Can Atheism ground objective morality?

[The Tanager]

In my exploration and discussions, I have not seen an atheistic worldview be able to logically account for morality being objective. The closest I've seen is an atheistic platonic kind of moral system, but while that seems to be able to account for the existence of 'good' and 'evil', it still doesn't seem to account for why humans would be obligated to choose Good over Evil. I'd love to hear cases from those who think atheism can account for objective morality to make sure I haven't missed (or misunderstood) thoughts in my exploration.

[Bradskii]

I think you are still misunderstanding what is going on here. (a) is a definition and (b) involves what would follow from that definition, if theism were true. It doesn’t matter what the fact of the shape of the earth really is, whether theism or atheism is true, or anything like that.

Subjective means something which I prefer. You could say that if I'm going to design a simple shape from wood I might prefer it to be round. But when I've made it, the fact that I preferred what shape it was going to be doesn't make the shape subjective. It's an objective fact that it is round.

The fact that God decided the planet was going to be round doesn't make the shape subjective. If that was the case, then nothing is an objective fact. It wouldn't be an objective fact that we circle the sun, because God preferred that. It wouldn't be an objective fact we're an evolved species because God preferred that.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Bradskii in post #89]

Joe says he'd prefer the world was flat rather than round.
The shape is an objective fact. He doesn't have a choice about it (making a choice here meaning to express a preference).

Joe says he'd prefer chocolate rather than vanilla.
He has a choice. He can express a preference.

Joe says he'd prefer assaulting his daughter rather than watching the game.
He has a choice. He can express a preference.

Are these moral choices? Well, we need to decide if harm is going to be done by acting on the preferences. In the first, there is no preference. There's no harm in the second so I've no further input. There obviously will be in the last case, so I need to decide what to do about it. I need to make a personal decision and I will then act on my preference.

I’m not disputing your reasoning for calling something ‘moral’ or not. I’m trying to explore what you mean by ‘preferences’ and if that makes any difference in our discussion.

Joe isn’t saying he’d prefer the world to be flat; he actually thinks it is flat. And this belief can be explained by the language of preferences. Some people probably believe the earth is flat simply because they prefer the community and identity that community gives them over any actual evidence one way or the other, for instance.

So, here we have preferences that are involved in something we know to be an objective issue. Therefore, saying that something involves ‘preferences’ isn’t enough to say that, by definition, we are talking about something subjective.

You didn’t respond to the second point. On ice cream tastes, a subjectivist doesn’t think Joe’s preference for chocolate is better or worse than Sue’s preference for vanilla. The only other logical option is that they are equal in value, right?

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Bradskii in post #91]

I think you are still misunderstanding what is going on here. (a) is a definition and (b) involves what would follow from that definition, if theism were true. It doesn’t matter what the fact of the shape of the earth really is, whether theism or atheism is true, or anything like that.

You could say that if I'm going to design a simple shape from wood I might prefer it to be round. But when I've made it, the fact that I preferred what shape it was going to be doesn't make the shape subjective. It's an objective fact that it is round.

The fact that God decided the planet was going to be round doesn't make the shape subjective. If that was the case, then nothing is an objective fact.

That’s exactly my point. This means that the definition bluegreenearth asked me about is a bad definition. ‘Objective’ does not mean “something that exists in reality such that its properties are not contingent on a mind.”

[Mr E]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #93]

Following along with the conversation-- I have a question about the example used. To put it another way, I'll offer my own example--

I have a coin in my pocket... an objective truth. It is not contingent on my mind, it's objective fact and not subject to anyone's opinion of it. You might believe that it is a penny and @bradskii might believe it is a dime, but neither of those opinions at all affect what it really is--- which happens to be a quarter.

So while the shape of the earth is an objective fact, neither one of you have enough objective information to state what that might be. It might be something other than what you believe it to be altogether.

-I forgot to ask my question---- Does objective truth rely upon subjective opinions while the truth remains unknown? If it relies on subjective opinions, it's not objective, and if it's objectively true, then subjective opinions can't affect it in the least.

[Bradskii]

Joe isn’t saying he’d prefer the world to be flat; he actually thinks it is flat. And this belief can be explained by the language of preferences. Some people probably believe the earth is flat simply because they prefer the community and identity that community gives them over any actual evidence one way or the other, for instance.

So, here we have preferences that are involved in something we know to be an objective issue. Therefore, saying that something involves ‘preferences’ isn’t enough to say that, by definition, we are talking about something subjective.

You are mangling the language. You can have an opinion on an objective fact, such as the world being round. But it is still an objective fact. Your opinion, or your preference, or your belief doesn't change that.

You didn’t respond to the second point. On ice cream tastes, a subjectivist doesn’t think Joe’s preference for chocolate is better or worse than Sue’s preference for vanilla. The only other logical option is that they are equal in value, right?

There is no value in either. It's a simple preference. So 'are they equal in value?' makes no sense.

I'm beginning to hear a little tinkle of an alarm bell that is suggesting that I am being trolled.

[Bradskii]

-I forgot to ask my question---- Does objective truth rely upon subjective opinions while the truth remains unknown?

No. They are different things. There are objective facts (known or unknown) and there may be subjective opinions about them. But the latter has no effect on the former.

If it relies on subjective opinions, it's not objective...

If something is objectively true then it would be true if nobody had an opinion on it. It would be true even if there was nobody to have an opinion on it.

...if it's objectively true, then subjective opinions can't affect it in the least.

Correct. My opinion on what the coin might be doesn't change the fact of what it actually is. Rather obviously.

[Mr E]

-I forgot to ask my question---- Does objective truth rely upon subjective opinions while the truth remains unknown?

No. They are different things. There are objective facts (known or unknown) and there may be subjective opinions about them. But the latter has no effect on the former.

If it relies on subjective opinions, it's not objective...

If something is objectively true then it would be true if nobody had an opinion on it. It would be true even if there was nobody to have an opinion on it.

...if it's objectively true, then subjective opinions can't affect it in the least.

Correct. My opinion on what the coin might be doesn't change the fact of what it actually is. Rather obviously.

And the same holds true with respect to the truth (objectively) even if everyone has an opinion on it and even if everyone was in agreement. Disagreement, agreement, opinion or not. The objective truth of any matter is completely unaffected by subjective opinion whether right or wrong, and particularly when the truth is unknown by all the opinion-offerors.

And there stands God.... in my opinion.

[bluegreenearth]

So, according to your proprietary definition, "objective" mean something that exists in reality such that its properties are independent of the observer's opinions. Since morality is an entirely conceptual phenomenon and doesn't actually exist in reality, how could it have objective properties that exist independently of an observer's opinions?

What do you mean that it is an entirely conceptual phenomenon?

You previously confirmed that you understand "morality" to be a set of behavioral standards that consistently distinguishes conduct valued as "good" from conduct valued as "evil." Does a "value" have an independent existence in reality like a sphere-shaped planet?

[Bradskii]

And the same holds true with respect to the truth (objectively) even if everyone has an opinion on it and even if everyone was in agreement. Disagreement, agreement, opinion or not. The objective truth of any matter is completely unaffected by subjective opinion whether right or wrong, and particularly when the truth is unknown by all the opinion-offerors.

Yes, I agree. If we're talking about objective facts. But objective morality doesn't exist, for the reasons I have given upstream.

And there stands God.... in my opinion.

For the sake of this discussion, let's say that you can determine the objective morality of an act via an appeal to God. So...

We have a Jew and a Christian. One considers early term abortion to be acceptable. The other does not. Their views are based on what they consider to be God's will. They can't both be right. So how do you know which one it is? Will God give you the answer?

We have a father who sends his young daughter to her room as punishment for backchatting to her mother. He is considering the length of time she needs to remain there. Is it going to be one hour or one year? I'm assuming that we'd agree that one hour is entirely acceptable but that one year is so unacceptable as to be immoral. Now it's not a binary answer, one or the other. It's on a continuum. At some point, the duration will become a little less acceptable and little more immoral. So, two parts to this question:

Is there a particular moment when it becomes immoral? In which case we have the same question as above: How do you know what the length of time is?
If there isn't a specific time, then can something be a little bit immoral? In which case, how do we determine which questions don't have a simple yes or no answer?

In passing, when you read what I just wrote, when I said that the time in her room could be a year, your immediate reaction would have been 'No, that's obviously exaggerated for effect. That's obviously ridiculously long and not acceptable'. Well, yeah. Of course it is. But you just made that determination.

[The Tanager]

You are mangling the language. You can have an opinion on an objective fact, such as the world being round. But it is still an objective fact. Your opinion, or your preference, or your belief doesn't change that.

I agree. So why do you think I was mangling the language? Let me try to get at it in a different way. When you said “If they are preferences, then they are, by definition, subjective,” I can see at least two things you might be meaning.

One is that preferences just are subjective (i.e., personally held) views. Two is something like: for issue X to be objective, we must have facts outside of preferences that establish that. Do you mean either of these or could you rephrase what you meant?

There is no value in either. It's a simple preference. So 'are they equal in value?' makes no sense.

I'm beginning to hear a little tinkle of an alarm bell that is suggesting that I am being trolled.

No, I’m trying to understand your position and correct your misunderstandings of what I’m saying. What do you mean by ‘value’ in the above statement? That there is no value in chocolate, vanilla, assaulting someone, not assaulting someone, etc.?