The Problem with the Problem of Evil

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williamryan
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The Problem with the Problem of Evil

Post #1

Post by williamryan »

I'm new to this site. I've surfed around a bit on this topic, and I've constantly run into incantations of the problem of evil. I've seen Juliod, among others, use it over and over. I hope this thread will isolate the real issues of contention and shed some light on this often misused and abused argument. I have learned much from William Lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga's writings on this matter, and much of what I say is from their writings.

There are two basic versions of the problem of evil: deductive and probalistic (aka inductive). The propontent of the deductive problem of evil attempts to show that the existence of Deductive looks like this:

1. If a God exists who is omnipotent (all powerful) and omnibenevolent (all loving),
2. and evil exists,
3. then God cannot be omnipotent or omnibenevolent.

This version of the argument has been almost completely abandoned by professional philosophers today. It lives on in its popular level form and is made immortal by producing this corpse of an argument between non-philosopher friends. Alvin Plantinga (a preeminent Christian philosopher at Notre Dame and past president of the Amer. Philosophical Assoc., which is the main association of professional philosophers) showed that this version of the problem of evil is logically untenable.

Alvin Plantinga presented a "defense" as opposed to a theodicy. A theodicy is an effort to explain why God would allow evil to exist. A defense, however, merely seeks to show that the atheist has failed to carry their case that evil is incompatible with God's existence. In other words, a sucessful defense with show that the atheist has failed to show that evil is logically incompatible with God's existence, while leaving us in the dark as to why God allows evil.

The deductive argument was destroyed because, in short, the atheist has assumed an overwhelming burden. Premises (1) and (2), above, are at not explicitly, logically inconsistent. An explicit, logically inconsistent statement would be that "God is blue, but God is not blue."

If the atheist thinks that premises (1) and (2) are implicitly inconsistent, then he or she must be assuming some hidden premise(s) that would make the inconsistency explicit. Those premises seem to be these:

(3) If God is omnipotent, then God can create any world that God desires.
(4) If God is omnibenevolent, then God prefers a world without evil over a world with evil.

Hidden premise (3) then is the view that if God is omnipotent, he could create a world that were all humans freely choose to do the right thing. This world would then be free of all moral evil: no lying, no cheating, no murder etc. So, because we can conceive of a world in which everyone freely chooses every time to do the right thing, and God is all-powerful, then God must be able to create it.

This links with hidden premise (4) because if God was powerful enough to create this type of world, then he certaintly would because he is all-loving. In other words, if God had the choice between creating a flawed, evil world like this one and creating one w/o any evil, then God would most certainly chose the latter. Otherwise, God would be evil to prefer that people experience pain and suffering when God could have given them happiness and prosperity.

In David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, he summarized this last point when he asked: "Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?"

Plantinga and others object to hidden premise (3) with what he calls the free will defense. It goes like this: if it is possible that humans have complete freedom to make choices, then (3) and (4) are not necessarily true. If humans have freedom to make choices, then it is not necessarily true that God could have created another world in which no evil exists but people have complete freedom of choice. This is because God's omnipotence doesn't imply that God can do logical impossibilities like create a round triangle or make a married bachelor, or make someone freely chose to do something.

All God can really do is create a world in which a person may freely chose to act and then allow that person to make the free choice. This implies that there are possible worlds that are not feasible for God to create. Just like its not "feasible" for God to create a round triangle or a married bachelor. This does not impinge on God's omnipotence though, because God cannot be impinged for not being able to do a logical impossibility. Another example how how non-sensical this is, is for someone to say that God is not all-powerful because he cannot exist and non exist at the same time.

So, suppose that in every feasible world that God could create, free creatures sometimes choice evil. Here it is us, the creature, not God that is responsible for evil and God can do nothing to prevent their ability to choose the evil, apart from refusing to create such a world at all. Therefore it is at least possible that feasible world that God could create that contains free human beings is a world that has evil in it.

I'm about to say something that will seem crazy and you might be tempted to label be a total fundamentalist and crazy, but please keep reading past the next few sentences. As for natural evils (i.e. earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.) it is possible that these evils could result from demonic activity. Demons could have freedom just like humans and it is possible that God could not preclude natural evil w/o removing demons' free will. You might be thinking, "That is ridiculous!" and you might even think that it is a spurious, frivolous argument. But only let this thought last a few moments lest you confuse the deductive argument with the probabilistic arguments. I admit, ascribing all evil to demonic beings is improbable, but that is completely irrevelant to the deductive version of this argument. Probability only enters the calculus in the probalistic argument. All I must do here is show that such an explanation (both for the moral evil and natural evil) is merely possible.

In summary, hidden premise (3), that an omnipotent God can create any world he desires, is plainly not necessarily true. Therefore, the atheist's argument on this ground alone fails, which causes the whole argument to fail. But we can go further, what about hidden premise (4).

What about (4), the hidden premise that if God is all-loving then he would prefer a world w/o evil over a world with evil. Again, this is not necessarily true. By analogy, we allow pain and suffering to exist in a person's life to bring about some greater good. Every parent knows this. There comes a time when parents cannot protect their child from every mishap, or when the parent must discipline the child so the child matures. Similarly, God could permit suffering in our lives to build us or test us or others and to achieve some greater good. Therefore, premise (4) is also not necessarily true. And again the argument fails, this time on totally separate grounds. Notice that the atheist must show that both (3) and (4) are true, while the theist merely need show one is false.

If I may be permitted to read some of your minds, at this point you might be thinking, "Even if there is no inconsistency between God and evil, surely the existence of God is incompatible with the amount and kinds of evils that actually exist." What good, you might ask, could possibly come from a pregnant mother in the wrong part of town that is struck down by a stray bullet fired from a gang member's 9mm?

This as its own hidden premise, that God cannot have morally sufficient reasons to allow the amount and kinds of evil that exist. But again, this is not necessarily true, and all I must show is that it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason. As terrible as some things about the world are, people generally agree that life is worth living, from which we could surmise that there is much more good that evil in the world, regardless of the amount and kind of evil actually present. As for the kinds of evil, it is possible that God has some overriding reasons to permit the kinds of evil that occur.

Again, you might think that that seems pretty unlikely. But this would confuse the deductive problem with the probabilistic problem again. To refute the deductive version, the theist doesn't have to suggest a likely solution--all he or she must do is suggest a possible solution.

In summary, the atheist assumes at least two hidden premises in the deductive version of this argument. He or she must prove both of those premises for this version to be true. I have shown that both of those hidden premises can be indenpendently refuted.

Further, because it is the atheist who claims to note a contradicition w/in the theist's truth claims, it is the atheist that bears the burden of proof to show that there is no possible world in which premises (1) and (2) are true. That is an incredibly heavy burden, which the atheist ultimately cannot shoulder. The deductive version of the problem of evil is impotent.


Probabilistic Version

After the deductive argument was destroyed, most who want to use the problem of evil (POE) to show that God cannot be all loving or all powerful moved to the probabilistic argument. The inductive version admits that it is possible for the traditional God of Christianity and evil to coexist, but it is highly improbable for them to coexist. The argument looks like this:

1. If a god exists who is all loving and all powerful,
2. yet evil exists,
3. then it is highly improbable or unlikely that a god exists who is all loving or all powerful.

Let me make a few observations. Notice that even if the Christian granted this argument, this argument does not show that God does not exist. It is, however, a step along that path. At most, this argument can claim that the type of God posited by traditional Christianity does not exist. Further, this argument cannot show that God is not all loving and not all powerful; it can only show that one of this is incorrect. But this is all only the case if we grant this argument, and there are powerful reasons not to grant it.[/u]

Given that this post is way too long already, I'll be brief here, and will flesh out my comments on this version as other posts come in (if anybody actually gets this far into the novel :)

(1) Given the full scope of the evidence for God's existence, it is far more likely than not that God exists.

(2) Because of our finite nature, we are not in a good position to asses with a sufficient confidence that God has no morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evils that occur.

(3) Christianity entails doctrines that increase the probability that God and evil coexist

I look forward to your comments.

williamryan
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Post #31

Post by williamryan »

A Response to Harvey1/b]

It looks like you were working on your post at the same time I posted my most recent post. Given your arguments in your most recent post, I'm curious to hear your response to what I said in my previous post.

You are the only poster that has consistently used a probabilistic approach, and I have been so busy responding to others' deductive arguments that I haven't had sufficient time to respond to the probabilistic version. I incorporate my most recent post in the post. I think it is crucial to point out that even if I should fail in presenting theodicies, that is not fatal to even the probabilistic argument, for the reasons noted in that previous post.

When we consider the probabilistic version of the PoE (versus the deductive) things look much different for both sides. Even thought eh account of evil that I have tried to sketch out is possible, still it seems improbable. This works to defeat the deductive version, but what of the probabilistic version. Could God not reduce the amount of evil in the world w/o reducing the amount of good? The world is fille w/so many seemingly pointless or unnecessary evils that is seems doubtful that God could have any sort of morally sufficient reason for permitting them. Accordingly, it might be argued (as Harvey1 aptly does) that given the evil in the world it is improbable that God exists.

This is a much more powerful argument than the deductive version. Since its conclusion is more modest (improbable as opposed to impossible), it is much easier to prove. How should the theist respond? Three possible responses present themselves to me.

1. Full Scope of the Background Info

First, relative to the full scope of the evidence, God's existence is more likely than not. Probabilities are relative to one's background information. Thus, with a probability argument, we have to ask: probable with respect to what? For example, suppose that joe is a college student.. Suppose further that 90% of college students drink beer. With respect to that info, it is highly probable that Joe drinks beer. But suppose we find out that Joe is a student of Very Conservative Christian College, where 90% of the students do not drink beer. suddenly the probability of Joe's drinking beer has reversed. The point is that the probabilities are relative to the background info that one considers.

Now apply this principle to the probabilistic version of the PoE. The objector, Harvey1 and certainly others, claims that to be able to prove that God's existence is improbable, or at least the existence of certain traits of God (all-powerful etc.) is improbable. But improbale w/respect to what? To the evil in the world? IF that is all the background info one considers, then it is hardly surprising if God's existence should appear improbable relative to that alone. Indeed, it would be a major philosophical achievement if Christians could show that relative to the ament of evil in the world alone, God's existence is not improbable. But the Christian theist is not stuck with such an arduous task. We must consider not just the evil in the world, but other evidence for God's existence also (i.e. the cosmological, teleological, ontological argument, the axiological argument for an ultimate personal God, as well as evidence concerning the person of Christ, the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus, the existence of miracles, and existential and religious experience). When we take all these things into account, when we examine the full scope of the evidence the the probability of God's existence (or the probability of god being all-powerful and all-loving) become quite high. The reason the latter becomes quite high is that when we examine all these things they point to some basic ideas about God, ideas that Christians have dealt with for centuries--ideas that we deal with now (i.e. omnipotence etc.). These truths about God's character become much more likely than not.

Therefore, for the Christian theist, there is nothing at all objectionable or irrational in believing statements that are improbable w/respect to each other as long as one can show that both statements are independently true. All agree on the existence of evil. And most seem to grant my definition of omnipotence. Take an example: relative to the background info of human reproductive biology, one's own personal existence is incredibly improbable. Yet there is nothing irrational abobut believing both the facts of human reproductive biology and the one exists. Similarly, if it is rational to believe that God exists (or has the characteristics as I describe), then there is no problem occasioned by the fact that this believe is improbable relative to the evil in the world.

2. We're Not in a Confident Possession to Assess God's Rationale

Lets assume that we only look at the background info of evil. What then? We are not in a good position to asses w/confidence the probability that God has no morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evils that occur. I have raised this w/Harvey1 before, but he seems to think this is not applicable to his argument. Yet, I cannot see how his argument side-steps this counter-argument. His, and others', arguments say that if god is omnipotent and omnibenevolent then we would cause there to be less suffering. But if God has sufficient reasons to allow the suffering that we see, then surely harevy1's argument is w/o merit. Let me explain further.

Whether Gods existence or the existence of his attributes as I define them is improbable relative to the evil in the world depends on whether god has morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil that occurs. This is incredibly difficult for both sides to assess precisely because we are not in a good position to make these specific kinds of probability judgments w/any sort of confidence. As finite persons, are limited in space, time, intelligence, and insight. But assuming God is transcendant and sovereign, God sees the end of history from its beginning and orders history so that his purposes are ultimately achieved through free human decisions. To achieve those ends and still maintain human freedom, God may have to put up with certain evils along the way. Evils that appear pointless or unnecessary to us w/in our limited perspective may be seen to have bene justly permitted from w/in God's wider framework.

Consider this illustration from a developing field of science: chaos theory. Scientists have discovered that certain macroscopic systems (i.e. whether and animal populations) are incredibly sensitive to the smallest disruptions. A butterfly fluttering on a branch in West Africa may set in motion forces that would eventually issue in a hurricane over the Atlantic Ocean. Yet it is impossible in principle to for anyone observing the butterfly to predict such an outcome. The same may be said of God's permitting evil.

To say this is not to appeal to mystery, but rather to point out the inherent cognitive limits that frustrate any attempt to say it is improbable that God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing a particular evil.

3. Christian Theism Entails Doctrines that Make the Co-Existence of God (including his properties) and Evil Probable.

In response to the objector, the christian theist can offer certain hypothesis that tend to raise the probability that God and a given evil might co-exist. This in turn reduces any improbability that any evil might be seen to throw on God's existence or his traits. Thus, as we'll see, the problem is being presented as a internal problem for the Christian theist, yet answering these objections is much easier from the Christian theist's perspective than it is from merely a theist's perspecitve. I will mention just 4 of these.

3(a): The chief purpose of life is not happiness, but the knowledge of God and love of fellow creatures.

One reason that the PoE seems so intractable is that people assume that if God exists, then his purpose for human life is happiness in this world; the idea is that God's only role is provide a comforting environment for humans. But on the Christian view, this is false. We are not God's pets, and the goals that I enumerated above bring authentic human fulfillment. God's omnibenevolence urges us to become more fully human. this is the way it is done.

3(b): Humanity is in a state of rebellion against God and God's purposes. Rather than submit to God and worship him, some decide to go their own way and so find themselves alienated from God and pursuing their own idols. The terrible human evils in the world are a testimony to man's depravity. All this only serves to heigthen humanities moral responsibilities to fight against evil and create more good.

3(c): God's purpose is not restricted to this life, but spills over into eternal life. According to christian theism, this life is but a blink in time; a small opening in a cave that opens into the cavernous expanse of eternity. We are a rose quickly fading, a vapor in the wind. Indeed much of the philosophies and religions of the world deal, at their base level, when how we should handle this truth. Even if there are evils in this world that serve no good at, that are entirely gratuitous from are view, but that God permits simply so that he might reward those in eternity for those that bear such evils with faith and confidence in God.

3(d): The knowledge of God is an incommensurable good. Imagine a huge scale and on one side there was the knowledge of GOd and the other was all the evil in the world. The knowledge of the supreme being and creator of all life is far greater than any of these evils.

3(d):

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juliod
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Post #32

Post by juliod »

In other words, you'd rather argue against an inferior argument because you know you can win that one.
No, I argue against religions as they exist, not as they could exist if they changed to conform to someone's particular view.
I just cannot see why it is uninteresting to debate with those people who have the training to present rigorous and compelling arguments
Because religion is about the desires and intentions of super-beings that supposedly have a direct, personal, and fundemental interest in human lives and events. The two main attributes given to all gods are universality and accessibility. How universal is your god if he can only be percieved by deep, scholarly, introspection?

I take it as axionomic that a powerful and interested god could not be represented on earth by a small, marginal, or academic following. Any being that could qualify as "God" must be represented by at least one of the religious mass movements.
After all, the more people that agree with you the more likely it is that you are right.
Woo hoo! I'll leave it for your study of philosophy to find out what this particular fallacy is called.
It is the mainstream view among christian philosophers and theolgians today--the scholars, not the layman.
Did you know that philosophers and theologians are considered atheists by most active christians?

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Post #33

Post by juliod »

When I took my 6 year old daughter to the dentist, she needed to get a tooth pulled out. And from her perspective, I let the dentist stick a painful needle in her gums. Was that evil of me since I permitted her to experience pain? Why didn't I stop it? From her perspective, it might not have made sense unless she understood the purpose in the pain.
I don't know why you even bother making such arguments. Are you infinitely powerful? Are you infinitely good? No. Why then should you think you can be compared to god?

For god, the problem becomes fundemental.

Is god unable to create painless dentistry?

Or does god want to inflict pain on children?

If god were infintely powerful, he could resolve this problem in an infinity of different ways without creating any negative conseqeunces. He either can't, or chooses not to. Or both.

But we can be sure that (like you) he is not both omnipotent and omnibenevolent.

And since painless dentistry does not present us with a so-called "logical impossibility" we can use this example to dispell WR's defense of his god.

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Post #34

Post by harvey1 »

williamryan wrote:Accordingly, it might be argued (as Harvey1 aptly does) that given the evil in the world it is improbable that God exists.
Just as a clarification/correction, I am not arguing that it is improbable that God exists (which would be silly since I myself am a Christian theist). I am arguing that God probably doesn't have all the qualities that the Christian God is traditionally said to possess.
William wrote:The objector, Harvey1 and certainly others, claims that to be able to prove that God's existence is improbable, or at least the existence of certain traits of God (all-powerful etc.) is improbable. But improbale w/respect to what?
It is improbable with respect to what we should reasonably expect to be the case. For example, I think it is very improbable that I'm the only mind that exists in the world. I say it is improbable because it strikes me as unreasonable to suggest that I'm the only mind because it does not jive with my other experiences as to what that belief (i.e., solipsism) would entail if it were true.
William wrote:We must consider not just the evil in the world, but other evidence for God's existence also (i.e. the cosmological, teleological, ontological argument, the axiological argument for an ultimate personal God, as well as evidence concerning the person of Christ, the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus, the existence of miracles, and existential and religious experience). When we take all these things into account, when we examine the full scope of the evidence the the probability of God's existence (or the probability of god being all-powerful and all-loving) become quite high.
I think you're jumping to conclusions just a bit. It's very true that we have very good reasons to think that God exists. In fact, I'm a strong theist so I think it is extremely unlikely, if not physically impossible, that atheism is true. However, what evidence do I have that God is not just counterfactually omnipotent? For example, it's logically possible that I could swim across Lake Michigan, but it's physically impossible. As a result, this logical possibility makes this subjunctive conditional true: if it were physically possible for me to swim across Lake Michigan, then I could swim across Lake Michigan. This could very reasonably apply to God: if it were physically possible for God to suddenly stop the earth's rotation without a natural cause, then God could stop the earth's rotation without a natural cause. But, it is not physically possible, so God cannot stop the earth's rotation without a natural cause. What evidence do we have that this is not the case? I think we have good reason to believe that God is restricted by the laws of physics. Therefore, why not commit to counterfactual omnipotence for God instead of full-blown omnipotence? I see no reason to accept full-blown omnipotence, and the evil in the world gives me, I think, good reason to reject full-blown omnipotence.
William wrote:These truths about God's character become much more likely than not.
Why?
William wrote:Therefore, for the Christian theist, there is nothing at all objectionable or irrational in believing statements that are improbable w/respect to each other as long as one can show that both statements are independently true. All agree on the existence of evil. And most seem to grant my definition of omnipotence... Similarly, if it is rational to believe that God exists (or has the characteristics as I describe), then there is no problem occasioned by the fact that this believe is improbable relative to the evil in the world.
But, I don't think you've given me a good reason to think that the existence of evil should convince me that God can have full-blown omnipotence. Just saying we have good reason to believe that God exists is not good reason to believe that God must have properties which the existence of evil, I think, strongly suggests isn't the case.
William wrote:Lets assume that we only look at the background info of evil. What then? We are not in a good position to asses w/confidence the probability that God has no morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evils that occur... if God has sufficient reasons to allow the suffering that we see, then surely harevy1's argument is w/o merit... [his argument] depends on whether god has morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil that occurs. This is incredibly difficult for both sides to assess precisely because we are not in a good position to make these specific kinds of probability judgments w/any sort of confidence. As finite persons, are limited in space, time, intelligence, and insight. But assuming God is transcendant and sovereign, God sees the end of history from its beginning and orders history so that his purposes are ultimately achieved through free human decisions. To achieve those ends and still maintain human freedom, God may have to put up with certain evils along the way. Evils that appear pointless or unnecessary to us w/in our limited perspective may be seen to have bene justly permitted from w/in God's wider framework.
Yes, and all of those are excellent points! However, I take a fallibilistic position with regard to that possibility. I say that, "yes, it is true that God could have full-blown omnipotence, and God could have very godly and logical reasons for allowing tremendous evils, etc., etc., but I don't have good reason to believe that God has full-blown omnipotence because there's no physical evidence to say that God does possess that attribute." In other words, God existing and having power to create a well-designed universe, etc., does not in itself give us good reason to believe that God has full-blown omnipotence. It only tells us that God could be counterfactually omnipotent, and perhaps omnipotent, but given the existence of evil we should commit only to a some level of counterfactual omnipotence. So, for example, there appear to be laws of physics, and they seem to always be the case (we don't have any evidence of their violations), and therefore we ought to believe based on this evidence, I think, that God is counterfactually omnipotent with respect to these laws. That is, if the laws did not prevent God's actions, then God could act. If the laws prevent God's actions, then God cannot act. God is limited in this respect. [However, Christians should have no fear, God created the laws and is able to accomplish the will of God despite these lawful restrictions, and in the longrun this will be a better world because of it.]
William wrote:In response to the objector, the christian theist can offer certain hypothesis that tend to raise the probability that God and a given evil might co-exist. This in turn reduces any improbability that any evil might be seen to throw on God's existence or his traits. Thus, as we'll see, the problem is being presented as a internal problem for the Christian theist, yet answering these objections is much easier from the Christian theist's perspective than it is from merely a theist's perspecitve.
Sure, I agree that evil and God can co-exist--at least for some finite period which God allows--but again I don't have to commit to the notion that God submits to evil as a choice or as a stroke of bad luck. For example, often the fall of Adam is posed as a solution to the problem of evil. The problem with this view is that it is often presented in a poor way. The standard presentation of the Fall is that God just had bad luck with Adam. Maybe there was a 50/50 chance that Adam and Eve would not have sinned, and that God just had bad luck with this Adam and Eve. Had God been lucky (or at least had Adam and Eve been lucky), then Adam and Eve could have stayed in the garden. Or, if God wanted to, God could have just destroyed the world (i.e., not be convinced by Noah's righteousness) and start over and go two out of three, or four out of five, etc..

The problem here is that the presentation of the Fall makes this same mistake of believing that God had a choice for evil to exist, and God just took the chance and lost. Therefore God is in this game of allowing horrendous amounts of real pain and suffering to get the upper hand on Satan. This kind of notion is kind of a cruel conception of God, I think, and I think it isn't one that the Christian must commit to.

I think that counterfactual omnipotence works just fine here. It wasn't what Adam and Eve did, it is what Adam and Eve represent about human nature. (Btw, even though I'm not a fundamentalist, I believe in scriptural inspiration and I see divine inspiration in the story.) And so, the counterfactual aspect is that if free will had a different property than its nature to seek independence from God, then God could have prevented evil. And, similarly, if God's will in the world could have been accomplished without evil, then God would have accomplished the divine will without evil. And, if God could exist without God's willing creation to a better world with evil present, then God would have not brought evil into the world. And, finally, if God could not exist so that evil didn't have to exist, then God would not exist. But, all these counterfactuals weren't the case. Therefore, evil exists. God is not allowing evil for better reasons (i.e., we better eat our vegetables), God is a governing cause to all the events that just couldn't be any other way. I think this is closer to the scriptures than a view that God has full-blown omnipotence.
William wrote:3(a): The chief purpose of life is not happiness, but the knowledge of God and love of fellow creatures. One reason that the PoE seems so intractable is that people assume that if God exists, then his purpose for human life is happiness in this world; the idea is that God's only role is provide a comforting environment for humans. But on the Christian view, this is false. We are not God's pets, and the goals that I enumerated above bring authentic human fulfillment. God's omnibenevolence urges us to become more fully human. this is the way it is done.
Amen. But, it still doesn't bring us closer to believe that God wouldn't do something about evil if God could do something about evil. I think that God bringing human fulfillment is ever the more fantastic because God is stronger than evil. God can overcome evil by divine power, and that evil does not have a lasting stay. Death is conquerable. Now, it takes time to achieve this. If God could do it a day faster, or an ounce easier, then God would do it. But, there's these laws of physics, logical implications, character of goodness, least action principles, etc., that restrict how this is all done. Since God is fundamental to the Universe, this all happens; but it happens "this way" and no other way. It's just the way it is. Counterfactual omnipotence.
William wrote:3(b): Humanity is in a state of rebellion against God and God's purposes. Rather than submit to God and worship him, some decide to go their own way and so find themselves alienated from God and pursuing their own idols. The terrible human evils in the world are a testimony to man's depravity. All this only serves to heigthen humanities moral responsibilities to fight against evil and create more good.
Yes, again I agree. The cards are stacked against God, but God is stronger than all of the forces aligned against God's nature. God doesn't choose these forces to exist, and God would eliminate them now if God could, but God cannot do it. That is, there's a counterfactual issue here, "if God wasn't divinely perfect in certain attributes, then God could bring about one of God's main objectives to squash evil now, but in doing so God would not achieve God's will to bring about all goodness as God desires it to exist."
William wrote:3(c): God's purpose is not restricted to this life, but spills over into eternal life. According to christian theism, this life is but a blink in time; a small opening in a cave that opens into the cavernous expanse of eternity. We are a rose quickly fading, a vapor in the wind. Indeed much of the philosophies and religions of the world deal, at their base level, when how we should handle this truth. Even if there are evils in this world that serve no good at, that are entirely gratuitous from are view, but that God permits simply so that he might reward those in eternity for those that bear such evils with faith and confidence in God.
This is a very possible reason to think that God chooses to allow evil. We have to be fallibilistic on this issue. However, is this enough reason to believe that God allows every bit of evil that exists? I don't think so. There are too many events and too much meaningless suffering that occurs that we just aren't justified in believing that these events became good weight training for the soul that was lost or the family and friends left behind. Just watch the daily news or read the daily papers, and there's just so much evil. I myself lost a Christian friend who died in a fire with her children. This event didn't shake my faith because I'm very sure that God exists, and reasonably okay with the notion that evil has its day. I only mention this because I think it is okay to think that God is counterfactually omnipotent. We don't lose anything by thinking this. We stay Christians, and I think, we have better answers for those who undergo those horrible tragedies. God becomes a protagonist who is working to eliminate death and suffering, rather than an incompetent daycare owner who has a strange sense of morality.
William wrote:3(d): The knowledge of God is an incommensurable good. Imagine a huge scale and on one side there was the knowledge of GOd and the other was all the evil in the world. The knowledge of the supreme being and creator of all life is far greater than any of these evils.
Yes, but I would argue that this only makes much more sense if we think of this knowledge as something that God did to bring it about versus as something that God allowed as good weight training. It certainly is possible that the joy of being "there" makes everything as trivial in comparison, and therefore it's not even on the same scale of comparison (which justifies the evil that God consciously and willingly choose for us to endure--every little bit of it), but where's the evidence? Why not then have more evil? Why not so much evil that each of us experience the worst of the worst (God forbid!). I think that we have to be fallibilistic about this ontological state of affairs, but we have to approach these issues with what is presented before us, and I would say that what is presented before us give us more reason to think that God is counterfactually omnipotent. If that's not the case, of course I believe that God did have good reasons, but there's no evidence to think that this is the case.
People say of the last day, that God shall give judgment. This is true. But it is not true as people imagine. Every man pronounces his own sentence; as he shows himself here in his essence, so will he remain everlastingly -- Meister Eckhart

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Post #35

Post by theleftone »

juliod wrote:No, I argue against religions as they exist, not as they could exist if they changed to conform to someone's particular view.
This would only be feasible if (a) religion can be extracted from its human context and (b) religion can be objectively understood. Since both (a) is impossible and (b) is highly unlikely (to the point it's more or less impossible), then it stands to reason one cannot argue against religion based on the qualifications you've made.

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Post by juliod »

This would only be feasible if (a) religion can be extracted from its human context and (b) religion can be objectively understood. Since both (a) is impossible and (b) is highly unlikely (to the point it's more or less impossible), then it stands to reason one cannot argue against religion based on the qualifications you've made.
Yet there is a majority of theists who claim to have a unified and complete view of the nature of god. When I engage in debates here I do not typically get a sense of tentativeness and doubt from the theist side.

The PoE is effective against christians who believe that YHWH is all-powerful and all-good, taken to their extremes. I think we all agree that most ordinary christians do in fact believe that. If you hedge, or place limits on god, or believe in a god that is merely very powerful and very good, then the PoE is not a problem for you. (But then you have the problem of explaining how god could have done all the things claimed for him if he is not omni-omnipotent.)

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Post #37

Post by otseng »

harvey1 wrote:However, there's another question that we must address, and that is whether the reasons for God not acting are sufficient to suggest that God has all the qualities in full that people often ascribe to God.
I believe there are reasons why God does not act in situations of pain/evil. And one main reason I believe is so that God would be able to redeem the pain/evil. What God wants during times of trial is for people to choose to allow God to redeem it. So, yes, in a sense, God chooses not to stop evil to allow the opportunity for people to choose to allow God to redeem it.

God had the power to remove the thorn from Paul. But He didn't remove it. Paul could've said, "This is ridiculous. I'm a mighty man of God. I can't forgive God for not getting rid of this thorn." But, instead, he said, "Most gladly therefore will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me. Therefore I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ's sake: for when I am weak, then am I strong."

When Jesus prayed, "Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me: nevertheless not my will, but thine, be done." Could God have been able to remove the cup and prevent Jesus to suffer on the cross? I guess an "omnipotent" God could've removed it. But Jehovah God did not. He allowed Jesus to suffer (arguably the most suffering for any human in existence) so that he could redeem it (and ultimately redeem us).

So, I believe that a god not acting during situations of pain/evil are compatible with the God of the Bible. As to whether they are compatible with the "qualities in full that people often ascribe to God", I'm not sure since I don't know what are those qualities that others claim God has.

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Post by juliod »

I believe there are reasons why God does not act in situations of pain/evil. And one main reason I believe is so that God would be able to redeem the pain/evil. What God wants during times of trial is for people to choose to allow God to redeem it. So, yes, in a sense, God chooses not to stop evil to allow the opportunity for people to choose to allow God to redeem it.
So then you have identified a concrete limit to god's goodness.

And also you've identified a limit on his power. Why could not an infinitely powerful being stop evil and "allow the opportunity for people to choose to allow God to redeem it"?

If this being you describe had finite power and finite goodness, can you make an argument that he should be considered to be a god at all?

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Post #39

Post by wuntext »

otseng wrote:
What God wants during times of trial is for people to choose to allow God to redeem it.
otseng. You've lost me here, "redeem" what? The victims? Could you tell me what definition of the word 'redeem' you are using?
Could God have been able to remove the cup and prevent Jesus to suffer on the cross? I guess an "omnipotent" God could've removed it. But Jehovah God did not. He allowed Jesus to suffer (arguably the most suffering for any human in existence) so that he could redeem it (and ultimately redeem us).
But how is this comparable to the random evil and suffering we see around us? Christians constantly tell us Jesus willingly sacrificed himself for us. He knew beforehand what was in store for him. He knew exactly what he was going to face, and the reason why this evil was going to happen.

Code: Select all

"With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer"
Luke 22:15 
How can this be compared to the evil and suffering inflicted on an innocent victim of a drive by shooting? Or a rape? Or a five year old cancer patient?

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Post by harvey1 »

otseng wrote:I believe there are reasons why God does not act in situations of pain/evil. And one main reason I believe is so that God would be able to redeem the pain/evil. What God wants during times of trial is for people to choose to allow God to redeem it. So, yes, in a sense, God chooses not to stop evil to allow the opportunity for people to choose to allow God to redeem it.
And, I do too believe that God chooses not to stop evil, Osteng. But, the question isn't whether God has choices such as this, the question is whether God chooses to let evil exist when God could have chosen a different world where evil doesn't exist. Again, it's possible that in God's divine wisdom and providence that God actually choose between a world with no evil and a world containing evil and said, "hmm... the world with no evil is not ultimately as happy as this world that contains all kinds of horrid stuff, so I choose the world with the horrid stuff that brings about this higher ultimate goodness." But, do we have a good reason to believe this assuming God is omnibenevelent? I don't think so. Even the bible doesn't present us with this kind of choice. The bible consistently says that evil was necessary because of the surprises that happened in creation.
Osteng wrote:God had the power to remove the thorn from Paul. But He didn't remove it. Paul could've said, "This is ridiculous. I'm a mighty man of God. I can't forgive God for not getting rid of this thorn." But, instead, he said, "Most gladly therefore will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me. Therefore I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ's sake: for when I am weak, then am I strong."
Well, even if God is under a number of necessary constraints, it doesn't mean that God has no choice as to how to allow evil to occur in the world. For example, I think it is the case that God could have stopped 9-11, but choose not to do so for a better reason. The reason is that evil would pop up in some other form, even worse than 9-11. That doesn't mean that this is the best of all possible worlds (as Voltaire's Candice character asked, referring to Leibniz's argument that this is the best of all possible worlds), it just means that the entire Creation of God is the best of all possible worlds. There can be worlds in this Creation which are not the "best." (Actually, when viewed in this context, the term "best" doesn't even make sense since the term best refers to Creation as a whole and not the individual parts of Creation.)
Osteng wrote:When Jesus prayed, "Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me: nevertheless not my will, but thine, be done." Could God have been able to remove the cup and prevent Jesus to suffer on the cross? I guess an "omnipotent" God could've removed it. But Jehovah God did not. He allowed Jesus to suffer (arguably the most suffering for any human in existence) so that he could redeem it (and ultimately redeem us).
Well, let's read another quote on that prayer:
He went away a second time and prayed, "My Father, if it is not possible for this cup to be taken away unless I drink it, may your will be done." (Matt. 26:42)
I think this clearly argues in favor of my point that it was not possible for God to avoid this heinous event for Jesus. Notice, this is not an issue of free will since it was actually Jesus' free will decision to avoid the crucifixion.
Osteng wrote:As to whether they are compatible with the "qualities in full that people often ascribe to God", I'm not sure since I don't know what are those qualities that others claim God has.
The chief quality that I think we ought to look at is omnipotence. God can do whatever is logically possible. This is a very strong requirement, and one in which I don't think the Christian God must necessarily meet. For example, in order to be omnipotent in this way, the garden of Gethsemane prayer must be interpreted as a logical impossibility, but this clearly does not seem like a logical impossibility since we can logically imagine that Jesus avoided crucifixion and God choicing to allow humans not to be saved, etc...
People say of the last day, that God shall give judgment. This is true. But it is not true as people imagine. Every man pronounces his own sentence; as he shows himself here in his essence, so will he remain everlastingly -- Meister Eckhart

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