The Coherence of Naturalism (Atheism)

[Haven]

One of the major criticisms of metaphysical naturalism (and by extension, atheism) is that it is logically inconsistent, with some even going as far as to say that it is self-undermining. This criticism, which comes primarily from Reformed Christian thinkers such as Cornelius Van Til, Alvin Plantinga, John Frame, and our own theopoesis, is due to the fact that (according to Reformed thinkers) naturalism cannot account for several features of human existence, such as (objective) morality, existential meaning, consciousness, free will, and aesthetic taste.

Plantinga goes further, saying that a combinstion of evolution and naturalism would lead us to develop cognitive faculties geared for survival rather than truth, meaning that, on naturalism, we would be unable to know whether or not any of our beliefs -- including naturalism itself -- are true, meaning naturalism defeats itself.

As an alternative to naturalism, Reformed thinkers believe Christian theism can account for true cognitive faculties, teleology, morality, beauty, etc., and that it should therefore be preferred over atheistic naturalism. They use a presuppositional approach to illustrate this, arguing that Christian presuppositions are required for a coherent worldview.

Atheists, in my experience, rarely respond to these criticisms. When they (we) do, they tend to defend a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability while writing off morality, aesthetics, knowledge, etc. as subjective or illusory. Naturalistic thinkers also tend to point toward philosophical problems with theism, such as Michael Tooley's (2008) update of the problem of natural evil. Additionally, one major naturalistic response to this comes from philosopher Feng Ye, who attempts to give a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability. The book "Naturalism Defeated?" (2001) was written in response to Plantinga's argument.

Debate question: Are the Reformed thinkers right? Is naturalism coherent? Can atheists account for morality, purpose, etc. on naturalism? Are Christian presuppositions necessary for a coherent worldview? Does Plantinga's argument succeed? Is theism coherent?

[Tired of the Nonsense]

theopoesis wrote:
Do we have any reason to believe that cognitive function of a higher philosophic level is evolutionarily advantageous?

No, I don't believe we do. In fact, the capacity for philosophical reasoning may be disadvantageous, as it may lead people to have fewer children (or opt to remain childfree).

The ability for high functioning reasoning has to do with problem solving, which has EVERYTHING to do with tool making and ultimately, with high technology. And high technology provides a reasonable assurance that, although we now have the choice to produce fewer children over the course of our lifetimes, the one's we do produce have an excellent chance of growing to adulthood. If you don't think higher cognitive functions have evolutionary advantages, then maybe you should unpack your own higher cognitive functions, look around and notice which species is currently the big top-of-the-food-chain boss hogg of this planet!

[theopoesis]

Hi Bust Nak:

Thanks for clarifying your argument. Now that I understand, I definitely was barking up the wrong tree.

Well performing calculus would certainly involve mora than just multiplying, and developing comprehensive philosophical systems would involve more than recognizing what is edible, but would it involve more than planning for winter?

I suppose that would depend on one's definition of "planning for winter." Squirrels "plan for winter" in a sense, but do they have philosophy?

I don't think it is more involving. If true, with respect to the above, I think it's more improbable to evolve a brain that can do that level of planning (do general maths) with the exception of philosophy (negate calculate pi program.)

If the two are not more involving, then you are correct. I think they are more involving. I guess my squirrel example is all I have for now to suggest that much.

Let me put it another way, it's of vital importance to outrun pray/preditors for survival, where as leaping over sand pits in sport competition have no notable effect on survival. It is of no consequence that leaping sand pits have no evolutionarily advantageous, it's a side effort from having strong leg muscles. Simularly it doesn't matter if thinking philosophically have no evolutionarily advantageous, it's a side effort from having good brains. Maybe the link between good brains and philosophical thinking isn't as obvious, so I am asking you why the reasoning involved in coming up with a plan to feed your family over winter is different to the reasoning involved in philosophy; Or why leaping sand pits doesn't use the same muscles as running, as it were.

Good analogy to explain your argument. Not being an expert on planning for winter, I would think there would be a number of differences:

(1) Being able to plan for the winter largely requires one to think in concrete terms of time, quantity, and space. Philosophy requires one to think in abstract and universal terms, developing complex systems of logic, and analyzing other's arguments. The type of thinking is different.

(2) Being able to plan for winter requires a lower level of mental development (as is evidenced by non-humans that plan for winter). Philosophy seems to be, as far as we can tell, an exclusively human phenomenon.

(3) Being able to plan for winter may be in some respects a result of instinct. However, I know of no reason why philosophy is instinctual.

(4) Not all humans would need to plan for winter, depending on their climate or condition. Yet virtually all human societies develop some form of religion or philosophy. This seems to indicate that the mental activity in planning for the winter is rooted in some conditional external stimulus, whereas philosophy might not be.

(5) Philosophical investigation requires, in many instances, self-transcendence and self-awareness. I am not sure that planning for the winter does.

(6) I suspect these differences would be a result of the two types of thought originating in different parts of the brain, but I don't really know this for sure.

[theopoesis]

So far, this discussion has been devoted to protecting naturalism from theistic philosophical attacks. I'd like to raise another question: is it possible to advance a theistic worldview that is coherent and meaningful; and that -- without contradiction or circularity -- accounts for both scientific truths and the so-called "soft truths" like morality, aesthetics, life purposes, etc.? My OP mentioned the 21st-century Reformed thinkers, who all feel that they possess a worldview more coherent than naturalism. What do you think on that?

Theopoesis, I'm especially interested in hearing your account of a coherent, non-naturalistic worldview.

I'm probably foolish to even put this up here. I think it would take an extensive thread to defend any one of these propositions. I am currently engaged in a head to head on one of these topics, and have argued at least one other extensively here in the past. Please note that I am in no way able to defend each and every point in what follows with the time at my disposal. In fact, and especially if several people challenge me on it, I probably cannot muster the time to defend more than one. Still, I offer what follows for your consideration since you specifically asked for it and mentioned me by name:

My Christian worldview presupposes the Christian God, who is Triune, eternally existing as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. As transcendent, these divine Persons are known to us, to me, through their interaction with the world both in redemption history and in the phenomenology of my own religious belief. This phenomenology is a result of a devotional and liturgical interaction with the Bible, and this knowledge of redemption history is as a result of the encounter with the historical claims of the Bible. So in some respect, my Christian worldview presupposes the Bible, though it does not necessarily commit one to acceptance of a particular view of the Bible (inerrancy or verbal plenary inspiration or any other alternative).

With this presupposition, I believe I can build a comprehensive worldview. This presupposition entails that ultimate reality is personal, as to be God is by definition to be ultimate reality. It also entails that I, as a creature, am dependent upon this ultimate reality. This interpersonal dependence is the foundation for much of the worldview I will construct. First, it should be noted that the Trinitarian ontology is particularly important in developing the idea of Personhood. I tried to develop this claim in another thread here in years past, and was not well received, to say the least. I'll direct you to it to read, but do not intend to defend my claim here as I lack time to do so, and it was frustrating to try last time around. Nonetheless, I'll mention that I believe that the ontological nature of the Trinity conceptually separates the idea of a person from the idea of an entity, such that personhood can transcend nature. In this way, Christianity truly explains the distinction between impersonal and personal in a way that I am not convinced naturalism does. (my previous debate).

Give the idea that personhood transcends our nature, and given the creature/creator distinction we can begin to speak of morality, beauty, and truth:

Beauty - God is beautiful. More accurately, the sense of awe and wonder that we get when we behold God is a form of worship; beauty is doxological. Since God has created the world and everything in it, the world points us to God. Beauty is not just in the eye of the beholder. It is not just a subjective feeling. Beauty is the natural creaturely response to the imprint of the Creator. It is the awe of being finite in the presence of infinity, but instead of fading into nothingness and insignificance, we are elevated toward the infinite in love. Beauty is recognized when the self notices a particular, but (consciously or subconsciously) through it recognizes the universal. In other words, beauty is the existential/phenomenal result of recognizing the relation between the particular and the universal, a relationship with is explained and overcome through the Christian doctrine of creation and sovereignty. Through beauty, the particular is not merely the particular. In this way we avoid extreme atomism, but connect each particular with the universal. But we also avoid extreme monism, retaining the distinction between the particular and the universal.

Truth: Truth is skewed by finitude. As humans, we have finite perspectives, seeing things only in part. It is impossible, moreover, for us to see the full picture. There is just too much information for our minds to completely grasp. Moreover, our particularity, our embodiment in specific times, places, as part of specific families, races, genders, and economic classes results in our having allegiances which also skew our understanding. God is infinite, transcending human limitations and human embodiment. God omnisciently can see all angles and aspects of a given thing, knowing it exhaustively. This is objective knowledge. Humans can know because they were created and designed to do so, and they do know because God has spoken and revealed what is objectively true to them. In this way, Christianity overcomes the tension between personal subjectivity and objective knowledge.

Morality: see my thread on how morality is possible through the Triune God. We'll see how the thread turns out, but I'm yet to feel a major challenge to my views. However, through the Trinity I believe we are able to explain the objective moral law of the universe, and overcome Hume's objection and move from "is" to "ought" subjectively through a covenant which conforms to teleology.

Scientific truths: Scientific truths are the result of uncovering an ordered universe. This is possible first because a universe exists through creation, second because we were designed to be able to reason and uncover these truths, and third because the universe that exists through creation and is discovered through reason is a universe ordered by the sovereign plan of God. One need not be anti-science in order to be a Christian.

In addition, the Christian worldview overcomes a few problems that it would be difficult for a secular worldview to overcome (in my reading of the secular world view):

(1) Creation in the image of God explains the distinctiveness of humanity and humanity's intrinsic worth. This seems superior to the logical conclusion of evolutionary naturalism, which it seems to me logically leads to Singer's ideas on "speciesism" which considers it wrong to differentiate between utility of animals and of humans. It also allows for the possibility of "inalienable rights" rooted in the intrinsic worth of human beings as a basis for national and international law against the pragmatist or contractarian secular alternatives, which it would seem can offer no ultimate basis for human safety.

(2) The doctrine of the incarnation allows for the universal to be the historical, which overcomes the difficulty of moving from the historical to the universal (Lessing's ditch, so to speak). Apart from this, I find it very challenging to move from a contingent historical statement to a universal truth. But since Christianity is a historical religion, and since modern theories suggest that all worldviews are historically determined, the incarnation provides a metaphysical resource that secularism and many other religions lack.

That's a very brief, very inadequate overview. I hope it helps.

[Haven]

Thanks for posting! I'll provide a few comments on your brief synopsis of your worldview.

My Christian worldview presupposes the Christian God, who is Triune, eternally existing as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. As transcendent, these divine Persons are known to us, to me, through their interaction with the world both in redemption history and in the phenomenology of my own religious belief.
This phenomenology is a result of a devotional and liturgical interaction with the Bible, and this knowledge of redemption history is as a result of the encounter with the historical claims of the Bible. So in some respect, my Christian worldview presupposes the Bible, though it does not necessarily commit one to acceptance of a particular view of the Bible (inerrancy or verbal plenary inspiration or any other alternative).

With this presupposition, I believe I can build a comprehensive worldview. This presupposition entails that ultimate reality is personal, as to be God is by definition to be ultimate reality. It also entails that I, as a creature, am dependent upon this ultimate reality. This interpersonal dependence is the foundation for much of the worldview I will construct.

This seems problematic to me for two reasons. First of all, it seems as though you are constructing this worldview (you even used the terms "I can build a . . . worldview;" "I have constructed a worldview," etc.) based on your preferred axioms, rather than accepting a worldview based on a reaction to facts about the universe and/or deductive logical argument. This seems like an exercise in post-liberal narrative theology, rather than any methodology by which one can arrive at knowledge of objective reality (if such a thing exists). In simpler terms, it sounds as though you have constructed a fiction that makes sense to you on a personal level, rather than take seriously the quest to discover "what really is."

Additionally, the thought process you have laid out seems quite postmodern and subjective, as Goat has pointed out earlier. In fact, it seems to end logically in relativism. This, in and of itself, is not problematic, but it is a dead end as it relates to convincing skeptics of your worldview's veracity. To rationally reject such a worldview, the skeptic must simply borrow a popular postmodern phrase: "your truth is not my truth."

You could avoid this subjectivity problem by rejecting the correspondence view and appealing to a coherence theory of truth, but you would then need to not only show that your worldview was perfectly logically and semantically coherent but also demonstrate that all possible alternative worldviews are incoherent. This seems a monumental task.

Also, your religious epistemology -- which appears identical to Reformed Epistemology -- suffers from the problem of counterexamples. Couldn't a non-Christian religious believer (for example, a Hindu) say the same things about her religious beliefs and be equally intellectually justified? This is the main problem that I see with Reformed Epistemology: it can be applied equally to any monotheistic religious system.

Beauty - God is beautiful. More accurately, the sense of awe and wonder that we get when we behold God is a form of worship; beauty is doxological. Since God has created the world and everything in it, the world points us to God.Beauty is not just in the eye of the beholder. It is not just a subjective feeling.


Beauty is the natural creaturely response to the imprint of the Creator. It is the awe of being finite in the presence of infinity, but instead of fading into nothingness and insignificance, we are elevated toward the infinite in love. Beauty is recognized when the self notices a particular, but (consciously or subconsciously) through it recognizes the universal. In other words, beauty is the existential/phenomenal result of recognizing the relation between the particular and the universal, a relationship with is explained and overcome through the Christian doctrine of creation and sovereignty. Through beauty, the particular is not merely the particular. In this way we avoid extreme atomism, but connect each particular with the universal. But we also avoid extreme monism, retaining the distinction between the particular and the universal.

In my opinion, it seems problematic, and borderline contradictory, to claim, on the basis of a subjective worldview, that beauty is not a subjective feeling. If your brand of postmodern-ish Reformed fideism is based upon subjective principles and presuppositions, then it by definition can only arrive at subjective conclusions.

Additionally, what about all the non-beautiful things within the universe, such as death, suffering, and pain; or even the "neutral" things which we find disgusting, such as earthworms and cow dung? Are not all these things created by God (according to your worldview)?

Truth: Truth is skewed by finitude. As humans, we have finite perspectives, seeing things only in part. It is impossible, moreover, for us to see the full picture. There is just too much information for our minds to completely grasp. Moreover, our particularity, our embodiment in specific times, places, as part of specific families, races, genders, and economic classes results in our having allegiances which also skew our understanding. God is infinite, transcending human limitations and human embodiment. God omnisciently can see all angles and aspects of a given thing, knowing it exhaustively. This is objective knowledge.

If human perspective is finite, it is incapable of grasping the infinite. However, God is said to be infinite. Given these things, it seems as though humans are incapable of possessing knowledge of God. However, your worldview presupposes that humans do have knowledge of God, in fact, it is based entirely on such a presupposition. This seems paradoxical.

Additionally, if humans are precluded from obtaining objective knowledge, then it follows that global skepticism (of the Humean variety), rather than theism, is the most rational worldview for individuals to adopt.

Humans can know because they were created and designed to do so, and they do know because God has spoken and revealed what is objectively true to them. In this way, Christianity overcomes the tension between personal subjectivity and objective knowledge.

Given your above comments on epistemology and truth, how can one non-circularly know this? On the basis of your presuppositions, it seems one can't know this without resorting to fallacious circular reasoning.

Even if, in such a scenario, God were to appear to a person and allegedly reveal all knowledge to him, it would still be possible that God is simply lying, leaving the person just as ignorant as before.

Morality: see my thread on how morality is possible through the Triune God. We'll see how the thread turns out, but I'm yet to feel a major challenge to my views. However, through the Trinity I believe we are able to explain the objective moral law of the universe, and overcome Hume's objection and move from "is" to "ought" subjectively through a covenant which conforms to teleology.

I'm monitoring that thread, excellent discussion so far .

. . . It also allows for the possibility of "inalienable rights" rooted in the intrinsic worth of human beings as a basis for national and international law against the pragmatist or contractarian secular alternatives, which it would seem can offer no ultimate basis for human safety.

As a secularist, I feel my worldview can account for inalienable rights via political fiat and popular consensus and consent. I'm not sure why anything more is necessary.

[scourge99]

I just have a general comment for evolution supporters: do not invent just-so stories to support evolution. If you don't know why a particular trait/behavior occurs then don't invent/hypothesize/guess an explanation that does not rest on any evidence beyond its own internal logic. Evolutionary psychology is especially ripe with just-so stories.

[ThatGirlAgain]

I just have a general comment for evolution supporters: do not invent just-so stories to support evolution. If you don't know why a particular trait/behavior occurs then don't invent/hypothesize/guess an explanation that does not rest on any evidence beyond its own internal logic. Evolutionary psychology is especially ripe with just-so stories.

As Dawkins said in one of his books (don't remember which) the stories are not ends in themselves. They are attempts to understand how the process of evolution might work. Stories must fit into an overall pattern that can be recognized in other contexts or they do not work. Stories are starting points not ending points. But they are generally not invented for the purpose of 'confounding the non-scientific infidel'.

Of course there is also the issue that some anti-evolutonists are fond of saying "How could this possibly have happened by natural selection?" with the implcation that no naturalistic story can possibly work. Coherent, pattern-observant stories can provide answers to "how it could possibly be". Yet they are then dismissed as 'just so stories' despite being exactly what was asked for. However as I said above, scientists in general are not responding to any challenge when they utilize these stories as development tools.

And then there are some extreme cases like the Missouri Synod Lutheran minister of my acquaintance who insists that evolution cannot possibly be true because his 'just so story' of literal six day creationism in near historical times is so much more believable.

[Bust Nak]

I suppose that would depend on one's definition of "planning for winter." Squirrels "plan for winter" in a sense, but do they have philosophy?

Squirrels could be said to plan for winter by hiding food, and they do not have philosophy (not the kind we have anyway.) But the planning I had in mind was our kind of planning.

If the two are not more involving, then you are correct. I think they are more involving. I guess my squirrel example is all I have for now to suggest that much.

I think our kind of planning have a clear evolutionarily advantage over the instinctive kind of planning that squirrels do. So would you accept that our far more involved kind of planning, as a simple advance from squirrel planning, is something that one would expect from evolution? If so, it would not be unfair to compare the thinking in our complex planning with the thinking involved with philosophy.

(1) Being able to plan for the winter largely requires one to think in concrete terms of time, quantity, and space. Philosophy requires one to think in abstract and universal terms, developing complex systems of logic, and analyzing other's arguments. The type of thinking is different.

I think being able to form meaningful statements about concrete things, and then distinguish between statements which are accurate and which aren't, necessitate abstract concept such as truth and falsity, as well as the required analytical skills (if not at the beginning then surely after the first time someone lies to you.)

(2) Being able to plan for winter requires a lower level of mental development (as is evidenced by non-humans that plan for winter). Philosophy seems to be, as far as we can tell, an exclusively human phenomenon.

As commented on above. I propose that advances in mental prowess is easily explained. As such we should compare the human phenomenon of planing with human phenomenon of philosophy.

(3) Being able to plan for winter may be in some respects a result of instinct. However, I know of no reason why philosophy is instinctual.

This is simular to the original argument that philosophy is not evolutionarily advantageous; I don't think this matters if philosophy turns out to be a side effect of good brain. Thinking itself is instinctual.

(4) Not all humans would need to plan for winter, depending on their climate or condition. Yet virtually all human societies develop some form of religion or philosophy. This seems to indicate that the mental activity in planning for the winter is rooted in some conditional external stimulus, whereas philosophy might not be.

If not planning for winter isn't univesal enough then compare the thinking involved in dividing food amongst your group, I chosed planning for winter as a "survival orientated thinking," any such examples would do.

(5) Philosophical investigation requires, in many instances, self-transcendence and self-awareness. I am not sure that planning for the winter does.

Ok, I agree that this seem like a genuine difference between the survival orientated thinking and philosophy, but there are good evidence that self-awareness is also the result of evolution, particular in relation to communication. Or to frame it in the contect of this discusion, self-transcendence and self-awareness are also side effects of good brains.

(6) I suspect these differences would be a result of the two types of thought originating in different parts of the brain, but I don't really know this for sure.

Maybe, this sounds like something that can be confirmed by the technologies we have avaliable.

[theopoesis]

Thanks for posting! I'll provide a few comments on your brief synopsis of your worldview.

Thanks to you as well. As I noted, I'll only defend/elaborate on a few things, so forgive me skipping many of your points and questions. I think it would just be wiser to focus on a few points at a time. This is still becoming a large post, but I'm ultimately just trying to defend presuppositional methodology as not self-defeating at the moment, while leaving behind questions of Christian epistemology, aesthetics, and morality, which I put forward in such brevity as to not be seriously defensible.

My Christian worldview presupposes the Christian God, who is Triune, eternally existing as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. As transcendent, these divine Persons are known to us, to me, through their interaction with the world both in redemption history and in the phenomenology of my own religious belief.
This phenomenology is a result of a devotional and liturgical interaction with the Bible, and this knowledge of redemption history is as a result of the encounter with the historical claims of the Bible. So in some respect, my Christian worldview presupposes the Bible, though it does not necessarily commit one to acceptance of a particular view of the Bible (inerrancy or verbal plenary inspiration or any other alternative).

With this presupposition, I believe I can build a comprehensive worldview. This presupposition entails that ultimate reality is personal, as to be God is by definition to be ultimate reality. It also entails that I, as a creature, am dependent upon this ultimate reality. This interpersonal dependence is the foundation for much of the worldview I will construct.[/color]

This seems problematic to me for two reasons. First of all, it seems as though you are constructing this worldview (you even used the terms "I can build a . . . worldview;" "I have constructed a worldview," etc.) based on your preferred axioms, rather than accepting a worldview based on a reaction to facts about the universe and/or deductive logical argument.

I can see how you'd read me this way, as I, in being brief, was not particularly careful in choosing my words. Though my belief proceeds from a set of axioms, it does not proceed apart from logical argument, nor apart from facts (though I do not arrive at my worldview through empiricism). Allow me to elaborate in several points:

(1) I experience the world as if morality is real, as if persons are different from non-persons, as if epistemology is possible. I have considered secular and theistic axioms, and considered what logically seems to be deducible from these axioms. In some instances, secular alternatives did not seem logically coherent, and in some cases some varieties of theism did not seem coherent. I, like you I believed indicated earlier, believe that there are ultimately two coherent worldviews: trinitarian theism and an extreme form of secular nihilism. I find both can be coherent if deduced logically from their axioms, but I find that the latter is logical at the cost of having to invalidate my experience of the world, while the former is logical while validating my experience of the world. As such, I choose the worldview that is logical, and that explains the phenomenal "facts" of my experience. I also continue to wonder whether nihilism can justify the idea of "logic" in itself.

(2) I have considered in some depth whether there is any reason to believe that, if there is a God, this God is Trinitarian. I see many logical arguments in the affirmative. To share a single simple and easily reproduced argument, I'll point to Bernard Lonergan's divine phenomenology. Lonergan suggests that all people are able to develop a conception of themselves, and that, through self-love, they are able to love that conception of themselves. God, being perfect in knowledge and in power, creates a conception of himself that is indistinguishable from himself in nature and identical to himself in attributes, and thus begets the son. The Father loves this conception of himself perfectly through the giving of himself wholly, and thus spirates the Spirit. And there we see a psychological analogy of why an omnipotent, omniscient being would be Triune. Is this alone conclusive? Hardly. But taken with dozens of other arguments and serious study, I find there to be logical reason to accept the Trinity.

(3) I have considered in significant depth the historical data regarding Christianity. I have analyzed historical Jesus studies (D. Strauss, A. Schweitzer, G. Theissen, J.D. Crossan, M. Borg, M. Powell, N. Perrin, B. Ehrman, G. Bornkamm, B. Witherington, W.L. Craig). I have examined the NT through redaction criticism, form criticism, tradition-historical criticism, source criticism, and canonical criticism. I have taken classes on the archaeology of second temple Judaism, and read arguments for and against a historical Exodus, a historical Davidic monarchy, and a historical Moses. I've considered multiple variations of the Q hypothesis, the Documentary Hypothesis, and the Newer Documentary Hypothesis. I've considered the history of religions school and the relationship between Christianity and various mystery religions. I learned Greek and examined the textual tradition of the New Testament, examining the dating of various NT manuscripts and contested manuscripts. In short, I've completed graduate level work at non-evangelical schools, and I've still come out an evangelical. Why? Because I believe the historical data, though never able to prove the miraculous life of Jesus happened as recorded in the gospels, has not raised any sufficiently plausible theory to discount the possibility of the truth of these stories. Ultimately, any theory that succeeds in dismantling Jesus, does so by presupposing that Jesus is not, nay, cannot be, what Christians claim that he was. But that obviously begs the question. Christians defending Jesus do so through beginning with the momentous leap of faith that claims Jesus was what he says he was, and they are able to explain the evidence in such a way that it plausibly makes sense. But there is no neutral historiography, and so I must ask which set of presuppositions leads me to a workable worldview, which returns me to #1 and #2.

(4) Giving heed to some atheists who claim that Constantine invented Christian Orthodoxy, I have extensively studied patristic theology. I began as a reformed baptist, but at the end of my research I am halfway towards a conversion into Greek Orthodoxy (I'll never make it the full way). Why have I changed? Because I find the philosophical and logical arguments of the Orthodox theologians in the Trinitarian and Christological debates compelling. There are logical and philosophical reasons why Nestorianism fails, why Arianism fails, why Sabellianism fails. I understand why Gregory of Nazianzus is superior to Apollinarius. And so forth. The view of the Trinity which I have and use as an axiom is defensible philosophically, even if this philosophy begins within a loosely Trinitarian worldview (the elements were all there in proto-orthodoxy, just not clearly articulated).

This seems like an exercise in post-liberal narrative theology, rather than any methodology by which one can arrive at knowledge of objective reality (if such a thing exists).

I suppose I share similarities with post-liberalism, but I am hardly a post-liberal. Why?

(1) Post-liberalism considers the effect of theological language to be more important than the referent of theological language. I do not because, a) I think the referent of theological language, the Triune God, actually exists and is not just a linguistic construct, and b) I think that theological language spoken by those who believe that they are speaking to a God who is real, and theological language spoken by those who think they are not speaking of anything real produces two extremely different results on the speaker, thereby suggesting that the "community" to which post-liberal theology speaks is not contiguous with the traditional community of the Church. As soon as it invents its theology, post-liberalism distinguishes itself from the church that it is trying to speak about.

(2) Post-liberalism thinks that the effect of linguistic and liturgical elements shapes Christians into being the type of community they should be. I believe that the effect of linguistic and liturgical elements is to shape Christians to be able to relate to the God who is there, and that it is God who works in the Christian community to make it what it should be (even if theology has not successfully helped that community to be able to relate to God).

(3) Post-liberalism was never distinctively trinitarian. I am.

(4) Post-liberalism focuses on narrative theology, reducing the Bible to a story. I consider the Bible to be a narrative account of history, specifically redemption history. And it is this redemption history, the real incarnation of the transcendent God in immanence, that provides much philosophical benefit in my presuppositional framework.

In simpler terms, it sounds as though you have constructed a fiction that makes sense to you on a personal level, rather than take seriously the quest to discover "what really is."

First, I'll note that I did not construct much of anything (fiction or otherwise). Most of what I believe I received, and I am passing on to you, much in the way that Christians have received and passed on aspects of the Christian faith for millennia.

Second, I am not allowing myself to be offended so please know that I am not. I know you don't mean to offend, but are you serious? I've not "taken seriously the quest to discover 'what really is'"? Then why have I read hundreds of books in trying to discern what is real? Why have I pursued years of study at schools that disagree with me? Why was I marginalized in seminary and ostracized from my peers? Because I didn't take things seriously, or because I believed that following what I considered to be true was more important than following what my professor told us to follow, and what many of my peers blindly did? If I don't care about "what really is" why did I pursue a course of study that my non-christian dad condemned me for, that he critiques me over? Why am I going into debt to study more, instead of carrying on in a very lucrative family business? Why am I here on this board instead of watching Burn Notice? (Ok, Ok, I've watched all the episodes on Netflix, but there's got to be something else worth watching).

Yes, a presuppositionalist methodology is different from empiricism, but I didn't just adopt it because I think its a convenient fiction. I first read Cornelius Van Til in high school, but I didn't become a full fledged presuppositionalist until five years later, after I'd read many philosophy of science books, sociology of knowledge books, and other theological analysis of the secular/sacred distinction and the role of axioms. It was mostly secular confirmation of what Van Til had suggested that lead me down this route, not a convenient fiction. In fact, this fiction has in many ways been quite inconvenient. I couldn't have premarital sex in college. I turned down dates with girls who weren't Christian. I gave away lots of money instead of buying myself cool things. I spent most of my spring breaks on mission trips helping the poor instead of in Miami with my friends. I was criticized by others, denounced by my family, and often completely alone. Some might argue that I had an emotional benefit that made Christianity convenient, but this too I denounce. The church I was a part of in college split up my senior year. At the same time, I found myself ministering to a guy who tried to commit suicide, to a guy cutting himself, and to a girl with an eating disorder. My faith and the leadership I had assumed in the Christian church led me to try to support inmates in prison, the homeless in homeless shelters. I worked as a hospital chaplain, where I watched teen mothers sob over their stillborn children after a tragic car accident. I watched parents sob over a deceased fourteen year old girl who had died in a car accident, and whom I had seen die on the trauma room table as I, as the chaplain on the trauma team, stood in the back. And where did all of this bring me? Three years of depression. I could have walked away. I didn't have to put myself through these emotion-destroying situations, but I did. Not because it was convenient, but because I believed with everything I had that it was true. And even if I couldn't understand what I saw, even if I couldn't accept it at times, even if I wanted to run from God, I couldn't because every ounce of me thought it was true.

Today, I'm married. I'm working as a salesman. I'm respected by my church. I've reconciled with my family. I'm on my way to the world of academia. God has blessed me and it is convenient today. But I had to walk through hell to get here.

(seriously, as I edit this it sounds like an angry rant, but I'm really just trying to "testify" so to speak. To show why I'm here.)

Additionally, the thought process you have laid out seems quite postmodern and subjective, as Goat has pointed out earlier. In fact, it seems to end logically in relativism. This, in and of itself, is not problematic, but it is a dead end as it relates to convincing skeptics of your worldview's veracity. To rationally reject such a worldview, the skeptic must simply borrow a popular postmodern phrase: "your truth is not my truth."

You could avoid this subjectivity problem by rejecting the correspondence view and appealing to a coherence theory of truth, but you would then need to not only show that your worldview was perfectly logically and semantically coherent but also demonstrate that all possible alternative worldviews are incoherent. This seems a monumental task.

I believe my worldview is postmodern insofar as it denies that there is knowledge that is not subjective. Some points to consider:

(1) Whenever we read (say a book as we try to develop a true worldview), we find that the meaning is not exhaustive. Our minds have to fill in the gaps, so to speak, and in doing so we always skew and shape the meaning. I don't take this so far as Derrida to say there is no meaning, nor as far as Fish and say that all meaning is just the projection of the community's beliefs, but I do agree with Iser that as we read, we effect the meaning. All reading is subjective, and subjectively interpreted.

(2) I take seriously the neurological claims that our minds interpret data through particular frameworks. When we reach a conclusion, we do so through any number of mental heuristics. But our mind is not identical to any other mind, nor our heuristic to any other's heuristics. Therefore, any sensory data that our minds process will necessarily be affected by that subjectivity.

(3) I take seriously the claims of modern philosophy of science, which suggests that even pure empirical testing is, to a degree subjective. Why? Because the data that comes in from a test must be interpreted, and this process of interpretation is itself subjective.

(4) I read about the psychological phenomenon known as "online processing." Studies have shown that most people simply don't know why they believe what they believe on any number of issues. This doesn't necessarily mean that people have no reason to believe what they do. Rather, researchers have suggested that we often had very real, very logical reasons for accepting a particular belief, but once that belief is in place we often do not retain those reasons. Now, a corollary of this fact is that our memories are not perfect. So we analyze data in a given situation with a set of beliefs in place, and we recognize that we had good reason at some point for accepting these beliefs, but with time the beliefs can change in minute ways due to the imperfection of memory, and so our analysis of new data can be skewed by our subjectivity.

(5) I take seriously the indisputable fact that whatever enters our consciousness, does so as an experience. We even experience our thoughts. As such, everything we are consciously aware of is subjective experience.

What does this mean? I do not believe that subjectivity leads us to solipsism. We can know things. But I believe naive claims of objectivity are just that - naive. Whatever we call them (created meaning for #1, heuristics for #2, paradigms for #3, forgotten reasons for #4, or fundamental subjective experiences for #5), yes whatever we call them, axioms shape conclusions. It's seemingly indisputable in our era to deny this.

So what do I do? I do not abandon correspondance theories of truth. What is true is that which corresponds to reality. What I do question is what set of axioms produce a subjective experience of reality that most approximately corresponds to reality, and therefore is most true. And within a set of axioms the best way to determine which are superior is through an analysis of internal coherence, hoping to uncover a reductio ad absurdam.

Of course, I'll never live to be old enough to consider every possible epistemological framework, every possible worldview. But I do what I can. And within my worldview, through the doctrines of election and providence, I have to believe that I'll have the chance to get as close of an approximation as I need.

Those who pretend that their subjective analysis of the data is not subjective, who never consider the validity of their axioms, who never wonder what interpretive heuristic grants the best results, who never contemplate the possibility of a paradigm shift, in short who blindly follow a naive view of objectivity, these are the ones we should worry about. True, I will never consider all possible worldviews and axioms, but they will only consider 1: that which they have adopted from birth. And without comparing their system to the other possibilities, it seems that they literally have no reason to prefer their own system. At least I believe mine is superior to the other options I have considered, so I can turn to the data with some faith that I have done the best I can to develop a worldview which will allow me to sift data in a way that yeilds results that correspond to reality. When my mind fills in the gaps of my reading, when my paradigm shapes the conclusions I derive from data, I can then at least trust that what my mind is doing isn't counterproductive.

Also, your religious epistemology -- which appears identical to Reformed Epistemology -- suffers from the problem of counterexamples. Couldn't a non-Christian religious believer (for example, a Hindu) say the same things about her religious beliefs and be equally intellectually justified? This is the main problem that I see with Reformed Epistemology: it can be applied equally to any monotheistic religious system.

I think you like to use "counter-examples" in a very broad way. Yes, we have dozens of counter examples of individuals who seriously and honestly adopt a worldview and try to interpret reality through it. So what? This counter-example doesn't undermine my claim any more than the "counter-examples" of different conclusions from the same empirical data in the same scientific test undermines the validity of science. One interpretation of the scientific test, one set of axioms and their resulting worldviews, can better explain reality and the truth.

Your suggestion that "any monotheistic religious system" is equally valid just isn't reading closely enough. When I defend morality, I do so on the basis of a Trinitarian God. When I begin with the claim that personhood is essential to all of this, I note that only the ontology of the Trinity allows for a sufficient view of the idea of a person. When I speak of knowing and epistemology, I speak of a God who as spoken, against monotheistic deism. When I explain the Christian way out of speciesism I do so with reference to The Christian doctrine of the image of God, a resource which a reincarnational Hindu does not have. When I explain how to overcome Lessing's objections about the historical (which in today's world might be made by Foucault), I do so by reference to the Christian doctrine of the incarnation.

This isn't just a bland generic monotheism that I'm presenting or defending. This is Christian monotheism: The Trinity, the incarnation of Jesus Christ, the God who reveals, who acts in history, who creates in His image. And that is why I am a Christian and not a Muslim or Buddhist. Perhaps, when it is all said and done, it will turn our that Jainism was the true religion, the set of axioms that yeild the correct worldview which allows us to find God. But right now, based on my logical analysis, this doesn't seem to be the case. The necessary paradigm is Christian.

If your brand of postmodern-ish Reformed fideism is based upon subjective principles and presuppositions, then it by definition can only arrive at subjective conclusions.

Can you demonstrate that reaching a conclusion subjectively thereby guarantees it is false?

If so, can you demonstrate how you transcended your subjectivity in demonstrating this proof? (otherwise it will be self-defeating)

If human perspective is finite, it is incapable of grasping the infinite. However, God is said to be infinite. Given these things, it seems as though humans are incapable of possessing knowledge of God. However, your worldview presupposes that humans do have knowledge of God, in fact, it is based entirely on such a presupposition. This seems paradoxical.

The finite cannot exhaustively know the infinite. But I see no reason why the finite cannot understand as much of the infinite as can fit within the finite.

Let's tell a ridiculous story to make a point. Suppose you find a genie's lamp, and use your first wish to ask for infinite wealth. The genie, being a literalist, takes you to another dimension full of literally infinite amounts of gold. Realizing you don't want to stay in the other dimension, you use your second wish to ask for a way home, and a magic train appears to return you to your world. Now, the train has lots of space so you can load it with gold. But it is a finite train, so you can't take all the gold. Do you leave all the gold behind because the finite cannot carry the infinite, or do you grasp what you can and make due?

To move away from silly stories, I'd like to note that no finite mind can exhaustively know anything. Really, to fully know a thing exhaustively, we'd have to know each attribute of that thing, each atom composing it, how that thing related to every other thing in existence at time 1, at time 2, etc, and each possible way that the thing could exist in relation to each other thing at time 1, at time 2, etc.
We would die before we could come close to naming all propositions about a thing and therefore knowing it exhaustively. Non-exhaustive knowledge is not a problem at all.

The theist can actually use this fact to his advantage. Humans cannot know a thing exhaustively, and therefore cannot really know a thing in itself. Our knowledge will always be incomplete and skewed. But an infinite God can know all things exhaustively, and as such obtain perfect, exhaustive knowledge, knowing all things in themselves. Then God can communicate this knowledge through discourse, as a communicative way to ensure an appropriate degree of understanding.

Additionally, if humans are precluded from obtaining objective knowledge, then it follows that global skepticism (of the Humean variety), rather than theism, is the most rational worldview for individuals to adopt.

I do not see that this is the case.

If we are skeptical, you have arrived at the position of skepticism through your subjective reasoning. If you can accept skepticism as a sufficient approximation of truth, why then couldn't you accept an alternative?

As a secularist, I feel my worldview can account for inalienable rights via political fiat and popular consensus and consent. I'm not sure why anything more is necessary.

I believe the syllogism explains:

(1) Popular consensus and consent create rights and describe which rights exist
(2) For a right to be inalienable it must, by definition, be impossible to take away
(3) Popular consensus and consent can change
(4) One such change that popular consensus and consent can bring about is to change its description of which rights exist
(5) Therefore, rights can be taken away
(6) Therefore, rights are not inalienable

However, it seems that inalienable rights are the best means of protecting human life, liberty, and equality. Therefore, a theory of rights not based in consensus is superior.

Wow, that was long. If anyone is still here, thanks for reading.

[Haven]

Thanks for responding. First of all, I'd like to apologize for the offensive personal comment I made about your search in a previous post. After reading it again, I realize the offensive, condescending tone it possesses, and I'm embarrassed and ashamed for having posted it. Thank you for dealing with my stolidity with grace.

I'll address the arguments you raised in a following post. For now, I want to focus on your personal story because we share so many commonalities .

Second, I am not allowing myself to be offended so please know that I am not. I know you don't mean to offend, but are you serious? I've not "taken seriously the quest to discover 'what really is'"? Then why have I read hundreds of books in trying to discern what is real? Why have I pursued years of study at schools that disagree with me? Why was I marginalized in seminary and ostracized from my peers? Because I didn't take things seriously, or because I believed that following what I considered to be true was more important than following what my professor told us to follow, and what many of my peers blindly did? If I don't care about "what really is" why did I pursue a course of study that my non-christian dad condemned me for, that he critiques me over? Why am I going into debt to study more, instead of carrying on in a very lucrative family business? Why am I here on this board instead of watching Burn Notice? (Ok, Ok, I've watched all the episodes on Netflix, but there's got to be something else worth watching).

Yes, a presuppositionalist methodology is different from empiricism, but I didn't just adopt it because I think its a convenient fiction. I first read Cornelius Van Til in high school, but I didn't become a full fledged presuppositionalist until five years later, after I'd read many philosophy of science books, sociology of knowledge books, and other theological analysis of the secular/sacred distinction and the role of axioms. It was mostly secular confirmation of what Van Til had suggested that lead me down this route, not a convenient fiction. In fact, this fiction has in many ways been quite inconvenient. I couldn't have premarital sex in college. I turned down dates with girls who weren't Christian. I gave away lots of money instead of buying myself cool things. I spent most of my spring breaks on mission trips helping the poor instead of in Miami with my friends. I was criticized by others, denounced by my family, and often completely alone. Some might argue that I had an emotional benefit that made Christianity convenient, but this too I denounce. The church I was a part of in college split up my senior year. At the same time, I found myself ministering to a guy who tried to commit suicide, to a guy cutting himself, and to a girl with an eating disorder. My faith and the leadership I had assumed in the Christian church led me to try to support inmates in prison, the homeless in homeless shelters. I worked as a hospital chaplain, where I watched teen mothers sob over their stillborn children after a tragic car accident. I watched parents sob over a deceased fourteen year old girl who had died in a car accident, and whom I had seen die on the trauma room table as I, as the chaplain on the trauma team, stood in the back. And where did all of this bring me? Three years of depression. I could have walked away. I didn't have to put myself through these emotion-destroying situations, but I did. Not because it was convenient, but because I believed with everything I had that it was true. And even if I couldn't understand what I saw, even if I couldn't accept it at times, even if I wanted to run from God, I couldn't because every ounce of me thought it was true.

Today, I'm married. I'm working as a salesman. I'm respected by my church. I've reconciled with my family. I'm on my way to the world of academia. God has blessed me and it is convenient today. But I had to walk through hell to get here.

(seriously, as I edit this it sounds like an angry rant, but I'm really just trying to "testify" so to speak. To show why I'm here.)

I just wanted to say that my story mirrors yours, only in reverse fashion. I was born into an evangelical Christian (Southern Baptist) family, where my parents took their faith very seriously. They took me to church every Sunday, read the Bible daily, listened to Christian music, and lived a "pure" evangelical life (no drinking, smoking, Halloween, Harry Potter, etc.). I was "saved" as a young child, and, with the exception of a brief period of questioning, lived my teenage years as a Christian. I was involved in church, youth group, and youth church "activities," and the majority of my friends were Christians. Although I tried the "typical college life," my parents deep commitment to the conservative Christian faith left a lasting impression on me, and I "rededicated my life to Christ" during the summer after my freshman year of college. From that point on, I was, as fundamental believers say, "sold out to Christ." I took a major role in my campus' Intervarsity chapter, where I took part in on-campus "contact evangelism," took spring break mission trips to Detroit and Jamaica, and faithfully showed up at a myriad of meetings, Bible studies, and teach-ins. I also met my closest friends through IV, many of whom remain close friends today. I lived the "evangelical Christian" life to a T: I abstained from all sexual activity, eschewed excessive drinking, never tried drugs, voted Republican, avoided most secular music, and skipped parties in favor of "get-togethers" with my IV friends and church buddies. I rejected evolution and many areas of modern science, opting to accept young-earth creationism on purely theological grounds. I studied the Bible religiously, and even engaged in "spiritual warfare" by praying against demons and smearing oil on walls (yes, I was in really deep).

In addition to my emotional commitment to Christ, I began to pursue him intellectually as well. I read every word in the Bible and began getting into Biblical criticism and apologetics, the defense of the Christian faith. Through my studies of the Bible, I came to reject the Southern Baptist teachings of my youth and became a Calvinist, eventually joining the Christian Reformed Church in North America (CRCNA, a "Dutch Reformed" church). Although my understanding of Reformed theology and presuppositional apologetics was nowhere near as advanced as yours, I held to them faithfully and believed they were what God intended.

However, this new-found intellectual quest raised more questions than it answered. Through my studies of Biblical criticism, I came to discover that the Bible was not inerrant, but full of discrepancies, mistakes, interpolations, and alterations. I learned that the Exodus almost certainly never happened, the census mentioned by Luke was ahistorical, the wars of Joshua were mythological, and the Flood myth originated from ideas put forth by Ancient-Near-Eastern pagans. I also informed myself on scientific matters, including biology, geology, and astronomy, and came to discover that the young-earth creationism I had been taught was deeply flawed, and that macroevolution, an old Earth, and Big Bang cosmology were undeniable facts. There went Genesis and the Flood, two events that I believed were central to Christian theology and, as you put it, "redemption history." I also began to learn of the philosophy of mind, and that, coupled with neuroscientific brain studies, removed any warrant for embracing substance dualism and the existence of the spirit or soul. I also began to think through the implications of evangelical Christianity, and realized it was both self-contradictory and immoral: it produced paradoxes (why would God sacrifice himself to himself to appease himself?), it devalued life (better to die and go to heaven than live on Earth), contradicted experience (no one wants to die, despite "eternal life"), nullified justice (Jesus forgives the unforgivable: murderers, pedophiles, etc.), and conflicted with the evidence (evolution, the age of the Earth, historical studies, form criticism, historical criticism, etc.). I also thought about the presuppositionalist methodology, and realized it was indeed self-defeating (more on this in my next post). During this trying time, I also decided to apply to graduate school in order to obtain a PhD and pursue my dream of becoming a university professor. After considering all I had learned, I came to the conclusion that no rational person could accept such information.

Months of prayer, consideration, and discussion (with Christian friends, pastors, and believing academics) later, I left the Christian faith and became an agnostic (and eventually an atheist). I went through a serious grieving process after losing my faith, as it was my entire identity -- without Jesus, there was no me. I spent nights agonizing over my decision, worrying about the absence of objective moral standards, and searching for a reason to even continue living now that the purpose of life was gone. I became depressed at the thought of a meaningless existence and an eternity of nothingness after my inevitable demise.

In addition to my crisis of faith, I've also had to deal with family conflict as a direct result of my departure from Christianity. My parents were shocked at my deconversion, convinced I had fallen into Satan's hands. My mom wanted me to unlearn everything I've learned and return home to faith, while my dad took a more ambivalent approach, convinced this was just a phase and that I would come back to Jesus. A few of my Christian friends abandoned me due to my new-found atheism, I lost touch with many others. I left my church, where I was heavily invested in volunteer work. This process was arduous, and several times I considered returning to faith for emotional comfort and community.

I can relate to your career path as well. I'm also going into copious amounts of debt to pursue advanced degrees and an academic career (in political science / political theory). My dad, a large business owner, isn't so hot on what I do either (he'd prefer I go into the family business), even though he's come to accept my chosen path.

However, my ravenous search for truth and meaning didn't stop with my deconversion. I continued learning about philosophy, theology, history, and Biblical criticism, and my graduate studies introduced me to more modern and postmodern philosophical thought. Through school and/or my own studies, I learned of Kierkegaard, Sartre, Camus, Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Derrida, as well as theologians such as Borg, Crossan, Spong, Price, and Hauerwas. These studies led me away from hard secularism to a liberal kind of Christian atheism (much more 'non-practicing' than post-liberalism) and gave me a newfound appreciation for my religious heritage.

So, while I obviously have nowhere near your level of expertise (I mentioned your name in the OP for a reason ), I know what it is like to question everything you believe and go through hell on the basis of what is true and what is right.

[Haven]

**emphases mine**

Thanks to you as well. As I noted, I'll only defend/elaborate on a few things, so forgive me skipping many of your points and questions. I think it would just be wiser to focus on a few points at a time. This is still becoming a large post, but I'm ultimately just trying to defend presuppositional methodology as not self-defeating at the moment, while leaving behind questions of Christian epistemology, aesthetics, and morality, which I put forward in such brevity as to not be seriously defensible.

Thanks for this response. Now on to your points .

I can see how you'd read me this way, as I, in being brief, was not particularly careful in choosing my words. Though my belief proceeds from a set of axioms, it does not proceed apart from logical argument, nor apart from facts (though I do not arrive at my worldview through empiricism).

I apologize if that was the impression I gave in my previous post, I didn't mean to imply that you had reached your conclusions in the absence of logical argument and/or facts.

(1) I experience the world as if morality is real, as if persons are different from non-persons, as if epistemology is possible.

So do I, in fact, I would argue that all humans experience the world in this fashion. However, as I'm sure you know, experience is susceptible to illusion. I feel that our senses of morality and personhood are illusions produced by our evolutionary biology (brain structure, social orientation, etc.) and social history. This explanation accounts for our moral and personhood experiences while relying on a much more elegant and parsimonious ontology (naturalism) than trinitarian Christian theism. Additionally, the evidence we possess from science (evolutionary biology, cosmology, neurobiology, psychiatry, etc.) seems to suggest that naturalism is more plausible than Christian theism.

I, like you I believed indicated earlier, believe that there are ultimately two coherent worldviews: trinitarian theism and an extreme form of secular nihilism.

I agree with your conclusion that secular nihilism is coherent, however I don't see why it must be an "extreme" form thereof. I think a modest form of nihilism is both self-coherent and adequate to explain reality. I also agree that there are formidable forms of trinitarian theism (which I'll abbreviate as TT from here on), however, I feel they suffer from a few fatal flaws, which I'll discuss later in this post.

I find that [nihilism] is logical at the cost of having to invalidate my experience of the world, while [TT] is logical while validating my experience of the world. As such, I choose the worldview that is logical, and that explains the phenomenal "facts" of my experience.

See my above comments on how naturalistic nihilism can account for phenomenal experience.

I also continue to wonder whether nihilism can justify the idea of "logic" in itself.

I see no problem, on nihilistic naturalism, with the statement "logic is simply a system describing the behavior of objects, forces, and beings within the universe."

(2) I have considered in some depth whether there is any reason to believe that, if there is a God, this God is Trinitarian. I see many logical arguments in the affirmative. To share a single simple and easily reproduced argument, I'll point to Bernard Lonergan's divine phenomenology. Lonergan suggests that all people are able to develop a conception of themselves, and that, through self-love, they are able to love that conception of themselves. God, being perfect in knowledge and in power, creates a conception of himself that is indistinguishable from himself in nature and identical to himself in attributes, and thus begets the son. The Father loves this conception of himself perfectly through the giving of himself wholly, and thus spirates the Spirit. And there we see a psychological analogy of why an omnipotent, omniscient being would be Triune. Is this alone conclusive? Hardly. But taken with dozens of other arguments and serious study, I find there to be logical reason to accept the Trinity.

I don't feel I'm qualified to adequately address this argument, so I'll leave it for others. However, the points you raised here are peripheral to my critique of your worldview.

(3) I have considered in significant depth the historical data regarding Christianity. I have analyzed historical Jesus studies (D. Strauss, A. Schweitzer, G. Theissen, J.D. Crossan, M. Borg, M. Powell, N. Perrin, B. Ehrman, G. Bornkamm, B. Witherington, W.L. Craig). I have examined the NT through redaction criticism, form criticism, tradition-historical criticism, source criticism, and canonical criticism. I have taken classes on the archaeology of second temple Judaism, and read arguments for and against a historical Exodus, a historical Davidic monarchy, and a historical Moses. I've considered multiple variations of the Q hypothesis, the Documentary Hypothesis, and the Newer Documentary Hypothesis. I've considered the history of religions school and the relationship between Christianity and various mystery religions. I learned Greek and examined the textual tradition of the New Testament, examining the dating of various NT manuscripts and contested manuscripts. In short, I've completed graduate level work at non-evangelical schools, and I've still come out an evangelical. Why? Because I believe the historical data, though never able to prove the miraculous life of Jesus happened as recorded in the gospels, has not raised any sufficiently plausible theory to discount the possibility of the truth of these stories.

I find the bolded statement highly dubious, especially as it relates to an evangelical interpretation of the Biblical stories. Geology and evolutionary biology falsify literal interpretations of the Creation myth, the Flood myth, and the long ages of the Genesis figures. Linguistics falsifies the Babel myth. Historical studies demonstrate that the Exodus, wars of Joshua, reign of David, and the existence of the first temple are unlikely. The gospels possess numerous inconsistencies and discrepancies exist, which seem to invalidate the evangelical assertion that they are the product of eyewitness testimony.

As for the unfalsifiable supernatural claims (e.g., the talking donkey, Jonah's fish, Job's sufferings, the Jericho walls, Jesus' miracles and exorcisms, Jesus' resurrection, Paul's vision, etc.), I find it unreasonable to assent to such things for two reasons:

(1) Writings and stories of supernatural claims similar to those in the Bible exist in other religions (Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, etc.) and cults (Heaven's Gate, Branch Davidians, etc.), and all evidence strongly points to such claims being false. To give the claims of evangelical Christianity -- without physical evidence -- special status is to commit the fallacy of special pleading.

(2) In the case of supernatural stories (or any extraordinary claim, such as alien abduction), the burden of proof is on the one making the claim, not the one who is skeptical of the claim. It is reasonable to lack belief in supernatural stories unless and until sufficient positive evidence corroborating such stories surfaces.

Ultimately, any theory that succeeds in dismantling Jesus, does so by presupposing that Jesus is not, nay, cannot be, what Christians claim that he was. But that obviously begs the question. Christians defending Jesus do so through beginning with the momentous leap of faith that claims Jesus was what he says he was, and they are able to explain the evidence in such a way that it plausibly makes sense. But there is no neutral historiography, and so I must ask which set of presuppositions leads me to a workable worldview, which returns me to #1 and #2.

The above statement is self-stultifying. This is because you seem to be advancing a double standard: you have repeatedly stated that you non-fallaciously presuppose the truth of TT, yet you accuse the atheist who presupposes the truth of naturalism of begging the question. If presupposing naturalism is question-begging, then so is presupposing TT. If presupposing TT is not fallacious, then presupposing naturalism is also not fallacious. To state otherwise is to commit the fallacy of special pleading.

. . . I consider the Bible to be a narrative account of history, specifically redemption history. And it is this redemption history, the real incarnation of the transcendent God in immanence, that provides much philosophical benefit in my presuppositional framework . . .

If by "[the Bible is a] narrative account of history" you mean "[the Bible is] historically factual," then your brand of TT is demonstrably false for reasons I stated above (evolution, the age of the Earth, the historical errors of the Bible, the falsity of substance dualism, etc.).

I believe my worldview is postmodern insofar as it denies that there is knowledge that is not subjective. Some points to consider:

(1) Whenever we read (say a book as we try to develop a true worldview), we find that the meaning is not exhaustive. Our minds have to fill in the gaps, so to speak, and in doing so we always skew and shape the meaning. I don't take this so far as Derrida to say there is no meaning, nor as far as Fish and say that all meaning is just the projection of the community's beliefs, but I do agree with Iser that as we read, we effect the meaning. All reading is subjective, and subjectively interpreted.

If all reading is subjective and subjectively interpreted, then so is the Bible, since it is a reading. Given this, the atheist could just as easily subjectively read the Bible as a meaningless, incoherent collection of ancient writings as the TTist can read it as the inerrant word of God. This makes your view self-defeating, as you are left with no basis to claim that your reading of the Bible (i.e., as the "word of God") is superior to that of the atheist.

(2) I take seriously the neurological claims that our minds interpret data through particular frameworks. When we reach a conclusion, we do so through any number of mental heuristics. But our mind is not identical to any other mind, nor our heuristic to any other's heuristics. Therefore, any sensory data that our minds process will necessarily be affected by that subjectivity.

No disagreement here.

(3) I take seriously the claims of modern philosophy of science, which suggests that even pure empirical testing is, to a degree subjective. Why? Because the data that comes in from a test must be interpreted, and this process of interpretation is itself subjective.

No disagreement here, though I feel that we can approximate a more or less objective reading of scientific data through repeated testing and peer review.

(4) I read about the psychological phenomenon known as "online processing." Studies have shown that most people simply don't know why they believe what they believe on any number of issues. This doesn't necessarily mean that people have no reason to believe what they do. Rather, researchers have suggested that we often had very real, very logical reasons for accepting a particular belief, but once that belief is in place we often do not retain those reasons. Now, a corollary of this fact is that our memories are not perfect. So we analyze data in a given situation with a set of beliefs in place, and we recognize that we had good reason at some point for accepting these beliefs, but with time the beliefs can change in minute ways due to the imperfection of memory, and so our analysis of new data can be skewed by our subjectivity.

No disagreement here.

(5) I take seriously the indisputable fact that whatever enters our consciousness, does so as an experience. We even experience our thoughts. As such, everything we are consciously aware of is subjective experience.

I agree.

What does this mean? I do not believe that subjectivity leads us to solipsism.

I definitely feel that subjectivity logically ends in solipsism, and that it is only pragmatic concerns and social norms that keep us from that epistemic black hole.

We can know things

Define "know."

But I believe naive claims of objectivity are just that - naive. Whatever we call them (created meaning for #1, heuristics for #2, paradigms for #3, forgotten reasons for #4, or fundamental subjective experiences for #5), yes whatever we call them, axioms shape conclusions. It's seemingly indisputable in our era to deny this.

I don't dispute any of this.

So what do I do? I do not abandon correspondance theories of truth. What is true is that which corresponds to reality.

But your view (and mine, to some extent) does not allow us to have knowledge of objective reality, if such a thing even exists. Given this, it seems irrational and inconsistent to define truth as "that which corresponds to reality."

What I do question is what set of axioms produce a subjective experience of reality that most approximately corresponds to reality, and therefore is most true.

I don't see how, on your view, we can have any knowledge of objective reality, but only subjective reality representations that may or may not apply to an objective world.

And within a set of axioms the best way to determine which are superior is through an analysis of internal coherence, hoping to uncover a reductio ad absurdam.

For what it's worth, I also adhere to a coherentist epistemology, without completely abandoning foundational truths. My epistemic view is similar in many respects to Susan Haack's "foundherentism."

Of course, I'll never live to be old enough to consider every possible epistemological framework, every possible worldview. But I do what I can. And within my worldview, through the doctrines of election and providence, I have to believe that I'll have the chance to get as close of an approximation as I need. Those who pretend that their subjective analysis of the data is not subjective, who never consider the validity of their axioms, who never wonder what interpretive heuristic grants the best results, who never contemplate the possibility of a paradigm shift, in short who blindly follow a naive view of objectivity, these are the ones we should worry about. True, I will never consider all possible worldviews and axioms, but they will only consider 1: that which they have adopted from birth. And without comparing their system to the other possibilities, it seems that they literally have no reason to prefer their own system. At least I believe mine is superior to the other options I have considered, so I can turn to the data with some faith that I have done the best I can to develop a worldview which will allow me to sift data in a way that yeilds results that correspond to reality. When my mind fills in the gaps of my reading, when my paradigm shapes the conclusions I derive from data, I can then at least trust that what my mind is doing isn't counterproductive.

This seems like an inference to the best explanation and a pragmatic consideration. While I won't claim that such a view is incorrect, I don't see how adopting such an approach puts you in any better position than the atheist who adopts nihilistic naturalism for the same reasons.

I think you like to use "counter-examples" in a very broad way. Yes, we have dozens of counter examples of individuals who seriously and honestly adopt a worldview and try to interpret reality through it. So what? This counter-example doesn't undermine my claim any more than the "counter-examples" of different conclusions from the same empirical data in the same scientific test undermines the validity of science. One interpretation of the scientific test, one set of axioms and their resulting worldviews, can better explain reality and the truth.

It seems that trinitarian Hindus can take belief in their god as properly basic and can also use the same trinitarian arguments as the Christian in order to defend morality, personhood, etc. I don't see how this does not serve as a valid counterexample to your brand of TT.

If your brand of postmodern-ish Reformed fideism is based upon subjective principles and presuppositions, then it by definition can only arrive at subjective conclusions.

Can you demonstrate that reaching a conclusion subjectively thereby guarantees it is false? If so, can you demonstrate how you transcended your subjectivity in demonstrating this proof? (otherwise it will be self-defeating)

I never claimed that reaching a conclusion subjectively guarantees it is false. My argument was that there is no reason to prefer one subjectively reached conclusion over another subjectively reached conclusion. Without appealing to some objective truth, subjective opinions boil down to preference and convention.

The theist can actually use [the limitations of human knowledge] to his advantage. Humans cannot know a thing exhaustively, and therefore cannot really know a thing in itself. Our knowledge will always be incomplete and skewed. But an infinite God can know all things exhaustively, and as such obtain perfect, exhaustive knowledge, knowing all things in themselves. Then God can communicate this knowledge through discourse, as a communicative way to ensure an appropriate degree of understanding.

This assumes a god exists, and that she/he/it is willing to accurately communicate with human beings. As a skeptic, I see no reason to accept this without supporting argument.

Additionally, if humans are precluded from obtaining objective knowledge, then it follows that global skepticism (of the Humean variety), rather than theism, is the most rational worldview for individuals to adopt.

I do not see that this is the case.

If we are skeptical, you have arrived at the position of skepticism through your subjective reasoning. If you can accept skepticism as a sufficient approximation of truth, why then couldn't you accept an alternative?

From this line of reasoning, it follows that one could very well accept any alternative that is logically coherent (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, atheistic nihilism, Pastafarianism, etc.), it simply boils down to personal preference. This is the key problem with your brand of strong subjectivism: it leaves us in an epistemic black hole. Assuming such a framework is correct, I find skepticism the best option as it makes the fewest positive claims.

I believe the syllogism explains:

(1) Popular consensus and consent create rights and describe which rights exist
(2) For a right to be inalienable it must, by definition, be impossible to take away
(3) Popular consensus and consent can change
(4) One such change that popular consensus and consent can bring about is to change its description of which rights exist
(5) Therefore, rights can be taken away
(6) Therefore, rights are not inalienable

However, it seems that inalienable rights are the best means of protecting human life, liberty, and equality. Therefore, a theory of rights not based in consensus is superior.

It seems that "inalienable rights," in the sense you describe, do not exist. I don't see how that is a problem for the atheist; the concept is simply a convenient fiction based in emotion and norm expression and enforced through power.

I agree that a theory of rights not based in consensus is superior, but such a theory cannot be ontologically established. To provide a silly example, I think it would be superior for my bank account to have $10,000, but that doesn't mean my account actually possesses that amount.