landscape. This knowledge, once attained through deep philosophical investigation, is useful in instructing how best to move within this space practically. It does not result in "nothing". From this knowledge, I believe a method for deriving objective "moral" judgments can be established through a definition of "morality" rooted in objectively existing phenomena (acts) which embody our subjective values. From this, we can make "moral" judgments regarding what objectively is and is not consistent with these phenomena and consistent with actualizing a state of affairs which reflect the social conditions we desire and value. These judgments are NOT derived through consensus alone nor are they predicated upon subjective opinion once established.


This is my stance. Take from it what you will.

[cnorman18]

I'm not trying to trick you or trap you at all; I see some problems with your approach, but they may very well be more about my not understanding it than with actual disagreement.

Before we go on, let me ask this: When you say that a moral judgment is "objectively verifiable," would that not indicate that it would, or should, be accepted as correct by everyone concerned. or everyone who examines the question? After all, if something is objectively true, it cannot be said to be false. "Objectively verifiable" seems to me to mean "final and inarguable." Is that not correct?

Perhaps you can already see where I'm going. I can objectively define MY OWN moral standards of concern and priorities in a given area -- say, abortion, since I've argued circumcision all I care to in this lifetime -- and we can kick them around and refine them and get them all nailed completely down over the next twenty or thirty posts. But someone else's objectively defined standards may not match my own; in fact, I can guarantee that. I can be perfectly confident of the correctness of my own moral judgment on any number of issues; and, in fact, of course, I am. But others are equally convinced that their own opinions are objectively true and correct as well, even though theirs and mine are mutually exclusive. You see this sort of thing literally every day on this very board. Where, then, is objective verifiability, and of what practical use is it? Do you see what I mean? Where do we objectively verify, that is, PROVE, that my judgment is right and the other fellow's is wrong (or vice versa, of course)?

Not a trick question, I assure you. I agree with you that there are no black-and-white standards, no Divine standards, available here; social context, a rational understanding of the real-life significance of our actions, and logic are all we have. But that social context is not uniform, and neither are individual people's understandings of the significance of their actions. I'm asking about your use of the word "objective." I don't see how it applies, considering everything you've said here.

No rancor, no nonsense. Honestly. I suspect that I've misunderstood what you mean by the term.

[Ionian_Tradition]

I'm not trying to trick you or trap you at all; I see some problems with your approach, but they may very well be more about my not understanding it than with actual disagreement.

Before we go on, let me ask this: When you say that a moral judgment is "objectively verifiable," would that not indicate that it would, or should, be accepted as correct by everyone concerned. or everyone who examines the question? After all, if something is objectively true, it cannot be said to be false. "Objectively verifiable" seems to me to mean "final and inarguable." Is that not correct?

Perhaps you can already see where I'm going. I can objectively define MY OWN moral standards of concern and priorities in a given area -- say, abortion, since I've argued circumcision all I care to in this lifetime -- and we can kick them around and refine them and get them all nailed completely down over the next twenty or thirty posts. But someone else's objectively defined standards may not match my own; in fact, I can guarantee that. I can be perfectly confident of the correctness of my own moral judgment on any number of issues; and, in fact, of course, I am. But others are equally convinced that their own opinions are objectively true and correct as well, even though theirs and mine are mutually exclusive. You see this sort of thing literally every day on this very board. Where, then, is objective verifiability, and of what practical use is it? Do you see what I mean? Where do we objectively verify, that is, PROVE, that my judgment is right and the other fellow's is wrong (or vice versa, of course)?

Not a trick question, I assure you. I agree with you that there are no black-and-white standards, no Divine standards, available here; social context, a rational understanding of the real-life significance of our actions, and logic are all we have. But that social context is not uniform, and neither are individual people's understandings of the significance of their actions. I'm asking about your use of the word "objective." I don't see how it applies, considering everything you've said here.

No rancor, no nonsense. Honestly. I suspect that I've misunderstood what you mean by the term.

My use of the term "objective" refers to the logical implications that follow from a comprehensive definition of morality, derived from a set of properly basic values that are embodied within objectively existing actions (phenomena). Allow me to attempt to unpack this:

I value a healthy, cooperative, flourishing, society where individuals have the opportunity to live without fear of violation. It is also the case that I also value amicable social dealings between myself and others..dealings which serve to increase my ability to function, and thrive, within a societal framework which requires that such exchanges occur regularly. Given these properly basic, primary values, it is objectively true that there exists a set of actions that serve to produce outcomes consistent with these values...It is also objectively true that there exists a set of actions which are deleterious to the actualization of these conditions...actions which may impede my ability to function adequately within the society upon which my livelihood is largely contingent. We might call the set of actions which are consistent with my values "moral actions", and actions which are the converse "immoral actions". Again, these actions objectively exist. It necessarily follows from this that in order to actualize the societal conditions I value, I objectively ought to perform these actions and refrain from actions that do not serve to actualize these conditions. Thus it can be said that an objective judgment has been made regarding my conduct. Regardless of subjective opinion concerning the matter, it remains objectively true that there exists a set of actions which are consistent with my values and a set which are not. If my actions are inconsistent with my values then it is objectively true that I am performing acts which ought not be committed, since to perform such actions is deleterious to the actualization of the societal conditions I primarily value.


Now you issue a valid question, how do we distinguish whether or not, for example, circumcision is objectively "moral" or "immoral", if two individuals possess contrary opinions regarding the act itself? Circumcision is an action. Does this act reside within the set of facts which are objectively consistent with the two individual's most basic values? If we can answer this question, we can formulate an objective judgment which is not predicated upon mere subjective opinion. Whatever that judgment ends up being, it will be an objective fact. What if their most basic values conflict? Then it follows that each individual has an objective obligation to remain consistent with their owns values, but we mustn't forget that society itself is more or less a collection of individuals who form communities which promote and protect an extremely basic set of values which relate to the conditions most beneficial for survival. In truth, I believe we all have much more in common with each other than we choose to acknowledge in terms of our own properly basic values. Society is predicated upon shared values, even in the most minute degree. It is this similarity of primary values shared between members of a community, imposed by inescapable social conditions, which I believe forms the "moral" bedrock of any society which has ever existed. Each society will have its own moral idiosyncrasies of course, but a shared set of basic values remain the foundation upon which societies are ultimately established. How does the old saying go?..."A kingdom divided against itself cannot stand"? I believe this principle is important in understanding the nature of "morality" within a societal context. A society of rapists won't remain a functionally viable society for very long.

All that said, objectively determining the moral quality of circumcision will depend largely upon how well we understand the primary values of both parties involved. From there we can objectively determine whether or not circumcision is an action consistent with the most basic values of the two individuals respectively, and thus objectively conclude whether or not it ought be done. Given that you and I both agree that there is no divine moral standard which lists the objective moral quality of every action committed by man, this is the best I believe we can hope to achieve.

One last caveat, I want to make sure we have a proper appreciation for what "understanding primary value" truly entails. One might assert that they value circumcision...but what does that mean? Why is circumcision significant so as to be worthy of value? It is just an act. From where does this act derive its significance? Is it not perhaps more accurate to say that it is the traditions which promote circumcision, and ascribe it significance, that are what is truly valued? Do these traditions constitute as a primary, or properly basic, value? If these very traditions happened to promote rape or child molestation would we ascribe them the same value? If not, can it be said that these traditions are truly of primary value? Perhaps there is something of greater value than tradition itself...And on the questions could go until we reached a properly basic set of primary values which supersede lesser values. Deconstructing one's values so as to arrive at a basic set of primary values is a daunting feat which I doubt many of us have truly performed, though I would argue if we were to do this, we as social creatures, possessing healthy minds, would certainly find many striking similarities in terms of what it is we primarily, and most basically, value.

[cnorman18]

My use of the term "objective" refers to the logical implications that follow from a comprehensive definition of morality, derived from a set of properly basic values that are embodied within objectively existing actions (phenomena). Allow me to attempt to unpack this:

I value a healthy, cooperative, flourishing, society where individuals have the opportunity to live without fear of violation. It is also the case that I also value amicable social dealings between myself and others..dealings which serve to increase my ability to function, and thrive, within a societal framework which requires that such exchanges occur regularly. Given these properly basic, primary values, it is objectively true that there exists a set of actions that serve to produce outcomes consistent with these values...It is also objectively true that there exists a set of actions which are deleterious to the actualization of these conditions...actions which may impede my ability to function adequately within the society upon which my livelihood is largely contingent. We might call the set of actions which are consistent with my values "moral actions", and actions which are the converse "immoral actions". Again, these actions objectively exist. It necessarily follows from this that in order to actualize the societal conditions I value, I objectively ought to perform these actions and refrain from actions that do not serve to actualize these conditions. Thus it can be said that an objective judgment has been made regarding my conduct. Regardless of subjective opinion concerning the matter, it remains objectively true that there exists a set of actions which are consistent with my values and a set which are not. If my actions are inconsistent with my values then it is objectively true that I am performing acts which ought not be committed, since to perform such actions is deleterious to the actualization of the societal conditions I primarily value.

It seems to me that you have proven that actions which can be defined as “moral� and “immoral,� according to your definitions, objectively exist. I do not see anything which shows that you can always determine with 100% confidence what those actions, specifically speaking, would be. It seems to me that you have glossed over a most essential question -- how, SPECIFICALLY, can one determine which of a range of actions will best serve the ends you have here outlined? In most situations, of course, the judgment is easy and obvious; but certainly not always. It is very often hard to judge exactly what the consequences of an action might be. I submit that unless one knows ALL the results of an action -- predicting the future, one might say -- one cannot be certain of making an objectively correct judgment.

Of course, none of this even approaches the question I brought up in my last; how one can reconcile two opposing views. I’d like to go on from here, but as it stands, I will decline unless you choose another example.

I specifically said that I have argued all that I care to on the subject of circumcision, and yet you have chosen that issue for your exemplar anyway. I will assume that that choice was not calculated to provoke, but either way, I decline to join you in that discussion. I find that beating dead horses interferes with my own ability to function and thrive, you see.

If you want to see what I’ve posted on this subject of circumcision before, there’s a thread on this very subforum where I and several others go into detail on a number of aspects of this controversy -- though I assure you that dismissing “tradition� as arbitrary and meaningless by proposing ludicrous and offensive hypotheticals does not enter into the discussion. It’s at a rather more substantial level than that.

(For the record, those very hypotheticals have been alleged to be true; that is, it has been claimed on this very forum, and recently, that Jewish tradition actually holds that rape and child molestation are perfectly moral and right actions. You'll forgive me if I found your example, and the way you have approached it, inflammatory and offensive, whether intended or not. Let's choose another, shall we?)

I have suggested the issue of abortion; if you can rephrase all that followed here to fit THAT issue, we can continue, but if you insist on circumcision, I think I’ll opt out. I could have rewritten your words myself to that end, but I decided that that would not be quite the proper thing; so I respectfully ask you to respect my own wishes in this matter. Since the specific issue at hand would not seem to be of great importance to your argument, and since my objections to this one are rather strong, I don’t think it’s too much to ask.

If I may pick up on your argument as it might apply to abortion in a good-faith attempt to continue: One person’s “primary value� might be the absolute preservation of life under any and all circumstances; the other’s might be preserving the liberty of women to choose what shall happen to their own bodies and lives. If I read your analysis correctly, when both sides examine the values they have identified as most vital and central, eventually one core value common to both will emerge and settle the issue.

What would that core value be in this case? Which set of values should objectively prevail -- or is there another that is above them both? That discussion has been going on in our society for quite some time now, and I see no sign of any “objectively true standard� emerging. Can you show me how your process would work in this case?

[Ionian_Tradition]

It seems to me that you have proven that actions which can be defined as “moral� and “immoral,� according to your definitions, objectively exist. I do not see anything which shows that you can always determine with 100% confidence what those actions, specifically speaking, would be. It seems to me that you have glossed over a most essential question -- how, SPECIFICALLY, can one determine which of a range of actions will best serve the ends you have here outlined? In most situations, of course, the judgment is easy and obvious; but certainly not always. It is very often hard to judge exactly what the consequences of an action might be. I submit that unless one knows ALL the results of an action -- predicting the future, one might say -- one cannot be certain of making an objectively correct judgment.

Firstly, allow me to apologize for my delayed response. I've been quite busy as of late. With that said, I agree, the consequences of a given action cannot be known with absolute certainty. However, the statistical probability regarding whether or not a given action will produce a response conducive with actualizing the social conditions which are of primary value CAN be known. While it cannot be known with absolute certainty that altruistic behavior will always serve to improve the quality of relationships I share with others, it is absolutely certain that it is far less probable that violent behavior will prove more affective than altruistic behavior in improving the quality of said relationships. This is where I believe the opportunity exists for morality to become a science of sorts. With a proper understanding of the intrinsic primary values which draw individuals to seek community, we can then begin to study human behavior in light of these values in an attempt to determine the probability that any action in a set of possible actions will prove conducive with actualizing a state of affairs which promote the social conditions which are of primary value. Once these probabilities are determined, it follows that one objectively ought to act in a way which possesses the best possible chance of producing the social conditions which reflect their primary values. It is not a perfect system, but the uncertainty of outcome does not negate the objective behavioral judgment which can be derived from an understanding of probable outcomes.

I specifically said that I have argued all that I care to on the subject of circumcision, and yet you have chosen that issue for your exemplar anyway. I will assume that that choice was not calculated to provoke, but either way, I decline to join you in that discussion. I find that beating dead horses interferes with my own ability to function and thrive, you see.

If you want to see what I’ve posted on this subject of circumcision before, there’s a thread on this very subforum where I and several others go into detail on a number of aspects of this controversy -- though I assure you that dismissing “tradition� as arbitrary and meaningless by proposing ludicrous and offensive hypotheticals does not enter into the discussion. It’s at a rather more substantial level than that.

(For the record, those very hypotheticals have been alleged to be true; that is, it has been claimed on this very forum, and recently, that Jewish tradition actually holds that rape and child molestation are perfectly moral and right actions. You'll forgive me if I found your example, and the way you have approached it, inflammatory and offensive, whether intended or not. Let's choose another, shall we?)

I have no stake in arguing for or against circumcision. I merely employed it for the sake of illustration. If you've taken offense to this then you have my apology. Such was again, never my intention.

I have suggested the issue of abortion; if you can rephrase all that followed here to fit THAT issue, we can continue, but if you insist on circumcision, I think I’ll opt out. I could have rewritten your words myself to that end, but I decided that that would not be quite the proper thing; so I respectfully ask you to respect my own wishes in this matter. Since the specific issue at hand would not seem to be of great importance to your argument, and since my objections to this one are rather strong, I don’t think it’s too much to ask.

It certainly is not. Abortion will do just fine.

If I may pick up on your argument as it might apply to abortion in a good-faith attempt to continue: One person’s “primary value� might be the absolute preservation of life under any and all circumstances; the other’s might be preserving the liberty of women to choose what shall happen to their own bodies and lives. If I read your analysis correctly, when both sides examine the values they have identified as most vital and central, eventually one core value common to both will emerge and settle the issue.

What would that core value be in this case? Which set of values should objectively prevail -- or is there another that is above them both? That discussion has been going on in our society for quite some time now, and I see no sign of any “objectively true standard� emerging. Can you show me how your process would work in this case?

In matters of this nature one must ask what are the core values, shared by all individuals of a community, which serve to drive said individuals toward community in the first place? Obviously there are values we hold which we believe are best promoted and preserved within the bounds of society...What are they? While I will not deign to list them all, for I believe this is still a very rich field of study which merits further investigation, it is certain that whatever they are, our ability to survive and thrive as a species is inextricably tied to these basic values. This is why we tend to hold these values in a higher regard than other more gratuitous values of less import. One might assume that a woman's right to choose, in this regard, stands among this set of primary values...Is such truly the case? Through the employment of a basic Socratic methodology perhaps we can test the validity of this assumption.

We believe that a woman has the right to choose what ought be done to her body, but to what extent do we hold this value binding regarding abortion? A woman's desire to terminate a fetus within 26 weeks of gestation seems appropriate to most abortion advocates. Yet if that same woman, were to desire to abort an unborn infant developed over the course 8 or 9 months, abortion advocates might take pause...Perhaps go so far as to classify such late term abortion as "murder"...How very interesting that though the child still continues to develop within her womb (as it did in fetal form) and is still very much a part of her body, her "right to choose" has been called into question. Might this suggest that a mother's right to choose what ought be done to her body has its limits given certain variables? If such is the case, then it is clear that a woman's right to choose is not of primary value given that there are values which supersede her choice in the matter...Values regarding the life of the child, who though still residing within the mother's womb, is now consider a creature of autonomy... A member of society which is deserving of the same rights and dignities enjoyed by the mother. We may respect a mother's right to decided what ought be done to her body, but we reject her the right to decide what ought be done to the body of another..though that body reside within her. So it would seem choice is not our primary value. But life is. In society, we value conditions which promote and preserve the lives of ourselves, which, when at their best, serve to promote the lives of those with which we share community. A strong, viable community is established upon this value. A community which does not promote and preserve the life of its citizens is weakened and liable to fail. Often we stress this value through judicially imposed laws because our survival depends on our neighbors prizing this same value. Though other carnal desires might drive us to act in a manner contrary to our primary values, it was and is for this purpose of self and corporate preservation that we as a species assemble in communities. With that said, if value regarding social conditions which promote and preserve the lives of a society's members supersedes mere choice, how does this apply practically to the issue of abortion?

To be sure, we value the preservation of life (primarily our own), but within a societal context, what form of life is of most value? We slaughter the cow and take little thought for the preservation of its life when we pierce it with the fork and knife. The same for the chicken, the pig....even the nefarious spider which we trample under toe...Yet the preservation of human life is of much greater import. Why? Society isn't as much concerned with the preservation of ANY form of life as it is with the preservation of its members. Thinking, feeling, sentient, human members of which the society is comprised. The reason why we do not permit the termination of 9 month old children who have yet to leave the womb is because we believe these unborn children aren't just an extension of their mother's body...They are individuals, possessing the quality and characteristics of personhood. Though shrouded by flesh they are people...and society IS people. Now, if societal conditions which promote and preserve the life of its members are of primary value, the question becomes "Is a fetus undergoing its 6th week of gestation" the same as an unborn infant of 9th months? What are the distinctions, if any, which makes the preservation of one's life more valuable than the other? What does it mean to be a member of society? What does it mean to possesses "personhood"? If we can conclusively answer these questions, an objective judgment regarding whether or not abortion is conducive with our primary values will begin to emerge.

[cnorman18]

It seems to me that you have proven that actions which can be defined as “moral� and “immoral,� according to your definitions, objectively exist. I do not see anything which shows that you can always determine with 100% confidence what those actions, specifically speaking, would be. It seems to me that you have glossed over a most essential question -- how, SPECIFICALLY, can one determine which of a range of actions will best serve the ends you have here outlined? In most situations, of course, the judgment is easy and obvious; but certainly not always. It is very often hard to judge exactly what the consequences of an action might be. I submit that unless one knows ALL the results of an action -- predicting the future, one might say -- one cannot be certain of making an objectively correct judgment.

Firstly, allow me to apologize for my delayed response. I've been quite busy as of late.

Understood. I learned my lesson on that issue -- plus, my own schedule lately has not left time for much extracurricular activity. (I owe a phone call to a good friend, for instance, but I've been working double shifts with my clients and now Passover is looming. Soon, I hope, Cat...)

With that said, I agree, the consequences of a given action cannot be known with absolute certainty. However, the statistical probability regarding whether or not a given action will produce a response conducive with actualizing the social conditions which are of primary value CAN be known. While it cannot be known with absolute certainty that altruistic behavior will always serve to improve the quality of relationships I share with others, it is absolutely certain that it is far less probable that violent behavior will prove more affective than altruistic behavior in improving the quality of said relationships.

Like I said, the easy ones are, well, easy. I don't mean to be flip; but the difficulty comes with more complex and difficult decisions, where the outcome is less easily foreseeable.

This is where I believe the opportunity exists for morality to become a science of sorts. With a proper understanding of the intrinsic primary values which draw individuals to seek community, we can then begin to study human behavior in light of these values in an attempt to determine the probability that any action in a set of possible actions will prove conducive with actualizing a state of affairs which promote the social conditions which are of primary value. Once these probabilities are determined, it follows that one objectively ought to act in a way which possesses the best possible chance of producing the social conditions which reflect their primary values. It is not a perfect system, but the uncertainty of outcome does not negate the objective behavioral judgment which can be derived from an understanding of probable outcomes.

Sure, but the problem there is the same as that of theoretical "free will" -- what we do may be predetermined, but the influences may be so complex that they may as well be random. If it were possible to control for ONE factor or aspect of a decision, what you say might have some practical merit; but as it stands, what you offer here is more of an outline for a possible science that might exist sometime in the distant future (it reminds me of Isaac Asimov's Foundation series, in that way), as opposed to any kind of practical science of ethics in the present day. It is, though, a rather good indicator of where we might be going in that future.

I have no stake in arguing for or against circumcision. I merely employed it for the sake of illustration. If you've taken offense to this then you have my apology. Such was again, never my intention.

Also understood. Think no more of it.

It certainly is not. Abortion will do just fine.

If I may pick up on your argument as it might apply to abortion in a good-faith attempt to continue: One person’s “primary value� might be the absolute preservation of life under any and all circumstances; the other’s might be preserving the liberty of women to choose what shall happen to their own bodies and lives. If I read your analysis correctly, when both sides examine the values they have identified as most vital and central, eventually one core value common to both will emerge and settle the issue.

What would that core value be in this case? Which set of values should objectively prevail -- or is there another that is above them both? That discussion has been going on in our society for quite some time now, and I see no sign of any “objectively true standard� emerging. Can you show me how your process would work in this case?

In matters of this nature one must ask what are the core values, shared by all individuals of a community, which serve to drive said individuals toward community in the first place? Obviously there are values we hold which we believe are best promoted and preserved within the bounds of society...What are they? While I will not deign to list them all, for I believe this is still a very rich field of study which merits further investigation, it is certain that whatever they are, our ability to survive and thrive as a species is inextricably tied to these basic values. This is why we tend to hold these values in a higher regard than other more gratuitous values of less import. One might assume that a woman's right to choose, in this regard, stands among this set of primary values...Is such truly the case? Through the employment of a basic Socratic methodology perhaps we can test the validity of this assumption.

We believe that a woman has the right to choose what ought be done to her body, but to what extent do we hold this value binding regarding abortion? A woman's desire to terminate a fetus within 26 weeks of gestation seems appropriate to most abortion advocates. Yet if that same woman, were to desire to abort an unborn infant developed over the course 8 or 9 months, abortion advocates might take pause...Perhaps go so far as to classify such late term abortion as "murder"...How very interesting that though the child still continues to develop within her womb (as it did in fetal form) and is still very much a part of her body, her "right to choose" has been called into question. Might this suggest that a mother's right to choose what ought be done to her body has its limits given certain variables? If such is the case, then it is clear that a woman's right to choose is not of primary value given that there are values which supersede her choice in the matter...Values regarding the life of the child, who though still residing within the mother's womb, is now consider a creature of autonomy... A member of society which is deserving of the same rights and dignities enjoyed by the mother. We may respect a mother's right to decided what ought be done to her body, but we reject her the right to decide what ought be done to the body of another..though that body reside within her. So it would seem choice is not our primary value. But life is. In society, we value conditions which promote and preserve the lives of ourselves, which, when at their best, serve to promote the lives of those with which we share community. A strong, viable community is established upon this value. A community which does not promote and preserve the life of its citizens is weakened and liable to fail. Often we stress this value through judicially imposed laws because our survival depends on our neighbors prizing this same value. Though other carnal desires might drive us to act in a manner contrary to our primary values, it was and is for this purpose of self and corporate preservation that we as a species assemble in communities. With that said, if value regarding social conditions which promote and preserve the lives of a society's members supersedes mere choice, how does this apply practically to the issue of abortion?

To be sure, we value the preservation of life (primarily our own), but within a societal context, what form of life is of most value? We slaughter the cow and take little thought for the preservation of its life when we pierce it with the fork and knife. The same for the chicken, the pig....even the nefarious spider which we trample under toe...Yet the preservation of human life is of much greater import. Why? Society isn't as much concerned with the preservation of ANY form of life as it is with the preservation of its members. Thinking, feeling, sentient, human members of which the society is comprised. The reason why we do not permit the termination of 9 month old children who have yet to leave the womb is because we believe these unborn children aren't just an extension of their mother's body...They are individuals, possessing the quality and characteristics of personhood. Though shrouded by flesh they are people...and society IS people. Now, if societal conditions which promote and preserve the life of its members are of primary value, the question becomes "Is a fetus undergoing its 6th week of gestation" the same as an unborn infant of 9th months? What are the distinctions, if any, which makes the preservation of one's life more valuable than the other? What does it mean to be a member of society? What does it mean to possesses "personhood"? If we can conclusively answer these questions, an objective judgment regarding whether or not abortion is conducive with our primary values will begin to emerge.

That was rather well done. Your thinking rather parallels my own on this subject; some sort of line must be drawn between the (obvious, at least to some) acceptability of early abortion, and the (equally obvious, I think to virtually everyone) unacceptability of late- or full-term abortion. The extremes, I think, are out of court, even though only one of them actually exists; "no abortion at all" is a rallying point for many "pro-life" supporters, while I know of no one who routinely supports abortion of a normal child on the day before natural birth, the "partial-birth abortion" issue notwithstanding. In any case, the "no abortion at all" extremists -- as I judge them -- will be the major obstacle to any settlement of the question until they see their way clear to compromise, which seems rather more than doubtful at the present juncture. As I said, some day your ideas here might bear some practical fruit, and they are an interesting and promising foundation for an objective science of ethics and morality; but I rather suspect that as long as humans remain humans, with varying points of view and conflicting priorities and value systems, the day of an inarguably objective system of moral judgments will remain a theoretical possibility and not a practical reality.

Might as well toss out this old proposal for a compromise on abortion here; the Talmud holds that the line should be drawn at "quickening," that is, when the woman first feels the fetus move within her. If a miscarriage occurs before that time, it is considered an injury or an illness; if the child is lost after it has begun to move on its own, it is considered a death. That seems about as logical and objective, not to mention practical and reasonable, a standard for the acceptable limits of abortion as any, to me.