God didn't keep his words

[Compassionist]

In Genesis 2:16 and 17 the Bible (New International Version) says:
And the Lord God commanded the man, "You are free to eat from any tree in the garden; but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat from it you will certainly die."

If after eating the forbidden fruits, Adam and Eve died just as God had said, then that would have been just and consistent with God's Words. However, after Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruits, instead of just Adam and Eve just dying:
1. God evicted them from Eden.
2. God punished Eve and all her daughters (an estimated 54 billion and counting) with painful childbirths.
3. God evicted all the other species from Eden, too, and makes herbivores, parasites, carnivores and omnivores instead of making all the species non-consumers.
4. God punished humans with having to toil to survive.
5. God commanded humans to reproduce which leads to more suffering and death. Ruling over other creatures causes suffering and death to those creatures, too. "God blessed them and said to them, "Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over every living creature that moves on the ground."" - Genesis 1:28, The Bible (NIV)

These acts are cruel and unjust and totally inconsistent with what God had said to Adam and Eve which was they would just die if they ate the forbidden fruits. God didn't keep his words to Adam and Eve.

I didn't ask to come into existence. No living thing does. I would have preferred it if I never existed. If God is real and actually did the things the Bible claims, then these cruel, unjust and inconsistent actions make the Biblical God evil.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #80]

Thank you for your thoughtful reply. I will address your points one by one.

A. Valid types of evidence
A will does produce differential evidence, it's just not empirical evidence... We definitely need to be consistent with the empirical data, but we must go beyond it.

I agree that metaphysical reasoning extends beyond laboratory data, but epistemic warrant still depends on inter-subjective detectability. If a “will” produces only non-empirical evidence - accessible solely to the person asserting it - then others cannot discriminate that evidence from imagination. Determinism remains consistent with all observable data and introduces no invisible causes. Libertarian will adds an unobservable variable whose effects are never independent of neural processes. That makes it metaphysically optional, not explanatory.

B. The default position
Agnosticism is the default position, not determinism.

Agnosticism is a stance toward knowledge claims; determinism is a model of causation. When every investigated phenomenon shows law-governed regularity, the default model becomes causal continuity unless evidence shows a break.
That’s methodological determinism - the same assumption that lets physics and neuroscience function. Calling that the “default” is not dogma but inductive extrapolation from universal experience.

C. Parsimony
Determinism invokes additional physically undetectable elements as well, since the illusions are an extra layer...

The “illusion” of choice isn’t a new entity; it’s a misrepresentation generated by known brain functions - comparable to optical illusions. Parsimony is about reducing the number of kinds of causes, not the number of concepts. Determinism unifies phenomena under one causal domain; libertarianism splits reality into two interacting kinds (physical and non-physical) without predictive benefit. That’s the opposite of parsimony.

D. Scientific studies
All they show is that there is at least neural preparation going on before one feels they are making a choice...

True - they show that intention reports lag behind brain activity. Each refinement (Soon 2008, Schultze-Kraft 2016, Bode 2019) narrows the timing but never reverses the order. So the evidence doesn’t prove total determinism but consistently undermines the idea that volition originates outside neural causation. Every known experiment places awareness downstream from preparation.

E. Rationality
If both our right and wrong beliefs are equally the result of neurons and previous physical causes, I see no reason to trust that your neurons pick out truth better than mine... We'd have no reason to think physics, chemistry, and engineering are actually being successful.

The reliability of cognition under determinism arises from evolutionary and social feedback, not from indeterminism. Brains that systematically mis-model the world fail to survive, reproduce, or build working technology. The causal chain, therefore, selects for systems whose internal representations correspond to external regularities. That is precisely why rockets reach orbit and antibiotics work. Introducing libertarian will doesn’t increase reliability - it merely adds an untested variable between stimulus and response.

F. Moral agency
"We" sound like robots, not persons. Why does rehabilitation, deterrence, and compassion still matter? We don't choose those things...

Under determinism, persons are causal agents within the network, not detached souls. Our actions alter future states - including other brains - so moral practices still function. Rehabilitation, deterrence, and compassion change the conditions that determine future behaviour. Freedom, in this framework, means acting according to one’s desires and capacities, not exemption from causality. That’s the sense in which law, therapy, and ethics remain coherent.

G. First cause
A timelessly eternal agent does resolve the regress; it would be the starting point of causation...

Postulating an “eternal agent” halts the regress only by assertion: “here the chain stops.” But the same move can be made with a timeless physical substrate. Both are metaphysical; the difference is that physics describes how the substrate behaves in mathematically consistent ways, while an “agent” adds intentionality that can’t be independently verified. Quantum fields are not “objects in time”; they define the very spacetime in which objects exist. So a “timeless field” is conceptually coherent, whereas a “timeless mind with intentions” isn’t - intending is inherently temporal (it involves before/after).

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #81]

A. Valid types of evidence

A will does produce differential evidence, it's just not empirical evidence... We definitely need to be consistent with the empirical data, but we must go beyond it.

I agree that metaphysical reasoning extends beyond laboratory data, but epistemic warrant still depends on inter-subjective detectability. If a “will” produces only non-empirical evidence - accessible solely to the person asserting it - then others cannot discriminate that evidence from imagination.

We aren't talking about a particular will's decisions, but the concept of a will and if that makes metaphysical sense of the various data better than determinism does. The philosophical evidence for and against both are accessible to everyone.


B. The default position

Agnosticism is the default position, not determinism.

Agnosticism is a stance toward knowledge claims; determinism is a model of causation. When every investigated phenomenon shows law-governed regularity, the default model becomes causal continuity unless evidence shows a break.
That’s methodological determinism - the same assumption that lets physics and neuroscience function. Calling that the “default” is not dogma but inductive extrapolation from universal experience.

You are still conflating two issues. There are theists who are determinists. They assert that our choices are determined by God, rather than prior physical causes; yet they are determinists in the free will vs. determinism debate. This tells us that determinism isn't just about the causal regularity in the physical sciences. It's about whether we have free choice or if our choices are determined by something other than our will. And on that question, agnosticism is the default.


C. Parsimony

The “illusion” of choice isn’t a new entity; it’s a misrepresentation generated by known brain functions - comparable to optical illusions. Parsimony is about reducing the number of kinds of causes, not the number of concepts. Determinism unifies phenomena under one causal domain; libertarianism splits reality into two interacting kinds (physical and non-physical) without predictive benefit. That’s the opposite of parsimony.

Let's say a man is found with a broken neck in his study. Two detectives propose to you competing theories. Detective A says that the wife did it, leaving a dinner party across town unnoticed, disabling a security system she'd never used before, without having a technological background, breaking the neck of her husband who was much bigger than her, and then returned to the party without anyone the wiser. Detective B says the wife hired someone else to do it.

If it comes down to parsimony and parsimony is about fewer entities, then Detective A's theory is stronger, no matter how complex the explanation of how she did it gets. But parsimony is about having fewer assumptions/pieces that need to be explained. Detective B's theory is actually simpler, it seems to me, in spite of having more entities in it. That's because there are less pieces that need explaining and that is what parsimony is actually about.

Libertarian free will and determinism have the same number of pieces to explain and, therefore, are equally parsimonious.


D. Scientific studies

True - they show that intention reports lag behind brain activity. Each refinement (Soon 2008, Schultze-Kraft 2016, Bode 2019) narrows the timing but never reverses the order. So the evidence doesn’t prove total determinism but consistently undermines the idea that volition originates outside neural causation. Every known experiment places awareness downstream from preparation.

There are at least four things here: (a) preparation to move, (b) determination to move in a particular way, (c) moving in that way, and (d) the experience of "choosing" to move. Determinism says (b) is prior to (d). These studies show (a) being prior to (d).

Not only that, we then would need to extrapolate beyond these studies about basic motor movements to things more complex, like ethical decisions, to support the determinism of the free will vs. determinism debate.


E. Rationality

The reliability of cognition under determinism arises from evolutionary and social feedback, not from indeterminism. Brains that systematically mis-model the world fail to survive, reproduce, or build working technology. The causal chain, therefore, selects for systems whose internal representations correspond to external regularities. That is precisely why rockets reach orbit and antibiotics work. Introducing libertarian will doesn’t increase reliability - it merely adds an untested variable between stimulus and response.

What is more conducive to survival: belief in determinism or free will? I think it is obviously free will. We feel that our decisions can make a difference and so we "act" in accordance. On determinism, we have no control; we and everything else are just the result of prior physical causes. If the socio-evolutionary picture you paint is true, then that is selecting something that mis-models the world.


F. Moral agency

Under determinism, persons are causal agents within the network, not detached souls. Our actions alter future states - including other brains - so moral practices still function. Rehabilitation, deterrence, and compassion change the conditions that determine future behaviour. Freedom, in this framework, means acting according to one’s desires and capacities, not exemption from causality. That’s the sense in which law, therapy, and ethics remain coherent.

No, under determinism the physical reactions in our body alter future states; the thoughts that accompany those are irrelevant.


G. First cause

A timelessly eternal agent does resolve the regress; it would be the starting point of causation...

Postulating an “eternal agent” halts the regress only by assertion: “here the chain stops.” But the same move can be made with a timeless physical substrate. Both are metaphysical; the difference is that physics describes how the substrate behaves in mathematically consistent ways, while an “agent” adds intentionality that can’t be independently verified. Quantum fields are not “objects in time”; they define the very spacetime in which objects exist. So a “timeless field” is conceptually coherent, whereas a “timeless mind with intentions” isn’t - intending is inherently temporal (it involves before/after).

Why does intention inherently involve a before and after? And is there no before/after with a quantum field, where it is in one state and then a different one (say with a fluctuation)?

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #82]

You have made several well-structured points; I’ll address them in order.

1. On the concept of will as a metaphysical explanation

I agree that both “will” and “determinism” are metaphysical interpretations of the same data. The question, though, is which one adds more without explaining more. Determinism already accounts for regularities in action, reasoning, and behaviour using known causal processes. Postulating a “will” that somehow originates choices outside those processes doesn’t increase coherence - it only adds a second layer that mirrors the first. The “will” still operates through brain states and external causes; to call it a separate metaphysical entity risks duplication of explanation.

2. On agnosticism as the default

Agnosticism is the default about ultimate causation, but methodological determinism remains the working baseline for explanation. We assume causality until we have reason to abandon it. Every successful prediction in science depends on that assumption. You’re right that some theists are determinists - they just replace “physics” with “God” as the determining agent. But that confirms the point: determinism is about the structure of causation, not its ultimate source. Whether the cause is physical or divine, the result is still determined.

3. On parsimony

Your detective analogy is useful, but note that both detectives still appeal to human agency. The difference is between explanatory reach and the number of elements. A theory isn’t simpler just because it invokes fewer agents - it’s simpler when it unifies more phenomena under a smaller set of laws. Determinism explains mental life, physics, and biology with one rule: causal continuity. Libertarianism requires an extra, untestable type of causation. Equal parsimony in “pieces” isn’t equal parsimony in domains.

4. On Libet and motor studies

I agree that these studies only show motor preparation, not moral reasoning. But their relevance lies in directionality: conscious awareness lags behind neural activity. That undermines the idea that the will originates action. The burden shifts to the libertarian to show evidence of top-down causation - where intention alters neural readiness - not simply awareness following it.

5. On survival and belief

Belief in free will may be adaptive, but adaptiveness isn’t a truth criterion. Many false beliefs (e.g. placebo effect, optimism bias, superstition) promote survival. Evolution selects for behaviour, not metaphysical accuracy. A brain wired to feel free could easily outperform one aware of its causal limits, even if determinism is true. The illusion would persist because it’s useful.

6. On thoughts and physical causation

If thoughts are neural processes, then they are part of the physical chain, not separate from it. Saying “the physical reactions alter future states” doesn’t exclude thoughts - it identifies them with the physical processes that alter future states. Thoughts are not irrelevant; they are how those physical states are internally represented. The illusion is of autonomy, not of irrelevance.

7. On intention and temporality

Intention implies orientation toward a not-yet-realised outcome: an “aboutness” that inherently distinguishes present from future. That distinction presupposes temporal structure. Quantum fields fluctuate timelessly only in the mathematical sense that their states are described by probabilities across spacetime. But no physicist imagines them as conscious agents aiming at outcomes. A timeless mind with intentions faces a contradiction: “intending” presupposes the possibility of acting otherwise, and that’s a temporal relation. A timeless entity can instantiate reality, but not intend it. Intending presupposes the very before-and-after that timelessness abolishes.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #83]


You are so kind, Compassionist. Your name is a very fitting one, both in that you care enough about me to challenge my views with what you see as truth and by doing so in such a deeply kind way. That's not always common on these threads, but we would do well to follow your example here. Thank you.


A. Valid Types of Evidence


B. The default position

Agnosticism is the default about ultimate causation, but methodological determinism remains the working baseline for explanation. We assume causality until we have reason to abandon it. Every successful prediction in science depends on that assumption. You’re right that some theists are determinists - they just replace “physics” with “God” as the determining agent. But that confirms the point: determinism is about the structure of causation, not its ultimate source. Whether the cause is physical or divine, the result is still determined.

Methodological determinism is the baseline for explaining completely physical processes. Libertarian free will theorists completely agree with that. The free will/determinism question is not that. The free will/determinism question is whether certain kinds of beings are completely physical processes. Telling us what completely physical processes are like does not tell us what is and is not a completely physical process.


C. Parsimony

Your detective analogy is useful, but note that both detectives still appeal to human agency. The difference is between explanatory reach and the number of elements. A theory isn’t simpler just because it invokes fewer agents - it’s simpler when it unifies more phenomena under a smaller set of laws. Determinism explains mental life, physics, and biology with one rule: causal continuity. Libertarianism requires an extra, untestable type of causation. Equal parsimony in “pieces” isn’t equal parsimony in domains.

Limiting parsimony to "types of causation" or number of ‘domains’ is arbitrary. Parsimony needs to have a general definition that fits all situations, whether it's about causation or not. I think this is through language such as "the theory with the fewest assumptions or explanatory steps or pieces to explain" or something like that. That definition covers parsimony no matter the context and doesn't risk begging the question in any of those contexts. Your definition doesn't apply to more than one context and begs the question within that one context.

As to my example involving human agency, the analogy doesn't make that claim at all. Assume determinism and the analogy still applies to where the simpler theory involves more entities.


D. Scientific Studies

I agree that these studies only show motor preparation, not moral reasoning. But their relevance lies in directionality: conscious awareness lags behind neural activity. That undermines the idea that the will originates action. The burden shifts to the libertarian to show evidence of top-down causation - where intention alters neural readiness - not simply awareness following it.

These studies do not undermine the idea that the will originates action. They undermine the idea that the will is prior to any neural activity whatsoever, but the libertarian does not hold the idea that the embodied will (such as in a human) is prior to any neural activity whatsoever.


E. Rationality

Belief in free will may be adaptive, but adaptiveness isn’t a truth criterion. Many false beliefs (e.g. placebo effect, optimism bias, superstition) promote survival. Evolution selects for behaviour, not metaphysical accuracy. A brain wired to feel free could easily outperform one aware of its causal limits, even if determinism is true. The illusion would persist because it’s useful.

That's exactly my point. You were just arguing that we can trust scientific truths because evolution selects for things that model reality truthfully and that this is how determinism would give us true beliefs about reality. If false beliefs can be selected, though, there is no reason to think the scientific and deterministic beliefs (or any particular belief) our neurons are creating for us are true; they may be useful illusions.


F. Moral Agency

If thoughts are neural processes, then they are part of the physical chain, not separate from it. Saying “the physical reactions alter future states” doesn’t exclude thoughts - it identifies them with the physical processes that alter future states. Thoughts are not irrelevant; they are how those physical states are internally represented. The illusion is of autonomy, not of irrelevance.

But the thought "I ought to be a vegetarian" isn't something we can physically touch. If determinism is true, then we can touch the physical chain that produces that thought, but we can't touch "I ought to be a vegetarian" anymore than we touch the water in a mirage.


G. First Cause

Intention implies orientation toward a not-yet-realised outcome: an “aboutness” that inherently distinguishes present from future. That distinction presupposes temporal structure. Quantum fields fluctuate timelessly only in the mathematical sense that their states are described by probabilities across spacetime. But no physicist imagines them as conscious agents aiming at outcomes. A timeless mind with intentions faces a contradiction: “intending” presupposes the possibility of acting otherwise, and that’s a temporal relation. A timeless entity can instantiate reality, but not intend it. Intending presupposes the very before-and-after that timelessness abolishes.

But the future doesn't exist until it comes to be. And if the creation of time itself were the outcome (and time must have had a beginning to avoid the problem of infinite regress), then the "prior" intention, logically, could not be a part of time. Now, maybe (at best), in a state where that outcome is realized, one could say that the one with the intention became itself temporal, but logically prior to that it logically couldn't be temporal. That's why I think it's wrong to assume temporality to intention.

Quantum fields do have actual before and after, even without considering the before/after of a fluctuation, it seems to me, because material things are constantly moving and changing.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #84]

The Tanager, you are equally kind. I care deeply about all sentient beings, which includes you. I appreciate your appreciation and the kindness in your posts. Even if we never come to share the same worldview, my caring for you will remain.

B. The Default Position

You’re right that the free-will debate concerns whether minds are entirely physical systems. My point is that every reliable explanation we possess - from planetary motion to neural firing - proceeds as if causation is continuous. Until we encounter a verified case where intention overrides causal continuity, methodological determinism remains our baseline. That baseline doesn’t assume humans are fully physical; it simply withholds special exceptions - such as an immaterial soul - until evidence warrants them.

C. Parsimony

Your definition of parsimony as “fewest assumptions needed to explain the data” is spot-on. The key issue is what counts as an assumption.
Libertarian free will posits an unobservable causal category (i.e., the soul) that can intervene in the physical order without a measurable trace. That’s an additional explanatory step. Determinism, by contrast, uses the same causal grammar already confirmed in every other domain. So, by your own definition, determinism posits fewer assumptions about how causation operates - even if both frameworks use the same number of words.

D. Scientific Studies

I agree that libertarianism need not deny neural precursors, but the empirical question is directionality: does conscious awareness initiate the decision, or does it register it? So far, every experiment - from Libet to Schultze-Kraft to Bode - places awareness downstream from neural preparation. If will were a top-down, independent source from the soul, we should sometimes observe awareness leading readiness. We never do. The data, therefore, fit the deterministic model better, even if they don’t conclusively prove it.

E. Rationality

The evolutionary argument for reliable cognition doesn’t claim perfect truth-tracking, only approximate correspondence between sensory and cognitive representations and reality sufficient for survival. False beliefs can certainly persist, but across generations, systematically delusional species tend to go extinct or fail to develop predictive science and technology based on sound scientific principles. In other words, evolution doesn’t guarantee truth in every belief; it guarantees a statistical bias toward sensory and cognitive models that work. That’s enough to explain why the methods of science - collective correction, prediction, replication - progressively weed out error even if individuals remain fallible.

F. Moral Agency

The statement “I ought to be a vegan” isn’t a ghostly entity hovering above neurons; it’s the brain’s linguistic encoding of evaluative computation.
We can’t touch it for the same reason we can’t touch a melody - we can only touch the air vibrations or neural firings that instantiate it. The content of the thought is real as information, not as a separate substance. Determinism doesn’t erase meaning; it explains how meaning arises from physical processes capable of representing values and acting on them.

G. First Cause and Timeless Intention

You’re right that if time began, any “cause” of time must itself be atemporal. But intending an outcome is inherently a temporal notion - it involves a present mental state oriented toward a possible future state. To “intend” is not merely to be the logical antecedent of an effect; it is to deliberate and choose, and those verbs presuppose temporal sequence. A timeless state can instantiate reality, but it cannot deliberate or decide, because decision entails a transition from one cognitive state to another. That’s why a “timeless intention to create time” is self-contradictory: the act of intending already presupposes temporal differentiation. Mindless quantum fluctuations in an atemporal vacuum can plausibly explain the Big Bang without appealing to a supernatural mind - and their consequences are consistent with the observable universe. A quantum fluctuation is a temporary change in energy due to the uncertainty principle: energy and time can briefly “borrow” from one another as long as the balance is restored very quickly. In ordinary space-time, such fluctuations constantly happen in the quantum vacuum.

Before the Big Bang, there was no classical space or time, but if a quantum field (or the laws that govern it) existed timelessly, it could have undergone a self-causing fluctuation. That fluctuation could have produced a region of spacetime that rapidly inflated - what we call the Big Bang.

Quantum mechanics allows it: the vacuum isn’t “nothing”; it’s a seething background of probabilistic potential energy.

Inflationary cosmology fits it: models like the Hartle–Hawking no-boundary proposal and Vilenkin’s tunneling-from-nothing model mathematically describe how a universe could spontaneously appear from a quantum vacuum.

No “before” needed: in these models, time itself begins at the Big Bang - so asking “what happened before” is like asking what’s north of the North Pole.

While we can’t observe the fluctuation directly, these models make testable predictions about:

The pattern of cosmic microwave background (CMB) fluctuations. The overall flatness and uniformity of the universe. The relative ratio of quantum noise across scales. So far, those observations match quantum-inflationary predictions far better than any creation model invoking an external mind.

Adding a conscious agent (a “timeless mind”) introduces contradictions:

Intention implies a before/after structure - impossible without time.
Choice implies potential alternatives - which require temporal differentiation.

An atemporal quantum field, however, can generate probabilistic events without intending them. It’s a simple, non-contradictory causal origin.

Determinism remains the simpler and better-evidenced explanatory framework.
Evolutionary epistemology grounds rational trust in science without requiring infallibility.
Thoughts are physical representations, not immaterial additions.
And a “timeless mind with intentions” is an incoherent concept, not a coherent solution.

Once again, I appreciate your kindness. Thank you ever so much.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #85]

B. The Default Position

You’re right that the free-will debate concerns whether minds are entirely physical systems. My point is that every reliable explanation we possess - from planetary motion to neural firing - proceeds as if causation is continuous. Until we encounter a verified case where intention overrides causal continuity, methodological determinism remains our baseline. That baseline doesn’t assume humans are fully physical; it simply withholds special exceptions - such as an immaterial soul - until evidence warrants them.

My general point here was that agnosticism is the default, so that both the determinist and libertarian has a burden to support their view over against that. Here you are actually offering an argument for determinism, based off of knowledge of physical entities and no evidence for non-physical entities, so I think we are actually agreeing here?


C. Parsimony

Your definition of parsimony as “fewest assumptions needed to explain the data” is spot-on. The key issue is what counts as an assumption.

Libertarian free will posits an unobservable causal category (i.e., the soul) that can intervene in the physical order without a measurable trace. That’s an additional explanatory step. Determinism, by contrast, uses the same causal grammar already confirmed in every other domain. So, by your own definition, determinism posits fewer assumptions about how causation operates - even if both frameworks use the same number of words.

Yes, but how causation operates isn't the only piece of the deterministic explanation. It also has to explain the subjective experience of freedom and it does so through additional information (the causation issue of what is really going on is not the same piece, although they are related).

So, at this point, I don't think it's parsimony that moves the needle one way or the other but, at best, your argument offered under section B above. If that is all we had, then perhaps, but we've been talking about a whole lot more than that with the remaining lettered sections.


D. Scientific Studies

I agree that libertarianism need not deny neural precursors, but the empirical question is directionality: does conscious awareness initiate the decision, or does it register it? So far, every experiment - from Libet to Schultze-Kraft to Bode - places awareness downstream from neural preparation. If will were a top-down, independent source from the soul, we should sometimes observe awareness leading readiness. We never do. The data, therefore, fit the deterministic model better, even if they don’t conclusively prove it.

But neural preparation of what? The choice itself or bodily movements that will be needed once a choice is made? That is what I keep trying to distinguish, but you seem to continue to conflate choice with preparing what is needed once the choice is made. The studies only show the latter.


E. Rationality

The evolutionary argument for reliable cognition doesn’t claim perfect truth-tracking, only approximate correspondence between sensory and cognitive representations and reality sufficient for survival. False beliefs can certainly persist, but across generations, systematically delusional species tend to go extinct or fail to develop predictive science and technology based on sound scientific principles. In other words, evolution doesn’t guarantee truth in every belief; it guarantees a statistical bias toward sensory and cognitive models that work. That’s enough to explain why the methods of science - collective correction, prediction, replication - progressively weed out error even if individuals remain fallible.

The deterministic-evolutionary argument is wholly about survival. Yes, some things will probably be true, but that's uneccessary because it's about survival. If it's about survival, then while there will probably be some truths, we can't know which ones are true because, physically, all of our "beliefs" look the same as the neurons firing that they are.


F. Moral Agency

The statement “I ought to be a vegan” isn’t a ghostly entity hovering above neurons; it’s the brain’s linguistic encoding of evaluative computation.

We can’t touch it for the same reason we can’t touch a melody - we can only touch the air vibrations or neural firings that instantiate it. The content of the thought is real as information, not as a separate substance. Determinism doesn’t erase meaning; it explains how meaning arises from physical processes capable of representing values and acting on them.

It is the brain's encoding as much as a mirage is. With the above (section E), there is no way to truly see if it is true, false, or meaninglessly unapplicable to reality at all. Our personhood and "agency" are just as illusory as those mirages, if determinism is true.


G. First Cause and Timeless Intention

You’re right that if time began, any “cause” of time must itself be atemporal. But intending an outcome is inherently a temporal notion - it involves a present mental state oriented toward a possible future state.

A mental state oriented toward a possible future state does not make it temporal unless that mental entity is already within time. Yes, the intention could result in a change to where the future state comes to be, but until it does, no time has to pass.

To “intend” is not merely to be the logical antecedent of an effect; it is to deliberate and choose, and those verbs presuppose temporal sequence. A timeless state can instantiate reality, but it cannot deliberate or decide, because decision entails a transition from one cognitive state to another. That’s why a “timeless intention to create time” is self-contradictory: the act of intending already presupposes temporal differentiation.

That's claiming such is the case, not showing why it must be so. At best, acting on an intention requires time (to move from intention without action to intention with action).

Mindless quantum fluctuations in an atemporal vacuum can plausibly explain the Big Bang without appealing to a supernatural mind - and their consequences are consistent with the observable universe. A quantum fluctuation is a temporary change in energy due to the uncertainty principle: energy and time can briefly “borrow” from one another as long as the balance is restored very quickly. In ordinary space-time, such fluctuations constantly happen in the quantum vacuum.

...

But quantum vacuums exist within spacetime; they are temporal. They have physical qualities, including being temporal.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #86]

The Tanager, thank you once again for your thoughtful engagement. I appreciate your intellectual rigour and patience as we explore this complex terrain.

B. The Default Position

Yes - I’m comfortable saying that agnosticism about metaphysical ultimate causes is the default, while methodological determinism is the working baseline. In practice, all empirical inquiry proceeds as if events follow continuous causation. That’s why I treat determinism not as dogma but as the default explanatory model - the one we use successfully everywhere else until compelling counter-evidence emerges.

C. Parsimony

You’re right that subjective experience must also be explained. But determinism doesn’t need a second ontological layer to do so: experience, choice, and intention can be modeled as emergent informational patterns within physical processes. Adding an immaterial soul introduces an extra type of causation - one that has never been detected, described, or constrained - whereas neural representation is already observable. So determinism explains both the mechanism and the illusion of agency using one framework rather than two.

D. Scientific Studies

I do recognize your distinction between “choice” and “motor preparation.” But the experiments measure not just movement readiness (the Bereitschaftspotential) but also the timing of conscious reports. Every refinement - Libet (1983), Soon (2008), Schultze-Kraft (2016), Bode (2019) - has narrowed the lag between neural activity and awareness, and none have reversed it. If awareness were the causal initiator, we’d expect at least occasional trials where subjective decision preceded measurable preparation. That has never been found.

E. Rationality

Evolution doesn’t select for perfect truth-tracking but for approximate predictive success. If our brains were globally unreliable, complex technology, astronomy, and logic itself would be impossible. Determinism doesn’t make all beliefs epistemically equal; it shows how systems that better model reality out-compete those that don’t. The feedback loops of empirical testing, not individual neurons, provide the selection pressure for reliable cognition.

F. Moral Agency

Under determinism, agency is causal participation, not metaphysical exemption. “I ought to be vegan” is the brain’s computational representation of value relations - analogous to how “redness” is a neural representation of a wavelength band. We can’t touch either, but both correspond to identifiable neural encodings that influence future behaviour. Calling them mirages misses the key difference: a mirage misrepresents external stimuli, whereas neural representations of value have measurable predictive and motivational effects.

G. First Cause and Timeless Intention

Intention inherently entails directedness toward an unrealized outcome. Directedness presupposes a distinction between present and potential states - the very structure time defines. A timeless being could instantiate the universe, but “intending” or “deciding” to do so would require internal differentiation, which is itself temporal.

As for quantum vacuums: yes, ordinary quantum fields exist in spacetime, but cosmology’s proposal of atemporal quantum fluctuation refers to a pre-spacetime quantum state - not a “vacuum in space,” but the quantum state of the universe itself. In the Hartle-Hawking or Vilenkin models, spacetime emerges from this boundary condition; time begins with the fluctuation. That gives us a plausible physical cause for the Big Bang without invoking a timeless mind that “chooses” to create.

Determinism remains the simplest framework consistent with all data.
Evolutionary processes yield practical epistemic reliability without requiring free-floating souls.
Meaning and agency are emergent informational features, not illusions.
“Timeless intention” is conceptually incoherent, while atemporal quantum genesis is physically coherent.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #87]

C. Parsimony

You’re right that subjective experience must also be explained. But determinism doesn’t need a second ontological layer to do so: experience, choice, and intention can be modeled as emergent informational patterns within physical processes. Adding an immaterial soul introduces an extra type of causation - one that has never been detected, described, or constrained - whereas neural representation is already observable. So determinism explains both the mechanism and the illusion of agency using one framework rather than two.

For the reasons I’ve already shared, I don’t think parsimony is about number of entities or “ontological layers” as that is too narrow a definition that begs the question in many contexts rather than offering support for why it should be so.


D. Scientific Studies

I do recognize your distinction between “choice” and “motor preparation.” But the experiments measure not just movement readiness (the Bereitschaftspotential) but also the timing of conscious reports. Every refinement - Libet (1983), Soon (2008), Schultze-Kraft (2016), Bode (2019) - has narrowed the lag between neural activity and awareness, and none have reversed it. If awareness were the causal initiator, we’d expect at least occasional trials where subjective decision preceded measurable preparation. That has never been found.

Remember I said there were at least four distinguished concepts: motor preparation, determination of choice, experience (selection or awareness) of choice, and action. Yes, the experiments talk about motor prep preceding experience of choice, but determinism requires the determination of choice to precede the experience of choice. If free will were true, we would not expect even occasional trials that the subjective experience of choice would precede motor prep; that’s a completely different question about how our “minds” and bodies work together. That our “mind” is aware that we will be raising one of two hands and our brain is preparing our bodies for that movement prior to a decision on which hand it will be is not unexpected at all.


E. Rationality

Evolution doesn’t select for perfect truth-tracking but for approximate predictive success. If our brains were globally unreliable, complex technology, astronomy, and logic itself would be impossible. Determinism doesn’t make all beliefs epistemically equal; it shows how systems that better model reality out-compete those that don’t. The feedback loops of empirical testing, not individual neurons, provide the selection pressure for reliable cognition.

My critique is not about perfect truth-tracking. You’ve agreed that belief in free will out-competes belief in determinism in regards to helping us survive. But you say determinism is true. This shows that it’s not about truth-tracking at all, no matter how much truth is actually tracked. Truth-tracking, therefore, is irrelevant. This means that, if determinism is true, we don’t know how reliable or unreliable our brains are. If determinism is true, technology, astronomy, logic, supposed predictive success may itself be unreliable.


F. Moral Agency

Under determinism, agency is causal participation, not metaphysical exemption. “I ought to be vegan” is the brain’s computational representation of value relations - analogous to how “redness” is a neural representation of a wavelength band. We can’t touch either, but both correspond to identifiable neural encodings that influence future behaviour. Calling them mirages misses the key difference: a mirage misrepresents external stimuli, whereas neural representations of value have measurable predictive and motivational effects.

One person sees red, while the color blind person sees a shade of brown. How does the color blind person know they are misrepresenting external stimuli?


G. First Cause and Timeless Intention

Intention inherently entails directedness toward an unrealized outcome. Directedness presupposes a distinction between present and potential states - the very structure time defines. A timeless being could instantiate the universe, but “intending” or “deciding” to do so would require internal differentiation, which is itself temporal.

Excellent use of “potential” here, that really helps clarify things, I think. The opposite of potential is not ‘present’ though…that’s bringing in temporal language that risks fallaciously begging the question…the opposite of potential is ‘actual’. Directedness presupposes a distinction between one actual state and another potential state. Time, however, speaks of distinction between two actual states.

As for quantum vacuums: yes, ordinary quantum fields exist in spacetime, but cosmology’s proposal of atemporal quantum fluctuation refers to a pre-spacetime quantum state - not a “vacuum in space,” but the quantum state of the universe itself. In the Hartle-Hawking or Vilenkin models, spacetime emerges from this boundary condition; time begins with the fluctuation. That gives us a plausible physical cause for the Big Bang without invoking a timeless mind that “chooses” to create.

This is an equivocation then. If the proposed eternal quantum field is not like the actual quantum fields we know, then why call it a quantum field? Why would evidence of one speak to evidence of the other thing? Simply calling something by the same name begs the question, it’s not evidence it should be called that.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #88]

The Tanager, thank you again for your thoughtful engagement. I appreciate how precisely you frame these issues.

C. Parsimony

Parsimony isn’t about counting things but about explanatory economy - the fewest types of entities or causal principles needed to account for all data. Determinism and emergence don’t multiply causal kinds; they extend one kind - physical interaction - across levels of complexity.
Libertarianism adds a new causal principle (“uncaused choosing”) that has never been independently observed or constrained. That’s an additional ontological postulate, not merely a new data point. Parsimony, therefore, remains with determinism because it unifies mechanism and experience under one rule of causal continuity rather than positing a sui generis mental force.

D. Scientific Studies

The distinction between “motor preparation” and “determination of choice” is fair, but the experiments measure more than muscle readiness. In the Schultze-Kraft and Bode paradigms, subjects could veto an impending movement when a readiness signal was detected - yet their vetoes were themselves preceded by predictive neural patterns. The consistent ordering (pre-conscious activity → conscious report → action or veto) implies that the determining process begins below awareness. If free will were an independent initiator, we should sometimes see the sequence reversed - awareness predicting neural readiness - but that has not been observed.

E. Rationality

Evolutionary epistemology doesn’t claim our brains guarantee truth, only that across populations, models that more accurately mirror the environment outperform those that don’t.
Belief in free will may enhance motivation, but its adaptiveness doesn’t show it’s false - only that it’s useful. By contrast, the methods of science - replication, falsification, peer correction - provide a higher-order feedback loop that filters out individually useful illusions. That’s how truth-tracking survives even in a deterministic universe.

F. Moral Agency

Color blindness doesn’t undermine determinism; it illustrates representational variance. The color-blind person identifies their mismatch through intersubjective calibration - communication, instruments, and testing.
Analogously, moral cognition can misrepresent value, yet intersubjective norms and empirical consequences allow partial correction. That process is what “agency” means under determinism: causal participation within a system capable of self-modeling and updating its own behavioural rules.

G. First Cause and Timeless Intention

I use “potential” in the Aristotelian sense: the capacity to become actual. Potential/actual distinctions acquire meaning only within a temporal framework where transitions occur. A timeless being cannot traverse from potential to actual without temporal differentiation.
Regarding cosmology: the Hartle–Hawking “no-boundary” and Vilenkin “tunneling from nothing” models are called quantum because they mathematically extend quantum mechanics’ probabilistic formalism beyond classical spacetime, not because they are vacuums within spacetime. The same equations govern both domains; the context changes. That continuity is precisely why it’s reasonable to apply the term “quantum.”
Both the Hartle–Hawking “no-boundary” proposal and Vilenkin’s “tunneling from nothing” model are theoretical frameworks that make broad, qualitative predictions about the early universe, but their specific features are currently beyond direct experimental reach. However, parts of each model yield indirectly testable consequences, especially in the form of cosmic microwave background (CMB) patterns and inflationary spectra.

1. What the models propose

Hartle–Hawking no-boundary model (1983):
Suggests that time itself behaves like a spatial dimension near the Big Bang, so the universe has no sharp temporal “beginning” - it’s finite but unbounded (like the surface of a sphere).

Vilenkin’s tunneling model (1982-84):
Proposes that the universe quantum tunneled into existence from a state of “nothing” - meaning no classical space or time, but a quantum vacuum obeying probabilistic laws.

2. What can be tested (in principle)

Both models make slightly different statistical predictions about:

The initial conditions for cosmic inflation: e.g., the distribution of inflationary field energies.

The curvature of the universe: the no-boundary model tends to predict a smoother, more uniform cosmos than the tunneling model.

Fluctuation spectra: minute differences in CMB temperature anisotropies (the “ripples” seen by WMAP and Planck) could, in principle, favour one probability distribution over another.

3. The practical challenge

The predicted differences are tiny - far smaller than current observational precision allows us to distinguish.
We can test the class of inflationary cosmologies that both belong to, but not yet discriminate decisively between “no-boundary” and “tunneling” origins.

Future missions that measure primordial gravitational waves (like LiteBIRD or CMB-S4) may eventually tell us which set of boundary conditions best matches reality.

We currently lack any empirical access to the pre-Big-Bang domain. Both the Hartle–Hawking “no-boundary” and Vilenkin “tunneling” models describe quantum conditions before classical spacetime existed. Since we cannot rewind observations beyond the Planck time (~10⁻⁴³ seconds after the Big Bang), direct experimental confirmation is impossible at present.

However, these models can still be indirectly tested if their implied initial conditions leave measurable fingerprints - for example, in the cosmic microwave background’s power spectrum or in primordial gravitational waves. So far, no observation decisively confirms or falsifies either model.

In short:

We can’t go back and watch it happen.

We can only compare today’s universe to the patterns those models predict.

Future cosmological observations may narrow the field, but for now, both remain plausible, mathematically consistent possibilities - not proven facts.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #89]

C. Parsimony

This is how I see where we are at on this consideration. You say parsimony is about fewer entities/causes/ontological domains. I’ve said that definitions should be wide enough to apply in every context and that, therefore, your definition is too narrow. You’ve responded by just moving forward with your definition. You won’t defend your definition and, therefore, it is arbitrary.


D. Scientific Studies

Saying there is also neural prep for vetoing an action doesn’t change my point. All these studies would still show, at best, that there is preparation in the body to be ready for any decision made, including if the decision needs to be vetoed. The accuracy of the predictions is slightly better than chance which is far short of what we would get if this neural activity was determinative of the choice (it should be 100%). Even in Schultze, the accuracy was 70% when talking about vetoing a choice 200 milliseconds before acting.

You then also continue to say that on libertarian free will, we should respect the sequence to be reversed. There are actual studies (like Matsuhashi & Hallett) that suggest just that, by claiming to measure more carefully than the self-reporting of awareness of the other studies that are unreliable. But I think this request is a complete misunderstanding of the relationship of human wills with human brains that is required by libertarian free will. There is no reason to think the libertarian is committed to a view that human decisions must precede any related neural activity whatsoever.


E. Rationality

Belief in free will may enhance motivation, but its adaptiveness doesn’t show it’s false - only that it’s useful. By contrast, the methods of science - replication, falsification, peer correction - provide a higher-order feedback loop that filters out individually useful illusions. That’s how truth-tracking survives even in a deterministic universe.

The results of science are still neural representations that we can’t trust as anything more than useful illusions. Piling on more and more possible illusions doesn’t equal truth. It might filter out which individually useful illusions are more popular and which ones aren’t, but it still has nothing to do with truth.


F. Moral Agency

Color blindness doesn’t undermine determinism; it illustrates representational variance. The color-blind person identifies their mismatch through intersubjective calibration - communication, instruments, and testing.

But why trust other people’s subjective neural representations? They are all equally neural representations.


G. First Cause and Timeless Intention

I use “potential” in the Aristotelian sense: the capacity to become actual. Potential/actual distinctions acquire meaning only within a temporal framework where transitions occur. A timeless being cannot traverse from potential to actual without temporal differentiation.

Okay, but I’m not using it in the Aristotelian framework. The concept of a timeless being directed to a different state from the actual one can be described by “potential” in a non-Aristotelian sense. Now, at best, once that potential state is actualized by the timeless being, we have the existence of time and the timeless being becoming temporal.

Regarding cosmology: the Hartle–Hawking “no-boundary” and Vilenkin “tunneling from nothing” models are called quantum because they mathematically extend quantum mechanics’ probabilistic formalism beyond classical spacetime, not because they are vacuums within spacetime. The same equations govern both domains; the context changes. That continuity is precisely why it’s reasonable to apply the term “quantum.”
Both the Hartle–Hawking “no-boundary” proposal and Vilenkin’s “tunneling from nothing” model are theoretical frameworks that make broad, qualitative predictions about the early universe, but their specific features are currently beyond direct experimental reach. However, parts of each model yield indirectly testable consequences, especially in the form of cosmic microwave background (CMB) patterns and inflationary spectra.

While there is more to say on those particular issues, wouldn’t they still require determinism to not be true at all explanation points? At some point, something would have not been determined by prior physical causes?