Arguments against first cause/uncaused cause?

[BearCavalry]

I've always believed that the argument of first cause/uncaused cause is an unbeatable argument for proving the concept of God.

It doesn't prove whether Christians, Muslims, Jews, or Jainists have the right idea about God. It doesn't prove whether God is good or evil. It doesn't prove whether God is a personal, loving entity or something as impersonal as some self-causing physics concept that propogates the galaxy.

But I think it does prove the existence of God if God is defined as an entity so infinitely powerful that it becomes self-causing by permeating all time and space. I just don't logically see how something could come out of nothing. In my opinion, that's an absolute, self-evident truth the way Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" is. However, I was curious if any of the cynics had anything to say.

[Ionian_Tradition]

What is your rationale for assuming that knowledge possessed by non-human, non-physical entities is not experiential in nature. Can you offer me an example of knowledge which is not first predicated upon prior experience?
...
Then would you be so kind as to demonstrate why you believe this is the case? Can you put forward an example of knowledge which is not based upon prior experience to some degree? Can you demonstrate why it is rational to assume that the properties of a thing can be known, by non-human minds, prior to their own existence and without experiential reference?
...
How does a mind uniformed by external causes inform itself concerning that which is entirely foreign to its experience?

I'm merely stating that we can't extrapolate our thought process onto an entity whose mind we know next to nothing about.

Then is it wise to build an argument based upon an assumption which is largely predicated upon an extrapolation of the human minds capacity to know and choose impressed upon an entity whose mind we know next to nothing about? Or is it wise to posit this entity must be capable of mental feats completely foreign to us? Can we say with confidence that such feats are even possible?

That aside, I would wish to learn why you believe knowledge is not necessarily predicated upon prior experience. You've not answered the questions I posed to you in my previous response. I can start a new thread if you believe answering my questions will derail the current topic of discussion. Let me know.

[StephanM]

What is your rationale for assuming that knowledge possessed by non-human, non-physical entities is not experiential in nature. Can you offer me an example of knowledge which is not first predicated upon prior experience?
...
Then would you be so kind as to demonstrate why you believe this is the case? Can you put forward an example of knowledge which is not based upon prior experience to some degree? Can you demonstrate why it is rational to assume that the properties of a thing can be known, by non-human minds, prior to their own existence and without experiential reference?
...
How does a mind uniformed by external causes inform itself concerning that which is entirely foreign to its experience?

I'm merely stating that we can't extrapolate our thought process onto an entity whose mind we know next to nothing about.

Then is it wise to build an argument based upon an assumption which is largely predicated upon an extrapolation of the human minds capacity to know and choose impressed upon an entity whose mind we know next to nothing about? Or is it wise to posit this entity must be capable of mental feats completely foreign to us? Can we say with confidence that such feats are even possible?

Only to the extent which can be shown by logical implications.

That aside, I would wish to learn why you believe knowledge is not necessarily predicated upon prior experience. You've not answered the questions I posed to you in my previous response. I can start a new thread if you believe answering my questions will derail the current topic of discussion. Let me know.

I think it's relevant to the topic; I just don't think that it necessarily applies to every potential mind. There could very well be a mind that could form completely new concepts.

[Ionian_Tradition]

What is your rationale for assuming that knowledge possessed by non-human, non-physical entities is not experiential in nature. Can you offer me an example of knowledge which is not first predicated upon prior experience?
...
Then would you be so kind as to demonstrate why you believe this is the case? Can you put forward an example of knowledge which is not based upon prior experience to some degree? Can you demonstrate why it is rational to assume that the properties of a thing can be known, by non-human minds, prior to their own existence and without experiential reference?
...
How does a mind uniformed by external causes inform itself concerning that which is entirely foreign to its experience?

I'm merely stating that we can't extrapolate our thought process onto an entity whose mind we know next to nothing about.

Then is it wise to build an argument based upon an assumption which is largely predicated upon an extrapolation of the human minds capacity to know and choose impressed upon an entity whose mind we know next to nothing about? Or is it wise to posit this entity must be capable of mental feats completely foreign to us? Can we say with confidence that such feats are even possible?

Only to the extent which can be shown by logical implications.

I'm not sure that any of the aforementioned notions are logically implied for the first cause. There is nothing in our understanding regarding the relationship between the mind and knowledge which would lend credence to the claim that knowledge without experiential referent is logically possible. Let alone that it follows as a logical implication for a mind we know absolutely nothing about.

That aside, I would wish to learn why you believe knowledge is not necessarily predicated upon prior experience. You've not answered the questions I posed to you in my previous response. I can start a new thread if you believe answering my questions will derail the current topic of discussion. Let me know.

I think it's relevant to the topic; I just don't think that it necessarily applies to every potential mind. There could very well be a mind that could form completely new concepts.

There is nothing in our experience which would suggest that this is the case, or that it is even plausible. Concepts are never shown to emerge from nothing. They are always preceded by some prior knowledge. Much in the same way that we do not see a table form from nothing. The table is always preceded by the the material which comprise it. How then do you suggest it is possible for a "new concept" to form in the absence of some prior knowledge from which to construct it? I must admit, this seems like rather spurious ground upon which to found an argument for an intelligent first cause.

[Danmark]

There could very well be a mind that could form completely new concepts.

There is nothing in our experience which would suggest that this is the case, or that it is even plausible. Concepts are never shown to emerge from nothing. They are always preceded by some prior knowledge. Much in the same way that we do not see a table form from nothing. The table is always preceded by the the material which comprise it. How then do you suggest it is possible for a "new concept" to form in the absence of some prior knowledge from which to construct it? I must admit, this seems like rather spurious ground upon which to found an argument for an intelligent first cause.

An example of a concept that can 'emerge from nothing' and has the added benefit of being related to this topic is this:

The universe has always been. It has no beginning, it has no end. It just is. This concept does not come from prior experience or prior knowledge. Just because every thing else has a prior cause, does not mean the universe needs one too.

The 'first cause' argument is one that springs from lack of imagination, from lack of openness to what is. You can argue against it, but you cannot refute it.

The beauty of this argument is that it in particular it must be respected by any one who argues for a first cause and calls that first cause 'god.' The argument for god as the 'first cause' is an argument for the universe having always been, but with a different label, 'The universe.'

[Ionian_Tradition]

There could very well be a mind that could form completely new concepts.

There is nothing in our experience which would suggest that this is the case, or that it is even plausible. Concepts are never shown to emerge from nothing. They are always preceded by some prior knowledge. Much in the same way that we do not see a table form from nothing. The table is always preceded by the the material which comprise it. How then do you suggest it is possible for a "new concept" to form in the absence of some prior knowledge from which to construct it? I must admit, this seems like rather spurious ground upon which to found an argument for an intelligent first cause.

An example of a concept that can 'emerge from nothing' and has the added benefit of being related to this topic is this:

The universe has always been. It has no beginning, it has no end. It just is. This concept does not come from prior experience or prior knowledge. Just because every thing else has a prior cause, does not mean the universe needs one too.

It seems to me you required a few bits of knowledge in order to form this concept. Firstly, you needed to know what a universe was in order to conceive of one existing without beginning or end. Secondly you needed to be familiar with what actually constitutes a "beginning" and "end" in order to also deduce what conditions might qualify as their antithesis. Put simply, you required experiential knowledge of the known universe in order to conceive of a conceptually infinite one. I'm not sure this example qualifies as concept emerged from "nothing".

[Danmark]

There could very well be a mind that could form completely new concepts.

There is nothing in our experience which would suggest that this is the case, or that it is even plausible. Concepts are never shown to emerge from nothing. They are always preceded by some prior knowledge. Much in the same way that we do not see a table form from nothing. The table is always preceded by the the material which comprise it. How then do you suggest it is possible for a "new concept" to form in the absence of some prior knowledge from which to construct it? I must admit, this seems like rather spurious ground upon which to found an argument for an intelligent first cause.

An example of a concept that can 'emerge from nothing' and has the added benefit of being related to this topic is this:

The universe has always been. It has no beginning, it has no end. It just is. This concept does not come from prior experience or prior knowledge. Just because every thing else has a prior cause, does not mean the universe needs one too.

It seems to me you required a few bits of knowledge in order to form this concept. Firstly, you needed to know what a universe was in order to conceive of one existing without beginning or end. Secondly you needed to be familiar with what actually constitutes a "beginning" and "end" in order to also deduce what conditions might qualify as their antithesis. Put simply, you required experiential knowledge of the known universe in order to conceive of a conceptually infinite one. I'm not sure this example qualifies as concept emerged from "nothing".

You might as well add 'language' or 'logic' to your list of 'bits of knowledge one is supposed to do without to qualify under your conditions.

If you want to define your conditions that tightly, simply living as a conscious being would disqualify a person from being able to fulfill your conditions. Conditions defined that absolutely render the challenge absurd.

My example however, fulfills the conditions set in a meaningful way, because it is a concept we have no experience with, by definition.

[Ionian_Tradition]

There could very well be a mind that could form completely new concepts.

There is nothing in our experience which would suggest that this is the case, or that it is even plausible. Concepts are never shown to emerge from nothing. They are always preceded by some prior knowledge. Much in the same way that we do not see a table form from nothing. The table is always preceded by the the material which comprise it. How then do you suggest it is possible for a "new concept" to form in the absence of some prior knowledge from which to construct it? I must admit, this seems like rather spurious ground upon which to found an argument for an intelligent first cause.

An example of a concept that can 'emerge from nothing' and has the added benefit of being related to this topic is this:

The universe has always been. It has no beginning, it has no end. It just is. This concept does not come from prior experience or prior knowledge. Just because every thing else has a prior cause, does not mean the universe needs one too.

It seems to me you required a few bits of knowledge in order to form this concept. Firstly, you needed to know what a universe was in order to conceive of one existing without beginning or end. Secondly you needed to be familiar with what actually constitutes a "beginning" and "end" in order to also deduce what conditions might qualify as their antithesis. Put simply, you required experiential knowledge of the known universe in order to conceive of a conceptually infinite one. I'm not sure this example qualifies as concept emerged from "nothing".

You might as well add 'language' or 'logic' to your list of 'bits of knowledge one is supposed to do without to qualify under your conditions.

Both of which are necessary elements of thought so I suppose they would qualify, yes. That both are derived through experience underscores my point.

If you want to define your conditions that tightly, simply living as a conscious being would disqualify a person from being able to fulfill your conditions. Conditions defined that absolutely render the challenge absurd.

My intention was to test whether or not it is possible for a concept to be born without reference to prior experiential knowledge? If we wish to explore the question thoroughly we must examine the whole not merely the part. I find nothing absurd in this approach. We need to trace concepts back to their source in order to determine if conceptualizations can emerge from truly nothing. This requires the very conditions you deem "too stringent".

My example however, fulfills the conditions set in a meaningful way, because it is a concept we have no experience with, by definition.

But I wasn't asking for a concept which refers to an idea foreign to our experience. I was asking for an example of a novel concept which can be derived without calling upon prior knowledge born from experience. A concept, in effect, born from "nothing". You are welcome to take another stab at it if you wish.

[Danmark]

There could very well be a mind that could form completely new concepts.

There is nothing in our experience which would suggest that this is the case, or that it is even plausible. Concepts are never shown to emerge from nothing. They are always preceded by some prior knowledge. Much in the same way that we do not see a table form from nothing. The table is always preceded by the the material which comprise it. How then do you suggest it is possible for a "new concept" to form in the absence of some prior knowledge from which to construct it? I must admit, this seems like rather spurious ground upon which to found an argument for an intelligent first cause.

An example of a concept that can 'emerge from nothing' and has the added benefit of being related to this topic is this:

The universe has always been. It has no beginning, it has no end. It just is. This concept does not come from prior experience or prior knowledge. Just because every thing else has a prior cause, does not mean the universe needs one too.

It seems to me you required a few bits of knowledge in order to form this concept. Firstly, you needed to know what a universe was in order to conceive of one existing without beginning or end. Secondly you needed to be familiar with what actually constitutes a "beginning" and "end" in order to also deduce what conditions might qualify as their antithesis. Put simply, you required experiential knowledge of the known universe in order to conceive of a conceptually infinite one. I'm not sure this example qualifies as concept emerged from "nothing".

You might as well add 'language' or 'logic' to your list of 'bits of knowledge one is supposed to do without to qualify under your conditions.

Both of which are necessary elements of thought so I suppose they would qualify, yes. That both are derived through experience underscores my point.

If you want to define your conditions that tightly, simply living as a conscious being would disqualify a person from being able to fulfill your conditions. Conditions defined that absolutely render the challenge absurd.

My intention was to test whether or not it is possible for a concept to be born without reference to prior experiential knowledge? If we wish to explore the question thoroughly we must examine the whole not merely the part. I find nothing absurd in this approach. We need to trace concepts back to their source in order to determine if conceptualizations can emerge from truly nothing. This requires the very conditions you deem "too stringent".

My example however, fulfills the conditions set in a meaningful way, because it is a concept we have no experience with, by definition.

But I wasn't asking for a concept which refers to an idea foreign to our experience. I was asking for an example of a novel concept which can be derived without calling upon prior knowledge born from experience. A concept, in effect, born from "nothing". You are welcome to take another stab at it if you wish.

I'd be happy to if you can tell me one thing or concept or idea that cannot be related to any other thing, concept or idea.

[StephanM]

I'm not sure that any of the aforementioned notions are logically implied for the first cause. There is nothing in our understanding regarding the relationship between the mind and knowledge which would lend credence to the claim that knowledge without experiential referent is logically possible. Let alone that it follows as a logical implication for a mind we know absolutely nothing about.

Please see my earlier posts in this thread for that reasoning.

I think it's relevant to the topic; I just don't think that it necessarily applies to every potential mind. There could very well be a mind that could form completely new concepts.

There is nothing in our experience which would suggest that this is the case, or that it is even plausible. Concepts are never shown to emerge from nothing. They are always preceded by some prior knowledge. Much in the same way that we do not see a table form from nothing. The table is always preceded by the the material which comprise it. How then do you suggest it is possible for a "new concept" to form in the absence of some prior knowledge from which to construct it? I must admit, this seems like rather spurious ground upon which to found an argument for an intelligent first cause.

Again, you're using human thought process and extrapolating it onto an unknown mind without showing why it must apply. This isn't my grounds for suggesting an intelligent first cause. That's covered in the earlier posts that I mentioned above.

[Ionian_Tradition]

I'm not sure that any of the aforementioned notions are logically implied for the first cause. There is nothing in our understanding regarding the relationship between the mind and knowledge which would lend credence to the claim that knowledge without experiential referent is logically possible. Let alone that it follows as a logical implication for a mind we know absolutely nothing about.

Please see my earlier posts in this thread for that reasoning.

I think it's relevant to the topic; I just don't think that it necessarily applies to every potential mind. There could very well be a mind that could form completely new concepts.

There is nothing in our experience which would suggest that this is the case, or that it is even plausible. Concepts are never shown to emerge from nothing. They are always preceded by some prior knowledge. Much in the same way that we do not see a table form from nothing. The table is always preceded by the the material which comprise it. How then do you suggest it is possible for a "new concept" to form in the absence of some prior knowledge from which to construct it? I must admit, this seems like rather spurious ground upon which to found an argument for an intelligent first cause.

Again, you're using human thought process and extrapolating it onto an unknown mind without showing why it must apply.

StephanM, you do the very same when you argue that this unknown mind is capable of conceiving novel concepts without reference to prior experiential knowledge. Though I'm not yet convinced that my own assessment is entirely an extrapolation of human thought processes, although I do make reference to it. I believe there is a logical issue which undergirds your claim that a unknown mind can produce novel concepts from absolutely nothing. I believe that the structures of concepts are such that they require a pre-existing knowledge base from which to form. They are not an entity separate and distinct from knowledge but rather a formation of pre-existing knowledge into new and novel forms. Much like a log cabin actually. A cabin is not an entity separate and distinct from the logs which comprise it. Rather it is a structuring of those logs into a new and novel form, a log cabin. Just as the log cabin can not form without logs, neither can concepts be born without a preceding knowledge base from which to form. If the mind of our unknown entity is in any way analogous in our own, in that it can form concepts and choose to act upon that which it conceives, then I believe this understanding of the means by which concepts are formed must hold true for the first cause as well.

This isn't my grounds for suggesting an intelligent first cause. That's covered in the earlier posts that I mentioned above.

Could you refer me to the exact post# where you make this argument?