Subjective Morality

[The Tanager]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to post 150 by Divine Insight]

I'm sorry I could not make myself clearer. Anything I would say in response would just be rehashing what I've already said. May you have peace and perhaps we will meet in another thread.

[Divine Insight]

[Replying to post 150 by Divine Insight]

I'm sorry I could not make myself clearer. Anything I would say in response would just be rehashing what I've already said. May you have peace and perhaps we will meet in another thread.

Thank you for the clarification. I'll take this opportunity to be crystal clear and summarize as well.

In other words, you flat out refuse to acknowledge the truth:

In our real world the following two things are true:

1. Evidence that human morality is based on human subjective opinion is an observed fact of reality.

2. There is no real world evidence to suggest that any imagined philosophical notion of an objective moral system exists.

I have presented a crystal clear case for #1 above. There can be no doubt that statement #1 is true. We all know this to be a fact.

You have not provided any evidence to suggest that #2 is false. All you've done is offer up a clearly false claim of universal human moral intuition. An idealized philosophical notion that is not observed to exist in the real world. We all know this to be a fact as well.

And so this is where our debate ends.

Thank you for your time.

[Bust Nak]

To make (1) and (5) fit with subjectivism you are redefining them, though.

Am I? You've interpreting those ideas under the presumption objectivism, where as I interpreting them under the presumption of subjectivism, I wouldn't call different interpretation "redefining." You are connecting them to a different concept that already exists as much as I am, as the original concepts does not impose objectivism or subjectivism. Look at a few typical definitions for the word "ought:"

Used to indicate duty or correctness, typically when criticizing someone's actions.

Used to indicate a desirable or expected state.

Used to express duty or moral obligation.

Used to express justice, moral rightness, or the like.

Used to express propriety, appropriateness, etc.

Note the lack of explicit objectivity in these concepts? Consistent subjectivists would believe the above just fine. You've been operating under objectivism without being challenged for so long that you don't seem to realise that it is just one presumption out of two alternatives. Other people don't operate under the same presumption.

What do you have to say about misidentifying our thoughts and actions as inconsistent?

Now, to interject myself into your other conversation:

What I am saying is that if God exists, human morality has an ultimate objective source... If human morality is sourced in God/Form/Physical Element, then it is objective in relation to humans.

Did you not find it the least bit problematic to appeal to a subjective individual as some sort objective source, or having to appeal to relativism in an argument for objectivism?

[The Tanager]

Am I? You've interpreting those ideas under the presumption objectivism, where as I interpreting them under the presumption of subjectivism, I wouldn't call different interpretation "redefining.

This isn't about presuming one or the other. From your list of 8 phrases, how many distinct concepts do you see expressed? At most, it seems like you are saying 6. I am saying I see 8 distinct concepts. I can understand you saying that you think those 2 extra concepts don't pick out reality, but you seem to be saying that they aren't even extra concepts at all.

Did you not find it the least bit problematic to appeal to a subjective individual as some sort objective source, or having to appeal to relativism in an argument for objectivism?

The question is whether there is a source of morality external to the human mind. If there is, then by historical definition human morality is objective. What is the problem with that historical usage? It might be a problem if someone wants to use "objective morality" to mean something else, but I'm not using it that way.

[Bust Nak]

This isn't about presuming one or the other. From your list of 8 phrases, how many distinct concepts do you see expressed? At most, it seems like you are saying 6. I am saying I see 8 distinct concepts. I can understand you saying that you think those 2 extra concepts don't pick out reality, but you seem to be saying that they aren't even extra concepts at all.

That depends on your presumptions. If one holds the presumptions of objectivism, then there are 8; and given the presumption of subjectivism, then there are 6.

Whether you are the one adding two extra concepts to the existing 6, or I am taking away two existing concepts from 8, depends on which set presumptions you are working from. This absolutely is about presumptions.

The question is whether there is a source of morality external to the human mind. If there is, then by historical definition human morality is objective.

How? By the historical definition of subjectivity a personal god would be a subjective individual, the historical definition of objectivity would exclude the views of a personal god. You might have a point if you were arguing for a non-personal god like pantheism.

What is the problem with that historical usage? It might be a problem if someone wants to use "objective morality" to mean something else, but I'm not using it that way.

There is nothing wrong with the historical usage. The question is whether you are using it in accordance to said usage or not. While we are here, it's best to outline what I think the historical definitions are:

Moral Subjectivism: morality is decided by the individual. The individual is the measuring stick that decides right and wrong. They are based on personal tastes, feelings, and opinions.

Moral Objectivism: morality doesn't depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are.

[Divine Insight]

The question is whether there is a source of morality external to the human mind. If there is, then by historical definition human morality is objective.

How? By the historical definition of subjectivity a personal god would be a subjective individual, the historical definition of objectivity would exclude the views of a personal god. You might have a point if you were arguing for a non-personal god like pantheism.

I totally agree with this. A personal God who decides what he thinks is right or wrong would indeed be a subjective morality. So even something like Christian theology demands that morality is subjective.

What is the problem with that historical usage? It might be a problem if someone wants to use "objective morality" to mean something else, but I'm not using it that way.

Moral Objectivism: morality doesn't depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are.

Exactly. This is why our universe could not be the way it is if objective morality existed. We couldn't have animals eating each other and killing human babies unless that's an objective moral thing to do.

In fact, this same things even applies to a subjective morality demanded by the mind of a God. Since the God is the creator of the physical world then the same issues apply.

If this God created animals that eat each other as well as eating human babies then either things things would need to be moral according to that God's very own subjective moral opinions, otherwise he would be a creator of immoral things by his own decree.

So it can't even work in the case of a supposedly personal creator God who decrees what is moral and immoral. He would be in violation of his own moral decrees.

I think it should be obvious via the following example.

Let's say that a mortal human man build a bunch of alligator robots and sets them loose in the wild. If those robot alligators harmed or killed a human that mortal human man would be held accountable for murder. Or at the very least he would be found guilty of manslaughter but even this lesser crime would require that he was totally innocent of thinking that such a thing might occur. A God could not plead ignorance.

So if a human who designs alligators and sets them loose in the world would be charged with murder or manslaughter, then how could it be that a God who does this very same thing should be considered to be a moral God?

The very idea of a moral creator God is already disproved by the world in which we live. Such a being cannot exist without being guilty of being an immoral God himself.

So this argument for a moral creator of the universe can't even be made to work since the creator of the universe would necessarily need to be an immoral character himself.

Human morality amounts to nothing other than human opinions. Humans say that things they like are moral, and things they don't like are immoral. And that's all that exists in terms of morality. The very concept of morality is a human subjective construct.

[The Tanager]

There is nothing wrong with the historical usage. The question is whether you are using it in accordance to said usage or not. While we are here, it's best to outline what I think the historical definitions are:

Moral Subjectivism: morality is decided by the individual. The individual is the measuring stick that decides right and wrong. They are based on personal tastes, feelings, and opinions.

Moral Objectivism: morality doesn't depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are.

I agree with those definitions, but they must be understood within their context historically. That context is the discussion of human morality. Moral objectivism, historically, is the view that human morality doesn't depend on what any human thinks is right or wrong. Moral subjectivism is the view that human morality does depend on what each individual human thinks.

How? By the historical definition of subjectivity a personal god would be a subjective individual, the historical definition of objectivity would exclude the views of a personal god. You might have a point if you were arguing for a non-personal god like pantheism.

This definition of subjectivity is from a wider context, and rightfully so, since it can be extended beyond human morality to other issues. Confusion arises from mixing those contexts up. I have been talking about subjectivity in the context of human morality.

So, let me try to come at my point another way. I'm looking at a tree outside of my window right now. Most people would say that my idea of the tree is not identical to the tree itself, giving us two distinct concepts that could be discussed. A person that believes the tree does not physically exist outside of my mind still sees a distinction between the two concepts. It would be misleading, of his own view, for that person to claim that "the tree exists external to an individual's mind" really collapses into "the tree exists in one's individual mind." To be helpful in dialogue, he should just say that he thinks "the tree exists eternal to an individual's mind" is false. I see this as a trivial, definitional point.

With the 8 different concepts, in regard to our conversation, I'm saying that objectivism and subjectivism disagree on the truth value of 2 of those concepts. Saying that does not presume an answer either way.

What I'm trying to find out is what your experience of those 2 concepts are. Have you ever thought they were true? Have you ever acted as though they were true?

[wiploc]

That context is the discussion of human morality. Moral objectivism, historically, is the view that human morality doesn't depend on what any human thinks is right or wrong. Moral subjectivism is the view that human morality does depend on what each individual human thinks.

So if two wombats had a moral disagreement, both opinions--though they contradict each other--would be objective.

That's not a useful definition.

What's more, it gives you a pass on the essential issue: You get to say, "Even if you and my god have exactly the same morality, and even if it is based on exactly the same thing, my god's is objective and yours isn't. This distinction is based entirely on the irrelevant fact that my god is called a 'god' and you aren't."

That move makes the whole debate pointless and uninteresting.

[Bust Nak]

I agree with those definitions, but they must be understood within their context historically. That context is the discussion of human morality. Moral objectivism, historically, is the view that human morality doesn't depend on what any human thinks is right or wrong. Moral subjectivism is the view that human morality does depend on what each individual human thinks.

Why this and not "that human morality doesn't depend on what any subjective being thinks is right or wrong, Moral subjectivism is the view that human morality does depend on what each individual subjective being thinks?" We are still talking about human morality here. If I become a Christian tomorrow, I would stay a moral subjectivist (assuming God doesn't tell me explicitly that morality is objective.)

So, let me try to come at my point another way. I'm looking at a tree outside of my window right now. Most people would say that my idea of the tree is not identical to the tree itself, giving us two distinct concepts that could be discussed. A person that believes the tree does not physically exist outside of my mind still sees a distinction between the two concepts. It would be misleading, of his own view, for that person to claim that "the tree exists external to an individual's mind" really collapses into "the tree exists in one's individual mind." To be helpful in dialogue, he should just say that he thinks "the tree exists eternal to an individual's mind" is false. I see this as a trivial, definitional point.

Right, but you are still missing my point. It would indeed be misleading to claim that "the tree exists external to an individual's mind" really collapses into "the tree exists in one's individual mind." But that's not what I am saying at all. Instead I am saying "the tree outside of my window" really collapses into "the tree exists in one's individual mind."

That you are treating "that priest ought not to abuse that child" as analogous to "the tree exists external to an individual's mind" and not "the tree outside my window" have once again confirmed that you've been operating under objectivism for so long that you don't seem to realise your own presumptions.

To continue with your example, "the tree in my mind" and "the tree outside of the window" can be the same concept or two different concepts, depending on ones view. As "the tree outside of the window" does not impose one way or the other as to whether the tree is external to one's mind or not. In contrast "the tree exists external to an individual's mind" and "the tree in my mind" are without question two different concepts.

In other words, with this list of two phrases:
(a) The tree in my mind.
(b) The tree outside of the window.

There might be two concepts here or there might be just one, depending on your view.

On the other hand, this following list of two phrases:
(a) The tree in my mind.
(c) The tree exists external to an individual's mind.

Contains 2 concepts regardless of your view.

(a) and (c) are distinct concepts that could be discussed. (b) could be the same concepts as (a) or it could be the same concept as c) depending on your views. To understand the first list as containing 2 concepts, you are presuppose on a particular view. As I am charging you of presupposing objectivism, in understanding that list of 8 statements to contain 8 concepts instead of 6. There is only 6 concepts the way I see it. That doesn't stop me from recognising that moral objectivism exists and treats the list as if there is 8, but I will continue to object to your insistence that there are 8 concepts.

With the 8 different concepts, in regard to our conversation, I'm saying that objectivism and subjectivism disagree on the truth value of 2 of those concepts. Saying that does not presume an answer either way.

By saying there are 8 different concepts you've presumed objectivism. Here, let me throw you a bone:

(1') That priest objectively ought not to abuse that child.
(2) I don't like being abused.
(3) I don't like the feeling I have when hearing about children being abused.
(4) I realize others like abusing children.
(5') There is something objectively wrong with the priest.
(6) I don't like the priest.
(7) The priest must be stopped.
(8) The priest must be punished.

Now there are 8 different concepts without presuming anything.

What I'm trying to find out is what your experience of those 2 concepts are. Have you ever thought they were true? Have you ever acted as though they were true?

No, as I've state days ago, I have always been a subjectivist, long before I realise there was any controversy, long before I even came across the label "subjectivism" for describing what I believed in. The first time I thought about the nature of morality, I've placed it as the same category as food, music taste and aesthetics.

I have never thought that (1') and (5') were true, I have never acted as though (1') and (5') were true.

(With the caveat that "something wrong with the priest" meant something deeper than "the priest is acting in an atypical way," because kiddy fiddling is objective atypical to how human usually behave.)

[Artie]

Moral Subjectivism: morality is decided by the individual. The individual is the measuring stick that decides right and wrong. They are based on personal tastes, feelings, and opinions.

Moral Objectivism: morality doesn't depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are.

Wouldn't that make moral subjectivism logically impossible? If I am of the opinion that something is right and you are of the opinion that the same is wrong would it not be logically impossible for us both to be "right"?