otseng wrote: ↑Fri Jan 26, 2024 7:40 am
Here is an interesting admission:
What has always been attractive about Moorean non-naturalism is its capacity to combine the continuity and the difference into a coherent picture. There is room, at least, to account for moral thought’s continuity with other thought by emphasizing that it is all a matter of attributing properties (albeit different properties) to things; and there is room too for locating the distinctive nature of moral thought in the putatively authoritative standing of the properties attributed. Of course, leaving room for an account is not the same as actually providing one, and Moore himself does not actually offer much at all by way of an explanation of the normative authority (as we might call it) of moral properties. In any case, what has always been troubling about Moore’s view is that the coherent picture that emerges seems to presuppose (i) the existence of metaphysically dubious properties that fall outside the causal nexus and, so, are such that (ii) it would be a complete mystery how we could ever reliably learn anything about them, if they were to exist. Moore, and the intuitionists who followed him, work in various ways to address these concerns. Error theorists, in contrast, hold that the coherent picture painted by Moore is, at least roughly, the right account of what moral thought and talk involves, but they go on to argue that the metaphysically and epistemically troubling implications of that picture properly undermine its credibility. They argue that we have compelling reasons to reject moral thought, at least to the extent Moore was right about what moral thought presupposes.[12] That is of course compatible with thinking that we should use the same language meaning something different by it, or replacing it altogether with some other way of thinking and speaking.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meta ... OOpeQueArg
It admits a non-naturalistic explanation of morals is coherent. And by implication naturalistic explanations are non-coherent. But why is a non-naturalistic view rejected? Only because of its implications. This is a fallacious line of reasoning and an indication one is not willing to go where logic leads, but an explanation is rejected only because it does not fit their worldview.
I'm glad you read it, but you need to read it completely, not cherry pick the part you like.
Now, you might argue that a complete theory - even if speculative - is far better than saying "I don't know", especially if you don't know - but I'd disagree.
Like I said, read through completely. It's not for nothing that people don't consider morals to be as Moore suggests.
But the Is-Ought problem exists for you too. If God "is", why "ought" we accept God's moral authority just because it "is"?
The "is" in the "is-ought problem" only applies to the properties of the natural world, so the problem does not exist for theists.
Euthyphro proved this wrong thousands of years ago.
That's why I've been asking you what property an OMV has.
The property an OMV has is its universal applicability. The source of OMV is God, not in any "property" of the universe.
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It applies to God, too? Thou Shall not Kill? I think you have a tough row to hoe on that position.
Also, you claim the source is God - not that God embodies them, or some other claim. I'd certainly like to know why you think he is the source, since you have no way of knowing. B
You might want to read about Moore:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore-moral/
I will point out, Moore's non-natural morals doesn't mean they must come from God, as many philosophers who picked up from him were not Theists.
Moore himself became an agnostic, despite growing up in a highly religious environment. I point this out because I've been getting guff for saying that some people claim that OMVs can exist without a God.
