Mind/brain interaction.

[charles51]

I’m intrigued by Harvey1’s arguments for dualism. However, I wonder why he’s arguing for dualism, and not idealism. If the mind itself is an irreducible fact, and mind and matter appear to have no ontological being in common, what is the basis for mind/brain interaction?

Note: I’m not asking that anyone give a detailed neurological explanation. I’m only asking for a conceptual explanation.

[harvey1]

I’m intrigued by Harvey1’s arguments for dualism. However, I wonder why he’s arguing for dualism, and not idealism. If the mind itself is an irreducible fact, and mind and matter appear to have no ontological being in common, what is the basis for mind/brain interaction?
Note: I’m not asking that anyone give a detailed neurological explanation. I’m only asking for a conceptual explanation.

The mind does not cause brain events per se, rather the mind tells us why the brain is limited in carrying out X instead of Y or Z. I argue that the "mind" of the individual is akin to a mathematical attractor that identifies and restricts the probable behavior and decisions of that individual. Once the body (e.g., brain) "lock" onto a particular attractor, the fate of that individual is pretty much decided. The material cannot be eliminated in this account since it is part of the causal account on how free will decisions take place. In order to have a full causal account, we need both the mind/brain categories.

[charles51]

Harvey,

On one hand you seem to be saying that the mind only 'reports' what the physical brain determines. On the other hand you seem to suggest that the mind itself somehow 'acts' on the physical brain to limit or in some way determine brain function.

How, conceptually, is the mind able to do this? If the mind itself is a true ontological reality, and is not a physical 'thing' having tangible properties, its causal action upon the brain in any form would represent a physical effect without a physical cause, thereby violating the Law of Conservation of Energy.

[harvey1]

On one hand you seem to be saying that the mind only 'reports' what the physical brain determines. On the other hand you seem to suggest that the mind itself somehow 'acts' on the physical brain to limit or in some way determine brain function. How, conceptually, is the mind able to do this? If the mind itself is a true ontological reality, and is not a physical 'thing' having tangible properties, its causal action upon the brain in any form would represent a physical effect without a physical cause, thereby violating the Law of Conservation of Energy.

I agree up to a point with what you're saying. The mind does not have a causal action upon the brain as a proximate cause. The mind's causal influence on the brain is as a distal cause (i.e., ultimate cause) whereby any physical cause for a brain event must reference a higher level of organization (i.e., the mind). The mind, I think, is a strongly emergent feature which composes a geometric system. Events that occur at the physical level (of the brain) are explained in geometrical language of the mind, and without this "language" there cannot be an explanation for many of the physical events that happen in the brain. I would suggest that each brain has its own particular geometric system described by its own language. However, we each share some universal characteristics (e.g., a self). Therefore, trying to understand why certain brain events happen requires that we probe this geometric system: which in other words is to address the psychology of the mind.

[charles51]

Harvey,

You describe the mind as an 'emergent feature'. Are you claiming this emergent feature can itself act independently of the underlying physical facts that ultimately cause it? If it can, its effect upon the brain would be physically unaccounted for, and in violation of those physical facts.

However, if this emergent feature cannot act independently, then it's the blind physical facts themselves, not the emergent feature, that both causes and determines conscious experience. The mind would be nothing more than an incidental by-product -- an epiphenomenon—caused by mindless physical forces which neither know nor care what the mind thinks or believes.

[harvey1]

You describe the mind as an 'emergent feature'. Are you claiming this emergent feature can itself act independently of the physical facts that ultimately cause it? If it can, its effect upon the brain would be physically unaccounted for, and in violation of the existing physical facts.

The emergent feature is only instantiated if certain physical events (i.e., brain events) occur. If the physical brain events did not occur, the emergent feature would not be instantiated.

However, if this emergent feature cannot act independently, then it's the blind physical facts themselves, not the emergent feature, that determines conscious experience.

But, the physical facts themselves are only facts because of the emergence of the mind. A number of physical events depend on the emergence of the mind. If the emergent mind did not exist, then the physical facts would not (could not) exist. So, for example, if a 1000 neurons produced a mental tickle, then a laugh depends on the mental tickle emerging. If there is no laugh, then there's no causal explanation why 100,000 neurons (as an example) happen to be active when they do.

The mind would be nothing more than an incidental by-product -- an epiphenomenon—caused by mindless physical forces that neither know nor care what the mind thinks or believes.

When brain activity depends on a mental event for their explanation, there must exist a mental event for there to be this brain activity.

[charles51]

Harvey,

The emergent feature is only instantiated if certain physical events (i.e., brain events) occur. If the physical brain events did not occur, the emergent feature would not be instantiated.

Okay, the emergent feature is caused by physical events. I understand that.

But, the physical facts themselves are only facts because of the emergence of the mind. A number of physical events depend on the emergence of the mind. If the emergent mind did not exist, then the physical facts would not (could not) exist. So, for example, if a 1000 neurons produced a mental tickle, then a laugh depends on the mental tickle emerging. If there is no laugh, then there's no causal explanation why 100,000 neurons (as an example) happen to be active when they do.

I also understand that a physical fact, as mental idea, depends upon the mind. However, the physical event which objectively exists and corresponds to the mental idea would not depend on the mind.

I see confusion in your idea that a laugh is caused by a mental tickle, which itself is caused by neurons. It's true that a mental tickle might accompany the neurons, but unless the mental tickle is itself a physical 'thing' having physical properties, it would have no physical powers, and so could not cause a physiological response in the brain producing laughter. There would simply be two series of events, one tracking the other. One is the physical series which undergo the actual cause and effect relationships in a purely deterministic way. The other is a series of accompanying mental events which only reflect the physical series. The mental series, having no physical properties themselves, cause nothing in the physical series, and therefore, cause nothing in the mental series as well. And causing nothing, the mental series would have no biological survival value. Why the mental series exist at all would be a profound mystery. Why it should also be coherent and rightly tell us about a material world would seem to confound reason itself.

When brain activity depends on a mental event for their explanation, there must exist a mental event for there to be this brain activity.

It's true that an explanation requires a mental event. That much is obvious. What you haven't told us is why the mental series should rightly conform to the physical series, or what fact about their ontological being allows for interaction at all. That was the original question.

[harvey1]

Okay, the emergent feature is caused by physical events. I understand that.

Technically, the emergent features are instantiated by physical events. This needs to be stipulated since I deny that physical events can cause anything by themselves. (I.e., I have argued that Zeno's arrow paradox rules out material causation.)

I also understand that a physical fact, as mental idea, depends upon the mind. However, the physical event which objectively exists and corresponds to the mental idea would not depend on the mind.

For simplicity, let's define a few events:

Physical Event 1 (Pe1): This refers to a pre-emergent state of affairs that is physical (e.g., 1000 neurons in a certain state)

Emergence law 1 (E1): This refers to a law of nature that Pe1 is sufficient and necessary to produce a mental event according to how nature is structured (e.g., a theory of pain).

Mental Event 1 (Me1): This refers to an emergent state of affairs that is mental (e.g., a tickle). ME1 is instantiated as a result of Pe1:E1.

Lawful constraint 1 (L1): This refers to a natural law that Me1 is sufficient and necessary to restrict future physical events according to how nature is structured (e.g., boundary conditions imposed by a dynamic geometric system).

Physical Event 2 (Pe2): This refers to a state of affairs that exists within the boundary conditions placed on it by L1. That is, if Me1 did not occur, then L1 would not restrict Pe2 such that it has.

Emergence law 2 (E2): This refers to a law of nature that Pe2:Me1 is sufficient and necessary to produce a yet higher emergent mental event according to how nature is structured.

Mental Event 2 (Me2): This refers to an emergent state of affairs that is mental (e.g., the laugh). Me2 is instantiated as a result of (Pe2:Me1):E2.

Lawful constraint 2 (L2): This refers to a natural law that Me2 is sufficient and necessary to restrict future physical events according to how nature is structured.

Now, let me try and answer your objections...

I see confusion in your idea that a laugh is caused by a mental tickle, which itself is caused by neurons. It's true that a mental tickle might accompany the neurons, but unless the mental tickle is itself a physical 'thing' having physical properties, it would have no physical powers, and so could not cause a physiological response in the brain producing laughter.

The mental tickle (Me1) does not need to be a physical "thing" having physical properties (i.e., in order to causally affect the evolution of Pe2), since it is a law of nature (L1) that if Me1 obtains, then Pe2 is necessarily restricted as a result of L1 being the case.

There would simply be two series of events, one tracking the other. One is the physical series which undergo the actual cause and effect relationships in a purely deterministic way. The other is a series of accompanying mental events which only reflect the physical series. The mental series, having no physical properties themselves, cause nothing in the physical series, and therefore, cause nothing in the mental series as well.

This, I think, does not take into consideration the laws of nature which I think are needed for a causal explanation (i.e., I don't think material of itself causes anything to happen). When taking laws of nature into consideration, the mental can have causal efficacy without violating physical closure (afterall, physicists often say that many events happen as a result of the laws of nature).

[charles51]

Harvey,

Technically, the emergent features are instantiated by physical events. This needs to be stipulated since I deny that physical events can cause anything by themselves. (I.e., I have argued that Zeno's arrow paradox rules out material causation.)

I agree that physical events can’t cause anything by themselves. Once we remove the mind’s contribution to their conception, they fall into self-contradiction. This isn’t exactly your claim, but similar.

As for your other claims, I see a number of unwarranted assumptions. First, you’re assuming the existence of a law that somehow ensures a meaningful correspondence between the mental series and physical series. This is crucial to your position. Since mind states and brain states are incommensurable, there is no logically necessary correlation. Why a particular brain state should accompany one mental state and not another, or any mental state at all, is a complete mystery. What is your basis for making this presumptive reference to a ‘law’?

Second, the physical series ‘behaves’ in a deterministic way. Even if one denies that the physical series has any causal power itself, the fact remains that its macroscopic behavior is always consistent with determinism. Physical laws, if valid, require this. Given the lawful correlation you claim exists between both series, this ensures that the mental series slavishly follows determinism ‘just as if’ it’s physically caused. Thus the consequences this has for rational thought is equally destructive. As I’m sure you know, rational thought requires a true volitional intellect; not one driven by mechanistic laws.

And third, you still haven’t offered any ontological basis for mind/brain interaction. To interact at all, mind and matter must exist relative to each other. How is this even possible? The mind is nothing for that which itself has no mind. And matter is nothing for that which itself has no objective physical properties.

[harvey1]

First, you’re assuming the existence of a law that somehow ensures a meaningful correspondence between the mental series and physical series. This is crucial to your position. Since mind states and brain states are incommensurable, there is no logically necessary correlation. Why a particular brain state should accompany one mental state and not another, or any mental state at all, is a complete mystery. What is your basis for making this presumptive reference to a ‘law’?

I think there is sufficient reason to appeal to emergent phenomenon as a law of nature. For example, solids are an emergent phenomena of quantum particles having enormous amount of space between them. The composition of solids becomes even stranger when we consider quantum mechanics where the position of particles is perhaps vague (i.e., as a result of the uncertainty principle), and are not just particles but are particle-waves. The world of solid stuff that we experience is a result of natural law producing higher and higher emergent levels up until the point to where the world is made of solid stuff such as what we see and experience. Color is another simple example of a quality existing in the world where it simply does not exist even in principle at the quantum level.

Dynamical systems are studied in physics in terms of how behavior of simple sub-systems create a complex system in many diverse areas of study (e.g., economics, stock market, ecology, evolution, etc.). It is no surprise, I think, to see that the brain is just a small part of how nature organizes itself.

Second, the physical series ‘behaves’ in a deterministic way. Even if one denies that the physical series has any causal power itself, the fact remains that its macroscopic behavior is always consistent with determinism. Physical laws, if valid, require this. Given the lawful correlation you claim exists between both series, this ensures that the mental series slavishly follows determinism ‘just as if’ it’s physically caused. Thus the consequences this has for rational thought is equally destructive. As I’m sure you know, rational thought requires a true volitional intellect; not one driven by mechanistic laws.

I don't think that autopoietic systems require that we think of them as necessarily deterministic, at least without considering the system as a whole. What I actually mean by the emergence of the mental (or emergence of the self) is that we must consider the state of the self before we understand and predict what will happen on the lower emergent levels of the organism. The nature of this autopoietic self is that it can defy any algorithmic prediction of its behavior if immediately presented to itself, thus showing it has free will.

And third, you still haven’t offered any ontological basis for mind/brain interaction. To interact at all, mind and matter must exist relative to each other. How is this even possible? The mind is nothing for that which itself has no mind. And matter is nothing for that which itself has no objective physical properties.

At the lowest level of existence--quantum mechanics, "particles" have a dualistic nature where they can be a localized as a particle, and at the same time they are non-localized as a wave where they can even entangle with other particles as a complex system of particles. The wavefunction describes the state of the particle and the state of an ensemble of particles. I think that this forms the physical basis for all emergent systems in that the wavefunction, I wildly speculate, describes the mind as well, and even the whole universe. This is a hypothesis of some in quantum cosmology that the universe has its own wavefunction that describes the world as a whole. However, there is evidence for this on some large scales where hundreds if not thousands of atoms have already been shown to be entangled. The wavefunction for the entangled atoms would describe the system as one quantum system.